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THE CRUSADES AND OTHER HISTORICAL ESSAYS



THE CRUSADES
AND
OTHER HISTORICAL ESSAYS

PRESENTED TO DANA C. MUNRO
BY
HIS FORMER STUDENTS

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LOUIS J. PAETOW

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PREFACE

When Professor Dana C. Munro was elected second vice-president of the American Historical Association in 1923 a committee consisting of Mr. Herbert A. Kellar of the McCormick Agricultural Library in Chicago, Professor August C. Krey of the University of Minnesota, Professor Frederic Duncalf of the University of Texas, and Professor Eugene H. Byrne of the University of Wisconsin began to lay plans for a commemorative volume of historical essays by his former students, to be presented to him on the occasion of his presidency of that association. The plan met with success. The following essays were ready in manuscript form to be formally presented to Professor Munro, when, as president of the American Historical Association, he read his address, "War and history," on the evening of Tuesday, December twenty-eighth, 1926, in the Baptist Temple, Rochester, New York.

The publication of this volume was made possible by the admiration, gratitude, affection, and generosity of a host of students, colleagues, and friends in the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Wisconsin, and Princeton University, and by many others beyond the confines of these institutions in which Professor Munro has labored so effectively. Special thanks are due for the personal interest of Mr. H. A. Kellar and Mrs. Marion Peabody West, and to the publisher, Mr. F. S. Crofts.

The title of the book itself is a tribute to a beloved master. It is significant that so many students of Professor Munro have continued their scholarly interest in the history of the crusades, a subject which he has made particularly his own.

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PART ONE

HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES



I

THE GREAT GERMAN PILGRIMAGE OF 1064–1065

In the autumn of the year 1064 there departed from Germany an unprecedentedly large company of pilgrims bound for the Holy Sepulchre. The recorded experiences of these Jerusalemfarers are in themselves not without interest. Whether all the aspects of their undertaking and its possible relation to the First Crusade have been thoroughly clarified, may perhaps be questioned.[1] Close study reveals

[1] The most detailed secondary accounts are those of G. Meyer von Knonau, *Jahrbücher des deutschen Reiches unter Heinrich IV und Heinrich V,* I, Leipzig, 1890, 390–94, 445–55, and W. Möllenberg, *Bischof Günther von Bamberg,* Halle-Wittenberg dissertation, 1902, 42ff.; but while these, like the older and much briefer recital of W. Giesebrecht, *Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit,* III, 5th. ed., Leipzig, 1890, 110–11, present the pilgrimage as a religious phenomenon and a symptom of widespread discontent with the existing political situation in Germany, they signalize either inadequately or not at all its importance for the crusades. By Heinrich von Sybel, *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzugs,* 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1881 (the third edition, 1900, is an unaltered reproduction of the second), 160, this enterprise together with several others of a similar kind, was buried among "bedeutungslose Notizen." Yet Sybel's own master (cf. *ibid.,* "Vorrede," pp. iii–iv), Leopold von Ranke, "Ueber die Annalen des Lambertus von Hersfeld," in *Sämmtliche Werke,* LI–LII, Leipzig, 1888, 131, had pointed out as early as 1854 that the event was noteworthy because it constituted "einen Uebergang zwischen den Pilgerfahrten und den Kreuzzügen." A generation later M. Manitius, *Deutsche Geschichte unter den sächsischen und salischen Kaisern,* Stuttgart, 1889, 521, after having called it "das Vorspiel der Kreuzzüge," added: "vielleicht ist schon zu jener Zeit der Gedanke entstanden und laut geworden, dass die heiligen Stätten Palästinas durch einen gemeinsamen grossen Kriegszug des Abendlandes aus dem Besitze der Ungläubigen zurückerobert werden könnten." Reinhold Röhricht, in each of his two essays on pilgrimages prior to the crusades—"Die Pilgerfahrten nach dem Heiligen Lande vor den Kreuzzügen," in *Historisches Taschenbuch* (fünfte Folge, fünfter Jahrgang, Leipzig, 1875), 345–47; and *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge,* II, Berlin, 1878, 3–5—gives only a summarized (and somewhat inaccurate) account of this pilgrimage; and in his *Geschichte des*

that the character of the pilgrimage has usually been misunderstood; it raises grave doubt as to the validity of the recent dictum that "but for the coming of the Seljūqs popular indignation in Europe would have slumbered and the crusades might never have taken place"; [2] and it makes very clear that in the second half of the eleventh century belief in the end of the world, so far from being "worn out," [3] was still with thousands of people an efficacious superstition. These considerations together with others which will appear as the discussion proceeds, have suggested that the enterprise in question is in need of reinterpretation and that it may deserve detailed treatment in English.

Our study must begin with a survey of the available sources of information. Save a brief excerpt from a letter, to be noted presently, we possess no narrative record of the expedition by the hand of a participant. But there are several accounts written by contemporaries, the three most important being furnished by the *Annals of Nieder-Altaich*,[4] the *Annals of Lambert of Hersfeld*,[5] and the *Chronicle of Marianus Scottus*,[6] respectively.[7] The recital in the annals

ersten Kreuzzuges, Innsbruck, 1901, 27, he barely suggests its possible significance for the crusades. More recently Louis Bréhier, *L'Eglise et l'orient au moyen-âge*, 4th ed., Paris, 1921, 45–48, without fully grasping its true character, has concisely described this undertaking and recognized it as the most celebrated and important of all the eleventh century pilgrimages; which, taken as a whole, in his judgment "tiennent . . . une place importante dans l'histoire des origines de la croisade."

[2] H. M. J. Loewe, in the *Cambridge medieval history*, IV, New York, 1923, 316.

[3] Cf. G. L. Burr, "The year 1000 and the antecedents of the crusades," in *American Historical Review*, VI (1901), 435: "First of all, and most important, the belief in the end of the world was already [i.e. by the year 1000] worn out. It had cried 'Wolf' too often."

[4] *Annales Altahenses maiores*, 1065, ed. E. L. B. von Oefele, Hanover, 1891, 66–71.

[5] Lampertus Hersfeldensis, *Annales*, 1064, 1065, ed. O. Holder-Egger, *Lamperti Monachi Hersfeldensis Opera*, Hanover and Leipzig, 1894, 92–100.

[6] Marianus Scottus, *Chronicon*, 1086 (= 1064), 1087 (= 1065), *Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores*, V, 558–59.

[7] Excellent criticism on these sources is supplied in the introductions

first-mentioned was composed between 1073 and 1076 by an unidentified monk in the Bavarian monastery of Nieder-Altaich.[8] Avowedly a summarized sketch, this monk's narrative yields more information on the adventure as a whole than any other source: its earlier part is in considerable degree based upon, and includes a quotation from, a letter—the one referred to above—written by Bishop Gunther of Bamberg when he with his companions had arrived at Laodicea in Syria, on the outward journey; the remainder probably reflects information obtained from returned pilgrims.[9] In Lambert's work, completed during the period 1077–1080, attention is directed chiefly to a series of hostilities in which the travelers became involved after they had entered Palestine. These the elegant writer describes *in extenso* and in such minute detail that his information, where it is not the possible fruit of imagination, must, it seems, have been derived from eye-witnesses.[10] For Bishop Gunther, who devised the strategy of the pilgrims, Lambert and the Monk of Nieder-Altaich alike have the most unstinted laudation;[11]

to the editions cited in the three preceding notes. But see also W. Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter,* II, Berlin, 1894, 19–24, 97–108, 114–16; Möllenberg, *op. cit.,* 6–8, 42ff.; and the notes of Meyer von Knonau in the work cited *supra,* n. 1.

[8] Located on the left bank of the Danube near the confluence of the Isar. See Spruner-Menke, *Handatlas für die Geschichte des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit,* 3rd ed., Gotha, 1880, no. 36.

[9] Möllenberg, 43–44, 48, 53, assumes that besides the letter mentioned above, two additional letters were dispatched, one from Cæsarea and the other from Ramlah; both of these, he thinks, were used by the Monk of Nieder-Altaich, while Lambert used only the last one. This far-fetched assumption is wholly gratuitous, and seems entirely unnecessary.

[10] Cf. Holder-Egger's preface to his edition of Lambert's *Opera,* p. xl and n. 4. In 1058–1059 Lambert had himself undertaken a pilgrimage to Jerusalem (*ibid.,* 74, 75). His own experiences at that time may have been of aid in making the present recital vivid (cf. Möllenberg, 7; Meyer von Knonau, 448, n. 102).

[11] Both annalists probably knew Gunther personally and Lambert may have been on terms of familiarity with him. See Holder-Egger, *op. cit.,* pp. x–xii and also Möllenberg, 6–8, 42–43.

and both annalists, if we mistake not, took pains to make it appear that the pilgrims, having been brutally attacked, were justified in offering forcible resistance.[12] The *Chronicle of Marianus Scottus* in its final form antedates the year 1083; and that part with which we are concerned was probably written before the spring of 1073. Its author, a learned incluse of Celtic blood, lived for a time at Fulda, but in 1069 he was removed to Mainz. Despite the restrictions imposed by his manner of life, Marianus apparently retained some contact with the outside world; certainly he did not fail to obtain particulars on the pilgrimage in which his archbishop with many other men from the province of Mainz had taken part. His narrative, while more concise than either of the foregoing, contains some points which they leave unmentioned. The showy pomp affected by the prelates our incluse portrays in picturesque detail, not without a touch of humor; he cannot deny that the pilgrims endangered their lives when they refused to deliver up their money, *all* their money, but shows how they extricated themselves from the cruel dilemma by clever resort to stratagem. It may be conceded that, in general, the three accounts agree on the leading facts and supplement each other in the matter of details; yet there is on certain points sufficient divergence and even conflict, to warrant extreme caution in interpretation.

[12] Lambert, at the beginning of his narrative, frankly states that the wealth and ostentation of the bishops were the cause of all their woes (see *infra*, p. 16 and n. 45); later he tries to give the impression that the pilgrims were, or thought they were, fighting for their lives. The *Annals of Nieder-Altaich* yield the first of these points only by implication; but they are quite specific on the second and do not intimate, as Lambert does, that some of the pilgrims for religious reasons refused to fight. That both writers wished to glorify Gunther (Möllenberg, 42–43) is only part of the truth; beyond a doubt they were also intent upon justifying him for having undertaken to fight while on pilgrimage. In this light Ranke's view (*op. cit.*, 131) that "Lambertus verwischt jedes ungeistliche Element," appears less one-sided than Meyer von Knonau (p. 449, note) declared it to be.

The highly spurious and now almost unanimously discredited (fourteenth- or fifteenth-century) *Chronicle of Ingulf*[13] must, of course, be eliminated from the list of sources, notwithstanding that it was accepted as more or less trustworthy by almost every preceding writer on this subject and, with more deplorable consequence, by two well-

[13] Ingulf, *Historia Croylandensis,* ed. W. Fulman, *Rerum Anglicarum scriptores veteres,* I, Oxford, 1684, 73–74. That this work is wholly apocryphal was conclusively demonstrated by F. Liebermann, "Ueber ostenglische Geschichtsquellen . . . besonders den falschen Ingulf," in *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde,* XVIII (1893), 245 ff., who assigned its origin to the fourteenth century. W. G. Searle, *Ingulf and the Historia Croylandensis,* in *Cambridge Antiquarian Society, octavo publications,* no. XXVII, Cambridge, 1894, after much laborious research, arrived tentatively at the opinion (pp. 206–7) that it was composed about the middle of the fifteenth century. For other comment and a brief summary of the present status of critical opinion on this subject, see Charles Gross, *Sources and literature of English history,* 2nd ed., London, 1915, 247, no. 1371. That a man named Ingulf became abbot of the English monastery of Croyland during the reign of William the Conqueror, and that he had at some previous time undertaken a pilgrimage to Palestine, cannot be denied. But there is no evidence that this person, who may be distinguished as the true Ingulf, wrote the *Historia* which has been attributed to him and which bears his name. This *Historia* was written for ulterior purposes by some fourteenth or fifteenth century monk of Croyland who falsely represented himself to be the Ingulf of the eleventh century. What the false Ingulf says concerning the pilgrimage of 1064–1065, is not only valueless, but inaccurate and misleading. Wholly ignorant of Constantine X, Ducas (1059–1067), he states that Alexius I, Comnenus (1081–1118), was the reigning emperor at Constantinople (cf. *infra,* n. 47); and he would have us believe that not only his alleged Norman companions, but likewise all the German pilgrims including the bishops, on the return journey embarked at Jaffa on Genoese ships which brought them to Brindisi in Apulia—a statement wholly at variance and quite irreconcilable with what the contemporary chroniclers say (see *infra,* nn. 129–31). Such errors make it impossible to accept any statement in the pseudo-Ingulf which is not supported by other evidence. Accordingly, the view that the true (eleventh century) Ingulf accompanied the German pilgrims to Palestine is unwarranted, since it is based on no better authority than pseudo-Ingulf. The only authentic information we have on the pilgrimage of the true Ingulf is supplied by Ordericus Vitalis, *Historia ecclesiastica,* book IV, c. 16, ed. A. Le Prevost, vol. II, Paris, 1840, 285, who merely indicates that Ingulf visited Jerusalem just before he became a monk at Fontanelle (St. Wandrille). Ordericus tells us that the abbot of Fontanelle at that time was Gerbert (1062–1089) (cf. Liebermann, *op. cit.,* 249); but this does not establish the date of Ingulf's pilgrimage.

recognized authorities on the history of medieval commerce.[14] Better claim to consideration is presented by the *Life of Bishop Altmann of Passau.* For though this work was composed approximately two generations after the event in question, its author appears to have been well informed on the occasion for the pilgrimage and he has carefully identified several noteworthy participants not mentioned in the other sources. Yet it must be confessed that what he relates of the events on the journey, savors more of edification and wholesome advice than of sober recital of facts.[15] In the remaining narrative sources [16] the expedition is recorded in

[14] The first German scholar to be misled by pseudo-Ingulf was apparently (cf. *ibid.,* 259) W. Junkmann, *De peregrinationibus et expeditionibus sacris ante synodum Claromontanam,* Breslau, 1859, 58–59. Junkmann has had distinguished followers including Röhricht (see his works on pilgrimages cited *supra,* n. 1), Giesebrecht, *op. cit.,* 1107, and even Meyer von Knonau, *op. cit.,* 391, and n. 51, the latter trying as best he might to smooth over some of the difficulties presented by the *Historia Croylandensis* (cf. *ibid.,* 448 and n. 102, end). Möllenberg does not mention Ingulf at all. But both W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge,* I, Leipzig, 1885, 124, and A. Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte der romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge,* Munich and Berlin, 1906, 64–65, rely on the (erroneous) statement of pseudo-Ingulf referred to in the preceding note, as evidence (?) of Genoese trade with Syria prior to the crusades. Schaube, though he knew that the *Historia Croylandensis* was at least inaccurate (cf. p. 65, n. 1), yet did not hesitate to say (p. 64): "Für den Handelsverkehr der Genuesen in der Levante besitzen wir eine ebenso interessante wie *wichtige* [the Italics are mine] Nachricht"; and (p. 65) "Dieser Bericht zeigt uns also die Genuesen in völlig geregelter Handelstätigkeit an der syrischen Küste," etc. The truth appears to be that no evidence has yet been adduced which proves that Genoa traded with the Levant in the pre-crusading era.

[15] *Vita Altmanni episcopi Pataviensis,* cc. 3–5, *M.G.H., SS.,* XII, 230. Cf. Wattenbach, II, 76–77; Meyer von Knonau, 457, n. 115; Möllenberg, 44ff.

[16] Berthold, *Annales,* 1065, *M.G.H., SS.,* V, 272; Bernold, *Chronicon,* 1065, *ibid.,* 428; Ekkehard, *Chronicon universale,* 1064, 1065, *ibid.,* VI, 199; *Annales Augustani,* 1065, *ibid.,* III, 128; Sigebert, *Chronica,* 1065, *ibid.,* VI, 361; *Annales Ottenburani,* 1064, *ibid.,* V, 6; *Annales Mellicenses,* 1065, *ibid.,* IX, 499; *Chronicon monasterii Mellicenses,* 1065, H. Pez, ed., *Scriptores rerum Austriacarum,* I, Vienna, 1743, 225. The entry in the *Chronici Herimanni Continuatio codicis Sangallensis,* 1065, *M.G.H., SS.,* XII, 732, is a verbatim copy of Berthold's statement.

a few sentences or words, which indeed support, but add little or nothing to the substance of the longer accounts. And there is but one documentary source that possesses more than confirmatory value: a letter in which Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz informs Pope Alexander II, among other things, of his intention to undertake the pilgrimage.[17]

The participants in the enterprise included, besides Siegfried and Gunther, at least two additional prelates: Bishops William of Utrecht and Otto of Ratisbon.[18] These four

[17] P. Jaffé, ed., *Monumenta Bambergensia,* in *Bibliotheca rerum Germanicarum,* V, Berlin, 1869, no. 28, pp. 54–56. In addition we have: (1) a letter, *ibid.,* no. 29, pp. 56–57, written in 1065 by canons of Bamberg to Archbishop Adalbert of Bremen, which states (p. 57) that "Dominus noster [i. e. Gunther], rerum ignarus, in alio quodam orbe . . . moratur; eos etiam, qui idonee in tanto discrimine consulere poterant, secum abduxit"; (2) Gunther's epitaph, *ibid.,* no. 30, pp. 57–58: "Insigni forma, statura, stemate, norma / Presul Guntharius claruit; eximius / Heinrici templo, vivis gemmis opulento; / Virtutum radiis præditus est aliis. / Dum solvit votum, quo se vovit dare totum, / Exul abit Soliman, repperit et patriam." An undated letter, presumably written to Bishop Gunther by some cleric of Passau, H. Sudendorf, ed., *Registrum, oder merkwürdige Urkunden für die deutsche Geschichte,* Zweiter Teil, Berlin, 1851, XII, 14–15, has frequently been cited to show that Gunther made advance arrangements for the entertainment of the Bamberg pilgrims at Ratisbon and elsewhere (cf. Möllenberg, p. 45 and n. 3; Bréhier, p. 45 and n. 5; Comte Riant in *Archives de l'orient latin,* I, Paris, 1881, 54, 55, 56. But it is by no means certain, either that this letter was directed to Gunther or that it concerned the pilgrimage. Giesebrecht, *op. cit.,* 1107, n. 3, was of opinion that it referred to arrangements made in connection with the German expedition against Hungary in 1063; and Meyer von Knonau (p. 391, n. 50) takes a similar view.

[18] These four bishops are named or referred to in all the important sources and in several of the less important ones. It could perhaps be contended that more bishops participated in the pilgrimage than those specifically mentioned. For the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich (p. 66) indicates that Siegfried, William, Otto, and Gunther were the *principes* and *primates;* Lambert (p. 92) tells us that there were "item alii quam plures, columnae et capita Galliarum" (see *infra,* n. 26 and cf. n. 76); while Ekkehard (cf. *supra,* note 16) after having named Siegfried, Gunther, and William (one ms. omits William), adds: "aliique quam plures presules vel nobiles." Yet it must be remembered that two of the clerical pilgrims became bishops upon their return to Germany (see *infra,* nn. 20, 21); and though the chroniclers doubtless knew that these men were not bishops at the time of the pilgrimage, they may very easily have thought of them as such when they wrote.

dignitaries of superior order were accompanied by a large number of other ecclesiastics,[19] among whom the following are specifically named: Hermann, the *vicedomnus* of the church of Mainz and successor of Gunther as bishop of Bamberg;[20] Altmann, dean in the church at Aachen and chaplain of the widowed empress Agnes—who while Altmann was absent on the pilgrimage had him elected bishop of Passau;[21] Ezzo, canon and *scolasticus* of Bamberg, a man of great learning and eloquence, a poet withal, whose still extant verses in German on the "miracles of Christ" may have been, if not composed, at least sung or recited during the pilgrimage;[22] Conrad, finally, another distinguished canon and savant, afterwards dean of the church of Passau.[23] But probably most of the pilgrims were laymen: counts, princes, courtiers from the royal palace, numerous

[19] *Ann. Alt.*, 70: "aliisque compluribus sacri ordinis viris." Lamp., 94: "episcopus Mogontinus et Babenbergensis cum clericis suis"; 95: "quidam ex numero presbiterorum"; 97: "alii clerici." *Vita Altmanni*, c. 3, p. 230: "multi nominati viri et clerici et laici." See also the letter of the canons of Bamberg quoted *supra*, n. 17.

[20] Lamp., 99: "Successit ei [sc. Gunthero] in episcopatum Herimannus vicedomnus Mogontinus, qui in eadem Ierosolimitana peregrinatione constitutus, dum eum invalescente morbo ad exitum urgeri videret, etc." Cf. Meyer von Knonau, 456 and n. 113.

[21] Lamp., 100: 'Eilbertus Patavii episcopus obiit; cui Altman capellanus imperatricis successit, qui dum ipso tempore cum caeteris principibus Ierosolimam abisset, per interventum imperatricis absens designatus est episcopus." *Vita Altmanni*, cc. 2–5, p. 230; *Chron. Monast. Mellic.* (see *supra*, n. 16). Cf. Meyer von Knonau, 457 and n. 115.

[22] *Vita Altmanni*, c. 3, p. 230. The extant "Song of Ezzo," instead of being limited in content to the miracles of Christ (in the strict sense), is rather a versified history of the entire plan of salvation. Whether it may be identified with the "cantilenam de miraculis Christi" mentioned by Altmann's biographer, is a question on which literary authorities disagree. Without attempting a new solution of either this problem or the others that are connected with it, I have tentatively accepted the theory of Gustav Ehrismann, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur bis zum Ausgang des Mittelalters*, zweiter Teil, I, Munich, 1922, 44–45, because it seems to me the most plausible and best supported. But see also J. Kelle, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur von der ältesten Zeit bis zum dreizehnten Jahrhundert*, II, Berlin, 1896, 8–21.

[23] *Vita Altmanni*, c. 3, p. 230.

knights, a large host of commoners, rich and poor.[24] Yet of all these but two Bavarian nobles can be identified, and they only with approximate certainty: Siegfried of Ortenburg (in Carinthia) and Herrand of Falkenstein (on the Inn).[25] The pilgrims appear to have been drawn chiefly from western and southern Germany, i.e. from the lands bordering the Rhine and from Franconia and Bavaria; whether any non-Germans participated is doubtful.[26] The entire host numbered, according to one contemporary estimate, over seven thousand men; according to another, more than twelve thousand.[27]

It is true that the recorded pilgrimages to Jerusalem during the eleventh century are so numerous as to give the impression that by this time the pious journey, if it was not generally regarded as a religious necessity, at least had become a highly popular custom among the faithful.[28] It is

[24] *Ann. Alt.,* 66: "tanta multitudo comitum et principum, divitum et pauperum, etc."; 68: "diversarum gentium non parva multitudine." Lamp., 94: "Laici omnes, etc."; cf. p. 97. Marianus, 558: "Multi divites et pauperes, etc."; 559: "multis militibus." *Vita Altmanni,* c. 3, 230: "multi nobiles . . . non solum vulgares, sed et populorum primores, genere et dignitate insignes . . . multi nominati viri et clerici et laici . . . multis viris de palatio honoratis." Ekkehard, 1064, 199: "aliique quam plures presules vel nobiles multo comitatu."

[25] See S. Riezler, "Zur älteren bairischen Geschichte," in *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte,* XVIII (Göttingen, 1878), 551–52; Meyer von Knonau, 392, note.

[26] *Vita Altmanni,* c. 3, p. 230: "tam de Orientali Francia quam de Bawaria." According to Holder-Egger, *Lamp. Mon. Hersf. Opera,* index, p. 373, *s.v.* "Gallia," Lambert, in the expression "columnae et capita Galliarum" (cf. *supra,* n. 18), uses the word *Galliae* in the sense of *imperii pars Teutonica.* Pseudo-Ingulf's statement (pp. 73–74) that thirty or more Norman knights and clergymen joined the German bishops, must (Meyer von Knonau, 391, 448, to the contrary notwithstanding) be discarded; and whether the true Ingulf associated himself with the German pilgrims remains uncertain (cf. *supra,* n. 13).

[27] *Ann. Alt.,* 66: "tanta multitudo . . . quae videtur excedere numerum duodecim millium." Marianus, 558–559: "plus 7 milibus." Sigebert, *Chronica* (cf. *supra,* n. 16): "multi usque ad septem milia." Röhricht's figure of thirteen thousand, "Die Pilgerfahrten," 346, *Beiträge,* II, 4, is not given in any of the sources.

[28] Cf. Bréhier, 50.

likewise true that this century had already seen several large pilgrimages, one in 1054 numbering, it is said, as many as three thousand participants.[29] None the less it seems remarkable that in the year 1064 more than seven thousand persons should have resolved to visit the Holy Sepulchre. Why did so many people, representing virtually all classes of society, wish to undertake the adventure at this particular time? The most comprehensive, though not a fully adequate, reply to the question is furnished by the biographer of Bishop Altmann, who explains that the pilgrims had been misled by a popular opinion to the effect that the Day of Judgment would come at Easter, 1065; an opinion which was based on the fact that Easter in that year fell on March 27, the date ascribed in medieval calendars to the resurrection of Christ as an historical event. Not only the populace but also leaders of the people distinguished by birth and rank, and even several bishops, were compelled by the fear which this superstition generated, to set out on the arduous journey to Jerusalem. This testimony may not be lightly set aside as the invention of a twelfth-century monk; for in part at least it is corroborated by the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich, who reveals the currency in his time of chiliastic ideas, a fact which apparently has not heretofore been perceived.[30]

29 Röhricht, "Die Pilgerfahrten," 345, 390ff.; id., *Beiträge*, II, 3; Bréhier, 44–45.

30 *Vita Altmanni*, c. 3, p. 230: "Eo tempore multi nobiles ibant Ierosolimam, invisere sepulchrum Domini, quadam vulgari opinione decepti, quasi instaret dies iudicii, eo quod pascha illo anno evenisset sexto Kalend. Aprilis, quo scribitur resurrectio Christi. Quo terrore permoti non solum vulgares, sed et populorum primores, . . . et ipsi . . . episcopi, etc." On the question as to how the Latin Church came to accept March 27 as the historical date of the resurrection of Christ, see Ferdinand Piper, *Die Kalendarien und Martyrologien der Angelsachsen*, Berlin, 1862, 17ff. Writing in the last decade of the tenth century, Abbo of Fleury (see *Vita s. Abbonis Floriacensis*, in Bouquet *et al.*, *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, X, Paris, 1874, 332) tells of having in his youth heard a sermon at Paris in which it was said that Antichrist would appear directly upon completion of the thousandth year and that the Last Judgment would follow not long afterward. Abbo also states that in his day there was current almost everywhere (including Lorraine) a rumor to the effect that the

If it is true that the orthodox theology of this period frowned upon the belief that the end of the world was approaching and that, therefore, it was highly inadvisable, especially in the case of aspiring ecclesiastics, openly to commit oneself to such a belief,[31] then we have here a most interesting medieval example of the tenacity of popular superstition and the potency of mob mind. Yet it would probably be an error to assume that all our pilgrims were actuated solely by a desire to be prepared against anticipated exigencies on Judgment Day. Pious souls there were, no doubt, who fervently longed to worship where they believed their Saviour had suffered and died; for others, the pilgrimage may have meant little more than an opportune and convenient means of escape from an intolerable situation at home. Archbishop Siegfried did indeed inform the pope that his purpose was to do penance for past sins, to venerate the sacred tomb of the Lord, and to be edified by worship in the place where His feet had stood;[32] but scholars have shown that at this

world would without doubt come to an end in the year when the Feast of the Annunciation (a fixed festival celebrated on March 25) and Good Friday fell on the same day. Now obviously, when Good Friday comes on March 25, Easter follows on March 27. It is evident, therefore, that Abbo of Fleury and the biographer of Bishop Altmann are referring to the same superstition and corroborate each other on the fact of its widespread existence. But it should also be noted that the coincidence in question, though it had taken place four times during the tenth century, in 908, 970, 981, and 992, did not again recur until precisely the year 1065. See Piper, *op. cit.,* p. 19 and cf. H. von Eicken, "Die Legende von der Erwartung des Weltunterganges, etc.," in *Forsch. z. d. Gesch.,* XXIII (Göttingen, 1883), 317; Eicken omits the year 981. Cf. *Ann. Alt.,* 1065, p. 66: "Igitur fides catholica iam longe lateque florebat, omnia oracula prophetarum, quae ante adventum Christi admodum pauci intelligebant, iam eo nato et passo cunctis credentibus luce clarius liquebant, inter quae videbatur et illud esse completum: *Et erit sepulchrum eius gloriosum* [*Isaiah,* XI, 10]. Hoc etenim anno Iherusalem pergebat multitudo tanta, ad sepulchrum Domini adoratura, ut quivis credere posset, quia plenitudo gentium intraret [*Romans,* XI, 25; *Luke,* XXI, 24], et quoniam multa dicenda forent de eodem itinere, queso, ne cui videatur grave, nos etiam exinde pauca quaedam summatim perstringere."

[31] Cf. Burr, *op. cit.,* 436.

[32] Jaffé (cf. *supra,* n. 17), 54–55.

moment both Siegfried and Gunther might well have wished, for reasons of a political nature, temporarily to absent themselves from Germany.[33]

From indirect evidence [34] we learn that the preparations for the journey, particularly in the case of the bishops, had been elaborate. Not only were the prelates provided with many comforts which pilgrims as a rule disdained; but also they planned by an ostentatious display of wealth and magnificence to impress their importance and dignity upon the minds of the peoples through whose lands their journey would lead. At the halting places their quarters were hung with dorsals and draperies; and the salvers and table vessels used at their sumptuous repasts were of gold and silver. Money was brought in plentiful supply by the wealthy; and the general equipment probably included large stores of victuals.[35] That the baggage was conveyed by horses and mules, is certain; but it cannot be established that any of the participants were mounted.[36] The hitherto prevailing opinion that some or all were furnished with arms, is contradicted by the sources and must be abandoned; we have evidence, direct as well as indirect, which conclusively proves that

[33] Meyer von Knonau, 390–91, and n. 50; Giesebrecht, *op. cit.*, 111; Möllenberg, 41–42. But cf. the epitaph of Gunther (*supra*, n. 17).

[34] Cf. *supra*, n. 17.

[35] *Ann. Alt.*, 68: "pecuniarum dominos"; 70: "naulum dantes." Lamp., 93: "episcopi . . . magnitudinem opum suarum gentibus, per quas iter habebant, inconsultius ostentarent, . . . magnifici apparatus"; 94: "omnibus quae habebant"; 96: "pecunias eorum . . . preda . . . omnibus quae haberent usque ad novissimum quadrantem"; 98: "quanta convenerat pecunia." Marianus, 559: "Ubi vero episcopi sedebant, dorsalia pallia pendebant, scutellas et vasa aurea et argentea habebant; ex quibus gloriose comidebant pariter et bibebant . . . totam suam peccuniam nisi victum usque ad christianos . . . quingentos bisantios aureos." *Vita Altmanni*, c. 4, p. 230: "multos ex sociis cum rebus amiserunt." Ekkehard, 1064, p. 199: "rebus admodum attenuati" (this refers to the condition of the pilgrims when they returned home). Berthold (see *supra*, n. 16): "cum magno apparatu." See also the following note.

[36] *Ann. Alt.*, 68: "onera equorum deponere non valebant; ideoque perdiderunt ipsos equos et mulos cum omnibus, quae portabant."

our pilgrims were *unarmed.*[37] Since from the outset they appear to have formed one large body, it may be supposed that a time and point of ultimate departure had been agreed upon in advance; and we shall perhaps not err in assuming that the designated place of concentration was either Ratisbon or Passau.[38]

Archbishop Siegfried, though he preceded the other prelates in rank, cannot be regarded as the real director of the enterprise.[39] All the important sources testify that the dominant personality on the journey was Bishop Gunther of Bamberg.[40] Gunther was of high birth and very affluent. By contemporaries who probably had personal acquaintance with him, he is described as a man of imposing stature and striking comeliness; though younger than his fellow-bishops, he so far surpassed them in mental and moral qualities and in intellectual accomplishments, that after he was dead he

[37] *Ibid.:* "Nostri . . . ut inermes, etc." This testimony is fully substantiated by what is set forth *infra,* pp. 20ff. The erroneous view that "die geistlichen Herren zogen . . . nicht . . . zu Fuss, sondern hoch zu Ross in blitzendem Waffengeschmeide," has been held not only by Röhricht (*Beiträge,* II, 4; cf. "Die Pilgerfahrten," 346), but by several other investigators including Möllenberg, 45. Even Bréhier, 46, who is nearer the truth on this point, hesitates to say that *all* the pilgrims were unarmed; yet no other conclusion is warranted by the evidence.

[38] Möllenberg, 45, thought that the "allgemeiner Sammelplatz" was Ratisbon; but his argument is weakened somewhat by being based on the undated letter referred to *supra,* n. 17. Altmann "cum multis viris de palatio honoratis," apparently joined the other pilgrims at Passau, where he had arrived in the company of the widowed empress Agnes (*Vita Altmanni,* cc. 2–3, p. 230).

[39] In the letter in which he announced his pilgrimage to the pope (cf. *supra,* n. 32), Siegfried, so far from representing himself as the leader, did not even indicate that he was to have companions.

[40] The Annalist of Nieder-Altaich says (p. 66) that Gunther "tunc temporis decus et columna videbatur tocius regni"; and (p. 69) that a Bedouin chief in Palestine (see *infra,* n. 100) thought Gunther the *principem* of all the pilgrims. Cf. Lamp., 96: "Babenbergensis episcopus, cui, licet iunior aetate esset, tamen propter virtutum prerogativam et tocius corporis admirandam dignitatem precipuus a cunctis honor deferebatur." Marianus, 559: "Bambergensis episcopi, quasi domini nostrorum magnitudine et pulchritudine corporis eius." In the *Vita Altmanni,* c. 3, p. 230, Gunther is said, perhaps with some exaggeration, to have been the "praevius dux et incentor" of the pilgrims.

seemed to have been the "ornament and pillar of the entire realm." Such was his perfection in manifold virtues, continues the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich, that in his own time he had been rarely if ever excelled, and it was almost unbelievable that posterity would behold his equal.[41] On the pilgrimage to Jerusalem this alleged superman became, chiefly no doubt by reason of his admirable physique, the cynosure of vulgar curiosity; around the places where he was lodged the inquisitive would gather in great throngs, much to the annoyance of the other bishops who, in order to terminate the nuisance, would often compel Gunther to go out and make public exhibition of his person.[42]

Toward the middle of November, 1064, the pilgrims set forth from Germany.[43] The passage through Hungary probably offered no serious difficulty, although Bishop Gunther later complained that the Magyars had proved faithless in service. But in Bulgaria, after the Morava River had been crossed, dangers from thieves and robbers became frequent.[44] These troubles Lambert of Hersfeld attributes, obviously not without reason, to the lordly style in which the bishops traveled. He severely censures the pompous parade of episcopal wealth as a piece of temerity which might have subverted the whole enterprise had not divine mercy intervened. The barbarians, says Lambert, came in troops from the towns and the fields to behold these illustrious men, whose foreign apparel and gorgeous equipment they regarded at first with curiosity and then with cupidity.[45] We may believe that the barbarians thus affected included the Bulgars; for Gunther accuses that people of being stealthy pilferers. But a far worse enemy was encountered in the Uzes, who had

[41] Cf. *supra,* nn. 11, 40; and see *Ann. Alt.,* 66, 69–71; Lamp., 99; the epitaph of Gunther (*supra,* n. 17).

[42] Lamp., 99; see also *infra,* p. 17.

[43] Marianus, 558: "post transitum sancti Martini." St. Martin's Day is November 11. Lamp., 92: "autumnali tempore."

[44] *Ann. Alt.,* 66–67.

[45] Lamp., 93–94.

recently penetrated into Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Thrace; before the unrestrained fury of these terrible nomads the pilgrims fled. Yet by the exercise of prudence and caution they were able at last to reach the city of Constantinople.[46]

While Gunther intimates that he found the Constantinopolitans puffed up with Greek and imperial hauteur, the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich assures us that the pilgrims conducted themselves in a manner so estimable that the arrogant Byzantines greatly marveled at them. Upon Gunther they gazed as upon a great spectacle, refusing, however, to believe that he was a bishop; he was taken to be the king of the Romans who had assumed the disguise of a bishop because he could not otherwise have gone through those realms (the Saracen dominions are probably meant) to the Holy Sepulchre.[47] After a sojourn of several days in the Byzantine capital our pilgrims moved on into Asia Minor, which then, it should be remembered, was still included within the boundaries of the eastern empire. Gunther's letter indicates that they suffered on this stage of the journey[48]

46 *Ann. Alt.*, 67 and n. 2. Uzes is the Byzantine term for the Ghuzz Turks (cf. *Camb. med. hist.*, IV, 303, 325). The invasion and devastation of Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Thrace by the Uzes in the year 6573 of the Byzantine era, is recorded by the historians Johannes Scylitzes (see *Georgius Cedrenus Ioannis Scylitzae ope*, ed. Bekker, II, Bonn, 1839, 654–57, in *Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae*) and Michael Attaliates (ed., Bekker, *ibid.*, 1853, 83ff.). Since the Byzantine year 6573 began on September 1, 1064 A.D., and since Michael Attaliates, 83, states that the invasion took place at the *beginning* of the third indiction (i.e. probably in September or October, 1064), the testimony of these chroniclers (on whose value see K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur*, 2nd ed., Munich, 1897, 269ff., 365ff.) confirms the truth of Gunther's statement as given in the *Annals of Nieder-Altaich.*

47 *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.* The Byzantine emperor at this time was Constantine X, Ducas (1059–1067). On the general character and policy of his reign, see Carl Neumann, *Die Weltstellung des byzantinischen Reiches vor den Kreuzzügen*, Leipzig, 1894, 79ff. and references there cited; cf. *Camb. med. hist.*, IV, 324–25. In the eleventh century a belief was current among the Saracens that the Byzantine emperor used to visit Jerusalem, "but privily, so that no one should recognize him." An interesting illustration of this belief is cited by Guy Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems*, Palestine Exploration Fund, London, 1890, 205.

48 Cf. L. Weiland's translation of the *Ann. Alt.* in *Geschichtschreiber der*

at the hands of the "Romanites . . . who raged with a ferocity exceeding that of all other humans and even animals." Yet, distressed though they were, our travelers ceased not to pursue their goal; presently they reached Cilicia and, at length, "Aliquia which Holy Scripture designates as Laodicea." At this place, which was a Byzantine outpost [49] in Syria [50] and the last important Christian town on the route to Jerusalem,[51] there ensued a few days' pause, doubtless welcome to men who, in the words of Gunther, had "passed through water and fire."

From Laodicea Gunther wrote to inform his friends in Germany of what he and his companions had experienced thus far. That portion of his letter which has been preserved in the *Annals of Nieder-Altaich* is little more than a catalogue of woes; it ends in gloom: "Grievous indeed are the things we have endured, but more grievous things remain." [52] This cheerless foreboding, we learn from the annalist,[53] was

deutschen Vorzeit, Elftes Jahrhundert, IX, Berlin, 1871, 68 and note 3. Lambert, 94, dismisses the journey through the Byzantine dominions with two words: "transita Licia." By *Licia* he means (according to Holder-Egger, *ibid.,* index, 381, *s. v.*) *Cilicia.*

[49] Apparently the Byzantines had recaptured Laodicea from the Saracens ca. 968 or shortly thereafter (*Camb. med. hist.,* IV, 146ff.; V, 247), and they held the place until 1078 when it was taken by the Seljūq Sultan Malik Shāh (*ibid.,* IV, 307, bottom). Cf. Le Strange, *op. cit.,* 490–2.

[50] Southern Syria and most of Palestine had, prior to 1058, owned allegiance to the Fatimites; but after that date the extent of the Fatimite control was materially reduced, as a result of civil war and consequent anarchy in Egypt. By the time the Seljūq Turks entered Syria in 1070, "Damascus and the coast towns from Tripolis southwards . . . were governed by independent emirs, antagonistic to one another"; and "only the south-west of Palestine was still closely attached to Egypt" (*Camb. med. hist.,* V. 249, 259–62).

[51] According to the *Ann. Alt.,* 67, the pilgrims on departing from Aliquia, "per terram paganorum versus civitatem sanctam ceperunt abire." Jabalah, a fortress ten miles to the south of Laodicea, apparently marked the Byzantine-Saracen frontier from 968 to 1080 (Le Strange, *op. cit.,* 459–60; *Camb. med. hist.,* V, 249).

[52] *Ann. Alt.,* 67.

[53] The annalist clearly indicates that he has not reproduced the letter *in toto* (*ibid.*): "inter caetera scribens ita, etc."

not unfounded. While the pilgrims were tarrying at Laodicea there arrived daily many persons returning from Jerusalem; these not only related the deaths of countless companions but also, by exhibition of wounds recently inflicted and still gory, furnished proof of the calamities they themselves had suffered; and they declared in public that it was quite impossible to proceed by the road they had come, because a very savage tribe of Arabs, thirsting for human blood, had occupied the whole land. Alarmed by such reports, our pilgrims began to deliberate the advisability of continuing the pilgrimage; but counsels of self-denial and complete trust in divine providence speedily prevailed; with buoyant spirit they departed from Laodicea, entered the land of the Saracens,[54] and fared forth toward the Holy City.

Their progress was soon interrupted. At Tripoli [55] the "barbarian" governor, seeing the great multitude, hoped, it is said, to find infinite wealth and decreed that they all be put to the sword. The dire menace, perhaps more fictitious than real, is alleged to have been miraculously averted. Our annalist describes, in realistic fashion, an unusually severe electric storm of several days' duration. This, we are given to understand, was interpreted by all, including the Mohammedan population of Tripoli, as divine interference in behalf of the Christians. The overawed emir hastened, of

[54] The *Ann. Alt.* (*ibid.*) have "per terram paganorum"; Lambert, 94, says more correctly: "fines Sarracenorum introissent." On the alleged bloodthirstiness of the Arabs, cf. *infra,* n. 105.

[55] The Persian traveler Nâsir-i-Khusrau (*Diary of a journey through Syria and Palestine,* English tr. by Guy Le Strange, in *Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society,* London, 1888, 8), who visited Tripoli in 1047, tells us that the city belonged then to the [Fatimite] sultan of Egypt, who maintained there a body of troops in garrison, "with a commander set over them, to keep the city safe from the enemy" [i. e. the Byzantines]. Tripoli had become dependent upon the Fatimites ca. 969 and this relation appears to have continued at least until 1058, after which its emir began to assert his independence (cf. *supra,* n. 50 and see Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems,* 348ff.).

course, to grant his intended victims liberty of departure.[56]

Continuing, not without sundry troubles and anxieties, on the journey southward the pilgrims reached Caesarea on Maundy Thursday, which in the year 1065 fell on March 24. The religious rites proper to the day were celebrated, and congratulations were exchanged in the belief that all perils had now been evaded; for it was computed that from Caesarea to Jerusalem was not more than a two days' journey.[57] But on the morrow, i.e. Good Friday, March 25, between six-thirty and eight o'clock in the morning,[58] just as they had passed beyond the village of Kafar Sallām (Capharsala) and were one day's journey or a little more from the city of Ramlah,[59] suddenly they encountered a horde of Arabs. The news, swiftly broadcast, of the arrival of very distinguished men, had caused the Arabs to flock together from every direction, in large numbers and under arms, for the purpose of securing booty.[60]

Probably these Bedouins did not expect to obtain what they desired without a struggle, and in order to secure treasure they were perhaps ready to resort to any extreme; yet it can hardly be doubted that they would have permitted the pilgrims to pass if the latter had promptly offered to

[56] *Ann. Alt.,* 67–68. According to Nâsir-i-Khusrau (*op. cit.,* 7), "the town of Tripoli is so situate that three sides thereof are on the sea, and when the waves beat, the sea-water is thrown up on to the very city walls."

[57] *Ann. Alt.,* 68. From this point down to the arrival of the pilgrims at Ramlah (see *infra,* p. 37), the account of Lambert is much more detailed than that of the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich. On Caesarea, cf. Le Strange, 474–75.

[58] *Ann. Alt.,* 68: "hora diei pene secunda"; Lamp., 94: "circa terciam diei horam." On March 25 (only a few days after the vernal equinox), the *hora secunda* and *hora tertia* would begin respectively at seven and eight o'clock according to our reckoning of time.

[59] *Ann. Alt.,* 68: "cum egrederentur Capharsala vicum." Lamp., 94: "cum . . . iam a civitate cui Ramulo nomen est una vel paulo plus mansione abessent." On Kafar Sallām, see *infra,* nn. 74, 75.

[60] Lamp., 94: "Arabitis, qui comperto tam insignium virorum adventu undique ad spolia diripienda frequentes armatique confluxerant." Marianus, 559: "Arabitae vero fama pecuniae congregati."

surrender all their possessions.[61] There is no evidence that any such offer was made. Lambert of Hersfeld tells us, however, that most of the pilgrims, mindful that they had solemnly dedicated their safety to God, refrained on religious grounds from using force and corporeal arms in self-defense.[62] These non-resistants, it appears, were the first to be attacked. The Bedouins, obviously but mistakenly anticipating resistance, fell upon them "as famished wolves leap upon long-desired prey," massacring the foremost, prostrating and wounding the others, and utterly despoiling all of whatever they possessed. Among the wounded ones Lambert reckons Bishop William of Utrecht who, his arm almost crippled by blows, was left naked and half dead.[63] But the Bedouins, once in possession of the booty, evidently paid no further attention to these harmless victims of their fury; those still alive (including Bishop William?) [64] were permitted, and were able despite the maltreatment they had suffered, to proceed to Ramlah, a distance of at least one day's journey.[65]

Meanwhile the other pilgrims, probably a rather large minority,[66] had apparently become persuaded that the pious quest of the Holy Sepulchre did not, in a case of necessity, preclude forcible defense of life and property; and since this group included at least three of the wealthy prelates with their following, men who undoubtedly were anxious to preserve the treasure they had brought, it may be presumed that the decision to fight was largely due to their influence.

[61] A demand to this effect was later made by the Bedouins; see *infra*, p. 27 and n. 87.

[62] Lamp., 94: "Plerique christianorum religiosum putantes manu sibi auxilium ferre et salutem suam, quam peregre proficiscentes Deo devoverant, armis corporalibus tueri, etc."

[63] *Ann. Alt.*, 68; Lamp., 94; Marianus, 559.

[64] See *infra*, pp. 22–23 and n. 73.

[65] See *infra*, n. 115 and cf. *supra*, n. 59.

[66] Lambert (cf. *supra*, n. 62) refers to the non-resistants as "*plerique* christianorum."

Though these pilgrims like the non-resistants were unarmed,[67] that fact did not discourage them; for they had observed that the locality through which they were then traveling, abounded in stones. Availing themselves of these, they hurled them at the Arabs in an attempt to impede their assaults.[68] But with the enemy pressing incessantly forward, the pilgrims were at great disadvantage and soon found it necessary to seek shelter. Yielding ground little by little, they moved toward Kafar Sallām, the village which had been passed earlier in the morning and which now was not far distant.[69] The retreat, perhaps not too orderly when it began, became in the end a precipitate flight, attended, we are told, by casualties so numerous and so miserable as to beggar description.[70] The Annalist of Nieder-Altaich states that Bishop William of Utrecht was among those killed or wounded during this retreat;[71] whereas Lambert, whose account is more detailed, includes William, as we have seen,[72] among the non-resistants who had submitted to abuse and robbery at the first attack. In any case it is clear that

67 *Ann. Alt.*, 68: "Nostri . . . ut inermes, etc."

68 Here Lambert, 94, obviously tries to conceal the fact that the pilgrims really were endeavoring to save their treasure: "non tam periculum propulsabant, quam mortem, quae presens urgebat, differre conabantur." He had previously (p. 93) admitted that the ultimate cause of danger was the immense wealth of the bishops (cf. *supra*, p. 16).

69 *Ann. Alt.*, 68: "citius, ut inermes, compulsi sunt in vicum refugere." Lamp., 94: "Pedem etiam paulatim subtrahendo ad villam declinabant, quae ab ipso itinere spacio mediocri distabat. Capharnaum hanc fuisse ex similitudine vocabuli coniciebant." Lambert, it will be observed, says that the *pilgrims*, by reason of the *similarity* of the name, supposed the place was Capernaum. This does not necessarily mean that Lambert himself was of the same (mistaken) opinion, as Meyer von Knonau, 448, n. 102, von Oefele, *Ann. Alt.*, 68, n. 3, and apparently even Holder-Egger, Lamp., 94, n. 2, have held. Marianus, 559: "cum non sustinuerunt, in quoddam castellum vacuum Carvasalim nomine nostri fugerunt."

70 *Ann. Alt.*, 68; Marianus (see the preceding note). Cf. *Vita Altmanni*, c. 4, p. 230: "Proh nefas! hostes Christi ipsorum sacerdotum Christi dorso insilientes, eos per campum agitaverunt equitando, calcaribus ut equos urgentes."

71 *Ann. Alt.*, 68.

72 *Supra*, p. 21.

William did not return with his fellow-bishops to Kafar Sallām.[73]

Formerly a thriving village, Kafar Sallām [74] at the time of which we are speaking was in all likelihood a deserted place. The pilgrims found here an unoccupied structure variously referred to as a *castellum* or an *atrium*.[75] Apparently the *atrium* had a court, for it was inclosed by a wall with a gated entrance. The Annalist of Nieder-Altaich speaks of

[73] According to the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich, 68, it was "reliqui . . . tres episcopi" with their following who occupied Kafar Sallām; according to Lambert, 94, it was "caeteri christiani," exclusive of the non-resistants, with whom Lambert reckoned William.

[74] German scholars, including Meyer von Knonau, von Oefele, and Holder-Egger, have assumed that the village in question was Kafar Sābā (Kefr Sâba), which K. von Raumer, *Palästina,* 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1838, sought, perhaps mistakenly, to identify with the biblical Antipatris. But from the manner in which the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich and Marianus respectively spell the name (*Capharsala, Carvasalim;* cf. *supra,* nn. 59, 69), it seems obvious that they refer, not to Kafar Sābā, but to Kafar Sallām, a place on the road between, and approximately equidistant from, Caesarea and Ramlah (Ar Ramlah). Kafar Sallām, which in the opinion of Colonel Sir Charles W. Wilson is the modern Rās al 'Ain and the Antipatris of the *New Testament,* was probably not far (to the south?) from Kafar Sābā. See Le Strange, 471–72 and the map facing p. 14; also the following note.

[75] Marianus describes Kafar Sallām as an unoccupied fortress, the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich calls it a village, and Lambert makes it a town (cf. *supra,* nn. 59, 69). There is nothing in any of the Latin sources which would indicate that either Kafar Sallām or the *atrium* was inhabited when our pilgrims came there. Yet according to the Arabic geographer Mukaddasi, *Description of Syria, including Palestine,* English tr. by G. Le Strange, in *Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society,* London, 1886, 60–61, 96–98, Kafar Sallām was when he visited it, ca. 985 A.D., a very populous village with a mosque. But the Persian pilgrim Nâsir-i-Khusrau (*op. cit.,* 21; cf. *supra,* n. 55) tells us that in 1047 he "reached a city called Kafar Sābā, also Kafar Sallām." Le Strange, the translator (*ibid.,* note), thinks Nâsir "mistaken in writing of Kafar Sābā and Kafar Sallām as one and the same place," but adds that while the former still exists, the latter "has entirely disappeared from the present maps," its site being probably that of the modern Rās al 'Ain. The French orientalist Charles Schefer (ed. and transl., *Sefer Nameh, Relation du voyage de Nassiri Khosrau,* Paris, 1881, 62, n. 1) states, without citing evidence for it, that Kafar Sallām "était abandonné par sa population au XI e siècle." Yet Kafar Sallām appears, along with Kafar Sābā, in the thirteenth century *Geographical Lexicon* of Yākūt, and also in the later (ca. 1300) epitome of Safī ad Dīn, the *Marāsid al Ittilā* (see Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems,* 8–10, 471–72). For further documentation on what is set forth in this paragraph, see the next note.

two stone towers, one of which may perhaps be identical with a certain *domus* which Lambert locates in the centre of the *atrium*. The *domus*, Lambert goes on to explain, had a rather lofty upper story (*cenaculum*) prepared, purposely as it were, to stand a siege; but the wall inclosing the *atrium* was so poor and weak that even without the application of force it might easily have crumbled of age alone.

With a not inconsiderable, though quite miscellaneous, body of followers Bishops Siegfried, Gunther, and Otto proceeded to occupy the *atrium* and its two towers. The ecclesiastics took possession of that tower which Lambert designates as the *domus*. In its upper story the bishops of Mainz and Bamberg with their clergy established themselves, leaving the lower story for the bishop of Ratisbon and the remaining clergy.[76] At first it was hoped that the beasts of burden might also be brought within the walls. But the gateway proved too narrow to admit them, encumbered as they were with bulks of baggage; and by reason of the enemy's imminence, it was impossible to unload the carriers; consequently, horses and mules together with the effects and supplies they bore were lost.[77] Yet the occupants of the *atrium* had by no means been utterly impoverished; they still retained not only their money and treasure—which, to judge from the magnitude of the efforts made respectively to gain and to retain possession of them, must have been

[76] *Ann. Alt.*, 68: "Reliqui autem tres episcopi simul cum diversarum gentium non parva multitudine atrium quoddam muratum duasque turres lapideas occupavere"; p. 69: "turrim, in qua erant episcopi." Lamp., 94: "Quam (sc. villam) ut ingressi sunt, episcopi omnes atrium quoddam occupant, humili septum maceria et tam fragili, ut, etiamsi nulla vis adhiberetur, sola vetustate facile corrueret. In cuius medio domus erat, cenaculum habens satis editum et ad repugnandum quasi ex industria preparatum. Huius superiora episcopus Moguntinus et Babenbergensis cum clericis suis, inferiora caeteri episcopi sibi vendicant." On the question as to whether Lambert is in error when he states that there was more than one bishop (*caeteri episcopi*) in the lower story, cf. *supra*, n. 18. Both Lambert and the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich indicate that the wounded Bishop William of Utrecht did not return to Kafar Sallām (see *supra*, n. 73).

[77] *Ann. Alt.*, 68.

very considerable—but also, it would seem, a goodly portion of ecclesiastical paraphernalia.[78] They were, however, if we may trust our sources, totally devoid of victuals.[79] Undaunted in their plight, our pilgrims closed the gates of the *atrium* and made ready to continue resistance; while the Arabs, after they had apportioned among themselves the captured horses, mules, and baggage, lost no time in resuming the attack with a vengeance.[80]

The lay pilgrims, scurrying busily to and fro, tried bravely to keep the enemy at a distance and to defend the wall. Though at first they had to fight with whatever came to hand, chiefly stones and sticks, they were not long restricted to such primitive weapons. For on the one hand the Arabs, angered by resistance on the part of men they had supposed defenseless, surged vigorously forward and hurled a great cloud of missiles (javelins?) into the camp; on the other, the pilgrims, by pressing in upon the attacking enemy, frequently were able to wrench out of the hands of the Bedouins their shields and swords. As a result, the pilgrims became to some extent provided with regular arms and began to feel capable of more than mere defense of the wall; occasionally they dared sally forth from the gate, to engage their opponents in hand-to-hand combat. These sorties, which according to Lambert were uniformly successful and which probably proved somewhat costly to the Arabs, seem to have determined the latter to abandon their disorderly assaults and to proceed to a close investment of the *atrium;* by means of hunger and exhaustion, they would compel those to surrender whom it had proved impossible to subdue by force of arms.[81]

78 See *infra,* p. 31.

79 Lamp., 95: "inopiam rerum omnium, quibus vita humana sustentari solet." *Ann. Alt.,* 69: "nostris, quamvis fame et siti vigiliisque laborantibus, etc."

80 *Ibid.,* 68; Marianus, 559: "quod (sc. castellum) claudentes."

81 Lamp., 94–95; *Ann. Alt.,* 68–69; Marianus, 559: "lapidibus et fustibus."

The Arabs, whose hordes may have been swelled by late comers, by this time numbered according to the (possibly exaggerated) Christian estimate, something like twelve thousand men. In any case, they were sufficiently numerous to be able to relieve each other in carrying on the operations, and so to avoid giving respite to the beleaguered pilgrims. That these, lacking all the necessaries of life, would long bear up under the ceaseless labor of fighting, was not expected.[82] In fact the struggle, which had begun on the morning of Good Friday, March 25, continued for at least forty-eight hours without intermission. The Arabs, it is said, gnashed their teeth like infuriated wolves who, with their prey in the gullet, are prevented from gulping it down; while the Christians, suffering though they were from hunger, thirst, and vigils, yet after the fashion of men facing death, forgot their present distress in an ardent effort to preserve their lives—and, we may add with Marianus Scottus, their money.[83] Indeed, since the latter undoubtedly was the real bone of contention, it may be held that the lives of the pilgrims were endangered chiefly or perhaps only because they declined to give up their money.

It seems by no means impossible that the impatient Bedouins, exasperated at the stubborn resistance they had met, sought by the commission of various outrages to ter-

[82] Lamp., 95.

[83] *Ibid.:* "Ita christiani toto parasceve, toto sabbato sancto usque ad terciam fere horam paschalis diei sine intermissione oppugnabantur; nec eis hostilis improbitas vel modicum temporis punctum, quo saltem somni perceptione corpora recrearent, indulgebat. Nam cibum et potum nec, mortem pre oculis habentes, desiderabant nec, si magnopere desideraretur, quid sumerent, omnium inopes habebant." *Ann. Alt.*, p. 69: "Tribus igitur continuis diebus summa vi praeliatur utrimque, quoniam nostris, quamvis fame et siti vigiliisque laborantibus, tamen pro vita et salute res erat, hostes vero lupina rabie frendebant, quia praedam, quam sibi videbantur inter fauces retinere, nullo modo permittebantur transglutire." That this was not the *whole* truth, is revealed by Marianus (p. 559): "deffenderunt se contra iacula Arabitarum querentium cuntam peccuniam eorum vel vitam pariter et peccuniam." Cf. *supra*, n. 68.

rorize the besieged in order to bring them more speedily to terms. One such outrage is described by the biographer of Bishop Altmann,[84] professedly as a warning example to persons who reject sage counsel. A certain abbess—beautiful, pious, and of noble birth—had, contrary to the best advice, forsaken the nuns entrusted to her care and entered upon this perilous pilgrimage. The abbess was captured by the "pagans," who in the sight of all ravished her until she finally gave up the spirit. This incident, it is true, cannot be accepted without reservations, since it is reported by a posterior writer with a manifest penchant for the fabulous.[85] But Marianus Scottus, who was on the whole a well informed and not overcredulous contemporary chronicler,[86] also tells of a piece of cruelty perpetrated by the Arabs during the siege. One brave knight, resolving that he would in no wise be withheld from the Holy Sepulchre, went forth naked from the *atrium.* He was immediately seized and virtually crucified on the ground. Having incised his abdomen, the Bedouins threw its covering and the coverings of the viscera, from the bottom of the abdomen to the windpipe, over his face, observing meanwhile how the internal organs of the human body were arranged. After they had dismembered their victim limb by limb, the leader, and following him each one of the Arabs in turn, threw a stone on the remains. To the pilgrims, who from their besieged stronghold had gazed at this gruesome procedure, the Bedouins are said to have addressed the following threat: "Thus will it be for you if you do not deliver up to us all your money." [87]

If such a threat was really made, it must have been ren-

[84] *Vita Altmanni,* c. 4, p. 230. By the following words the biographer implies that the incident he relates was but one among several of a similar kind: "His et aliis multis probris pro Christo ab inimicis Christi affecti, etc."

[85] Cf. the references cited *supra,* n. 15.

[86] See *supra,* p. 6 and cf. Wattenbach, II, 114–15.

[87] Marianus, 559.

dered formidable by the preceding butchery and could hardly have been without effect upon the men to whom it was directed.[88] Let it be remembered that after two whole days of fighting and a vigil of forty-eight hours without nourishment, the pilgrims on the morning of Sunday, March 27, were hardly in condition to continue their resistance much longer.[89] Since, moreover, the dawn of Easter had not ushered in the expected Day of Judgment, the spell under which the pilgrimage had originally been undertaken must have begun to lose its power. It is not difficult to conceive how these various circumstances may have combined to elicit, especially among the poorer pilgrims who had little save their lives to sacrifice, a spirit of protest to the further prolongation of the seige.

According to Lambert, such protest was actually voiced by a priest, who cried out that it was not right to rely upon arms more than upon God, and that they ought not to try to repel a calamity which Heaven had suffered to befall them. Frankly advising surrender, on the ground that general exhaustion rendered further military efforts useless, the priest assured his hearers of divine mercy even after they had passed under the yoke of the enemy; who, in his judgment, desired not their lives but only their money. The suggestion, it is said, met with general approval. If we assume that this portion of Lambert's account is not fictitious, the whole matter, i.e. both the proposal of the priest and its acceptance, may be interpreted in two more or less supplementary ways. It may mean, as previously suggested, that the bishops and the wealthier pilgrims now were required and found it advisable to yield to the demands of those who, themselves

[88] Marianus (*ibid.*), without mentioning other considerations, gives the impression that this threat furnished the direct urge to the negotiations which followed.

[89] Still the exhaustion of the pilgrims as portrayed by Lambert on p. 95 seems overdrawn, especially when compared with what he says on p. 97 (see *infra*, pp. 33–34). Cf. *Ann. Alt.*, 69.

without much to lose, had thus far fought strenuously and loyally to protect the treasure of their betters; but it may also signify a resolve on the part of the leaders to change tactics in dealing with the enemy, a determination to obtain by artifice what fighting had failed to secure. Under the latter interpretation, the priest must be regarded as the mouthpiece of the bishops rather than the poorer pilgrims, and his representations then savor of an attempt to spiritualize a piece of purely secular strategy.[90]

Resorting promptly to negotiation, the pilgrims, says Lambert, through an interpreter requested the privilege of (a conditional) surrender. Marianus Scottus tells us that they offered to give up all their money, save what was needed for victuals on the homeward journey.[91] Whether a definite reply was given to this request, is uncertain; but we know that the Arabs agreed to a cessation of hostilities and that the leader, escorted by several sheiks, afterward proceeded to the *atrium*—ostensibly, adds the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich, to ascertain how much the Christians were willing to pay for their lives and the privilege of departure.[92] Obviously the fact that the negotiations were to be concluded in the *atrium* was a great advantage for the pilgrims; and the subsequent events indicate that their leaders had from the outset clearly perceived this advantage and were fully prepared to exploit it.[93] Probably the wealthy Gunther and his more or less

90 Lamp., 95–96; cf. *supra,* nn. 12, 68.

91 Lamp., 96: "ut in deditionem acciperentur." Marianus, p. 559: "Cum autem nostri promiserunt dare totam suam peccuniam nisi victum usque ad christianos, ducem Arabitarum cum viris 16 totidemque gladiis intromiserunt." See also the following note and cf. *infra.* p. 31 and n. 102.

92 *Ann. Alt.,* 69: "dicta inter eos pace, octo principes paganorum permissi ascendunt in turrim, in qua erant episcopi, velut ibidem cognituri, quanto pecuniarum pondere vitam suam ac abeundi licentiam vellent redimere."

93 Marianus (see *supra,* n. 91), by the use of the word *intromiserunt* (i. e. "caused to enter"), gives the impression that the offer to surrender was a bait intended to bring the sheiks into the *atrium,* where they would be at the mercy of the pilgrims. With the sixteen sheiks, according to

opulent associates, in despite of the offer to surrender, had not yet given up all hope of saving their treasure.

Though the armistice was declared at approximately the third hour (*ca.* 8:00 A.M.) of Easter Day, the leader of the Arabs did not arrive in the *atrium* until about the ninth hour (*ca.* 2:00 P.M.).[94] In the meantime he took measures to prevent a promiscuous dispersal of the anticipated booty. When he had learned that the pilgrims were ready to surrender, he sped at full gallop to his front ranks and discreetly moved the remainder of his forces back to a point from which the multitude would be unable to press its way into the stronghold.[95] Then followed the selection of sixteen or seventeen distinguished sheiks [96] who were to accompany their leader to the place of negotiation.

Armed with swords the sheiks entered the *atrium*, at whose opened gate the leader posted his son with a guard, to bar entrance to others; for there was danger that some Bedouin, greedy of plunder, might disobey orders and try to rush in after the sheiks.[97] The manner in which the pilgrims managed their visitors clearly shows that they were acting in accordance with a skillfully devised plan. All the sheiks were not permitted to ascend to the upper story of the house or tower which contained the bishops. Nine had to remain in the lower story, where Bishop Otto of Ratisbon and his companions were lodged. The other seven together with the leader [98] must climb a ladder to reach the *cenaculum*. Here

Marianus, came as many swords—swords which the pilgrims knew how to employ to their own advantage (see *infra*, p. 34).

94 Lamp., 95: "christiani . . . usque ad terciam fere horam paschalis diei sine intermissione oppugnabantur." *Ann. Alt.*, 69: "Tandem igitur in ipsa dominica sancti pascae hora diei quasi nona, dicta inter eos pace, etc."

95 Lamp., 96.

96 Lambert's (*ibid.*) seventeen may and probably does include the son of the leader; but since the son was left at the gate he could not strictly be numbered among the sixteen whom the pilgrims, according to Marianus (see *supra*, n. 91), *intromiserunt*.

97 Lamp., 96.

98 The Annalist of Nieder-Altaich states that eight (obviously including

they were greeted by a spectacle evidently calculated to impress upon them the high dignity of the persons with whom they were to deal. In the hall, which had been decked with the seemingly indispensable dorsals, draperies, etc., and which was filled with many knights, the sheiks found seated in state the "glorious" bishops of Mainz and Bamberg.[99] In the latter, i.e. Gunther, the Arab leader promptly and correctly recognized the real director of the pilgrim hostilities.[100] According to Lambert,[101] Gunther began to plead with the Bedouin that having taken all the pilgrims had down to the last farthing, he permit them to go away empty-handed. This statement may or may not be true: [102] but that Gunther now or at any other moment was ready to surrender his treasure, seems highly improbable. On the contrary, the sequel will show not only that Gunther himself had determined to apply *Faustrecht* to the solution of his problem, but that he and his companions had fully matured a plan whereby the sheiks would become the means of saving their treasure.

Gunther's alleged request, Lambert goes on to indicate, met no favor. The savage Bedouin, at once elated by appar-

the leader) were permitted to *ascend* (i.e. climb the ladder) into the tower (cf. *supra*, nn. 92, 96).

99 Marianus, 559; *Ann. Alt.*, 69: "episcopi sedentis."

100 *Ibid.*: "is, qui maximus inter eos [sc. principes paganorum] videbatur esse, ad pontificem Guntherium, quem principem omnium putabat, accessit." Lambert and Marianus are quoted *supra*, n. 40.

101 P. 96.

102 For several reasons it seems questionable. The request is not so much as hinted at in any of the other sources. Both the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich and Marianus indicate that the Bedouin leader took the initiative in the parley and was the first to speak. There is no apparent reason why the pilgrims now, with the sheiks in their power, should have yielded a point on which they had previously insisted, namely that they be allowed to retain money sufficient to buy provisions on the homeward journey (cf. *supra*, n. 91). If these considerations do not definitely prove that Lambert is in error, at least they make it impossible to accept his statement unreservedly. On the other hand, assuming that Lambert is correct, it may still be contended, on grounds which the following discussion will clarify, that even if Gunther's offer had been accepted, the presence of the sheiks in the *atrium* would none the less have been thoroughly exploited.

ent victory and irate over the not inconsiderable losses he had suffered during the recent fighting, was in no mood to entertain petitions however humble; he as conqueror would impose his terms on the vanquished.[103] The attitude and intentions of the barbarian were made clear, we may believe, not only in words but also by a symbolical act which, with some variations, is described by each one of our three chief informants. Unrolling the linen turban, which in Arabic fashion was wound about his head, the sheik made of it a noose which he flung round the neck of the still seated Gunther.[104] As he did this (perhaps before, or directly afterward), the Bedouin uttered something in Arabic indicating that by the capture of Gunther he held all the pilgrims in his power, that he would take all they had, and that he would hang Gunther and as many others as he chose. Marianus Scottus adds a threat to the effect that Gunther would be subjected to vampirism; and according to the (probably exaggerated) statement of Lambert, all the pilgrims were to be made victims of both vampirism and cannibalism.[105]

Whatever he may have said, it is clear that by his insolence the sheik played into the hands of his enemy. Bishop Gunther quickly perceived in the ignominious treatment he had received, not only personal insult but profanation of a priest of Christ. No sooner had he learned from an interpreter the full meaning of the Bedouin's words, than he

[103] Lamp., 96.

[104] *Ann. Alt.,* 69: "lintheum, quo caput suum involutum erat, absolvit, collo episcopi sedentis circumposuit." Marianus, 559: "sicut consuetudinis est paganorum reos tenere, extendit corrigiam circa collum Bambergensis episcopi." Lamp., *loc. cit.:* "linteum, quo caput more gentis obvolverat, expediens, facto vinculo in collum episcopi iniecit."

[105] *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "'Ecce,' inquiens, 'te solo capto omnes hos in mea potestate habeo et iam iamque tecum pariter in arbore suspendam, quantoscunque ex vobis voluero.'" Marianus, *loc. cit.:* "et ait: 'Tu et ista tua omnia mea erunt.' Episcopus vero per interpretem ait: 'Quid mihi facies'? Et ille dixit: 'Istum pulchrum sanguinem gutturis tui sugam, et suspendam te sicut unum canem ante castellum.'" Lamp., *loc. cit.:* "ne ergo falsa spe eluderentur, se, omnibus quae haberent sublatis, carnes eorum comesturum et sanguinem bibiturum."

leaped forward from his seat and thrust his fist into the face of his would-be captor "with such force that by the single blow he hurled him in consternation headlong to the floor." [106] Nay, more. Improving on the previous symbolism of his opponent, Gunther pressed his foot down upon the neck of the prostrate Bedouin and urged his comrades to action. The effect of this piece of episcopal daring was nothing short of electrical. So promptly came response to the bishop's summons, with such correctness and precision were his orders executed, that one cannot but conclude that every move had been planned in advance.[107]

Acting upon directions from Gunther, clergymen and laymen alike fell upon the sheiks in the *cenaculum*, stripped them of swords and clothing, and bound them so tightly with their hands against their backs, that in most cases blood issued forth as the finger nails penetrated into the skin.[108] After the sheiks in the lower story had been similarly fettered, all the laymen, vociferously summoning the "Creator of all things" to their aid, eagerly resumed arms, manned the wall again, and drove off the Bedouins who under the leader's son had been left to guard the entrance to the *atrium*. So completely, according to Lambert, had the unexpected success revived the strength and spirits of the previously out-

106 The quoted words are those of Lambert (*loc. cit.*). The Annalist of Nieder-Altaich (*loc. cit.*) would have us understand that if Gunther was bold, it was because he knew he was right (i.e. he was justified in acting as he did): "Hic, hic agnosci potuit, quia iustus ut leo confidit, etc." See also Marianus, *loc. cit.*

107 *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "collumque eius pede suo pressit: 'Eia,' inquiens, 'mei, insurgite, omnesque istos comprehensos vinculis fortiter constringite, telisque suorum, qui nos impugnant, nudos opponite.' Nec mora, simul cum dicto factum est, quod iussit." It is significant that Lambert (p. 97), despite his love of detail, fails to mention that the proud bishop barbarously trampled upon his enemy, and that it was he who prescribed the effective though certainly not gentle measures which were presently applied to the sheiks. Lambert would have us think that Gunther wished to punish an "idolater" for his impiety, and that the action taken by the other pilgrims was quite spontaneous on their part.

108 Lamp., *loc. cit.;* cf. Marianus, *loc. cit.:* "omnes alii ligati sunt."

worn and discouraged pilgrims, that the Arabs, unable to conceive of any other reason for the new turn in the situation, concluded that their sheiks had been put to death. Infuriated, the members of the horde closed ranks and prepared by storm to force their way into the *atrium*.[109] Bishop Gunther, however, had both anticipated this as an eventual danger and in good season taken measures which would effectively neutralize it.[110] The naked and fettered sheiks had been exposed [111] at that point on the wall where the hostile attack was expected to be most violent and the shower of missiles thickest: above each one stood an improvised executioner holding unsheathed in his hand the sword of the sheik, and ready if necessary to dispatch him. As the Bedouins charged forward they were warned by the interpreter in the service of the pilgrims that the sheiks would be decapitated if they did not desist from attack, a warning which was reinforced by imploring cries for consideration and mercy directed to the Bedouins by the sheiks themselves. These supplications were effective at least with the sons and friends of the sheiks, who promptly did what they could with voice and gesture to stem the onslaught of their fellows.[112] But on the question as to whether the lives of the sheiks were worth more than the booty, the members of the horde divided and presently fell to fighting, thus providing the pilgrims with a respite from hostilities [113]—hostilities which, as the event proved, were not to be resumed.

[109] In the main Lambert is here supported by Marianus: "Qui vero foras erant audientes ista, irruerunt supra castellum."

[110] See *supra*, n. 107. Cf. Lamp., *loc. cit.*: "Et acta res foret, nisi mature orto consilio, etc."

[111] Cf. *supra*, n. 107.

[112] Lambert's very detailed recital (pp. 97–98) of these incidents is essentially confirmed by the much more concise account of Marianus.

[113] Marianus, *loc. cit.*: "Inde bellum inter latrones actum est, cum multi eorum elegerunt peccuniam, multi patres et amicos suos." Lamp., 98: "Per hanc occasionem paululum ab armis et incursione vacatione data, etc." *Ann. Alt.*, 69: "et hoc modo impetus impugnantium paganorum illo die quievit."

Soon afterward, and probably before the close of Easter Sunday, there came to the *atrium* a messenger who brought the comforting news that a large Saracen force was on its way to liberate the besieged. The messenger had been dispatched from Ramlah by those pilgrims whose religious scruples against fighting had on the preceding Friday caused them to submit without resistance to attack and spoliation.[114] Upon their arrival at Ramlah, the Saracen seat of government for the surrounding region, they had recited their woeful experiences to the governor and begged him go to the relief and deliverance of their fighting brethren at Kafar Sallām.[115] The emir, Mohammedan though he was, readily acceded to this request; for he reflected, says the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich, that if the pilgrims perished in such miserable slaughter no one would afterward come through that land for the sake of prayer, and in consequence he and his people would suffer serious loss.[116] When the intelligence brought by the messenger was surreptitiously communicated to the Bedouins, these immediately abandoned all thought of continuing the siege and, departing each in his own direction, swiftly vanished from sight.[117] Also, amidst the commotion and confusion which ensued in the *atrium*, it became possible for one of the captive sheiks, aided by a Saracen whom the pilgrims had employed as their guide, to effect his escape. So great was the resentment over this, that the pil-

[114] Lamp., *loc. cit.;* cf. *infra,* n. 119

[115] *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "dux regis Babyloniorum, qui praeerat in civitate Ramula, auditis his, quae fiebant, etc." Marianus, *loc. cit.:* "rogantes eum alii qui evaserunt." Ramlah (Ar Ramlah), the capital of the province of Filastīn(i.e. Palestine; see Le Strange, 303–8), was held by the Fatimites until *ca.* 1071 when it, along with Jerusalem, was captured by the Seljūq 'At-sīz ibn Abaq (*Camb. med. hist.,* V, 262). See also *infra,* n. 122.

[116] *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.* Lambert, though himself evidently not quite convinced, tries in characteristic fashion to spiritualize the emir's action (*loc. cit.*): "divino tamen, ut putabatur, instinctu animatum."

[117] Lamp., *loc. cit.* Cf. *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "Cuius adventu cognito, Arabes undique dispersi fugere, etc." Marianus (*loc. cit.*) is perhaps less accurate: "dux . . . fugans Arabitas."

grims could hardly refrain from laying hands on the culprit through whose compliance the thing had happened.[118]

At about the ninth hour (*ca.* 2:00 P.M.) of the following day, i.e. Monday, March 28, the expected governor arrived with a considerable army.[119] Though he was pacifically received in the *atrium*, many of the pilgrims were at first inclined to doubt that one "pagan" would undertake to prevent another from persecuting the Christians. Would Satan cast out Satan? [120] From these anxieties they were soon relieved by the emir, who ordered the captives to be brought before him. After he had inspected the sheiks and listened to a detailed account of what had taken place, the emir is (by Lambert) said to have expressed gratitude to the pilgrims for the splendid service they had rendered in capturing these men; for they were most bitter enemies of the government, they had for many years infested the dominions of the caliph with assiduous devastations, and in battle they had often crushed large contingents endeavoring to subdue them.[121] The sheiks were committed to guards instructed to preserve them alive for the "king of the Babylonians," i.e. Mustanṣir, the reigning though hardly ruling caliph of Cairo.[122]

[118] Lamp., *loc. cit.*

[119] *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "Sequenti igitur die hora quasi nona dux . . . ad liberandum nostros cum magna multitudine veniebat." Marianus, *loc. cit.:* "Feria vero 2. post pascha . . . venit dux de Ramula cum multa manu." Lamp., *loc. cit.:* "Nec multo post dux ipse, ut nunciatum fuerat, cum exercitu advenit."

[120] *Ibid.* Their previous experience at Tripoli (cf. *supra*, p. 19) may have rendered the pilgrims suspicious even of the regular Saracen authorities.

[121] Lamp., *loc. cit.* Cf. Marianus, *loc. cit.:* "ducem Arabitarum, inimicum multo tempore regis Sarracenorum." We know that at this time the greatest troubles of the emirs of Aleppo "were caused by the unruly Arabs of the district, the Banī Kilāb" (*Camb. med. hist.*, V, 259).

[122] Lamp., *loc. cit. Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "ipse [i.e. dux regis Babyloniorum], acceptis his, qui comprehensi erant et ligati, etc." Marianus, *loc. cit.:* "dux de Ramula . . . accepit . . . captivumque ducem Arabitarum." Holder-Egger (Lamp., *loc. cit.*, n. 3) mistakenly stated that the *rex Babiloniorum* (*sic!*) was Alp Arslān (Seljūq Sultan, 1063–1072). But at this time (1065) southern Palestine including Ramlah was still dependent on the Fatimites

Having received a consideration of five hundred golden *bezants*, the emir escorted his protégés to Ramlah, where he and the townsmen forced them against their will to remain two weeks.[123] But they were at length dismissed [124] by the emir who, in order to eliminate further peril at the hands of robbers, arranged to have them conducted to Jerusalem by a guard of light-armed youths.[125] Amid tears of joy and prayers of thanksgiving the Holy City was finally entered on April 12; [126] thirteen days were spent here, days marked by many devotions. With vows fulfilled the pilgrims departed rejoicing, and still under escort, toward Ramlah.[127] Probably they had not even yet completely exhausted their treasure, for it is said that the Bedouins, multiplied in numbers and grieving because their booty had escaped them, lay in ambush at all the approaches to the highways. Fully aware of this danger, the pilgrims determined to avoid the land

and remained thus until 1071 (cf. *supra*, nn. 50, 115). By Latin writers Cairo was, not only during the crusading period but even in the ninth century, referred to as Babylon (H. Hagenmeyer, *ed., Ekkehardi Uraugiensis abbatis Hieroslymita,* Tübingen, 1877, 57, n. 13; cf. *id., Anonymi Gesta Francorum,* Heidelberg, 1890, 274, n. 44). By *rex Babyloniorum,* therefore, the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich means the caliph of Cairo. The latter was at this time the weakling Mustanṣir (1036–1094), but actually the government of Egypt was in the hands of Turkish slaves headed by "the unscrupulous and cruel . . . Nāṣir-ad-Daulah ibn Ḥamdān (1062–1073)," who nearly ruined the Caliphate (*Camb. med. hist.,* V, 259–62; C. Huart, *Histoire des Arabes,* I, Paris, 1912, 347–48; F. Wüstenfeld, *Geschichte der Fatimiden-Chalifen,* Göttingen, 1881, 227–71).

123 Marianus, *loc. cit.:* "dux . . . accepit quingentos bisantios aureos (i.e. denarios magnos), etc." *Ann. Alt.,* 69–70: "[Dux] nostris ianuam patefecit exeundi. Qui egredientes ad civitatem Ramulam pervenere, ibique a duce et oppidanis illis retenti duas heptomadas inviti resedere." Lamp., *loc. cit.:* "Ipse, accepta a christianis quanta convenerat pecunia, secum eos Ramulo perduxit."

124 *Ann. Alt.,* 70: "Tandem igitur dimissi, etc."

125 Lamp., *loc. cit.:* "Inde adhibito eis expeditorum iuvenum presidio, ne qua denuo latronum incursione periclitarentur, usque Ierosolimam eos perduci iussit." Marianus (see *infra,* n. 127).

126 *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "II. Idus Aprilis civitatem sanctam sunt ingressi, etc."

127 *Ibid.:* "Ibidem igitur per XIII dies intima devotione vota sua Domino solventes, tandem ad Ramulam regrediuntur ovantes." Marianus, *loc. cit.:* "dux de Ramula . . . duxit christianos Hierusalem, et inde ad navem."

route through Palestine and to seek transportation by sea.[128] Such was furnished by certain merchants whose identity cannot be definitely established.[129] Having advanced the passage money, our pilgrims with the rise of a favorable wind boarded ship, probably at Jaffa,[130] and after a prosperous sail landed safely on the eighth day in the port of Laodicea.[131] Here they tarried for some days [132] before setting out on the journey through "Licia" and Asia Minor.

Meeting frequently with great difficulties and often fatigued, no doubt, by the labor of travel on foot, they wended their weary steps homeward.[133] There was gladness when

[128] *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "Arabes autem multo plures undique convenerant, omnesque aditus viarum mente crudelissima insidiantes obsederunt, quoniam extractam sibi de faucibus praedam nimium dolebant. Sed hoc nostri non ignorantes, etc." Another implication, it may be noted, of the real object of the Bedouins.

[129] *Ibid.:* "mox negociatoribus illis naulum dantes, etc." Apparently *illis* refers back to *Ramulam* (cf. *supra*, n. 127). If so, it might be inferred that the ship which the pilgrims boarded, belonged to (Saracen?) merchants of Ramlah. In the fourteenth or fifteenth century (cf. *supra*, n. 13) it was natural for pseudo-Ingulf (*loc. cit.*, 74) to conjecture that they were Genoese merchants: "Vere igitur accedente, stolus navium Januensium in portu Joppensi applicuit."

[130] On this point pseudo-Ingulf's conjecture (see the preceding note) is in all likelihood correct, since Jaffa was the port of both Ramlah and Jerusalem (Le Strange, 550–51). Möllenberg (p. 54) had apparently neglected to consult the map when he stated that the vessel was boarded at Ramlah; for Ramlah was an inland town three leagues distant from the sea-coast (Le Strange, 306). The armed escort furnished by the emir seems to have accompanied the pilgrims to the place of embarkation (cf. *supra*, n. 127).

[131] *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "ventumque aptum observantes, navem ascenderunt, prosperoque cursu octavo die in portu urbis Aliquiae applicuerunt." Marianus, *loc. cit.:* "Dominus autem vento prospero portans eos usque ad christianos." Lamp., 98–99: "Nihil deinceps (i.e. after the pilgrims left Ramlah on the outward journey) difficultatis in eundo, nihil in redeundo perpessi Liciam pervenerunt." Cf. *supra*, nn. 49–51.

[132] *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "Post aliquot ergo dies moventes exinde, etc." Lambert is anxious to explain (p. 99) how these days were spent: "gratias Deo referentes, quod emensis tot rerum asperitatibus vivos eos et incolumes in tutum restituisset."

[133] *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "quamvis non sine magno labore et difficultate, etc." Cf. Lamp., *loc. cit.:* "Ex hoc per christianorum fines reditum facientibus omnia cedebant ex sententia."

after having trudged over roads that appeared interminable they reached at length the confines of Hungary and the banks of the Danube.[134] But hardly had the pilgrims crossed the Danube [135] when the joy of approaching the fatherland was dimmed. On the river bank Gunther fell on his knees to thank God that he had arrived thus far; for now he was certain that if death should overtake him before the journey's end, faithful hands would bear his body to Bamberg.[136] Seriously ill, the bishop could proceed no farther than Oedenburg,[137] where after having made confession to his three fellow-bishops and many other clergymen, and having received the sacrament, he died on July 23.[138]

The great pilgrimage had ended with the premature death of its resourceful, valiant, and now widely mourned hero. Gunther, however, was but one of the many whose lives had been lost in this adventure. For "out of seven thousand, not two thousand returned"; and these came back "measurably attenuated in material resources." [139]

The eleventh century has often been regarded as a period of transition from the peaceful pilgrimages of the early middle ages to the military expeditions of the crusading era;

[134] *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "tamen laeti post longa viarum spacia in finibus Ungariae et in ripa Danubii fluminis tandem consedere." Lamp., *loc. cit.:* "Verum posteaquam in Ungariam ventum est, etc."

[135] *Ann. Alt., loc. cit.:* "Iam enim flumen ipsum transierant."

[136] *Ibid.*

[137] *Ibid.* Cf. *Vita Altmanni,* c. 5, p. 230: "Dum in Pannoniam perveniunt, et in Wizenburc (i.e. Stuhlweissenburg; cf. Meyer von Knonau, 450, n. 103) laetos dies ducunt, Guntherus . . . de hoc saeculo migravit, etc."

[138] The date, "X. Kal. Augusti," is recorded by both the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich, 70, and Lambert, 99, who, it may be added, almost vie with each other in lamenting the demise of this avowedly matchless man and bishop. Ekkehard (cf. *supra,* n. 16), 1065: "Guntherus . . . ab Hierosolima rediens, in Pannonia moritur, perlatusque Babenberg, ibi sepelitur."

[139] Marianus, *loc. cit.:* "nec duo milia de septem milibus reversi sunt." Ekkehard, *loc. cit.:* "numero et rebus admodum attenuati, redierunt." Sigebert (cf. *supra,* n. 16): "de septem et eo amplius milibus vix duo milia reversi sint." *Vita Altmanni, loc. cit.:* c. 4: "multos ex sociis cum rebus amiserunt."

and scholars have sought to trace the transition process along two supposedly well-marked lines of development: (1) pilgrimages of the old type—i.e. unimportant journeyings of single individuals or of a few persons traveling together—while they had by no means ceased, were gradually being supplemented by enterprises of fairly large proportions, numbering hundreds and even thousands of participants; (2) because of the rise of new conditions along the routes leading to Jerusalem, these troops of pilgrims began to travel under arms and were prepared to defend themselves against possible attacks.[140] Let it be admitted that the point first mentioned is fully validated by the testimony cited in its support. As much cannot be said for the second contention. Decisive evidence has never been adduced to prove that pilgrims, prior to the crusades, had begun to arm for defense.[141] Establishment of the fact that the greatest pilgrimage of the eleventh century was made up exclusively of unarmed men, inevitably raises the question whether any pilgrimage in the pre-crusading period really was an expedition under arms. The need for detailed investigation of this larger problem is sharply signalized by the results of the present study.

We have seen that many of our pilgrims when attacked, refused for religious reasons to defend themselves; that these non-resistants were emulating the ancient pilgrim ideal, is clear. But it is also apparent that with the others this ideal was losing, if it had not already lost, its hold; pilgrims though they were, Gunther and his followers did not hesitate

[140] See Röhricht, "Die Pilgerfahrten," 345ff.; *id., Beiträge,* II, 3ff.; Bréhier, 43ff.

[141] Both Röhricht and Bréhier indicate, in the works cited in the preceding note, that several of the large pilgrim groups were armed, but they do not illustrate this point in any specific instance except (mistakenly) that of 1064–1065. Is it possible that these scholars first misinterpreted the pilgrimage in question and then proceeded to generalize on the basis of the misinterpretation?

to fight when in their judgment it seemed advisable or necessary. But the fact that they had fought to save worldly treasure was so utterly out of harmony with the prevailing concept of the pilgrim that but a single chronicler had the courage even to suggest it.[142] Carefully dissembling or ignoring this spiritually discomforting bit of history, all the other chroniclers who describe or mention the hostilities at Kafar Sallām are at pains to justify the pilgrims for having fought at all.[143] These phenomena are not without interest; for do they not announce the advent of a new concept, one thoroughly familiar to the crusading epoch, that of the warrior pilgrim? [144]

There is yet another consideration. The recent statement that "the origin of the Holy Wars was (in no small degree) due to the expansion of the Seljūq Empire," may perhaps not be an exaggeration; but to say that "as long as the Arabs held Jerusalem the Christian pilgrims from Europe

142 Marianus (cf. *supra*, n. 83). But even he, it will be observed, only *suggests;* for after he had written that the Arabs were seeking all the money of the pilgrims, he deemed it wise to dull the edge of his statement by adding: "vel vitam pariter et peccuniam."

143 That this is true of Lambert and the Annalist of Nieder-Altaich, hardly needs to be repeated. Both Berthold and Bernold (see *supra*, n. 16) say: "Nam et bellum cum eis inire sunt coacti"; i.e. they were *compelled* to fight. Sigebert (*loc. cit.*) states that the pilgrims were besieged and that many were killed or wounded, but fails to say that they fought. Even the twelfth century biographer of Bishop Altmann nowhere indicates that the pilgrims offered resistance, but writes piously and edifyingly (*loc. cit.*, c. 4) that "in omni loco spectaculum et angelis et hominibus effecti, quia per multas tribulationes regnum Dei se intraturos elegerunt"; he had previously written, at least inaccurately, that the bishops on setting out left their wealth behind (c. 3): "cognatos et divitias reliquerunt, et per artam viam crucem baiolantes Christum secuti sunt."

144 Let it be remembered that the crusaders were, by virtue of their vows, pilgrims as well as warriors (cf. *Anonymi Gesta Francorum*, c. 1, sec. 1, ed. Hagenmeyer, p. 102, n. 6) and that in the crusading era, the comparatively meagre forces of the Latin princes in Syria were sometimes augmented by pilgrims who, though hardly crusaders in the strict sense, none the less did not disdain to render military service during their sojourn in the Holy Land (for specific instances, see Röhricht, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem,* Innsbruck, 1898, 101–2, 274, and *passim*).

could pass unmolested," [145] is to ignore or impugn well established facts. That the pilgrims did *not* pass unmolested in the third quarter of the eleventh century, is proved by the enterprise above described and, apparently, by other evidence.[146] The truth is that maltreatment of pilgrims in Palestine antedated, by many years, the Seljūq occupation of that land. Whether, as is usually assumed, the hardships were increased as a result of the establishment of Turkish domination, is a matter which, though questionable, cannot here be determined.[147] In any case the fact remains that the outrages suffered by Bishop Gunther and his companions at the hands of the Bedouins, constitute the most flagrant instance on record of the persecution of occidental Palestine pilgrims prior to the crusades. Perhaps such persecution did not of itself generate the crusading idea; but that it became one of several pretexts for the crusades and was employed, even in the Clermont address of Pope Urban II, as argument

[145] *Camb. med. hist.*, IV, 316. The context shows that the quoted statement is intended to cover the entire period of Saracen domination down to the coming of the Seljūq Turks, exception being made for the time of Ḥākim (ca. 1010).

[146] In 1054, three thousand pilgrims led by Archbishop Lietbert of Cambrai were prevented, by fear of being robbed at the hands of the Arabs, from proceeding beyond Laodicea (Röhricht, "Die Pilgerfahrten," 345, 392–93; *Beiträge*, II, 294, *s.v.* "Cambray").

[147] Bréhier's opinion (p. 51) that "non seulement la sécurité des pèlerinages en Terre Sainte était compromise, mais l'existence même du Saint-Sépulcre et des établissements latins de Jérusalem pouvait paraître remise en question," does not well accord with the following statement of Röhricht, *Gesch. d. ersten Kreuzzuges*, 233, n. 7: "Doch schonten sie [the Seljūqs Ortok, Sokman, and Il-Ghāzī] wegen der reichen Tribute der Pilger das heilige Grab." Yet even Röhricht had previously (*ibid.*, 12) said: "den Pilgern standen [i. e. after the Seljūq invasion] schwerere Drangsale als je bevor" (cf. *Beiträge*, II, 5). For this view the principal if not the only basis seems to be the possibly exaggerated and misleading representations of William of Tyre (*Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum*, cc. 6, 7, 10, in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens occidentaux*, I, Paris, 1844, 21, 24–25, 30–31). Riant, in *Archives de l'orient latin*, I, 65, says that when the Turks seized Jerusalem *"les chrétiens . . . furent épargnés."* W. B. Stevenson, in *Camb. med. hist.*, V, 269, thinks it "not likely that the occupation of Jerusalem by the Turks (1071) stirred feeling in any special manner," though "the capture of Antioch from the Greeks (1085) may have done so."

in justification of a military offensive against Islam, can hardly be doubted.[148]

Toward the close of the year 1074, Pope Gregory VII announced, in a well-known letter to Emperor Henry IV of Germany, the project of an armed expedition against the "enemies of God," an expedition in which *ultramontani* as well as Italians were expected to participate, and which was designed "usque ad sepulchrum Domini . . . pervenire." [149] It is at least an interesting fact that the most stirring account we have of the harrowing experiences and bold exploits of the pilgrims of 1065, that given in the *Annals of Nieder-Altaich*, was penned "*circa annum* 1075." [150]

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[148] Cf. D. C. Munro, "The speech of pope Urban II. at Clermont," in *American Historical Review,* XI (1906), 237, 240–42.

[149] Jaffé, *Monumenta Gregoriana,* in *Bibl. rer. Germ.,* II, Berlin, 1865, 145. Cf. *Camb. med. hist.,* V, 270–71; Bréhier, 51–53; Meyer von Knonau, II, Leipzig, 1894, 437–38, 440–43; Riant, *loc. cit.,* 56–66.

[150] See Giesebrecht's *Praefatio* in von Oefele's edition, p. xvii; and cf. *supra,* p. 4 and n. 7.

II

THE POPE'S PLAN FOR THE FIRST CRUSADE

URBAN II, who started and proposed the First Crusade, had a plan for carrying through his great project. In a general way it is possible to reconstruct the original papal program for the crusade. Urban issued definite instructions, a few of which have been preserved. He also indicated quite clearly what the aims and policy of the crusaders should be. What influence did these ideas have upon the course of events which resulted in the restoration of much of Asia Minor to the Byzantine empire, and the establishment of Latin colonies in the East? There are suggestions that the pope impressed the essential points of his plan for the crusade so deeply on the minds of the leaders that they long hesitated to deviate from such instructions. If this view is tenable, it offers a reasonable interpretation of many of the puzzling events of the crusade.

The pope first gave unity to his undertaking by formulating definite and precise aims. The heterogeneous host, headed by many lords who had little training for such a coöperative enterprise, needed the unifying influence of a clear-cut purpose, for which there was a deep and lasting religious enthusiasm. The real objective of the crusade, as it is indicated in the letters and reported speeches of the pope, was the Holy Land. The birthplace of Christianity was to be recovered and preserved from the defiling hands of the Infidels. This was the idea which fired enthusiasm

throughout the West, and put real vigor into the crusading movement. Furthermore, the crusaders were bound to fulfill this pilgrimage to Jerusalem by vows, which were pledges not lightly to be broken. The church could make deserters return to the East to complete the journey which they had sworn to carry through. The crusaders could not forget that their destination was the Holy Land. However, before this conception of uniting western Christendom in an effort to rescue the Holy Sepulchre took form, Urban II, and Gregory VII before him, had considered the possibility of sending aid to the eastern empire. This idea was incorporated in the crusade and became its secondary purpose. The pope sought to arouse sympathy for the eastern Christians, who were oppressed by the Turks, and urged the people of the West to go to their assistance as a religious duty. It is possible that he hoped the crusade would promote better feeling between the East and the West, and that this would further the movement for the reunion of the Greek and Roman churches, in which he was interested. This question of union had been the subject of negotiation between pope and emperor, and Alexius had proposed that a council be held at Constantinople to discuss the matter.[1] The pope, then, gave the crusade two aims: the recovery of the Holy Land, and the deliverance of the eastern Christians.

The men who so enthusiastically undertook these tasks also accepted his plan for accomplishing them. Urban had no intention of entrusting his armies to divine guidance, although he proclaimed that the Lord would be their leader. Such information as we have indicates that he directed the organization of the crusading movement, and had a policy which he expected would be followed. He knew that someone was needed to keep harmony among the various lay lords, and, unable to go in person, he gave the crusaders an ecclesiastical commander, Bishop Adhemar of Puy, whose

[1] Leib, *Rome, Kiev et Byzance,* Paris, 1924, 20–26.

appointment was announced at Clermont.[2] There can be no doubt about the rôle of leadership which he intended this papal legate to play, for he specifically said that the crusaders were to obey him in all things.[3] It may be assumed that Adhemar was fully informed about the pope's plan for the expedition. Urban also set a date, July 15, 1096, for the final departure of the crusading armies from the West. He did not wish people who were unfit for crusading to go. His instructions specifically eliminated old men, and women without their husbands.[4] Finally, all the armies were to gather at Constantinople to begin the war against the Turks.

The manner in which the march to the East was conducted also suggests that some common policy was followed. The crusaders were not as disorderly as has been commonly assumed. To be sure there were camp followers (*pauperes*), who were unprepared for the journey, but the majority of the crusaders had sufficient means to pay their way. The accounts show that they resorted to foraging only when they were refused markets where they could buy their food.[5] In Byzantine territory, regular arrangements were made for markets, and imperial officials took charge of the provisioning of the armies. Another reason for the march being at least as orderly as could be expected of such armies, was the desire of the crusaders to treat all Christian peoples with consideration.[6] There is every reason to believe that the

[2] Hagenmeyer, "Chronologie," in *Revue de l'orient latin,* VI (1898), no. 10.

[3] ". . . et carissimum filium Ademarum, Podiensem episcopum, huius itineris ac laboris ducem, vice nostra constituimus, ut quibus hanc uiam forte suscipere placuerit, eius iussionibus tamquam nostris pareant atque eius solutionibus seu ligationibus, quantam ad hoc negotium pertinere videbitur, omnino subjaceant." *Kreuzzugsbriefe,* ed. Hagenmeyer, Innsbruck, 1901, no. 2, pp. 136–137.

[4] "Talis enim magis sunt impedimenta quam adjumento, plus oneri quam utilitati." Robert the Monk, *Recueil, Occ.,* III, 729.

[5] This was true of the first two bands of the peasants. Duncalf, "The peasants' crusade," in *American Historical Review,* XXVI, (1921), 440–53.

[6] Bohemond gave injunctions to his people "ut boni et humiles essent et ne depredarent terram istam que Christianorum erat et nemo acciperet,

crusaders went East with no feeling of ill will toward the Greeks, whom the pope had sent them to help. The accounts of the chroniclers are colored with the hatred which developed later, but there are suggestions of what the original attitude of the westerners must have been. Thus Godfrey, Robert of Flanders, and other leaders are reported to have told the count of Toulouse that it would be wrong to fight Christians,[7] although Godfrey, himself, had been willing enough to attack the emperor a short time before. In their calmer moments these hot-headed westerners remembered that they had come to aid the Greeks, who were fellow Christians.

Up to the arrival at Constantinople, it is evident that the crusading leaders followed the pope's plan and not their own. To what extent did the pope's aims and policy influence the crusaders in the negotiation of the treaty which they made with Alexius? Unfortunately, we have no evidence of any papal instructions, and as the papal legate was injured on the way to Constantinople, we do not know that he took part in the discussion of the treaty. However, in view of the fact that the crusade was recognized to be the pope's enterprise, it is reasonable to conjecture that the crusaders were prepared to make arrangements to coöperate with the emperor, whom they were to aid against the Turks. The pope most certainly expected that Alexius would welcome the crusaders. Otherwise, he would hardly have selected Constantinople as the mobilization point for his armies.

Urban knew that the basileus wanted military help from the West. Messengers from the emperor had come to the council at Piacenza with such a request.[8] No doubt, Alexius wanted mercenaries, but he did not dream of the great

nisi quod ei sufficeret ad edendum." *Gesta Francorum,* ed. Bréhier, Paris, 1924, 20–22.

[7] *Gesta Francorum,* 32.

[8] Munro, "Did the Emperor Alexius I. ask for aid at the council of Piacenza, 1095?" in *American Historical Review,* XXVII (1922), 731–33.

religious movement which the pope would awaken. On the other hand, the pope, once he had decided to preach the crusade, most certainly thought that the crusading armies could give the emperor far more help than a few mercenaries. Urban, who optimistically hoped that Greeks and Latins could again unite in one church, did not foresee the bad feeling which the crusade was to provoke. In his enthusiasm, he planned to send forth armies inspired by his own conception of a religious war against the Infidels in which all Christians, Greek or Latin, could unite. Although he was sending an independent religious expedition and not mercenaries, the pope surely did not think that he would embarrass the emperor in what he was doing.

The emperor had asked for aid, and the pope was sending it. Did they communicate with each other? It is reasonable to assume that they did, but we have no proof of such relations. The emperor was certainly informed of the favorable reception of his request at Piacenza, where, according to Bernold, Urban asked "many" to take oaths to aid the emperor.[9] The expectation of such aid should have caused Alexius to seek further information as to when and how it was coming. On the other hand, the pope, who was planning to send the crusaders through the Byzantine empire, should have had foresight enough to inform the emperor that they were coming, and should have been interested in making arrangements for the reception of his armies in the East. One of the western lords did take the precaution to announce his coming to Alexius.[10] There are historical rumors of an exchange of letters, and even of an embassy from the pope to the basileus, but they lack the certainty of historical evidence.[11] From the council of Piacenza to the

[9] Bernold, in *M. G. SS.*, V, 462.

[10] Riant, "Inventaire," in *Archives de l'orient latin*, I, no. LVI, pp. 120–21.

[11] Riant discusses these letters in his "*Inventaire*," nos. XLVIII, LI, LXIV, LXXI.

arrival of the crusaders in the Byzantine empire, the relations between the East and the West are veiled in tantalizing obscurity.

In the absence of all knowledge of any previous understanding between the pope and the emperor, we can only conjecture what was the attitude of the crusaders on the one hand and of the emperor on the other. Was the emperor willing to accept the help of the crusaders? No doubt he was surprised at the religious character of the movement as well as by the great number of people who had enlisted in the pope's armies. It is also frequently assumed that he was afraid the crusaders would forget their crusading purpose and become ambitious to conquer his territory. Chalandon, for example, believes that the pope did the emperor a great injustice in sending this horde of westerners into the empire.[12] To be sure, the westerners were troublesome fellows to handle, but it may be doubted if they caused the emperor as much embarrassment as many writers would have us believe. Even if Alexius was badly informed of the character of the crusade, he was surely astute enough to find out quickly from the crusaders themselves that they had come to help him, and that they had no intentions of taking any of his territory. He might have suspected the intentions of his former enemy, Bohemond, and thought that the armies contained other adventurers of the same kind. However, it should have been evident to the emperor that the expedition as a whole was bound for Jerusalem where the crusaders intended to fulfill their vows, and that on the way through Asia Minor they would fight the Turks. If the crusaders, then, pursued the aims which the pope had given them, the emperor had no more to fear from them than an occasional outbreak of western violence. On the other hand, he would profit from the war which the crusaders intended to wage

[12] Chalandon, *Essai sur le regne d'Alexis I Comnène, Paris,* 1900, 155–66.

with the Turks. There is no indication that the emperor had any thought of not accepting the aid of the crusade. Did he have the intention of accepting it as the pope intended him to have it? The pope had sent an independent expedition which had as its main purpose the recovery of the Holy Land. If the emperor had tried and succeeded in making mercenaries out of the crusaders, he would have broken up the pope's enterprise.

Alexius seems to have made some effort to do this. He adopted the policy of inviting the leaders to come to Constantinople ahead of their armies so that he could negotiate with them separately. He attempted to influence them by promising them splendid gifts if they would accept the terms which he proposed. One by one, the leaders took an oath to him, and according to the accounts he seems to have had little trouble in coming to terms with most of them. If these original oaths were like the final treaty, the leaders obligated themselves to restore such imperial territory as they might conquer from the Turks, and there is no indication that they were not willing to do this. However, the anonymous author of the *Gesta* indicates that the leaders felt that they were in some way forced to take oaths that were unfair to them, and that they did not swear willingly.[13]

The old count of Toulouse, Raymond, was stubborn, and would not swear to the same oath as that which the other leaders had taken. His reasons for not doing so are suggestive. The others had sworn homage and fealty to Alexius, thereby becoming his vassals, although in what manner we

[13] "Novissime vero congregati omnes majores natu qui Constantinopoli erant, timentes ne sua privarentur patria, reperunt in suis consiliis atque ingeniosis schematibus quod nostrorum duces, comites seu omnes majores imperatori sacramentum fideliter facere deberent. Quod omnino prohibuerunt dixeruntque: 'Certe indigni sumus atque justum nobis videtur nullatenus ei sacramentum jurare.'

"Forsitan adhuc a nostris majoribus sepe delusi erimus; ad ultimum quid facturi erunt? Dicent quoniam necessitate compulsi, volentes nolentesque humiliaverunt se ad nequissimi imperatoris voluntatem!" *Gesta,* ed. Bréhier, 30.

do not know.[14] It is of course possible that the westerners did this because they were familiar with no other form of treaty or contract than that between lord and vassal. However that may be, it is clear that Raymond objected to this implication of vassalage. He said that he had not come to get another lord, or to fight for any other lord than the one for whom he had left his country and his patrimonial possessions. Nevertheless, he was willing to pledge himself, his men, and all his wealth if the emperor would go with an army to Jerusalem. However, the emperor excused himself by saying that he had to stay and defend his empire.[15] The *Gesta* says that Raymond swore to respect the life and honor of the emperor, but when asked to take the oath of homage he declared that he would not do so on peril of his head.[16] Raymond, then, was willing to coöperate with the emperor as an independent ally, but objected to an oath by which he would become a vassal. It may be suggested that the old count, who was closely associated with the papal legate, was following the papal ideas in that he did not intend to be diverted from the main purpose of the crusade.

It may be that Raymond attached too much importance to the oath of homage. On the other hand it may be that his obstinacy forced the other leaders who may have wavered

[14] Whether they were to receive fiefs is not clear. The *Gesta,* ed. Bréhier, 30, says that Bohemond was promised territory north of Antioch.

[15] ". . . postulat imperator a comite hominium et juramenta, quae ceteri principes ei fecerant. Respondit comes: 'Se ideo non venisse, ut dominum alium faceret, aut alii militaret, nisi illi propter quem patriam et bona patriae suae dimiserat. Et tamen fore, si imperator cum exercitu iret Iherusalem, quod se et suos et sua omnia illi committeret.' Sed imperator excusat iter, dicens: 'Praetermetuere se Alemannos et Ungaros, et Comanos, aliasque feras gentes, quae imperium suum depopularentur, si ipse transitum cum peregrinis faceret.'" Raymond of Agiles, *Recueil, occ.,* III, 238.

[16] "Mandavit itaque imperator comiti ut faceret ei hominium et fiduciam sicut alii fecerunt. Et dum imperator hec mandavit comes meditabatur qualiter vindictam de imperatoris exercitu habere posset. . . . Igitur comes, accepto consilio a suis, Alexio vitam et honorem juravit, quod nec per se nec per alium ei aufere consentiat, cumque de hominio appellaretur, non se pro capitis periculo id facturum respondit." *Gesta,* ed. Bréhier, 32

to get in line with him. At any rate, the terms of the treaty show that the crusaders were really allies of the emperor for the war against the Turks in Asia Minor and perhaps for the whole crusade. They pledged themselves to restore to Alexius "whatever lands or cities they captured which had once belonged to the empire, and which were now in the hands of its enemies." In return, the emperor promised "to give military aid to the crusaders on land and sea, and eventually to assume command in person of the Greek forces coöperating with the Franks, to furnish them with markets where they could buy food during the campaign, to make reparation for all losses sustained by the Franks, and to guarantee the safety of all pilgrims passing through the Byzantine Empire." [17] These terms indicate that the crusade was to go on its way as the pope intended. If the emperor had tried to divert the leaders and make mercenaries of them, he had failed. He was forced to accept the aid of the pope in the form in which it had been sent to him. It would seem that Urban's policy triumphed at Constantinople. How much longer did it continue to direct the crusade?

Two factors threatened to break down the force of the original ideas which Urban had held about the crusade. First, the ambition to make conquests for themselves grew in the minds of the leaders as they marched southward, and this produced factions which threatened to break up the unity of the crusade. Although they had left the West without any well defined plans of their own, they now began to formulate individualistic policies. In the second place the attitude of friendliness toward the eastern Christians began to weaken. Greek and Latin were unable to coöperate with each other, because they failed to understand each other's point of view. Nevertheless the crusaders seem to have been faithful to the treaty. As a result of their campaign, the emperor was able to gain possession of much of Asia Minor,

[17] Summary of treaty in Yewdale, *Bohemond I, prince of Antioch,* 44.

and he certainly had little cause to complain of the aid which the pope had sent him. Furthermore, the crusaders seem to have remained friendly to the Greeks, and to have stuck to their general plan until they reached Antioch. When in camp near this city, Anselm of Ribemonte wrote home that the mother western church should rejoice to have produced such sons, who not only had made such names for themselves, but had aided the eastern church in such a wonderful manner.[18] The spirit with which Urban had inspired them was not yet dead.

Although it may be pushing too far what is after all a theory, it may be suggested that Raymond of Toulouse was again the defender of the papal ideas of the crusade at Antioch. Bohemond departed from the papal policy in two ways. He deserted the main expedition in order to secure Antioch for himself, and he also started a campaign of hatred against the Greeks. His argument that Antioch should not be restored to the emperor because the basileus had not kept his pledges to the crusaders, clearly had great weight. Alexius had given the westerners reason to be suspicious of his intentions. Nevertheless, to break with the Greeks meant a departure from the plan of the crusade, and this Raymond and the other leaders did not wish to do. They insisted on giving the emperor a chance to make good, and sent messengers to him asking him to come and take Antioch and fulfill his pledges. Although it may be said that they were trying to thwart Bohemond's ambition because of personal hatred for him, it is nevertheless true that they were loyal to the pope's ideas, and Bohemond was the insurgent.

That this was clearly understood is shown by the letter of April or July, 1098, which the leaders wrote to the pope,

[18] ". . . gaudeat mater Occidentalis ecclesia! quae tales genuit, qui et sibi tam gloriosum nomen adquirerent et Orientali ecclesiae tam mirabiliter succurerent." *Kreuzzugsbriefe,* no. viii, pp. 145–46.

where an effort was made to explain the change in policy which had taken place in the crusade. After announcing the death of the papal legate, Adhemar, the leaders asked the pope to come over and take charge of his expedition.[19] They had been able to conquer the Turks and the pagans, but they had not been able to overcome the heretics, namely the Greeks, Armenians, Syrians, and Jacobites, and they asked the pope to come and eradicate those peoples.[20] The easterners, including their allies, the Greeks, had ceased to be fellow Christians; instead they were heretics. This letter is supposed to be Bohemond's work and he added a postscript which the other leaders probably did not see, in which he asked the pope to release his sons from their oaths to the unjust emperor who had promised much and done little. This was Norman propaganda. Raymond and other leaders continued to be friendly to the emperor and did not regard the Greeks in an unfriendly way. Laodicea, which is south of Antioch, was handed over to the Greeks, and when Bohemond later attempted to take it he was driven off by Raymond and other leaders who were returning from Jerusalem.

Bohemond's example encouraged all the leaders to try to win cities for themselves, and in the end it was the common folk who forced the leaders to relinquish such ambitions, and go on with the main business of the crusade. When this was accomplished by the capture of Jerusalem, and the crusaders had fulfilled their vows, most of them prepared to return home. It became necessary, therefore, to provide for the permanent defense of the Holy City. Can we find any indica-

[19] ". . . et bellum, quod tuum proprium est, ex tua parte conficias." *Ibid.*, no. xvi, p. 164.

[20] ". . . nos enim Turcos et paganos expugnauimus, haereticos autem, Graecos et Armenos, Iacobitasque expugnare nequiuimus, mandamus igitur et remandamus tibi, carissimo patri nostro, ut tu pater et caput ad tuae paternitatis locum uenias, et qui beati Petri es vicarius, in cathedra eius sedeas et nos filios tuos in omnibus recte agendis oboedientes habeas, et omnes hareses, cuiuscumque generis sint, tua auctoritate et nostra uirtute eradices et destruas." *Ibid.*

tion of papal policy in the arrangement which was made for this purpose?

The pope seems to have intended to have the crusaders make conquests in the Holy Land. He held out inducements to the western lords by telling them that it was a "land flowing with milk and honey." Some of the leaders accepted the pope's suggestion. Raymond took an oath to spend the rest of his life in the East, and Godfrey disposed of his western holdings. Bohemond, we may be sure, expected to find a better principality than he could hope to acquire in Italy. The pope then and the crusaders had intentions of conquest. Now it is not probable that the pope intended the crusaders to occupy any territories which the Greek emperor might claim legitimately. The readiness of the crusaders to pledge themselves to restore imperial territory suggests that they may have been instructed to do so by the pope. On the other hand, it is reasonable to believe that Urban did intend the westerners to keep the Holy Land, in which he and the people of the West had such religious interest. It may be that Alexius objected to this idea and he could, of course, claim that Syria and Palestine had once been part of the empire.[21] However, if the pope had told the crusaders that they could have the Holy Land, Alexius, in order to get back Asia Minor, had to let them have their way. The treaty evidently drew a line between what was to be restored and what was presumably open to western conquest.

Did the pope plan for a church state in the Holy Land? In the absence of any statement by him, and because it is impossible to find any indication of a recognition of papal plans in what happened at Jerusalem, we cannot say. The papal legate was dead, and although the clerical party attempted to set up a church state, the lay leaders were con-

[21] Chalandon, *Alexis*, 165, says, "Kugler ne paraît pas avoir compris les idées d'Alexis, lorsqu'il dit que Byzance eût dû se contenter de l'Asie Mineure et laisser la Syrie et Antioche aux croisés. Renoncer sur un seul point aux droits de Byzance, c'eût été manquer à la tradition impériale."

cerned about providing for the military occupation of what had been conquered. However, Raymond, whom we have found defending what seemed to be the papal plan before, declined the kingship with the cryptic remark that he would not wear a crown of gold where Christ had worn a crown of thorns. Godfrey, furthermore, did not receive the title of king, but was made advocate or Defender of the Holy Sepulchre. Later, when Daimbert, the papal legate, became patriarch of Jerusalem, Godfrey and Bohemond received title to their possessions from him. Perhaps there is a suggestion in all this that the crusaders were still showing regard for what they knew the pope wanted. If so, the policy of Urban had influence with them to the very end of the crusade. It would seem that amid all the changing circumstances through which the crusaders passed they did not depart from what they knew were the intentions of the pope without great hesitation. If some of them forgot the spirit and aims of the undertaking, the others recalled them to the task which the pope had given them. They were self-seeking and ambitious enough, it is true, but is it not a safe premise to assume that their medieval religious consciences never allowed them to disregard entirely the aims and plan which the pope had made them vow to fulfill?

FREDERIC DUNCALF

III

A NEGLECTED PASSAGE IN THE *GESTA* AND ITS BEARING ON THE LITERATURE OF THE FIRST CRUSADE

EVEN in this sophisticated age diplomatic discussion is usually regarded with distrust by the laity. It should, therefore, be a matter of little surprise to find that, in the simple days of the First Crusade, suspicion was aroused by the negotiations between Alexius and the Latin leaders. Such natural perplexity, however, is inadequate to account fully for the tangled fashion in which the outcome of those negotiations is described in the anonymous *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolymitanorum*. The complete passage deserves to be quoted:

> Forsitan adhuc a nostris majoribus sepe delusi erimus; ad ultimum quid facturi erunt? Dicent quoniam, necessitate compulsi, volentes nolentesque humiliaverunt se ad nequissimi imperatoris voluntatem. *Fortissimo autem viro Boamundo, quem valde timebat, quia eum sepe cum suo exercitu ejecerat de campo, dixit quoniam, si libenter ei juraret, XV dies eundi terre in extensione ab Antiochia retro daret et VIII in latitudine; eique tali modo juravit ut, si ille fideliter teneret illud sacramentum, iste suum nunquam preteriret.* Tam fortes et tam duri milites, cur hoc fecerunt. Propterea igitur quia multi coacti erant necessitate.[1]

The middle portion of this quotation has been italicized

[1] This passage occurs without important variation, apparently, in the six manuscript copies of the work as listed by Bréhier. It is accepted in the printed editions of J. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, Hanoviae, 1611, 4, of the French Academy (*R. C. O.*, III, 125), of Hagenmeyer (*HG.*, 171–172), of Miss Lees, 11, and of Bréhier, 30.

by the writer of this article. The unitalicized portions seem clear enough and should strike a sympathetic chord in those who have suffered from diplomatic dealings. Taken in connection with the intervening portion, however, the passage presents numerous incongruities. The unitalicized sentences deal with the Latin leaders in the plural, while the italicized portion is concerned with only one. The unitalicized portions imply disadvantages to all the leaders, while the other clearly specifies a marked advantage to one of them. If the writer had belonged to some other band—Raymond's perhaps—there might have been some justification for the condemnatory tone of the introductory and concluding remarks. Since all the evidence, however, indicates that the writer of this account was one of Bohemond's own devoted followers, confusion becomes worse confounded. Surely he could not have begrudged his leader the prospect of this desirable material reward in addition to the promised spiritual riches which his arduous labors held forth! And if he did, why blame all the leaders when only one was thus implicated?

But, quite apart from the obvious verbal incongruities of this passage, the italicized statement presents difficulties later in the account. Antioch became the subject of much

Abbreviations of titles used in these notes:

Anna—Annae Comnenae *Alexiadis,* libri XV, ed. by L. Schopen and A. Reifferscheid, Bonn, 1878.

Bréhier—L. Bréhier, *Histoire anonyme de la première croisade,* Paris, 1924.

HEp.—H. Hagenmeyer, *Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus dem Jahren 1088–1100,* Innsbruck, 1901.

HG.—H. Hagenmeyer, *Anonymi Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolymitanorum,* Heidelberg, 1890.

Lees—Beatrice A. Lees, *Anonymi Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolymitanorum,* Oxford, 1924.

M. G. SS.—*Monumenta Germaniae historica: Scriptores,* ed. G. Pertz, Hanover, 1826ff.

Raymond—Raimundi de Aguilers *Historia Francorum* (*R. C. O.,* III).

R. C. O.—*Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens occidentaux,* publié par les soins de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 5 vols., Paris, 1841–1895.

Ralph—Radulfi Cadomensis *Gesta Tancredi* (*R. C. O.,* III).

discussion among the Latin leaders both during its siege and after its capture. Not once does the author of the *Gesta Francorum* again allude to this grant from Alexius to Bohemond. Indeed, it is from the *Gesta* that we learn the specific object of the embassy of Hugh the Great and Baldwin of Hainault, who were sent to Alexius by the council of the Latin leaders after the capture of Antioch. The statement runs that they were to invite Alexius "ut ad recipiendum civitatem veniret et conventiones, quas erga illos habebat, expleret." [2] Bohemond himself was present at this council and presumably acquiesced in sending the envoys. Strange conduct, truly, of one to whom that emperor had already granted that city and ample territory about it! Still more strange for the writer who had recorded that previous grant to be silent about its bearing upon the controversy which led to the despatch of the embassy! The two passages are flatly contradictory.

Some light may be thrown on the matter, perhaps, by reference to the *Hierosolymita* of Ekkehard of Aura. According at Hagenmeyer, whose proof on this point is generally accepted, the "libellus" which Ekkehard saw at Jerusalem in the early months of 1102 and which he cited as the source of his information on the First Crusade was the *Gesta Francorum*.[3] Ekkehard also described the result of the negotiations between Alexius and the Latin leaders, but apparently knew nothing of a secret grant to Bohemond. His statement of the agreement was that all the Latin leaders bound themselves "ut urbes quasque suo imperio detractas pristinae ditioni, si vincerent, redderent, ipsique vicissim tam armis quam stipendiis regiis infra metam eandem se foveri non dubitaverunt." [4] If the first part of this statement were in-

[2] Bréhier, 160.

[3] Hagenmeyer, H. "Das Verhältniss der Gesta Francorum zu dem Hierosolymita Ekkehards von Aura," in *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte,* XV, 19–42.

[4] *M. G. SS.,* VI, 216. Also in *R. C. O.,* V, 21.

serted in place of the italicized portion in the *Gesta*, all difficulties would disappear. The incongruities of the passage itself would cease, and the questions aroused by later discussion of the return of Antioch to Alexius would no longer exist.

The addition of Ekkehard's testimony would establish the story of the secret agreement as an interpolation, were it not for the fact that Baldric of Dol, Guibert of Nogent, Robert of Rheims, and Tudebode of Civray do not support Ekkehard in this statement. All of them copied the *Gesta* more fully than did Ekkehard. Guibert and Tudebode repeat the story of the agreement, as does also one manuscript of Baldric.[5] The other manuscripts of Baldric and the account of Robert do not mention the specific general agreement recited by Ekkehard. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that all four of these writers, contemporaries of the First Crusade, were writing their accounts within a decade after the crusade itself.[6] To accept their testimony and reject that of Ekkehard would still leave the awkward inconsistencies already discussed, while to retain Ekkehard's version against their testimony would require an explanation which thus far has not been made. The writer believes that there is such an explanation, and that it must be sought in the events which occurred about Antioch during the years of 1098 to 1105.

The first question to be settled in this controversy between Ekkehard's account and that of his four contemporaries is the truth of the statement involved. Was there such an agreement between Alexius and Bohemond regarding Antioch? According to H. von Sybel there was none. Hagen-

[5] Guiberti *Gesta Dei per Francos* (*R. C. O.*, IV, 155), Petri Tudebodi *Historia de Hierosolymitana itinere* (*R. C. O.*, III, 22) and Baldrici *Historia Hierosolymitana* (Codex G. variant, *R. C. O.*, IV, 25).

[6] See A. Molinier, *Les sources de l'histoire de France*, II, Paris, 1902. The work of Baldric is dated shortly after 1107 (pp. 282–83), of Guibert 1108–1112 (p. 283) and of Robert 1107 or even before that date (p. 282).

meyer, always loath to admit any reflection upon the accuracy of the *Gesta*, felt constrained to accept Sybel's argument. He excuses the author for inserting it on the ground that it was camp gossip to account for Bohemond's willingness to coöperate with Alexius. Chalandon, however, accepts the story of the separate agreement on the theory that Alexius, embarrassed by the presence of so many Latins, probably made some such vague, verbal concession in order to avoid Bohemond's persistent importunities for other favors. Yewdale has assailed this view of Chalandon, and has reasserted the conclusion of von Sybel.[7]

If there had existed such an agreement, some evidence of it should appear in the later conduct of the two principals to it. Bohemond had at least three clear opportunities to assert such an agreement to his own advantage. The first occurred during the siege of Antioch when the question of possession was discussed among the Latin leaders. It was Bohemond who proposed the discussion, not, however, on the basis of an agreement he had with Alexius. Instead, having reached an understanding with Firuz, the traitor within Antioch, Bohemond proposed that the Latin leaders agree to grant possession of the town to the one who should first obtain entrance to it.[8]

The second opportunity came after Antioch was securely in the possession of the crusaders. The other Latin leaders, repenting of their hasty acceptance of Bohemond's sporting proposition, reopened the matter by asserting that they had

[7] H. von Sybel, *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzuges, Düsseldorf,* 1841, 273; *HG.*, 172 n. 20; F. Chalandon, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis 1er Comnène,* Paris, 1900, 186, and the same author's *Histoire de la première croisade,* Paris, 1925, 137. R. B. Yewdale, *Bohemond I, prince of Antioch,* Princeton, 1922, 43.

[8] Bréhier, 100–103. See also discussion by Hagenmeyer (*HG.*, 293–300). The episode of the betrayal of Antioch to Bohemond as the basis for Bohemond's claim to Antioch appears also in the letter of Bohemond to Pope Urban II (*HEp.*, 162). The opposition of Count Raymond of Toulouse is indicated by his chaplain (*R. C. O.*, III, 268).

no right to give Bohemond possession of the town, because it came within the territory they had promised to return to Alexius. Here, surely, was the occasion for Bohemond to step forward and assert his agreement. He failed to do so. Instead, he argued that that agreement was no longer binding since Alexius had failed to live up to his obligations under it.[9] Strange action on the part of one who had a secret agreement! Even assuming a certain delicacy on Bohemond's part at revealing a secret arrangement, such delicacy would scarcely have justified charges of bad faith against his benefactor. The action taken by the Latin leaders, Bohemond included, was to send Hugh the Great and Baldwin of Hainault to invite Alexius to receive Antioch and fulfill his promise of further aid to the crusade. The last clause of the message was doubtless a concession to Bohemond's argument. This whole affair would indicate a tacit admission on Bohemond's part that the general agreement of all the crusaders included Antioch, as well as a denial of a secret agreement in his own behalf.[10]

The third opportunity to assert his separate agreement, if there were one, came in 1099 when the crusaders, returning from Jerusalem, vigorously opposed Bohemond's attempt to capture Laodicea. This seaport was held by the Greeks, and was clearly within the fifteen by eight days' journey around Antioch. With every prospect of success against the Greeks, who held the town, Bohemond was forced to relinquish the siege because the other Latin leaders insisted that Laodicea belonged to Alexius, under the terms of their agreement with the latter. Bohemond reluctantly yielded when it became clear that the others would actually

[9] This appears most pointedly in the letter of Bohemond to the pope (*HEp.*, 165) but runs as a thread through all the discussion between the Latin leaders about the possession of Antioch (Bréhier, 100–170 *passim*). See also account of Raymond (*R. C. O.*, III, 267).

[10] Bohemond's letter (*HEp.*, 162–65) is the most positive evidence for this inference.

take the field against him. The representations of the other leaders were so convincing that the Archbishop Daimbert, in charge of the Pisan fleet which was aiding Bohemond, turned from the siege and used his best efforts to reconcile the Latin leaders. Laodicea was restored to the Greeks.[11] Why did Bohemond fail to assert his separate agreement, if not to the other Latin leaders, at least to the Pisan Archbishop, who could not have been offended by it?

A somewhat more positive indication of Bohemond's view of the matter may be inferred from his conduct when the crusaders definitely left the environs of Antioch on the last stage of their expedition to take Jerusalem. There was no reason to fear any immediate renewal of danger from the Turks. The crusaders expected him to come with them on that final march. After feigning to do so, he turned back again to Antioch with his army and remained there.[12] Why? The only real explanation must be his fear that Alexius was coming to take the city and his determination to prevent that by force, if necessary.

The matter of Bohemond's view and attitude regarding Antioch fortunately has confirmation in his own words. He wrote a letter to Pope Urban in September, 1098, which, while purporting to be an official report of progress in the name of all the leaders, is really a plea to obtain papal sanction for his own possession of Antioch.[13] Early in the letter is the statement "ego Boemundus, conventione facta cum

[11] This dispute among the Latin leaders regarding Laodicea is discussed most fully in Alberti Aquensis *Historia Hierosolymitana* (*R. C. O.*, IV, 500–504). Albert received important confirmation in the brief allusion to the dispute by Archbishop Daimbert (*HEp.*, 173). The status of Laodicea during the First Crusade is fully discussed by C. W. David, *Robert Curthose*, Cambridge, 1920, 230–44.

[12] Bréhier, 186. See also account of Albert of Aix (*R. C. O.*, IV, 453) and of Raymond (*R. C. O.*, III, 286).

[13] Parts of this letter (*HEp.*, 162–65) have been under suspicion as not genuine. Hagenmeyer's discussion of the evidence, however, (*HEp.*, Introd., pp. 93–100 and notes, pp. 356–57) leaves little room for doubt regarding its genuineness.

quodam Turco, qui ipsam mihi traditit civitatem," clearly an exposition of Bohemond's justification for holding the city. Later the writer invites Urban to come and establish his seat in Antioch, "Petri—in cathedra," assuring him that "nos filios per omnia tibi oboedientes" would with him become "adquisitores totius Romaniae, Ciliciae, Asiae, Syriae." Bohemond's thought is quite clear. With the pope at Antioch, no Latin would question his right to hold it, and Alexius could challenge it only at the risk of war with all of western Christianity. And even if the pope did not accept the invitation, would he not be pleased at this evidence of filial piety, and extend his sanction to Bohemond's possession of the place? Such strategy on Bohemond's part well became the son of Guiscard, who, on another occasion and from another pope, obtained sanction for his hold in southern Italy by a similar display of humility. But the real travail of conscience which prompted this magnificent offer of penance is fully disclosed toward the end of the letter. Speaking of Alexius, he petitions the pope, "Tu vero nos—pater piissime, debes separare ab iniusto imperatore, qui multa bona promisit nobis, sed minime fecit. Omnia enim mala et impedimenta quaecumque facere potuit, nobis fecit." Bohemond is not holding Antioch by virtue of a grant from Alexius. He is holding it by a breach of the general agreement which all the leaders had made with that emperor, and he is seeking to justify it by accusing the latter of an antecedent breach of contract.

It scarcely seems necessary to analyze the conduct of Alexius for traces of such an agreement. His failure to instruct the Greek garrisons of towns within the territory of the supposed grant to turn over their fortresses to Bohemond would not support the theory of such an agreement. When the embassy of the crusaders inviting him to receive Antioch arrived, he despatched representatives to take over the city from Bohemond. These envoys, deriving no comfort

from Bohemond, complained bitterly against him to the Latins at Arka.[14] Again, the action of Alexius in reinforcing the Greek garrison at Laodicea against Bohemond in 1099 indicated clearly that he recognized no such grant. Finally, his determined attack upon Bohemond by land and sea in 1104 quite settled the question of his views on the matter. This attack was preceded by a renewal of the demand that Bohemond return those lands, in accordance with the general agreement of 1097.[15]

There was, therefore, no secret agreement between Alexius and Bohemond whereby the latter was to receive Antioch and territory fifteen days' journey long and eight days' journey wide around it. Even accepting Chalandon's view, that Alexius, to escape from a serious predicament, made some such insincere verbal promise to Bohemond, it would still be necessary to explain why Bohemond did not capitalize that promise. Bohemond was not quite so simple as that. That wily leader could safely be counted upon to make use of any such verbal commitment in exactly opposite proportion to its definiteness and sincerity. His failure to assert any such agreement, despite the many opportunities to do so, is, therefore, only the more convincing of its non-existence. The story of that agreement is a legend. There remains, then, the task of determining when and how it crept into the copy of the *Gesta*, and why it appeared in the copies used by Tudebode, Guibert, and Baldric and not in that used by Ekkehard.

The protracted discussion of the possession of Antioch among the crusaders from the first half of 1098 to the end of 1099 made the questions involved a matter of common knowledge to all the Latins in the East. All accounts by those who were present, and this includes the author of the

[14] This is mentioned in the account of Raymond (*R. C. O.*, III, 286). See also discussion by Chalandon, *Alexis*, 213–15 and by Yewdale, *op. cit.*, 83.

[15] Anna, XI, 9, pp. 111–12. See also Chalandon, *Alexis*, 233.

Gesta, agree that Antioch came within the territory which the Latin leaders had agreed to turn over to Alexius.[16] The only question was that raised by Bohemond, whether the emperor's failure to continue sending money, supplies, and reinforcements constituted a sufficient breach of contract to absolve the Latin leaders from this obligation. On this there were differences of opinion. Raymond clearly did not think so. The conduct of Counts Raymond, Robert of Normandy, and Robert of Flanders at Laodicea in 1099 implied that Raymond's view was shared by others. At any rate, there was no unanimity among the Latins on this question. In view of all the discussion, the crusading army afforded poor soil for the germination and growth of a legend which represented Alexius as having given Antioch to Bohemond. It is, therefore, highly improbable that it had risen in the East before 1100.

The legend is so obviously in the interests of Bohemond as to suggest that its development must be sought in connection with his career. Bohemond was undisturbed in his possession by Alexius in 1100. In the summer of that year Bohemond was taken captive by the Turks, a captivity in which he remained for three years.[17] Antioch was held during that time by Tancred. Alexius was so preoccupied with cares in the West during those years that he was unable even to make gesture toward the recovery of Antioch.[18] Tancred's affairs there prospered, and no occasion had arisen to necessitate such a legend. In fact, there was every reason to suppose that the Latin title to Antioch might be matured through continued possession.

Matters took a different turn toward the end of 1103. Bohemond, finally released from captivity through ransom,

[16] Bréhier, 160, Raymond (*R. C. O.*, III, 267), Hagenmeyer, *Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia Hierosolymitana*, 258.

[17] Fulcher (ed. Hagenmeyer, 346, 456–60); Ralph (*R. C. O.*, III, 709).

[18] Chiefly in dealing with new crusaders from the West. See Chalandon, *Alexis*, 217–32.

had resumed possession of Antioch. At the same time Alexius was relieved of the more pressing problems in the West, and could devote himself to the East. After a preliminary demand that Bohemond return Antioch and adjacent territory in accordance with the general agreement of 1097, Alexius made war upon him in dead earnest both by land and by sea. The campaign opened up in the spring of 1104.[19] With the Turks also active against him, Bohemond found himself in serious danger of losing Antioch. It was well on in the summer of that year that he determined upon his new policy of seeking aid in the West for a campaign against Alexius. Entrusting Antioch once more to Tancred, he embarked for the West in the fall, and arrived at Bari, January, 1105.[20]

Meanwhile, important developments had occurred in the western reputation of Alexius. There had been complaints and grumblings on the part of the Latins in the First Crusade. Most of these were unjustified, and due in large part to misunderstanding. Alexius was sensitive to the dangers which his reputation might suffer, and he not only made efforts to conciliate the leaders of the crusade, but also, seeking to gain favor in the West, wrote letters to the abbot of Monte Cassino.[21] The main expedition had proceeded to a successful conclusion without raising a definite issue between itself and Alexius. Only Bohemond was definitely ill-disposed toward him at that time. But, if Bohemond was ill-disposed, Raymond of Toulouse was correspondingly well-disposed, while the attitude of the rest ranged between

19 See n. 15.

20 Fulcher (ed. Hagenmeyer, 467), Anonymi Barensis *Chronicon*, in Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum scriptores.*, V, 155. See also discussion Yewdale, *op. cit.*, 102 and Chalandon, *Alexis*, 236–37.

21 Two letters to the abbot of Monte Cassino, one written in 1097, the other in 1098, have been edited by Hagenmeyer (*HEp.*, 140–41 and 152–53). Both contain lavish assurances of good will toward all the Latins as well as toward the abbot himself. Regarding the date of the second letter see A. C. Krey, *The First Crusade*, Princeton, 1921, 290.

these extremes. The ill-fated expedition of 1101–1102, which suffered so much on the march across Asia Minor, helped to blacken the reputation of Alexius. Fearful of this result, Alexius had asked Bishop Manasses of Barcelona to reassure the pope that he was blameless for the misfortunes of that expedition.[22] According to Albert of Aix, the report which Manasses made at the Council of Benevento in 1102 so completely convinced that body of the treachery of Alexius that Pope Paschal straightway commissioned the bishop to preach throughout the West against Alexius.[23] Whether Albert is entirely credible or not, the fact remains that the West was quite generally disposed to regard Alexius with distrust and suspicion. This was the situation which Bohemond found upon his arrival in Italy.

By 1105, therefore, the conditions necessary to promote the legend of the grant of Antioch to Bohemond by Alexius were fully developed. Alexius had acquired a general reputation as a breaker of promises, deceitful and treacherous. Alexius had attacked Bohemond in the possession of Antioch. Bohemond was seeking help in the West for an attack upon Alexius. Pope Paschal, having heard repeated complaints against Alexius, was disposed to favor the cause of Bohemond and lend his full support.[24] What more natural, therefore, than a general belief that Bohemond was only another victim of the broken promises of Alexius? Indeed, such a legend regarding Antioch might easily have arisen under the conditions without any active aid from Bohemond. He might truly have found it difficult to refute, had he so desired. Whether the veterans of the First Crusade would ac-

[22] The most extended discussion is that by Albert (*R. C. O.*, IV, 584–85). Cf. Hagenmeyer, *Ekkehard*, 235–37.

[23] It is not impossible that Albert has confused the mission of Bishop Manasses in 1102 with the commission to Bishop Bruno in 1106. See n. 30.

[24] Bartolfi de Nangeio *Gesta Francorum Hierusalem expugnantium* (R. C. O., III, 538); A. Lecoy de la Marche, *Œuvres complètes de Suger*, 30; A. Le Prevost, *Orderici Vitalis historiae ecclesiasticae*, IV, 211–13.

cept such a story or not, was no longer important. They were but thinly scattered through the West, and, like Bohemond himself, might have felt that the general situation did not warrant any active refutation of the tale. The great majority of the population was predisposed to accept it.

The solution of the problem as to how and when the legend of this separate agreement was inserted in the *Gesta*, therefore, promises to appear in connection with Bohemond's efforts to raise an army for his attack upon Alexius. Bohemond's task of raising troops was by no means a simple one, even though he had the sanction and support of the pope. Germany and, to some extent, northern Italy were still troubled by civil strife connected with the Investiture Struggle.[25] The expeditions of 1096 and 1100 had drawn off the surplus energy of the regions west of Germany. England, which offered the most promising field for new recruits, was ruled by Henry I, who was still having trouble with his brother, Robert Curthose. Henry refused Bohemond permission to make England a recruiting ground.[26] Capetian France, however, proved more favorable. Constance, the daughter of Philip I, had gained a separation from Hugh of Troyes on grounds of consanguinity either late in 1104 or early in 1105.[27] It was now proposed that a marriage be arranged for her with Bohemond. Richard of the Principate, who had been a captive along with Bohemond, went to France on Bohemond's behalf.[28] The marriage took place

25 Suger (ed. Lecoy de la Marche, 32) gives this as the reason for the journey of Pope Paschal II to France late in 1106.

26 Ordericus (ed. Le Prevost, 211). See also discussion by Yewdale, 106–7 and by David, 166–72.

27 Suger (ed. Lecoy de la Marche, 30). See also Yewdale, 108. The date of the separation is fixed as December 25, 1105 by A. Fliche, *Le règne de Philippe 1 er, roi de France,* Paris, 1912, 88.

28 Ordericus (ed. Le Prevost, IV, 156). Guibert (*R. C. O.*, IV, 152). While the implication of the words of Ordericus is that Richard started for France almost immediately after his release from captivity late in 1103, the fact that Philip I was still excommunicate and Constance still the wife of Hugh of Troyes makes it highly improbable that Richard could have

at Chartres shortly after Easter in 1106.[29] Doubtless the active support of Philip for Bohemond's proposed venture against Alexius figured in the arrangements. As feudal society was constituted at that time, such support could only mean an opportunity to solicit recruits. Not intending to go himself, Philip was scarcely in a position to command his vassals to go. It still remained for Bohemond or others to go about exhorting fighting men to enlist for the campaign.

There are ample evidences of such a campaign. The leading figures in it are Bruno, bishop of Segni, whom Paschal II had commissioned to preach the crusade, and Bohemond himself.[30] From March to July, 1106, both were busily engaged in the work, moving from place to place, arousing enthusiasm for the expedition and taking enlistments. The territory which they covered was limited quite closely to the lands in which Philip was recognized as king. The bishop was most active in the eastern and northern portion, Bohemond in the western and southern portion of this region. Both, however, were present at the Council of Poitiers, May 26, 1106. One interesting circumstance of the campaign was the great enthusiasm with which Bohemond was received.[31] Crowds thronged to see him and hear him, not so much to enlist in his campaign as to see a great hero of the First Crusade.

It is this fact which suggests that the people of France had been prepared for Bohemond's coming by something more substantial than a herald's blast. It suggests that liter-

broached the subject of a marriage between Bohemond and Constance at such a time. His statement of chronology is vague, however, and that visit can safely be dated in 1105 without a real contradiction of his testimony.

[29] Ordericus (ed. Le Prevost, II, 448, IV, 213), Suger (ed. Lecoy de la Marche, 30), Guibert (*R. C. O.*, IV, 134).

[30] The two appeared together at Chartres in connection with the marriage of Bohemond and at Poitiers at the Church Council. Suger (ed. Lecoy de la Marche, 30).

[31] Ordericus (ed Le Prevost, IV, 210–13). Suger (ed. Lecoy de la Marche, 28–30). The itinerary of Bohemond in France is reconstructed in part by Yewdale, 109–112.

ature about him had been circulated through the region before his coming, recently enough to be still very fresh in the minds of the people. Such procedure would not have been strange. Bohemond, whose life had been spent in southern Italy, required introduction to the people of northern France. Further, the circulation of writings, including even whole chronicles, had been a campaign device by both sides in the Investiture Struggle,[32] and men prominent in that struggle were now aiding Bohemond in his campaign. The *Gesta Francorum,* written by one of Bohemond's devoted followers, would lend itself admirably to such purposes.

Such an hypothesis would go far toward explaining one or two strange facts about the history of the *Gesta.* One of these is the fact that nearly all the extant manuscripts of the work and likewise nearly all of the important revisions of the work come from France,[33] though all the evidence points to southern Italy as the home of the writer. The other is the fact that three writers of distinction, living within a relatively short distance of each other in northern France, undertook each to write a literary revision of the *Gesta,* apparently without being aware that the other two were engaged in the same task. These three were Baldric, archbishop of Dol, Guibert, abbot of Nogent, and Robert the monk of Rheims. A reëxamination of their accounts in light of this hypothesis may clear up some of the difficulty.

Baldric in the prologue of his work explains his reason for writing it: "non tamen huic beatae interesse promerui militiae, neque visa narravi; sed nescio quis compilator, no-

32 See K. Mirbt, *Die Publizistik im Zeitalter Gregors VII,* Leipzig, 1894.

33 The *Historia belli sacri* which was written after 1131 appears to be the only important exception, if the contention of Hagenmeyer (*HG.,* 89–90) and of Molinier, *op. cit.,* 28–82, that the author was an Italian be accepted. By that time, however, the versions of Guibert, Robert of Rheims, and others were circulating widely and no conclusions can be drawn from its repetition of the secret agreement regarding Antioch.

mine suppresso, libellum super hac re nimis rusticanum ediderat; veritatem tamen texuerat sed propter inurbanitatem codicis, nobilis materia viluerat; et simpliciores etiam inculta et incompta lectio confestim a se avocabat." [34] Only one of the extant manuscript copies of Baldric's work contains the story of a separate grant of Antioch by Alexius to Bohemond. The other copies, however, do not contradict the theory that this passage was in the copy of the work which he was following. Bohemond is featured throughout the work, and Alexius is depicted as a man of treachery and deceit whom the crusaders were reluctantly compelled to recognize as a man without honor and an enemy of righteousness and justice. The theme of Bohemond's plea for support is there in full, and so, too, is the *Gesta Francorum*. It is as though the work was written while Bohemond and Bishop Bruno were still exhorting men to join this expedition against the villainous Alexius. This conclusion is virtually settled, however, by another statement in Baldric's prologue. Apologetically he declares "ad scribendum pene sexagenariam appuli manum." [35] He died in 1130 at the age of eighty-four.[36] He had, therefore, reached sixty years of age in the year 1106. His was "almost a sexagenarian hand," therefore, in the spring of that year when Bohemond was journeying through France in search of troops. It was at that time that he saw the *Gesta*.

Guibert, like Baldric, undertook to rewrite the story of the crusade in a more literary form. He refers to a work which he characterizes as a "historia sed verbis contexta plus aequo simplicibus, et quae multotiens grammaticae naturas excederet, lectoremque vapidi insipiditate sermonis saepius examinare valeret." [37] Some of his friends suggested that he rewrite this account in verse. The accepted reading of

[34] *R. C. O.*, IV, 10.
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] *Ibid.*, editorial preface, p. iii.
[37] *Ibid.*, 119.

Guibert's version contains the legend of the separate agreement. The evidence that his account was closely connected with Bohemond's journey to France for troops is even more clear than in the case of Baldric. His first book closes with an extended denunciation of Alexius, at the end of which he recites a prophecy which the mother of Alexius had had to the effect that her son would be deprived of both empire and life by some one of the race of the Franks: "cuius oraculum ipsis effectibus explere Boemundus *affectat;* qui tantopere illi insistit, ut saepenumero cum eodem confligens vertere terga compulerit, et plurimam provinciorum eius partem suae ditioni addixerit. Qui quum genus ex Normannia ducat, quam Franciae partem esse constat, ob hoc vel maxime Francus habebitur quia regis Francorum filiae conjugio *jam potitur.*" [38] The use of the present tense indicates quite clearly the time at which he was writing. Elsewhere he alludes to Richard of the Principate "quem pro Constantia, Boemundi conjuge, ad Franciae regem vidimus legatione perfunctum." [39] The events of Bohemond's negotiations and journey in France in 1105 and early in 1106 were still very fresh in his mind. The first six books of his version were already circulating before the close of 1108.[40]

Robert the monk also explains his reason for writing his revision of the *Gesta* in a prologue: "hanc scribere compulsus sum per obedientiam; quidam etenim abbas nomine Bernardus, litterarum scientia et morum praeditus, ostendit mihi unam historiam secundum hanc materiam sed ei admodum displicebat partem quia initium suum quod in Clari Montis concilio constitutum fuit, non habebat, partim quia series tam pulchrae materiei inculta jacebat et litteralium composito dictionum inculta vacillabat. Praecepit igitur

[38] *R. C. O.,* IV, 133–134.
[39] *Ibid.,* 152.
[40] Molinier, *op. cit.,* 283.

mihi, ut Clari Montis concilio interfui, acephalae materiei caput praeponerem et lecturis eam stilo componerem. Ego vero, quia notarium non habui alium nisi me et dictavi et scripsi." [41] Robert's account does not contain the specific statement of the separate agreement, but it does emphasize, like the other two, the villainy of Alexius and the heroic qualities of Bohemond, the slogans of the campaign for troops in France in 1106. As Abbot Bernard who "compelled" him to write a revision of the *Gesta* died in 1107,[42] it is not unreasonable to suppose that the work was probably begun in the previous year.

The actual evidence of these revisions, as well as the definite implications of their tone, makes it quite clear that they were all undertaken about the same time in the year 1106. The authors of these revisions, therefore, were unaware of each other's efforts, because they were writing at the same time. It may be regarded as a tribute to the widespread extent of culture in northern France that so many persons should have been so deeply affected by the literary crudeness of the *Gesta*. At any rate, the work of these writers reveals the existence of three copies of the *Gesta* in northern France in 1106, for each of them had a copy before him as he wrote.

To these three may be added a fourth, that used by Tudebode of Civray.[43] Civray was located along the lines of Bohemond's recruiting journey. Tudebode's account contains the separate agreement, and is, in addition, almost a verbatim copy of the *Gesta*. Civray was also on the edge of the territory of the followers of Raymond of Toulouse, and

[41] *R. C. O.*, III, 722.

[42] *Ibid.*, III, editorial preface, p. xlvii. Cf. Molinier, *op. cit.*, 282.

[43] It is scarcely necessary to review the evidence regarding the relative priority of the versions of Tudebode and the *Gesta*, so fully done by Hagenmeyer (*HG.*, 80–89). Hagemeyer's position on this matter is fully indorsed by both Lees and Bréhier, pp. xii-xiii. The conclusions of this study would add further testimony on Tudebode's plagiarism, were such needed.

Tudebode's account contains additions drawn directly from the account of Raymond of Aguilers,[44] which was circulating in that region.

If this theory that the *Gesta Francorum* was used as a campaign document in Bohemond's behalf be correct, the explanation of the interpolation is complete. Its injection into the *Gesta* may, therefore, be reconstructed as follows. When France was finally determined upon as the chief recruiting area, Bohemond's friends decided to use the *Gesta*, despite its lack of literary merit, to introduce him to the people of the region. The very fact that it featured Bohemond would have caused it to be preferred to such an account as that of Raymond of Aguilers. There was no time either to draw up a new account or to make any extensive literary revision of the *Gesta*. Assuming that the decision to recruit in France was reached in the summer of 1105, there remained little more than a half-year in which to prepare the work and most of that time would have to be spent in multiplying copies. The *Gesta* required but little editorial revision to suit the purpose for which it was intended. The early statement, as contained in Ekhehard, specifying the agreement of the Latin leaders to turn over to Alexius all lands, cities, and fortresses which had formerly belonged to the empire would not have helped the cause. It would scarcely have justified Bohemond in attacking Alexius for seeking to regain Antioch. The purposes of the campaign required at least the elision of that agreement. The insertion of a substitute agreement in which Alexius was represented as making a secret grant of Antioch to Bohemond was a second step. Such a belief was probably widespread in the West already, and the interpolation would serve to accentuate the duplicity and treachery of Alexius. The haste with which the work was done could account for the awkwardness

[44] This was demonstrated by von Sybel, *op. cit.*, 23.

of the inserted sentences. This copy was doubtless multiplied and circulated through northern France. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that the interpolation was made after Bohemond's arrival in the West in January, 1105, and before his journey to France in February, 1106, with the probability that it was done in the late summer or early fall of 1105.

In connection with this discussion one or two other points of interest deserve consideration. When Bohemond's expedition met failure in 1108, he was brought face to face with Alexius. Peace negotiations were opened with charges that Bohemond had broken the agreement of 1097. The treaty between them, as reconstructed by Yewdale, opened with Bohemond's agreement to consider the treaty of 1097 null and void.[45] This seems a mere attempt to save Bohemond's face before his own troops,[46] for the treaty then proceeds in almost the exact words of that general agreement of 1097 reciting the lands, once a part of the Greek Empire, which were to be returned to Alexius. Antioch itself was allowed to remain in Bohemond's possession as a fief of the empire until his death, after which it was to revert to Alexius or to his heirs. It is quite clear that Antioch had never been the subject of a special grant to Bohemond, at least not from Alexius, and that the latter claimed it under the agreement of 1097.

In a larger way, this study tends to confirm the conten-

[45] Yewdale, 125–29.

[46] This doubtless accounts for Ralph's late reiteration of a secret agreement in Bohemond's behalf in 1097. One of those who joined Bohemond's expedition as a result of the recruiting campaign of 1106, the brilliant young Norman, pays tribute both to the effectiveness of that bit of propaganda and to his faith in Bohemond by asserting that Alexius promised Bohemond "tanta Romaniae dimensione—in qua equus dies quindecim per longum, octo autem expenderet per transversum." Bohemond's treaty with Alexius had given the lie to the "Antiochia" but the vague and therefore less disputable "Romania" would save both Bohemond's reputation and Ralph's faith in him.

tion of Yewdale against that of Chalandon, that the expedition of 1107 was directly a crusade against Alexius, and not merely Bohemond's crafty diversion of it to his own ends. It does not, however, support Yewdale's thesis that Bohemond was serving a great design of a Norman Empire which should embrace all the Greek Empire and Syria. Bohemond's immediate purpose was to secure his principality of Antioch, which seemed a doubtful possession in 1104. An expedition in the Balkans would certainly relieve Antioch from Greek pressure, and, if at all successful, could be used to obtain complete recognition from Alexius. However much Bohemond may have wished for the overthrow of Alexius and the Greek Empire, it does little credit to his practical judgment to imply that he regarded the expedition which he led in 1107 as adequate for such an achievement. Even though the expedition collapsed in a way which deeply disappointed Bohemond, it did relieve Antioch and made it possible for Tancred to maintain it as a Latin principality.

The conclusions of this study may be briefly summarized as follows. The copy of the *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolymitanorum* which Ekkehard saw and used at Jerusalem early in 1102 was presumably the original work as it left the author's hand. The copies which were used by Baldric of Dol, Guibert of Nogent, Robert of Rheims, and Tudebode of Civray were not the original work, but a version modified to suit the needs of Bohemond's campaign for recruits in France late in 1105 and early in 1106. That campaign helps to date the writing of these four copyists, whose works were all under way no later than 1106 and probably all completed by the end of 1107. Though this study has dealt with but a single passage in the *Gesta*, it suggests that the process of adapting the work for the recruiting campaign may have led to other changes in the original text. In this it supports

Bréhier's thesis of multiple or at least dual authorship for the work as we have it.[47]

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[47] Among the passages which Bréhier, pp. v-viii, has designated as so palpably different in style as to suggest another hand in the composition, the lament of Guy at the reported death of Bohemond (chap. XXVII) and the highly fanciful interview of Kerbogha and his mother (chap. XXII) are very clearly laudations of Bohemond, the first being also a condemnation of Alexius. The other passages indicated by Bréhier seem also to have been included for effect, more purely literary than specifically in Bohemond's interest, however.

It would seem contradictory to the thesis of this study that a work edited to serve as propaganda for Bohemond in northern France should have contained the slurs on Stephen of Blois (p. 140) and Hugh the Great (p. 160). This might, however, indicate that the editorial work was done in Italy by some one unfamiliar with the later atonement which both had made. The French copyists, Robert, Guibert, and Baldric, refused to follow their copy in this. Tudebode, however, retained the slur on Stephen, though he omitted that on Hugh.

IV

ROBERT II OF FLANDERS IN THE FIRST CRUSADE

The study of the career of Robert of Flanders in the First Crusade, suggested by Professor Munro, has proved an especially pleasant one because the Flemish count seems to represent to the writer the true spirit of the crusades. The recent tendency to focus attention on the activities of the leaders has generally resulted in bringing into the foreground their low motives, their quarrels, and their faults, with a consequent distortion of the picture. Asserting the principle, in the words of a recent writer, that "the aim of the leaders stamps the character of the crusade" too many modern writers have made it "effectively an enterprise for the conquest and partition of Syria," and consequently have given us a story that differs little in spirit from that of the raid of Morgan's buccaneers on Panama.

There are two objections to this. It neglects the popular factor, and also it goes too far in eliminating the higher motives. To chronicle only the intrigues of the leaders can never give an adequate idea of the spirit characterizing any great movement. If from the pages of "Die Kriegsschuldfrage" and kindred publications the conviction arises that the allied leaders were not waging a war to avenge Belgium or to save democratic civilization it cannot obscure the fact that millions did fight for those causes. Surely the one is no more history than the other. If Urban's words were twisted by knaves to make a trap for the common people, the devotion and sincerity of those pilgrims, fools or no, must not

be forgotten. The crusades were not movements of the leaders alone. The sick and wounded, who tore down the walls of Marra to prevent further quarrels and to force the march on Jerusalem, cry out that they were not. Raymond's men, who deserted their leader in his quarrel with Godfrey at Jerusalem because they were anxious only to return home now that their vow was performed, join in the protest. The indices of the *Recueil* may be so arranged that it is easier to trace out the fortunes of the leaders than to put together those of the *peregrini*, *milites*, and *mulieres*, but that does not justify us in omitting entirely this large element when we endeavor to give an adequate idea of what the crusades really were.

It may also be suggested that it is as great an evil to fall a prey to the Charybdis of cynicism and hypercriticism as to the Scylla of credulity and adulation. A modern history where all the characters are blackguards is as dull as a medieval one where all are saints. It might be well therefore to return somewhat to the spirit of the writers who lived during the historical mean, of whom "quaint old Tom Fuller" is a notable example. Writing in the early part of the seventeenth century he escaped the excessive influence of Darwinism which causes too many modern historians to explain all human actions by the laws of the animal kingdom, and yet he was not unacquainted with the critical spirit. Wilken may have been the first adequately to criticise the sources, but others had already criticised the general outline of the crusades. Under the influence of the prevailing query, "Can any good thing come out of Rome?" Fuller doubts the worth of the crusades as a whole, impugns the pope's motives, rejects the miracles, and points out the low motives and the moral weaknesses of many of the crusaders. But he knew how to judge human nature (as well as how to produce charming paragraphs from which we shall borrow an occasional figure), and he reminds us that "it is not to be ex-

pected that all should be fish which is caught in a drag-net, neither that all should be good and religious people who were adventurers in an action of so large a capacitie as this warre was," and he does not scruple to call his production *The History of the Holy Warre.*

The religious motive must not be forgotten. To view the crusades primarily as an enterprise for the conquest and partition of Syria is like considering the voyage of the "Mayflower" as an experiment in navigation, or viewing John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry as merely an attempt to capture an arsenal. Without the religious motive being taken into consideration the military history of the crusades is unintelligible. The huge numbers, the variety of camp-followers, the free passage through foreign countries, and the markets, even though given reluctantly, make these expeditions quite different from the prevailing type of Norman coast raids in the previous century, and it is the religious motive which makes the difference. If we would answer in the negative the question, "Would you go on a crusade, if the opportunity were given?" we must then remember that most of these pilgrims of the Middle Ages had some motive beyond our interest in commerce and adventure, and we must make allowance for it.

Even granted that the aims of the leaders do stamp the character of the crusade, not all of the leaders were actuated by motives of the lower type so often asserted as characteristic of all of them. To the illustration of this statement we now proceed.

Robert II, count of Flanders, called the Jerusalemite for his crusading exploits, was the son and heir of a Norman adventurer of the same name, dubbed the Frisian, who had both acquired and ruled his territory with a strong hand. The son, though not such an energetic character, had also employed methods not unquestioned even in that rough age. He was no worse, but undeniably no better than the average

feudal lord of that period who lived by the rule of taking and holding according to his abilities.[1] However, when the crusading zeal swept western Europe, he decided to take the cross. The motives which influenced some of the other leaders to take this step may be discarded at once in Robert's case. He was firmly settled in his own large territory, and so did not embrace the sacred cause as "a welcome prospect of escape" from a troublesome domestic situation, as did Robert of Normandy,[2] nor as a means of personal aggrandizement, as did Bohemond and Tancred.[3] He was a cousin of Robert of Normandy,[4] and his sister was the wife of Robert Borsa, duke of Apulia, Bohemond's half brother,[5] but these relationships do not appear to have influenced him. Bohemond did not take the cross until the autumn of 1096,[6] when Robert's preparations must have been practically completed, and while his name is often linked with that of his Norman cousin, it appears to have been so for geographical and stylistic reasons rather than because of any personal attachment. Closer relationships with crusading leaders could, of course, be adduced for many a noble who did not take the cross.

Some effect may have been produced by a letter from Urban to the Flemish urging their participation in the coming crusade and reminding them of the general report of conditions in the orient.[7] But the pope could have cited a more adequate preparation of the ground for his seed than that of a general report. There was already a particular

[1] For brief sketches of the lives of father and son see *L'Art de vérifier les dates depuis Jésus-Christ jusqu'en 1770*, XIII, 293–300.

[2] C. W. David, *Robert Curthose, duke of Normandy*, 90.

[3] R. B. Yewdale, *Bohemond I, prince of Antioch*, 34–35, 37, 44.

[4] The Norman's mother was a sister of Robert the Frisian. Bouquet, XIII, 416A.

[5] Charta Clementiae, Hagenmeyer, *Epistulae et chartae* (cited as *HEp*), 143, and note 11.

[6] Yewdale, 35.

[7] In *HEp*, 136.

connection between Flanders and the East. Robert the Frisian had made an expedition to Jerusalem during the years 1087–1089 [8] to atone for his sins, especially the murder of Godfrey of Bossu, duke of Lower Lorraine, and predecessor of the crusading leader of that name.[9] On his return he met the Byzantine emperor Alexius, and promised to send five hundred knights to aid him in his struggle with the Turks and Petchenegs. Shortly after his return to Flanders he did this, and the Flemish were used in the campaign around Nicomedia in 1090.[10] Thus the pope's request would find a response in the natural desire of the count to emulate his father and in that of the younger warriors to surpass the exploits of their older brothers.

In addition to this we have only the statement [11] of Clementia, his wife, that the Holy Spirit fired his heart to check the wickedness of the Persians, and in view of Robert's career during the crusade we may perhaps allow it to stand. He earned for himself a reputation for piety and for devotion to relics beyond that of any other leader.[12] In contrast with other crusaders he was careful each day to arm himself with the sign of the cross.[13] In Apulia he declined a present of money, and chose some relics instead.[14] In Romania he obtained what purported to be an arm of St.

[8] A document, to which Professor Munro called my attention, catalogued by Wauters in his *Table chronologique des chartes et diplômes imprimés concernant l'histoire de la Belgique,* I, 683, dated August 4, 1089, "glorioso comite Roberto Jherosolymis commorante" requires that the much controverted dates for this journey be fixed a year later than has been previously supposed, or at least that the date of the termination be so postponed.

[9] *L'Art de vérifier les dates,* XIII, 294; William of Malmesbury, in *M. G. SS.,* X, 473.

[10] Anna Comnena, *Alexiad,* Bonn ed., VII, 6, p. 355, VII, 7, p. 360, VIII, 3, p. 395.

[11] Charta Clementiae, *HEp,* 142.

[12] *HEp,* 248, n. 7; 250 n. 13.

[13] Hagenmeyer, *Gesta* (cited as *HG*), XIII, 6, pp. 251–2.

[14] Charta Clementiae, *HEp,* 143.

George, and this he kept constantly in his tent, with such signs of devotion that the Turks nicknamed him "The Arm of St. George." [15]

But as Bellarmine tells us there is such a thing as too much sanctity, and there were all too many who had, in Fuller's phrase, "more sail of valour than balast of judgment." Even before the modern formulation of the law an army traveled on its stomach, and we naturally wonder about the more material factors of the expedition, such as the quality of his warriors, and his numerical and financial strength. On the first point Gilbert of Nogent [16] and the author of the *Book of the Miracles of St. Donatian* [17] speak enthusiastically, as might be expected from their geographical location. Since, however, many must have had previous experience in the orient, and as we shall find the Flemish doing their full share, we may accept such remarks as having some value.

The exact numerical strength of Robert's force is, like many another figure in this period, difficult to determine both for the chronicler and for the present-day historian. More important than the actual number is Robert's relative strength, and that once determined will give us some idea of the proper figure. When in January, 1099, Raymond of Toulouse endeavored to bribe the remaining leaders to side with him as against Bohemond, Robert was offered six thousand solidi, while Tancred was to have five thousand, and Godfrey and the Duke of Normandy ten each.[18] From what we are told of the strength of others we may, then, by a very rough estimate, place Robert's strength at seven or eight hundred knights and a few thousand foot-soldiers. Also judging from the rest of the army, we may suppose that a

[15] *Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens occidentaux* (cited as *H. C. Oc.*), V, 248–252; Bartolf of Nangeo (cited as Bart.), LXXII, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 543.

[16] *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 148G.

[17] *M. G. SS.*, XV, 858.

[18] Raymond of Agiles (cited as Raim.) *H. C. Oc.*, 271C.

considerable number of women, civilian pilgrims, and priests accompanied the expedition. Would that one of them had possessed a literary bent! If so Robert might not have been so neglected by later historians.

How such a host was supported over such a long period of time must remain an unsolved problem, in spite of tales of plunder and foraging expeditions. Doubtless most of the knights were expected to defray their own expenses, but even so the financial strain would be severe. Yet we have in all the Flemish documents of this period only one [19] that even suggests that the count mortgaged any property. Nevertheless, as we have seen, he declined gifts of money and jewels in Apulia, and did so on the ground that he was rich and had no need of such things. It is true that at Antioch he was twice in want, but those were times of crisis for the whole army, and thereafter we hear no more of his experiencing any need. Truly the crusading leader must have carried a long purse, of which we should be glad to hear more from the financial historian.

It is not the writer's intention to compete with the mighty in attempting to retell the story of the First Crusade, but rather, on the background already so well prepared, to sketch, in a little plainer outline, the part played by the Flemish count and his followers. The pope's original plan [20] for them had been that they should join Bishop Adhemar of Puy, whom he had appointed to lead the expedition in his stead, and set out with him in the middle of August, 1096. When Adhemar, however, appointed Constantinople as the meeting place Robert, like Stephen of Blois, elected to accompany his Norman kinsman thither by way of southern Italy and the Balkan peninsula. The Normans were to depart in late September or early October,[21] and since the

[19] Wauters, I, 599.

[20] Epistula Urbani II, *HEp*, 136–37.

[21] Hagenmeyer, *Fulcher* (cited as *HF*), I, VI, 8, p. 159, and n. 21. For the course and events of the joint march to Bari see David, 96–97.

Flemish joined them en route[22] they must have left their native land early in the former month. If any are prone to think of the crusades as undertaken only by knights or footmen, and not by husbands and sons, let them look at the vivid descriptions of the partings given by Gilbert and Fulk. Having thus left all for the love of God, as the Norman scribe tells us, the forces journeyed together through France and Italy to Lucca, where they met the pope, and thence through Rome and Campania to Bari, which they reached late in the autumn.[23]

Here they were well received by the Normans ruling that section. The Flemish count seems to have been especially welcome,[24] as was to be expected in his sister's country. Here it was that he declined the proffered gifts, and chose the relics of the Virgin, Matthew, and Nicholas which he sent home to be deposited in the new church at Watten.[25] His sister urged him to remain throughout the winter, as the other leaders did because of the unfavorable season, but here Robert showed signs of initiative for the first and last time during the crusades. He resisted both the appeal and prohibition of nature, and contrived to cross the strait and push on to Constantinople.[26] He left behind not only his sister and his fellow leaders but also Fulk, the faithful war correspondent of the expedition, and so his fortunes are left to surmise until he reached the Byzantine capital and joined the expeditions already there, whose lines of communication, though not perfect, were better manned than his. We can only conjecture that he followed through Albania and Macedonia the route of Bohemond who preceded him by a few months.[27]

[22] *HF*, I, VI, 8, p. 161 and n. 26.
[23] *HF*, I, VII, 164–67.
[24] Bart., *H. C. Oc.*, III, 493D. Ordericus Vitalis, III, 486.
[25] Charta Clementiae, *HEp*, 143–4.
[26] *HF*, *ut supra*.
[27] Yewdale, 39–41.

All the dates given for Robert's arrival in Constantinople are rendered impossible by reason of their being later than that of an event in which he definitely participated at the capital. It was on April 26, 1097,[28] that Robert entered upon a rôle with which he was to become increasingly familiar. On that day, together with Godfrey and Bohemond, he acted as peacemaker, persuading Raymond of Toulouse to take a modified form of the oath to the emperor rather than divert to him the hostile energies so much better expended on the Turks.[29] He had already showed his peaceful intentions by taking the oath, and had received, in consequence, the usual gifts.[30] Speculation on what might have been is generally futile, but it may help to emphasize the value of Robert's peacemaking tendencies if we consider the probable effect on the success of the crusade had he added, not a peacemaking spirit, but another self-seeking, quarrelsome party to the army.

When it was decided to move on Nicaea Robert crossed the strait with his troops, and joined forces with the other leaders. On May 1 the army set out with the emperor's public commendation, and no doubt his secret rejoicing also.[31] After the crusaders passed Nicomedia the Flemish veterans of 1090 would no longer be familiar with the territory, and this may account for Robert's lack of initiative in the future. He must have had experienced friends to aid him in his solitary march across Macedonia. Nevertheless he did his part in the siege operations around Nicaea, and shared in the victory over Solyman on May 16.[32] In the united army before

28 For all the dates in this paper, unless otherwise mentioned, I am indebted to Hagenmeyer, "Chronologie," in *Revue de l'orient latin,* VI–VIII (1898–1901), *passim.*

29 "Hist. Peregrinorum," *H. C. Oc.,* III, 179; Gilbert, *H. C. Oc.,* IV, 155 E; Raim., *H. C. Oc.,* III, 237–38.

30 Albert of Aix (cited as Alb.), II, 19; *H. C. Oc.,* IV, 313B; *HF,* I, 9, 2, p. 178.

31 Alb., II, 20, *H. C. Oc.,* 313–14.

32 *Ibid.*

the city he occupied a place between his Norman namesake and Godfrey.[33]

On June 28, ten days after the surrender of the city, the army set out for Antioch. The next day it became divided, whether by mere accident or to facilitate forage, we do not know, and on the third day the division led by Bohemond, Stephen, and the two Roberts was attacked by a great number of the enemy. A summons was quickly sent to the other division, and, after a stout-hearted resistance lasting all day, Godfrey and Hugh came to the rescue and routed the enemy.[34] Kilidj Arslan troubled them no more, but the army suffered severely from the hardships of the march through Asia Minor to Marash, which they reached in October.[35] Proceeding toward Antioch during the next week, Robert's forces drew near a town called Artasium or Artah, northeast of their goal. On his approach the Armenian inhabitants massacred the Turkish garrison and surrendered the town to the Flemish. Upon the news reaching Antioch a Turkish force was sent out which succeeded in ambushing the count outside the walls; but, collecting his forces, he fought his way back to the town, which he succeeded in holding until the advance of his fellow leaders relieved the pressure.[36] On the further march to Antioch he participated in the fight at the Iron Bridge, and helped to guard the wings during the last few miles from the bridge to the city.[37] His

[33] *HG,* VIII, 5, p. 186. Radulf and Albert give the besiegers only in the order of their supposed importance.

[34] *HG,* 167; Epistula II Anselmi, *HEp,* 145, 7; *HF,* I, XI–XII, pp. 188–89. The *Gesta* and its followers make Robert a member of Godfrey's division, but the author was perhaps with Tancred in the vanguard, and hence not an eye-witness.

[35] Alb. III, 27, *H. C. Oc.,* IV, 357 F. For the events of this march and those at Artah we are wholly dependent upon Albert. But while the author of his main source was probably with Baldwin in Cilicia this information seems reliable. Kugler, *Albert von Aachen,* 34–70, *passim,* especially 62–65 on the events at Artah.

[36] Alb., III, 29, *H. C. Oc.,* IV, 359.

[37] Alb., III, 35–6, *H. C. Oc.,* IV, 363–5; Tudebod, MSS B, III, 8, *H. C. Oc.,* III, 47.

position among the besiegers was next to Robert of Normandy at the northeast corner of the city near the Dog Gate.[38]

There were three important characteristics of the siege of Antioch, hard fighting, the shortage of provisions, and the growing importance of Bohemond. With all of them Robert had much to do. Throughout the crusade he proved himself a good fighter and earned from the writers the title of a famous and very bold warrior. In the middle of November he joined his Norman namesake and Bohemond in attacking the men of the troublesome fortress of Harenc, eight miles from Antioch beyond the Iron Bridge. With only one hundred and fifty men, a force so small that, but for the shame of it, they would gladly have turned back, they succeeded in drawing the enemy into a trap, and in the ensuing struggle many of the Turks were killed outright, some forced into the river and drowned, and others captured and later executed before Antioch.[39]

The count next proved his worth on an extended foraging expedition with Bohemond. This set out on the Monday following Christmas, 1097, and was composed of two thousand knights and a large number of foot soldiers.[40] On the third morning, when near Albara, they found themselves in the presence of a great number of the enemy, summoned to his aid by the emir of Antioch. The Turks attempted to surround the Franks, but before this effort could be completed Robert, after a preliminary skirmish, attacked the main body, while Bohemond withstood the flanking efforts of the detachment on a hill to the left. Robert's hand-to-hand tactics proved too much for the enemy, who fled with great loss pursued by the victorious count. After further ravaging the

[38] Alb., III, 38, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 366B., Rad., XLIX, *H. C. Oc.* III, 642D.

[39] Epistula I Anselmi, *HEp*, 145, 10; *HG*, XII, 5; Raim., V, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 242G.

[40] Alb., III, 50, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 374B.

country, the expedition returned in safety to Antioch.[41] This chance encounter can scarcely be called a misfortune for the crusaders,[42] but on the contrary most fortunate. Had the relieving force slipped by the foragers and attacked the weakened Frankish force before the city, the results would undoubtedly have been serious, as the difficulty the crusaders experienced with other relieving forces shows.

Robert participated in two more successful encounters before the fall of Antioch. On February 9, 1098, he commanded one of the six small bands of horsemen which, under Bohemond's leadership, in a battle fought near the lake of Antioch, brilliantly repulsed the attempt of Rudwan of Aleppo to relieve the city. Two hundred Turkish heads and some much needed horses were the spoil.[43]

Robert not only possessed courage in sudden emergencies, but he had the physical endurance and moral courage to endure prolonged hardship. When Baldwin of Edessa was absent on a private expedition, Godfrey and Raymond physically incapacitated, and the "sleepy" Robert of Normandy had deserted the siege for more pleasant quarters in Laodicea, Robert was still in the line of duty, though so much in want that at one time he was forced to beg for a horse.[44] To supply themselves with the necessities of life the remaining leaders occupied the surrounding country, and a valley, which contained several villages, near a town called Sedium fell to Robert's lot.[45] This did not suffice, however, and the foraging expedition above described was undertaken. Al-

[41] Raim., *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 244E; *HG*, XIII, 250–53; Alb., III, 52, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 375B. Kemal ed Din, *H. C. Orientaux*, III, 578–79. I have here followed Raymond, with whom the *Gesta* in the main agrees. Albert's story savors of the camp-song and seems quite impossible (e.g. the loss of all the foot soldiers). For the opposite view cf. Kugler, 81–83.

[42] As by Yewdale.

[43] David, 106, has incorrectly joined Robert with his Norman namesake in protecting the camp. Eustace was the Norman's support at that time. Tudebod, VI, 9, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 43; Alb., III, 61, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 381E.

[44] Rad., LIII, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 646; Alb., IV, 55, *H. C. Oc.*, 427F.

[45] Rad., LIX, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 650A.

though there was some success, as a whole the expedition was a failure from the point of view of obtaining supplies. Shortly thereafter Bohemond was again looking for food and the price of bread rose to the enormous figure of two solidi a loaf.[46]

Learning of their want Baldwin sent some supplies from Edessa, and among the recipients Robert is named next to Godfrey.[47] This is an indication that in the growing feud between Provençal and Norman Robert was joining with Godfrey in the neutral party [48] in spite of the fact that between their families there had been no previous good will.[49] A short time after this he was again associated with Godfrey in compelling Bohemond to return to the Teuton leader a tent destined by one of the neighboring Armenians as a present for Godfrey, but diverted by an enemy to Bohemond.[50] Nevertheless, because of the news of Kerbogha's advance, Robert concurred in the decision of the small council which on June 2 finally accepted Bohemond's terms for procuring the betrayal of the city. He and Godfrey accompanied Bohemond on the circuitous night march which brought them to the vulnerable point where he assisted in making the final arrangements. After some sixty crusaders had scaled the walls, he and the other leaders were summoned to their aid, and responding he took an active part in the capture of the city.[51]

[46] Raim., VI, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 245B; *HG*, XIV, 3, pp. 255–56. Albert, 375C, alone reports "immense spoil" (a fact unmentioned in Kulger's defence of his account) but admits that "a few days" sufficed to consume it.

[47] Alb., IV, 9, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 395E.

[48] I am unable to locate Yewdale's evidence for the statement that Robert was generally on good terms with Bohemond (75, n. 110). If "Alb. 295" be a misprint for "Alb. 395" still "adinvicem" must mean "to each other" and not "otherwise."

[49] Sybel, *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzugs*, 2nd ed., 367, pronounces Albert's whole story untrustworthy on this account. For the refutation cf. Kugler, 105–6.

[50] Alb., IV, 9, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 395E.

[51] Alb., IV, 21, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 403; *HG*, XX, 6, pp. 300–304. Raymond (*H. C. Oc.*, III, 251) makes Robert one of the first to scale the wall, but

The occupation of the city was only a prelude to the further troubles of the crusaders. The citadel, "more to be admired than assaulted," remained unconquered, and Bohemond's earthwork guarding it was only saved from capture on June 5,[52] by the timely assistance of his fellow leaders, Robert among them. Later in the day, to prevent complete investiture by Kerbogha, Robert with five hundred men occupied Raymond's fort beyond the bridge. There he beat off three severe attacks, the last an all-day attempt on June 7, but fearing a renewed attack with reënforcements the following day, after a council of war Robert burned the painfully constructed works, destroyed the wall, and retired within the city.[53]

There was another serious shortage of food, and in addition a fire, which was started on June 12 to force laggards from their hiding places, became uncontrollable, and from nine in the morning until midnight it consumed some two thousand buildings in the city. One authority of doubtful accuracy [54] attributes the deed to Robert, but admits that it was the result of a council's decision, and the best authorities make Bohemond responsible. It was a time for stout hearts only, and many could not meet the challenge. Robert joined the other loyal leaders in checking the panic. Following the defection of the Grandmesnil brothers and others on June 10, they took oath not to desert the city for death or life as long as they lived. Later, upon receiving word that Alexius had abandoned them, Robert, Godfrey, and Adhe-

Albert is more circumstantial and also supported by the *Gesta*. Raymond's patron was not present, hence he was not likely to be an eye-witness.

[52] Alb., IV, 30–31, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 409–410. The date is fixed by its being after Godfrey's repulse, which in turn was after the death of Roger of Barnville on June 4.

[53] Raim. *H. C. Oc.*, III, 252; Alb., IV 33, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 411–12.

[54] Ralph of Caen (LXXVI, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 660) writing what he heard from Tancred, Bohemond's nephew, years later. Hagenmeyer suggests (*Gesta*, 347, n. 12) that Bohemond later endeavored to shift the blame to Robert.

mar stopped the panic by reminding the people of the power of God and the certainty of pursuit and death in case of flight.[55]

At this time the troops were cheered by the invention of the Sacred Lance, and, when all help from without the city failed them, it was decided to risk all on a pitched battle outside the walls, to lose their lives by wholesale rather than to retail them out by famine, as Fuller puts it. Having made a virtue of necessity by celebrating a three-day fast, the Franks marched out on June 28 to do or die. Although barely able to ride in consequence of only having had a camel's foot for nourishment before the battle,[56] Robert, together with Hugh of Vermandois, led the attack on the right wing by the river where the enemy's strength was greatest. After a hard struggle [57] the Turks fled leaving an immense spoil to the crusaders, who returned to the city fatigued but exultant.

The way was now open to Jerusalem, but the Franks had had their fill of hardships for the time. At a council early in July the leaders decided to postpone the advance until the summer heat was over. The contingents were to scatter, each to its own territory, and return to Antioch the first of November. Under this arrangement Robert probably occupied the valley near Sedium above mentioned, though he may have joined other leaders in further conquests of a private nature.

Fuller tells us that "the army was like a cloth of many colours and more seams; which seams, though they were curiously drawn up for the present, yet after long wearing began to be seen, and at last brake out into open rents." Robert's part in trying to sew up these rents must now be considered. At first he seems to lean somewhat to Bohemond's

[55] Alb., IV, 41, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 418D.
[56] Gilbert, VI, 5, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 205C.
[57] For the somewhat complicated details of this battle see Kugler, 155-63.

side. Like all the other leaders except Raymond, he yielded to Bohemond the towers and gates in his possession. Sometime during this period arose the dispute over the Sacred Lance, and Robert is reported to have agreed with Bohemond and Arnulf in denouncing its genuineness.[58] At the council held in St. Peter's church early in November he concurred in awarding the disputed city to Bohemond.

On the other hand he joined in sending Hugh the Great and Baldwin of Hainault as ambassadors to Alexius offering him the city on condition that he join the crusaders and fulfill his promise of support. Furthermore, when the popular demand for progress led Raymond to agree to a compromise and to set out toward the southeast he chose Robert for his companion, which shows that he was still acceptable to the Provençal. The joint forces captured Albara and besieged Marra, whither the other leaders soon followed. But when, upon the capture of the city, the old feud broke out again, Robert, Godfrey, and Bohemond returned to Antioch. Thereupon at Raymond's request a council of the leaders, Robert included, met at Rugia, between Antioch and Marra, in the early part of January 1099 to settle the points at issue. It requested Raymond to yield Antioch to his rival, but he would not consent, and once more matters were at an impasse. Raymond returned to Marra, but not before he had offered the neutral leaders substantial sums if they would follow his standard to Jerusalem. Tancred, and apparently Robert of Normandy, accepted, but Robert and Godfrey refused and returned to Antioch.

But again the common people forced the leaders to action. The desertions from the camps of Robert, Godfrey, and Bohemond were so numerous that a council was held by them on February 2, and it was agreed to meet at Laodicea on March 1 to resume the march to Jerusalem. This was done and the first step was to besiege Gibel, a city a few miles

[58] Rad., CII, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 678E. A prejudiced source.

further down the coast which was reputed to be very rich. But before the expedition left Laodicea Bohemond withdrew himself, and returned to Antioch.

The troublesome prince of Tarentum was thus eliminated for the time, but Robert and Godfrey had yet to deal with the count of Toulouse. He had also resumed the march to Jerusalem and was now engaged in besieging Archas, a city four days' march below Antioch. When a rumor of the approach of a Turkish army arose, he sent messengers to summon to his aid the other division of the advancing army. In compliance with this request, Robert and Godfrey raised their siege, and in three days arrived at Archas only to find the rumor false and no Turkish army near. As a natural result Raymond was accused of having accepted a bribe from the citizens of Gibel to invent the rumor,[59] and the angry northerners pitched their camp two miles from that of the Provençal. Raymond soon mollified them and persuaded them to join the siege. Shortly thereafter, however, they yielded to their impatient followers and decided to abandon the siege and push on by way of Tripolis to Jerusalem, and Raymond had perforce to follow.

The journey was recommenced about the middle of May, and, since they were not afraid to leave unreduced fortresses in their rear, this time they allowed no extended sieges to delay them. Had they shown this divergence from modern tactics eighteen months before, more of the pilgrims might have lived to fulfill their vow. The anxious ruler of Tripolis concluded in advance an agreement with the crusaders to furnish them with money, supplies, and a guide, in return for a peaceful passage through his territories. They remained at Tripolis two or three days, and then continued their journey through Bethelon and Gibeletum to the stream called Nahr

[59] So Albert (V, 33–35, *H. C. Oc.,* IV, 453–56). Raymond of Agiles (278) and the author of the *Gesta* (430), now of course attached to the count of Toulouse, give the equally possible explanation that the rumor was invented by the Moslems.

Ibrahim. During the next week they marched steadily down the coast through the towns which we know as Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, and Acre, and on May 26 they arrived at Caesarea. There they stopped a few days to celebrate Pentecost, but the festival evidently did not mollify the old coolness since Robert and Godfrey once more camped some distance from Raymond and his followers. Proceeding further they encamped on June 2 near Rama, which Robert approached in the morning with Gaston of Beziers and a few followers and found deserted by the terrified population.[60] There they refreshed themselves for a few days, and installed a bishop and a garrison. Setting out once more, on the seventh of June they reached the goal of their long journey.

The Moslems in Jerusalem had been well warned, and the strengthened fortifications presented a difficult problem for the depleted crusaders' army. A siege being out of the question, the leaders selected the most suitable places from which to storm the city, and Robert located himself with Godfrey and Robert of Normandy, now free from his contract with Raymond, on the north side of the city opposite the church of St. Stephen. He doubtless joined in the assault of June 13 which was unsuccessful because of the lack of siege equipment, and when it was decided to construct the necessary apparatus he was chosen to carry out the service of supply. This he did by making at least one expedition beyond Neapolis, or Sichar, with a force of soldiers and woodcutters, and bringing back the necessary wood loaded upon camels.[61]

On July 9, when all seemed ready for the attack, the northern army decided to move their machinery further west toward the valley of Jehosaphat where the wall was not so strong. This work was carried out in the next four days, not without great labor, as the chronicler feelingly assures us,

[60] Alb., V, 41–43, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 460–61.
[61] Rad., CXXI, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 690; "Hist. Peregrinorum" CXVIII, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 219.

since everything had to be taken down, carried almost a mile, and there reconstructed. The attack which followed was unsuccessful on the first two days and part of the third, in spite of the exhortations of Robert and the other leaders, and in their discouragement the two Roberts are reported to have lamented that the Lord had judged them unworthy to see the Sepulchre.[62] But at nine o'clock on July 15 Robert's forces, led by Lethold of Tournai, scaled the wall, and the victorious Franks followed them into the city.

As the Holy Sepulchre detained the crusaders but a short time from their bloody work on the day of the capture, so the taking of the city itself furnished only a brief respite to the fighting followers of the Prince of Peace. After the election of Godfrey as Defender of the Holy Sepulchre on July 22, the count of Toulouse refused, although generous offers were made him, to yield to Godfrey the Tower of David. Robert must now have been the leader of the mediating party. He and his Norman cousin were supported in their efforts by Raymond's own troops, now impatient to be on their way home, and finally persuaded Raymond to yield.[63]

More serious was the approach of the Egyptian army along the coast. Godfrey and Robert went at once to meet it, but his Norman namesake and Raymond, showing scant gratitude for past favors at Archas, refused to go until a battle was certain. On the day of the combat, August 12, Robert's forces were part of the center,[64] and although most of the glory of this victory went to Tancred and the Norman duke, the Flemish joined battle early in the engagement and the fierceness of their attack contributed much to the successful outcome.

[62] Gilbert, VII 6, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 226G.

[63] Raim., XX, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 301E.

[64] *HG*, XXXIX, 12. Albert (VI, 45, *H. C. Oc.*, IV, 494C) refers to him as on the left because Godfrey on that wing held back to guard the rear. *HF*, I. 31, 6, pp. 314–15. Cf. Kugler, 230–34.

That concluded Robert's military career in the crusade. He and his Norman namesake were free to make a peaceful pilgrimage to the Jordan, gather palms in the traditional manner, and set out for home.[65] But in his rôle as peacemaker he was to receive a curtain call or two. Raymond was threatened by Godfrey with open war for preventing his capture of Ascalon and Arsuf, and at the end of August, at a place between Caesarea and Haifa, Robert was once more called upon to adjust the difficulty. His efforts were successful, and thereupon he and his companions took the messages of Godfrey and his band of "exiles" for the homeland, bade them good-bye and set out for Europe.[66] In their passage along the coast to Gibel they were undisturbed, but on arriving there they learned that Bohemond, with the aid of a Pisan and Genoese fleet, was attacking Laodicea, a city of Greek Christians. Raymond took the lead in forcing him to abandon the siege, and once more Robert had to make peace between the two rival leaders. This was accomplished sometime in September. When they were again on peaceful terms they informed Bohemond of events at Jerusalem, and joined him in drawing up a joint letter to the pope summarizing events from the fall of Nicaea to the agreement concluded a few days before.

Now at last the difficulties were passed, and the triumphal progress began. After some days Robert, bearing the above mentioned letter,[67] took ship for Constantinople with his Norman cousin and their companions.[68] They were honorably received by the emperor, who promised them great rewards if they would enter his service. When they declined

[65] *HF,* I 32, 1, p. 319.

[66] Alb., VI, 52, *H. C. Oc.,* IV, 498E. The *Recueil* index seems to list this event incorrectly as concerned with settling a quarrel between Raymond and Bohemond. A quarrel with Godfrey at this time does not seem unreasonable.

[67] Ekkehard, *H. C. Oc.,* V, 22.

[68] *HF,* I, 22, 1, p. 320; Alb., VI, 60, *H. C. Oc.,* IV, 504D.

he gave them presents and, of course, free passage through his dominions.[69] In Apulia they were received with great honor by their admiring relatives,[70] and once more the Norman duke tarried for entertainment while his more energetic cousin pushed on to the homeland, which he reached early in the spring of 1100.[71]

We are told by the recipient of the Arm of St. George at Aix, and by the later chroniclers,[72] that his people received Robert with great honor, and well they might. He represented the popular ideal of a crusader, and so, more than those of the self-seeking leaders, his aims stamp the character of the crusade. For three years he had freely spent and been spent in a cause from which he derived nothing save a few relics, and though he resumed his career of worldly aggrandizement, that unselfish devotion had given him a crusading record more admirable than that of any save possibly Godfrey. From that unselfishness he had derived a superior reliability that more than counterbalanced the comparative weakness of his forces. Though in times of peril he must have often wished with the honest Fulk[73] that he were safe at home, he endured both sudden danger and long-continued suffering without wavering, and when Jerusalem was stormed there was no Bohemond, Hugh, Stephen, or Baldwin to obscure his place in the sun.

His altruism also made him an ideal companion and

[69] Ord. Vit., IV, 75–78; Wm. of Tyre, IX, 13, *H. C. Oc.*, I, 383. Since the primary chroniclers remained longer in the east we are dependent from this point onward upon somewhat later sources, but the events recorded are not improbable.

[70] Bart., XXXIX, *H. C. Oc.*, III, 518D.

[71] Orderic's date of 1100 for the departure from Constantinople is probably incorrect since June 20, 1100, the date of his depositing the relic at Aix, is said to be "some time after" his return. Vion, *Pierre le Hermite,* 389, recorded in 1853 that January 19 was still celebrated in Brussels as the day of the crusaders' return in 1100.

[72] Narratio Acquicinensis, *H. C. Oc.*, V, 248–51. John of Ypres, Bouquet, XIII, 460C.

[73] *HF,* II, 2, 4. p. 360.

peacemaker, an invaluable member of such a loosely organized collection of differing elements. Because he sought nothing for himself he could safely ask others to abandon a part of their personal claims, in order to advance the common cause. If he undeniably lacked initiative he was at least saved from the aberrations of some of the more favored along that line, and yet was sufficiently energetic to make an acceptable associate. He was often linked with his Norman cousin, and was chosen in turn by Bohemond, Raymond, and Godfrey as a companion in their separate expeditions. Throughout the years of his pilgrimage, in which he participated victoriously in each of the six major battles and the three important sieges, his sword was ever drawn in an honorable and altruistic cause. Such is the ability of a religious ideal to raise a man above himself.

M. M. Knappen

V

ALBERT OF AACHEN AND THE COUNTY OF EDESSA

The controversy regarding the value of the information given by Albert of Aachen for the history of the First Crusade has languished during recent years.[1] The severe criticisms of Sybel have been softened by the enthusiastic counterblasts of Kugler, yet scholars are in doubt regarding what parts of the narrative are sound and what are a mere prose rendering of songs and popular traditions. Lacking a modern critical edition, scholars have contented themselves by quoting Albert on his own authority, checking him up where possible. Until a new edition shall be forthcoming one must go to Kugler's analysis (*Albert von Aachen*, Stuttgart, 1885), which is admittedly incomplete, and to the incidental remarks of Hagenmeyer, Röhricht, and other scholars. All of them use Albert's chronicle with great care and circumspection, and with good cause, for much of his seemingly exact information is obviously wrong. Yet, on the other hand, without much that Albert reports we should be permanently the poorer, and histories of the First Crusade and the founding of the Latin states in the East would lack many important details. For some time I have noticed the frequency with which the name of Albert as a source appears in all accounts of the county of Edessa. His account is much longer and more complete than any other, even those

[1] For a summary of the controversy and the literature on the subject see Molinier, *Les sources de l'histoire de France,* II (1902), 286, and Paul Meyer in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens occidentaux,* IV, (1879), pp. xx-xxix.

of the eyewitnesses Fulk of Chartres and Matthew of Edessa. Hence his story can rarely be checked. When it can it is the more baffling, for Albert shows a consistent variance with more trustworthy sources with regard to such definite details as dates, numbers of forces, and periods of time. As these are the spots most easily verified, Albert has suffered for his carelessness by the contempt of many scholars. Added to this, much of the work is a compilation from oral tradition, as Albert himself informs us (auditu et relatione ab his qui praesentes affuissent: Albert, I, 1). Yet a considerable amount remains which may have come from the written sources. Kugler has claimed that Albert used a definite "Lorraine chronicle," which has suffered in the use, but as no indication of the existence of such a chronicle has been found it remains in the realm of hypothesis. Albert's hopes of a pilgrimage to the Holy Land were unfulfilled, yet his circumstantial tales frequently have the marks of genuine eyewitness accounts. The history of Archbishop William of Tyre follows Albert closely, although he occasionally checks his account with information derived from other sources. William was in a situation similar to ours and used Albert for lack of a better source. Since he lived within two generations of the events he describes, something in Albert's favor may be inferred from the fact that he was the best source for the First Crusade soon after the middle of the twelfth century.

Bearing all these doubts and perplexities in mind, it is my purpose to go over Albert's information concerning the county of Edessa and to point out its exact value by a close comparison with all other sources. I believe that the greater part of his account will prove to be of great value and to be derived almost certainly from participants in the events described. A lesser amount is obviously manufactured for greater picturesqueness, yet little of this can be traced to

the only contemporary epic of the First Crusade which we possess—the *Chanson d'Antioche*. The likenesses are few and suggest, if a song source is necessary, some other of the same genre, but not this chanson. Indeed, the variance of Albert with the *Chanson* is far more pronounced than his divergence from sources of established trustworthiness.

I have not gone into the subject of Albert's identity for Molinier (*loc. cit.*) gives all that we now know concerning this doubtful canon of Aachen. The earliest manuscript of the chronicle is dated 1158. The only Albert who was a canon of the cathedral of Aachen in the twelfth century lived there from 1185 to 1192. This cannot be our man. Nevertheless, one manuscript, of the thirteenth century, describes the author as "canonicus et custos Aquensis ecclesie." [2]

Quite recently has appeared a new source which is reported to go far to sustain Albert's chronicle in those passages dealing with the county of Edessa. In volumes XIV (1920) and XV (1917) of the *Corpus scriptorum Christianorum orientalium: Scriptores Syri*, Chabot published "Anonymi auctoris chronicon," preceded by a "Chronicon anonymum" of twenty-five pages. This contains several references to Edessa which Chabot [3] says are derived from the lost chronicle written by Basil of Choumna, who was bishop of Edessa, 1143–1169. Since these references come from an almost contemporary Armenian source they are well worth consideration. Our only other Armenian source for this period, Matthew of Edessa, is violently prejudiced against the two Baldwins. Since Basil must have been a Frankish nominee he will represent that party among the

[2] This MS is No. 41 of the Biblioteca palatina of Darmstadt. It came originally from St. James of Liège.

[3] J. B. Chabot, "Edesse pendant la première croisade," in *Comptes rendues à l'académie des inscriptions et belles lettres*, November, 1918, 431–42.

Armenians favorable to the Franks and will serve admirably as a corrective to Matthew's jealous patriotism.[4]

BALDWIN I[5]

Albert's first reference (book III, chapter 17) to the foundation of the county of Edessa concerns the incentive which led Baldwin, the brother of Godfrey of Bouillon, to make an expedition into the lands of the Euphrates valley. Baldwin had, in the autumn of 1097, quarreled with Tancred over the captured cities of Cilicia and was certainly desirous of private conquest. Bohemond's reputation had enabled his nephew Tancred to gain the allegiance of the Cilician towns and Baldwin perforce searched elsewhere for his principality. Albert states that Baldwin was advised by

[4] I am indebted for the translation of the portion of the *Chronicon anonymum* dealing with the death of Thoros to the kindness of Dr. William Thomson, of Cambridge, Mass.

[5] Bibliographical note. To conserve space I have placed references to the sources in the body of the text. I refer to Albert's Chronicle by book and chapter and to the other sources by the page of their standard editions. I have used the following editions (the *Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens occidentaux, Historiens orientaux,* and *Documents arméniens are* referred to respectively as *Rec. occ., Rec. or.,* and *Rec. arm.*): Abou l'feda, *Rec. or.,* I, 1–165; Abulfaraj, Gregory (Bar-Hebraeus) edition of Bruns and Kirsch, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1789; Albert of Aachen, *Rec. occ.,* IV, 265–713; *Anonymi Gesta Francorum et aliorum,* edition of H. Hagenmeyer, 1890; Baldric of Dol, *Rec. occ.,* IV, 1–111; Bartolf of Nangis, *Rec. occ.,* III, 487–543; Basil of Choumna, in *Corpus scrip. Chr. or., Scriptores Syri,* ser. III, tom. XV; *La chanson d'Antioche,* edition of P. Paris, 2 vols., Paris, 1848; *Li estoire de Jerusalem et d'Antioche,* in *Rec. occ.,* V, 621–48; Fulk of Chartres, edition of H. Hagenmeyer, Heidelberg, 1913; Guibert of Nogent, *Rec. occ.,* IV, 113–263; Ibn el-Atyr, *Rec. or.,* I, 189–744, II, 2 ième partie, 1–378; Ibn Khaldoun, translated by R. Röhricht in *Quellenbeiträge zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge,* s. d. s. l., Berlin, 1875; Ibn Moyesser, *Rec. or.,* III, 457–72; Kemal ed-Din, *Rec. or.,* III, 571–690; Matthew of Edessa, *Rec. arm.,* I, 1–150; Mirat ez-Zeman (Sibt ibn el Jeuzi), *Rec. or.,* III, 511–70; Nodjoum ez-Zahireh (Jemal ed-Din), *Rec. or.,* III, 475–509; Orderic Vital, edition of LePrevost, 5 vols., Paris, 1840; Autobiographie d'Ousama, translated by H. Derenbourg, in *Revue de l'orient latin,* II, 327–565; Radulf of Caen, *Rec. occ.,* III, 587–716; Raymond of Agiles, *Rec. occ.,* III, 231–309; Robert the Monk, *Rec. occ.,* III, 717–882; Tudebode, *Rec. occ.,* III, 165–229; William of Tyre, *Rec. occ.,* I.

a certain Armenian knight, Pancrace (Pakrad), to undertake the conquest of Turbaisel (Tell bashir), an important fortress west of the Euphrates. This Pancrace, "vir instabile et magnae perfidiae," had escaped from the prisons of the Emperor Alexius and had joined the crusading army at Nicaea. Baldwin had retained him because he was well acquainted with Armenia, Syria, and "Greece," and had a reputation for military skill and resourcefulness. The citizens of Tell bashir expelled the Turks and surrendered their city and its citadel to Baldwin's army of seven hundred knights. Baldwin next took Ravenel, whence the Turks fled at his approach, and other cities and castles in the neighborhood with equal ease for the Turks were terrified by the Christian army then marching on Antioch. Pancrace received the castle of Ravenel, wherein he placed his son with an Armenian garrison. He remained with Baldwin that he might further his designs for the possession of the whole territory by intrigues with the Turks. He was not long in the enjoyment of his hopes, however, for two honest Armenian princes, Fer and Nichusus, who held castles in the neighborhood, made treaties with Baldwin and advised him of the well-known perfidies of Pancrace, of his traffic with the Turks, his crimes, his perjury to the emperor, and declared that trust in such a man could lead only to disaster. (Albert, III, 18). Baldwin tortured Pancrace into giving up Ravenel and thereafter conquered the country east of the Euphrates without his assistance.

This, as Kugler (*Albert von Aachen,* 50) says, is a credible story, although no other contemporary source reports it. Constantinople was the usual refuge for exiled Armenians and it is quite possible that Pancrace had been found there. We know from Matthew of Edessa (p. 30) that the Franks were gladly received by the Armenians and that many native lords knew of their approach. Radulf (p. 637) mentions an Armenian embassy which asked Baldwin to take

Tell bashir. Fulk of Chartres (pp. 203–215), who was present at the time, says that Baldwin captured many castles "tam vi quam ingenio" and that Tell bashir was given up peaceably by the Armenian inhabitants as well as many other places. William of Tyre (pp. 152–53) follows Albert except that he omits the disgrace of Pancrace. Albert differs from others in regard to the numbers of the expedition. Fulk says that Baldwin had few knights and Matthew (p. 35) places the number at one hundred at Tell bashir. William, whose word is of course of little value, gives two hundred knights besides the uncounted foot soldiers. This is one of the places where Albert is possibly wrong in detail, for an army of seven hundred knights would not be considered a small force. Wherever Albert got this information it is certainly not from any existing song. The *Chanson d'Antioche*, III, 24, makes no mention of Pancrace or Tell bashir, and speaks of Baldwin's numerous followers and of the massacre of seven thousand pagans at the siege of Ravenel.

In chapter 19 Albert reports that Thoros, the duke of Edessa in Mesopotamia, sent the bishop and twelve magistrates, by whose counsel the region was governed, to ask Baldwin to come to the city with his Franks, to defend the land from the encroachments of the Turks, and to divide the power and government, the revenues and tributes of the city with the duke. Baldwin accepted, distributed a part of his forces as garrisons in various subject places, and proceeded by forced marches to the Euphrates. By the advice of Pancrace the Turks assembled to the number of twenty thousand to dispute the passage of the river. Baldwin retreated to Tell bashir to wait until the Turks dispersed and then made the journey in safety with an escort of two hundred knights.

This is in the main true. Fulk (*loc. cit.*) mentions the embassy from the prince of Edessa, his need for assistance

against the Turks, and his offer to make Baldwin his heir. He says that Baldwin had only eighty knights and that he crossed the Euphrates and marched all night in great terror, for the Saracens were everywhere. The Turks of Samosata came out to interrupt the march but a friendly Armenian opened his castle, and the Franks were there besieged for two days. Then the Turks departed and Baldwin pushed on, eagerly welcomed by the Armenians along the route. Matthew (pp. 35–36) tells of Thoros's appeal for aid and of Baldwin's arrival with sixty knights. Other western sources speak of the embassy and the promise of the government of at least the reversion of power to Baldwin (so Baldric, variant G, 81; Guibert, 165; Radulf, 637; Raymond, 267). William of Tyre (pp. 154–56) follows Fulk with some unimportant additions. The song tradition is represented by the *Chanson d'Antioche* and Orderic Vital. The *Chanson*, III, 21, tells that the Old Man of the Mountain had sent for Baldwin to come and marry his daughter and to be his heir, and (III, 24) that Baldwin had gone without interruption to receive the keys of the city and the lady. Orderic likewise (IV, 491) would have us believe that Baldwin married Thoros's daughter. Of the Arabs, only Ibn el-Atyr (1, 207–8) mentions the event. He says that the Armenian inhabitants of Edessa invited the Franks to come and rule them. Albert, then, has this event well in hand. His only variations from Fulk, the eyewitness, are in the number of knights and in the place of the appearance of the Turks. Perhaps Albert's two hundred refers to all Baldwin's forces while Fulk's eighty means full-armed knights. In that case there would be no real discrepancy. Albert must be mistaken about the place of the Turkish attack.

Chapters 20 and 21 refer to Baldwin's difficulties in securing power in the city. The duke began to be jealous of Baldwin's evident popularity with the senators and people and refused to turn over any part of the government. He did, how-

ever, offer riches if Baldwin would take his orders as a mercenary soldier. Baldwin refused to accept so open a breach of the contract which had tempted him so far afield and demanded guides for the return journey. The leaders of the people, fearing that they might lose their champion, prevailed upon the duke to adopt Baldwin as his son and heir. The duke adopted Baldwin according to the custom of the country by receiving him naked beneath his shirt.

This piece of information is more doubtful, for Fulk is completely silent (*loc cit.*). This silence is strange, for Fulk must have known of any such event. The main difficulty about Fulk is his brevity, as in the case of all eyewitness accounts. Perhaps he suppressed this information to save space, or as being unessential to the story, or beneath the dignity of a Frankish knight. Still less did Baldwin's chaplain wish to link his master too closely with Thoros in view of later events. Matthew (p. 36) says nothing of an adoption and calls the relationship an alliance. William of Tyre (pp. 154–57) mentions Thoros's hesitancy in giving up his power but William obviously is following Albert. Guibert (p. 165) gives the adoption ceremony in greater detail and is followed here by Baldric (var. G, p. 81). The *Chanson* (*loc. cit.*) has Baldwin marry Thoros's daughter and gives a ceremony very like that of adoption between Baldwin and his new wife, but this is a mistake as all other sources, save Basil (see below, p. 111), insist that Thoros had no children.

Chapter 21 contains an account of Baldwin's attack on Samusart (Samosata), a fortress on the Euphrates held by the Turkish Emir Balduk. The fortress had formerly belonged to Edessa but Balduk had captured it and was only restrained from ravaging the country by receiving an annual tribute, for which he held the sons of the principal citizens as hostages. Baldwin took his own followers and

all the troops of the city, both horse and foot, on this his first expedition. The attack was repulsed, for the "effeminate" Armenians turned and ran when the Turks showed fight. Baldwin left his Frankish forces in a fortified position near by to harass the Turks continually, and returned to Edessa. Matthew (p. 37) says that the town of Samosata was taken while the Turks remained in the citadel. But when the Turks sallied forth, three hundred strong, the Christians fled, losing one thousand men in the fight. Baldwin and Constantine, the Armenian prince of Gargar, who was associated in this expedition, returned to Edessa. William (pp. 157–58) follows Albert, but mentions no defeat. Baldric's story (*loc. cit.*) would have Baldwin defeat the Turks and return to Antioch!

The divergence of Albert and Matthew is serious, for Matthew is a contemporary and the classical witness for Edessan events. Kugler (p. 59), however, believes that in this case Albert has the better information. He holds that if Baldwin had really been defeated he could not have left a force to watch the movements of the Turks. Still less could the subsequent events at Edessa have taken place as they did if the people had been so immediately disappointed in their supposed deliverer from the Turkish menace. The leaders of the people must have realized that the repulse was due to the cowardice of their own forces and not to the inability of the Frank.

The next event on record is the outbreak of a conspiracy against the life and the throne of Thoros. Albert tells this story in chapters 22 and 23. The people were dissatisfied with their ruler for he was avaricious and had amassed great wealth by extortion. When the people had resisted in times past he had stirred up the Turks against them. Constantine was present and acquiesced in the plot to overthrow Thoros and put Baldwin in his place. When the

Frankish prince was informed, he refused to participate in the plot to kill Thoros since he was the old man's adopted son. Nevertheless he was willing enough to warn Thoros to escape and thus profit by his overthrow. While Baldwin was explaining the situation to Thoros the people attacked the citadel. Thoros offered his treasures for his life and Baldwin undertook to buy off the mob. But no treasures would keep them from their prey. Thoros tried to escape by letting himself down from a window of the tower. He was shot down by arrows and his head paraded about the city stuck on a pike and exposed to the insults of the crowd.

This has been regarded as a rendering of the typical western romancers. Fulk (pp. 203–215) is extremely brief, mentioning only the plot to kill Thoros and Baldwin's sorrow at being unable to help him. "Dictum est et factum est" is Fulk's sole record of the course of events. It has always been held that the incident was not very creditable to Baldwin and that his chaplain was restrained from writing of it in any detail. Matthew (pp. 37–38) says that forty conspirators aroused the people, that Thoros deserved well of the city for only by his prudent care, his industry and bravery had the city been saved from the Turks, that Baldwin gave his adhesion to the plot, and Constantine likewise, and that Baldwin swore by the most sacred oaths to allow Thoros and his wife to go to Malatiya. Then Thoros gave up the citadel but he was hurled from the ramparts to the mob below. Thus Baldwin through perjury became lord of Edessa. William (pp. 158–59) follows Albert. Guibert (*loc. cit.*) tells an incredible story of the sentimental attachment of Baldwin and Thoros, how each tried to save the other's life, and that Thoros was killed interceding for Baldwin. Orderic Vital (IV, 491–99) has a story of Thoros's treachery to Baldwin that is entirely unsupported by more reliable sources. We can now add a new source to the above collection. I give Basil of Choumna's

account literally and entire, for it has never appeared in translation:[6]

When Baldwin and the Franks had been some time in Edessa, as we have reported above, the Edessans began to sow envy and suspicion between the Franks and Thoros, and when the jealousy between these had come to a head, they perpetrated the following villainy. They took counsel together to kill their prince and to set up the Franks as rulers over themselves. It was not, however, from love of the Franks that they did this; it was the result of the evil will of those who loathed Thoros. They raved like wild beasts and stirred up and incited each other, and a great crowd gathered and raised an uproar at the place of descent from the upper fortress to the source of the spring. When he came to that great crowd, they raged against him, but he escaped from them and entered the lower fortress which is near by the eastern gate of the city, and which he had built and completed [with battlements?]. When they attacked it, he demanded from them an oath [he compelled them to swear] that they would allow him, his wife, and his sons to depart on condition that he took with him none of his possessions [literally, in poverty]. When they had consented and sworn to this, he opened the gate to them, and they ascended and bound and tied him fast with a rope and let him down from that high wall in front of the city [i. e. citizens] naked clad only in a loin-cloth. When they took him down . . . [here the text fails] . . . bar Hatham and the destruction of his house, and Baldwin took possession of whatever belonged to Thoros and of the two fortresses of the city.

Here we find a remarkable agreement with Albert. The plot is laid entirely to Edessans without mention of Baldwin. The uproar in the city is the same and the attempt of Thoros to buy his life with his wealth. (Basil mentions sons of Thoros although all other sources describe him as childless.) The actual murder of Thoros and his being let down by a rope are substantially the same, as is the succession of Baldwin to the dignities and treasures of Thoros. Albert's story then gains greatly in probability and Matthew's,

[6] *Anonymi auctoris Chronicon,* II, 56.

hitherto regarded as the best, appears as another indication of his hostility for Baldwin. Both Armenians agree on Thoros's interest in the city (Basil's report of the building of the gate) and Albert's charge of intrigue with the Turks remains without foundation. There can now be little doubt that Baldwin had no part in Thoros's death, and Fulk's silence becomes more difficult to explain. Since Baldwin had no connection with the plot, Fulk may have seen no reason for mentioning it at length. Although Basil probably represents the Francophile party among the Armenians he hardly could have falsified any real evidence of Baldwin's guilt.

Chapters 24 and 25 of Albert's chronicle are concerned with the taking of Samosata and Seruj. Balduk was now thoroughly frightened and offered to sell Samosata for ten thousand byzantines. Baldwin refused the offer but, when Balduk threatened to burn his citadel and execute his hostages, the new ruler gave way to the prayers of his subjects and bought the fortress, apparently for a smaller price. Balduk was received at Edessa and became one of Baldwin's household. He was asked for hostages of his good faith in the persons of his wife and children. He readily consented but put off their delivery with various excuses.

Balas, the Turkish lord of Seruj, offered to surrender his city and castle to Baldwin if the Mohammedan population could be brought to agree. These citizens sought Balduk to assist them in their defense and he left Baldwin's side to become their lord. But when the citizens heard of Baldwin's warlike preparations they were terrified into surrender. Balduk made peace with Baldwin but was ever afterwards distrusted. Balas turned over the city and castle and also a fort in the near-by hills. Seruj was given as a fief to the knight Fulk of Chartres.[7]

[7] It is doubtful whether the knight Fulk was in Edessa before the sum-

Albert is alone in his discussion of these events. Fulk (pp. 214–15) mentions in very general terms the reduction of the country to Baldwin's rule. William (pp. 158–60) summarizes Albert's account. Ibn el-Atyr (I, 207) and the Mirat (523) mention the bare fact that the Franks took Seruj. I see no reason for doubting this information for both Samosata and Seruj were certainly taken by Baldwin during the course of the year 1098.

In chapter 31 Albert gives an account of Baldwin's marriage to the daughter of a rich Armenian prince, Taphnuz, the brother of Constantine of Gargar. Baldwin was made Taphnuz's heir for his estates and was promised a dowry of sixty thousand byzantines, of which only seven thousand were paid. Taphnuz was retained in Edessa to act as a councillor for his son-in-law. William of Tyre tells the same story (pp. 401–2). He gives the prince's name as Tafroc (tatos) and adds the point that his castles were situated in the Taurus Mountains. Albert's story is correct and not derived from the song tradition. The *Chanson d'Antioche* (see above p. 107) reports Baldwin's marriage to the daughter of Thoros. Kugler (*op. cit.*, 60) complains that Albert contradicts himself in III, 31 and IV, 6 with regard to this marriage. In the latter place he says that Baldwin married the spurious daughter of Thoros in accordance with the popular legend. This point occurs in the midst of a purely fictitious account of Kilij Arslan's speech at the court of Bagdad. The first eight chapters of book IV are taken up with this appeal of the sultan of Rum for aid against the Franks. This is one of Albert's worst lapses for it is very like the *Chanson* (V, 16ff.), although the

mer or autumn of 1098 to receive Seruj as a fief, while the city was apparently taken in the spring. His arrival is mentioned in Albert, V, 15, and his fief again, V, 22. This present reference may be inserted because Albert wrote of the event long afterward and he puts in all he knows of Seruj in both places. This Fulk was killed in January 1101. (Matthew, 53)

latter puts the same words in the mouth of Yagi Siyan the dispossessed ruler of Antioch. Yet I see no reason for insisting on Albert's contradiction here for he has Kilij Arslan say that Baldwin has married "filiam principis terrae." This may very well refer to the daughter of Thoros, but why to her rather than to the daughter of any other prince? Beyond this point I enter heartily into the condemnation of these eight chapters.

With chapter 9 of book IV we come to better information, which Kugler (*op. cit.*, 106–7) believes Albert took from his "Lorraine chronicler." Here we find Baldwin relieving the distress of the princes at Antioch with liberal gifts of gold and silver, horses and arms. Furthermore he gave to Godfrey the revenues of Tell bashir in grain, wine, oil, barley, and gold amounting to fifty thousand byzantines per year. Nichusus, the Armenian, sent Godfrey a magnificent tent which was stolen en route by Pancrace and sent by him as a gift to Bohemond. When the theft was discovered Bohemond was forced to give up the tent by the threats of Godfrey and Robert of Flanders, who were friends and sworn associates (qui ad invicem dilectissimi amici et consocii foederati erant). This presents some difficulties for the story of the tent appears doubtful and very like a romantic tale for the glorification of Godfrey. So, too, the friendship of the duke of Lorraine and the count of Flanders, and Bohemond's surrender of the tent in response to their threats, which seems entirely out of character. But Kugler (*loc. cit.*) resolves these difficulties. He points out that Nichusus and Pancrace appear in their same respective relationships of friendship and enmity to Baldwin as they had previously (Albert, III, 17, see above p. 105). Sybel (*Gesch. d. ersten Kreuzz.*, 365ff.) has doubted the friendship of Godfrey and Robert because of their well-known enmity in Europe and he points to the tradition of the songs to glorify the duke. Kugler, on the other hand, be-

lieves the friendship to be quite natural since the Lorrainers and Flemings would draw together as a neutral party between the antagonistic Normans and Provençals. Bohemond was doubtless willing to give in to buy the support of the princes holding the balance of power in the army, for his designs on Antioch were being consistently opposed by Raymond of Toulouse.

Chapters 10 to 12 deal with the passage of Corbogha's army through the confines of the county of Edessa. Albert mentions the enormous forces which remained "aliquot dies." Baldwin set out to meet Corbogha and attacked a detachment of the van with Frankish lancers and Armenian bowmen. The Christians drove back the Turks and took their spoils to Edessa. Corbogha thereupon ordered the siege of the city. The attack lasted three days without success and Corbogha went on to his main objective in Antioch planning to take Edessa on his return. Baldwin followed hoping to cut off some parties of stragglers but was unsuccessful as the Turks kept their rear well guarded.

This account is somewhat like the song tradition (*Chanson d'Antioche*, VI, 1–3), but all of it must not be thrown out for that reason as the songs frequently have some real historic value. Fulk (pp. 242–43) says that Corbogha was before Edessa for three weeks, and is followed here by William (pp. 216–17), and Bartolf (p. 300G). Matthew (p. 39) gives forty days. There is no necessary contradiction here, for Fulk's three weeks and Matthew's forty days probably refer to the whole time that the Turks were in Edessan territory and Albert's three days to the actual attack on the city. Albert's "aliquot dies" certainly implies a longer period than three days (see Kugler, *op. cit.*, p. 108). The *Chanson* tells of the nocturnal revictualing of Edessa by the princes of the crusading army, and attributes Corbogha's attack on the city to Baldwin's refusal to become a Mohammedan! It agrees with Matthew in the motive for raising the

siege. The son of Yagi Siyan, whom the Latins call Sansadoine, persuades Corbogha to hurry on to Antioch while the Christian army is still suffering from famine. Here, then, Albert, while possibly drawing partly from the songs, has kept his credulity in check and gives an account which may be trusted.

The information concerning the county of Edessa in book V begins with the expedition for the relief of Ezaz in the late summer of 1098 (chaps. 5–12). This town was one of the important strongholds on the direct route from Antioch to Tell bashir, and must have been a source of annoyance to the Christians on their journeys to Baldwin's possessions. Albert (V, 5) speaks of the frequent attacks on travelers who were going to Edessa to avoid the plague in Antioch in the summer. His tale regarding Godfrey's interest in the town begins with the capture of the wife of Folbertus of the castle of Bouillon after her husband and his companions had been killed by the Turks. The lady's beauty of face and figure attracted the Turks and they held her for ransom. But a Turkish warrior sought her in marriage from Omar (the name comes from Kemal ed-Din), lord of Ezaz (Hasart in Albert). He was more zealous in Omar's service after his marriage and carried his raids into the territory of Ridhwan of Aleppo. Ezaz had been a dependency of Aleppo but its lord was making his bid for freedom after the manner of any feudal baron. Upon the occasion of these new attacks Ridhwan determined to bring his rebellious vassal to heel and assembled a large army. Omar was terrified for the ruler of Aleppo was a formidable personage. The husband of the Christian lady suggested that he call in Godfrey, "dux christiani exercitus," to his assistance. Messengers were dispatched to offer an alliance and every assurance of good faith. Godfrey hesitated, but when Omar sent his son Mohammed as a hostage the duke promised his aid in all things and fixed the date

for his march against Ridhwan. The Franks were amazed when the messengers drew forth two pigeons and sent them off to their lord with perfect confidence that they would reach their destination. Ridhwan appeared before Ezaz with forty thousand men. Five days later Godfrey began the three days' march to its relief. He had already sent word to Baldwin to meet him with his forces (three thousand men), but Bohemond and Raymond refused to take any part in the affair since they were jealous that Omar had sought Godfrey first. Godfrey sent back word that if these two princes did not come to his aid they might expect him to be their enemy. Seeing the enthusiasm of the people for the expedition they gave in and the combined Christian army amounted to thirty thousand. Ridhwan judged from the campfires that he could not cope with this force and broke camp. Before returning to Aleppo he sent a force of ten thousand men by a circuitous route through the hills to fall upon the rearguard and stragglers of the Christians. The princes were two miles away. Before they were aware of the attack the Turks had killed six hundred pilgrims. Omar came to meet the Christians with grateful words and promises of future loyalty. Godfrey gave him an ornamented helmet and cuirass. The Christian army returned to Antioch without further adventures.

This story on the face of it bears all the marks of a romantic fiction for the glorification of Duke Godfrey. The only other Latin source (save William, pp. 280–83, who follows Albert) to mention it is Raymond (pp. 264–65), and he is very brief. He says that the Turks in Ezaz (he calls it Asa) offered to surrender to Godfrey when they were attacked by troops from Aleppo. Godfrey hastened to Antioch and asked help of Raymond of Toulouse, who had just recovered from an illness and was collecting his troops for a foraging expedition. When Godfrey promised that the Turks, once they were delivered, would be baptized,

it was enough for the pious Raymond. When they reached Ezaz they found the besiegers gone and Godfrey received hostages for the good behavior of the citizens. Raymond returned to Antioch having suffered considerable loss. This agrees in the main with Albert's account, but it lacks the detailed information of the situation between Aleppo and Ezaz. Granted that the speeches reported by Albert and probably the career of the lady are fable, the outline of the story seems to be exact. Albert, as we shall see from time to time, seems to have better information about the political situation among the Turks than any other Latin source. Kemal ed-Din (p. 586), under A. H. 491 (9 December, 1097, to 27 November, 1098) tells of the revolt of Omar of Ezaz and of his calling in Frankish allies. "St. Gilles," who is credited with most of the Frankish activity by this author, came to the assistance of Omar and the army of Aleppo retired. He received the son of Omar as a hostage, pillaged the country, and returned to Antioch. The Franks do not seem to have held much power over Ezaz for Kemal (p. 595) mentions it in 1107 as still a dependency of Aleppo. It is surprising to find such agreement between a Latin and an Arabic source, but it certainly strengthens Albert's authenticity, even if he has added romantic embellishments. There is no song which tells this story. The numbers in the armies reported by Albert are certainly the conventional expressions for large bodies of troops. The threats of Godfrey to secure the aid of the other princes seem at first impossible, but Kugler (*op. cit.*, pp. 175–77) makes a case for Albert, or rather for his Lorraine source, by appealing to the silence of Raymond.

In chapter 13 Albert tells us that Godfrey left plague-stricken Antioch for the healthier highlands of his lordship of Tell bashir. Godfrey remembered the ravages of the plague in Rome in 1083 when he was there with the Emperor Henry IV, and feared a like weakening of his forces.

Chapter 14 deals with punitive expeditions against Pancrace[8] and his brother Kogh Vasil, whose exploits in brigandage aroused the people of the towns. Godfrey took and burned the robbers' castles. Other sources make no mention of these events beyond the bare fact that Godfrey went towards Edessa (*Anon. Gesta*, 384–85; Baldric, 80; *Chanson d'Antioche*, VIII, 2, 9, 11; Guibert, 209; Orderic Vital, III, 522; Raymond, 262, 264; Robert, 837; Tudebode, 84). William of Tyre (pp. 280–84) follows Albert as usual. Kugler (*op. cit.*, 177–78) believes the story to be entirely trustworthy, for it agrees perfectly with what we already know of Pancrace's character. I am not sure about the inclusion of Kogh Vasil, for he usually appears as a friend of the Franks. These two chapters also appear to be an interpolation in the text, for chapter 15 opens with words that indicate that it originally followed the account of the expedition to Ezaz in chapter 12: "Duce itaque Godefrido ab Hasart in Antiochiam reverso, dehinc, obside suo Mahumet in manu et custodia fidelium suorum Antiochiae relicto, Turbaisel et Ravenel profecto, Baldewino a Hasart cum suis Rohas reverso . . ."

Chapters 15 to 22 take us to Edessa. In the summer of 1098 great numbers of crusaders, noble and simple, made their way by hundreds and fifties to offer their services to Baldwin. Among them were Drogo of Nahella, Reinard of Toul, Gaston of Béarn, and Fulk of Chartres.[9] Baldwin hired them all and gave them rich gifts, of which they had great need for the long expedition to the Holy Land had eaten up their resources. The whole city was filled with Franks and there was much difficulty in finding accommodations for so many. With this added strength Baldwin reduced the whole region to his authority. But the influx of Franks was exceedingly displeasing to the Ar-

[8] On Pancrace see Dulaurier, in *Rec. arm.*, I, 35 n. 2.
[9] On Fulk see Kugler, *op. cit.*, 178–79, and above, p. 14.

menians who saw their positions as favored councillors handed over to foreigners. One faithful soul informed Baldwin that the Edessans were plotting to call in the Turks and murder all the Franks. The count ferreted out the conspirators and suddenly ordered their arrest and imprisonment and the confiscation of their goods. Many Armenians offered large sums for freedom, but Baldwin ever held out for more, knowing through his spies that they had transferred their most valuable possessions to castles in the mountains. Finally he consented to ransom all save two whose treason was too flagrant. These two had their eyes put out. Several lesser conspirators had their nostrils slit and their hands and feet severed and were expelled from the city. From each ransom he received twenty thousand, or thirty thousand, or even sixty thousand byzantines, besides horses, mules, silver vases, and ornaments of price which could be distributed as salaries to his knights. From that day his name was respected and there was no further attempt at rebellion. Taphnuz, thinking of the still unpaid dowry, fled to the mountains, and could not be enticed back to the city.

Kugler (*op. cit.*, 178–79) says that this account, in the high spots, is not to be doubted. William (pp. 283–85) copies the story. Guibert (p. 165) places the conspiracy early in the year (Easter Sunday), not long after Thoros's death. This is a short account in which Baldwin appears far more cruel in his mutilations of the conspirators. Here I should prefer Albert to Guibert for he gives a logical cause for the plot and a more probable punishment for the conspirators.

The coming of such large numbers of Franks brought Baldwin into further dealings with his Turkish friends (Albert, V, 18–22). Balas of Seruj now despaired of recovering his lordship and, since he received no pay because of the multitude of Franks, he plotted Baldwin's

death by craft. He offered to surrender to Baldwin the castle of Amaja, near Seruj, and a day was fixed for the transfer. Balas hid a force of one hundred Turks in the castle and invited Baldwin to enter with a few chosen friends, leaving his force of two hundred knights outside. Prudent Franks prevented Baldwin's acceptance of this proposal and twelve picked men were sent in his stead. These were immediately seized by the Turks but not before two had reached a window and reported the treachery. Since Amaja was impossible to take by assault, Baldwin retired sadly to Edessa completely cured of his friendships with Turks. When Balduk of Samosata appeared a few days later, Baldwin ordered him decapitated, for he had never surrendered the promised hostages. Seruj was given to Fulk of Chartres with a force of one hundred knights to harass Amaja. Fulk managed to capture six Turks who were exchanged for six of the captive knights. The other six were held in Amaja until Baldwin's departure for Jerusalem in November, 1099, when four escaped through the negligence of their guards. Balas then beheaded the two remaining, Gerard the secretary of Baldwin and Picellus, a nephew of Udelard of Wizan. William of Tyre (pp. 286–88) repeats this story. The information is probably true for it hangs together and agrees with earlier references to Balas and Balduk (Albert, III, 24, 25, and above p. 112).

The next adventure reported by Albert (V, 26, 27) concerns Godfrey on a journey from Tell bashir to Antioch in the autumn of 1098. Baldwin had gone across the Euphrates to meet his brother. After the conference Godfrey started back with forty knights. The duke stopped for dinner at a fountain a short distance from Antioch and was surprised to hear of a party of one hundred Turks in the vicinity. The Christians hastily armed and drove off the Turks. They returned to Antioch with spoils and horses and the heads of Turks hanging from their saddles.

This would appear to be the most romantic of tales, a piece with Godfrey's miraculous recoveries from illness and his hunting adventures, and one would suspect Albert of having drawn on the songs were not the stories of other chroniclers, who had no interest in glorifying the duke, even more remarkable. Raymond (p. 267) allows Godfrey only twelve followers against one hundred and fifty Turks. Here the Duke killed thirty and took as many prisoners. The rest were driven into the swamps along the river and many were drowned. Guibert (p. 254) in his quotation from the letter of Baldwin of Bourg to Manasses of Rheims gives a third version. Godfrey with twenty men is attacked by one hundred and twenty Turks. He kills eighty and captures ninety horses. The letter gives the date October 9 (Festum Sancti Dionysii). This account is more doubtful for it is merely the report of one of Godfrey's exploits and no year is given. Godfrey is reported to be returning from Morocoria (Seruj ?). There is considerable doubt about the date of this letter [10] but I believe that it refers to the exploit referred to by Albert and Raymond and belongs to the autumn of 1098. Neither Kugler nor Hagenmeyer has noticed the similarity of the accounts. Hence, Hagenmeyer [11] dates Godfrey's exploit towards the end of October. Kugler (*op. cit.*, 188–89) explains Godfrey's reasons for seeking a meeting with Baldwin in the late autumn, by pointing out the momentous decision which had to be reached. Should the Lorrainers remain in North Syria and defend the ill-defined boundaries of their possessions on both banks of the Euphrates, or should Baldwin undertake the defense alone and Godfrey profit by the general feel-

[10] See Riant, "Inventaire des lettres des croisades," in *Archives de l'orient latin,* 157, 213–14; R. Röhricht, *Regesta regni Hierosolymitani,* Innsbruck, 1893, nos. 11, 33, *Additamentum* (1904), no. 33; Röhricht, *Gesch. d. ersten Kreuzz.,* Innsbruck, 1901, 157–59.

[11] H. Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie de la première croisade,* in *Revue de l'orient latin,* VI–VIII, no. 320.

ing of the army, which he felt himself, and fulfill the vows of the crusade, seizing whatever lands opportunity might offer in the South and thus not leave everything to be snatched by the Provençals? At all events it seems probable that some such adventure as Albert reports actually took place probably in the very manner he describes.

This closes the earlier portion of Albert's work with regard to the county of Edessa. We have found his information sound in its main outlines. His only offenses against credibility are in the numbers of the forces engaged at various times and in his tendency to write long speeches for various characters under circumstances imaginary or otherwise (especially book IV, 1–8). This last is a convention of medieval historiography and may be pardoned in Albert though hardly condoned. His dependence on the only song which we possess has proved to be extremely slight. One may say that for the county of Edessa during the years 1097 and 1098 Albert has used good material whether oral or written. I am inclined to say written, for his familiarity with the political situation in northern Syria would scarcely be possible for a European unless he had before his eyes either one or several accounts of events written by participants.

BALDWIN II

For the rest of the reign of Baldwin I in Edessa Albert has nothing to say and from 1098 on his principal source tells everything from the point of view of one with the main army at Jerusalem. The same is true concerning Baldwin of Bourg. The second count of Edessa appears in the story only when his principality enters events which have to do with the other Latin states. Hence Albert's information is less detailed for the whole period up to 1120 when his chronicle stops, but for any event which he

does mention he gives an almost indispensable account.

Information of this character begins in book IX, chapters 38–47. Here is the great attack of the united forces of Antioch and Edessa upon the city of Harran in 1104. This city lay some forty miles south of Edessa in the fertile valley of the Balikh. Once captured it would have been a valuable outpost for Edessa and would have served to prevent surprise attacks from Mesopotamia. Albert's story begins with the attack on Edessa of the Emir Geigremich (Jekermisch) of Mosul with sixty thousand troops. Baldwin of Bourg sent hurriedly to Bohemond and Tancred for aid. The Normans set out at once with three thousand horse and seven thousand foot. The rendezvous was fixed at Harran (Aran or Caran in Albert), but the Christians actually met near the Balikh River (Albert calls it the Chabar as do all the Latins). They were informed that the Turks were endeavoring to destroy Edessa, so they moved to Racha and prepared for battle by confessing their sins to the patriarch of Antioch and the bishop of Edessa, who were with the army. The battle-line was formed with the Antiocheans on the right and the Edessans on the left flank. These were opposed by Socoman (Sokman of Hisn Keifa) and Jekermisch. During the battle the wings of the Christian army became separated, and Baldwig of Bourg and Joscelin of Courtenay were captured, while on the right Bohemond and Tancred were winning the advantage. With the two counts were captured eighteen priests, three monks, and the bishop of Edessa, but the latter was delivered by Tancred. Nightfall put an end to the fighting. At dawn the Christians were seized with terror. They fled to the protecting walls of Edessa in great confusion. There the people chose Tancred to govern and protect the country until Baldwin could be ransomed. Bohemond returned to Antioch.

A week later Jekermisch and Sokman attacked Edessa

with still greater forces. Tancred had few Frankish knights but he so encouraged the Edessans that they made a stout defense. He wrote to Bohemond asking help against this new danger. Before his uncle could arrive Tancred had already made a sortie at dawn and driven off the Turks, who were taken completely by surprise. Bohemond's coming turned the defeat into a rout. In the course of the pursuit the Christians captured a noble Turkish lady whom the Turks proposed to exchange for Baldwin of Bourg or to ransom for fifteen thousand byzantines. King Baldwin wrote urging the Normans to accept the exchange but they put him off with fair words, saying that they proposed to secure both Baldwin and the money. They were insincere, for they had no intention of giving up the revenues of Edessa, which amounted to forty thousand byzantines annually from the tolls of the city alone, not to speak of the revenues of the cities and castles of the county. But they satisfied the king and remained in possession.

Albert's account of these events is by far the most detailed of any contemporary source. Fulk (pp. 468–77) agrees with him in general although his account is much shorter. His only difference lies in his account of the headlong flight to Edessa in which the baggage of the army was lost and many Christians were drowned in the Balikh as they attempted to cross. Radulf (pp. 710–12) likewise agrees in the main outlines of the story. The Turks make the first attack and the Christians gather and pursue them to Harran. Radulf makes three divisions of the Christian army. Only Tancred, in the center, was prepared to fight when the Turks suddenly attacked late in the afternoon. Bohemond and Baldwin abandoned their camps and the latter was captured. Radulf, like Fulk, goes into detail in describing the flight of the Christians and the crossing of the Balikh. The refugees abandoned even their arms in their eagerness to reach Edessa through the rain and mud.

Tancred was elected Baldwin's successor. Of all the Latins, only William of Tyre (pp. 443–47) differs materially from Albert's story and he must have enjoyed the use of Arabic sources for his account. He tells of the preparation Baldwin had made for this attack on Harran by laying waste the fields of the valley so that there was already a famine in the city when the Christians attacked. The inhabitants surrendered the city unconditionally, but the leaders could not agree about its possession and delayed entering until the next day when it was too late, for a relief force of Turks arrived. The Christians were defeated from the first and abandoned their camp. Almost all were massacred. Baldwin and Joscelin were captured while the other princes escaped to Edessa. There Bohemond, with the consent of the inhabitants, gave Edessa to Tancred on condition that he would make no difficulties when Baldwin returned. He took Joscelin's territories under his own protection. Matthew of Edessa (pp. 71–73) agrees with William. He makes Baldwin and Joscelin the aggressors, and tells of the famine in Harran. With his invincible hatred for Baldwin and Joscelin he ascribes the defeat to their foolhardiness in insisting on fighting the Turks without Norman help, that they alone might reap the benefits of a victory. The defeat took place without the intervention of the Normans and the massacred Christians numbered forty thousand. Baldwin was taken to Mosul by Jekermisch and Joscelin to Hisn Keifa by Sokman. Bohemond left Edessa to Tancred and departed for Antioch. Of the Arabic sources (Abou i'feda, 7; Ibn el-Atyr, 221–23; Ibn Khaldoun, 9–10; Mirat, 527; Nodjoum, 494; Kemal ed-Din, 592) Ibn el-Atyr alone gives any extended account. Ibn Khaldoun merely copies from him. He tells that the Franks first attacked Harran and that Jekermisch and Sokman made up their differences and advanced with ten thousand men to rescue the city. He says that the Frankish forces were

divided by a mountain from each other during the battle and that Bohemond and Tancred took no part but fled to Edessa by night accompanied by six knights. The two emirs then ravaged the country. Jekermisch, with Baldwin as his prisoner, besieged Edessa for two weeks and Sokman occupied a Frankish castle in the territory. Kemal ed-Din tells of Bohemond's giving Edessa to Tancred.

From these varied accounts it is almost impossible to reconstruct any very definite story of the progress of events. Albert, however, appears to have as accurate an account as any other. He is entirely wrong, to be sure, about the original attack of the Turks on Edessa, but all the other contemporary Latin accounts make the same mistake, and he is the only one who knows the names of the Turkish leaders. His numbers are again conventional—sixty thousand is too large an army for the Turks. It is of a piece with Matthew's forty thousand Christians killed. Ibn el-Atyr gives what is probably nearer the truth when he allows Jekermisch three thousand and Sokman ten thousand. He says that twelve thousand Christians were killed which is surely an exaggeration. Albert's story of the division is perhaps doubtful, but some division certainly took place and his is not incompatible with Radulf's account. Matthew (and William) reports the jealousies existing among the various princes as the cause for the defeat and this point is well born out by later events. Radulf agrees with Albert in having Tancred chosen governor of Edessa, while Matthew and Kemal ed-Din give the disposal of the city to Bohemond who passed it on to Tancred. William combines both and has Bohemond give the city with the consent of the inhabitants. The subsequent attack on Edessa is mentioned only by Albert and Ibn el-Atyr and seems to be a further indication of the accuracy of Albert's detail for this series of events. His story of the possibility of exchanging Baldwin of Bourg for the Mohammedan lady is unsup-

ported by any further evidence and verges on the fabulous. It is almost too neat a story of Norman perfidy to be true when coming from the pen of an obvious partisan of the Lorrainers. Doubtless the letters in the text (Tancred to Bohemond, and both to the king) are the literary efforts of the author of the account and need not be taken as actual copies of such letters, if there ever were any.

Albert (X, 37–38) returns to Edessa to mention the ransoming of Baldwin of Bourg and Joscelin of Courtenay. In 1108 (the eighth year of Baldwin I) Joscelin collected one hundred thousand byzantines from great and small for Baldwin's ransom. The count was received in Edessa with honor by the citizens and Tancred left the city, but the two princes were very hostile. They ravaged each other's lands and soon came to open war. Baldwin was defeated and shut himself up in Tuluppa (Dolouc) where he was besieged. Joscelin fled to Jekermisch and secured the aid of his army of forty thousand men. Tancred gave up before the Turks arrived and a truce was arranged.

This account is fragmentary and contains grave errors but is on the whole as exact as any Latin source. Fulk (pp. 477–81) tells that Joscelin raised the ransom and that hostages were given, that Baldwin could not enter Edessa because Tancred forbade him, although Bohemond had charged his nephew to give up the city when Baldwin escaped. War broke out over the possession of Edessa and Joscelin called in seven thousand Turks, but Tancred was the victor in the field. Finally the leaders of the people patched up a truce and Baldwin recovered his lands. William of Tyre (pp. 464–65) here follows Fulk. Matthew of Edessa (pp. 85–87) says that Joscelin ransomed Baldwin from Javaly for thirty thousand tahegans and that both princes took refuge with Kogh Vasil until they might win back their territories by force of arms. With Armenian help and five thousand Turks from Javaly

they struggled to secure Edessa and Tell bashir without doing homage to Tancred. They were unsuccessful in battle but Tancred's victory had no result. The Arabic sources tell the most likely story. They (Abulfaraj, 296–98; Ibn el-Atyr, 260–63, 266–67; Ibn Khaldoun, 10, 12–13) give the ransom as seventy thousand denarii (Abulfaraj) or thirty-five thousand gold pieces (Ibn Khaldoun) for Baldwin and twenty thousand gold pieces (Ibn el-Atyr) for Joscelin, with one hundred Mohammedan prisoners. Tancred contributed thirty thousand gold pieces towards the ransom but refused to give up Edessa. Javaly had been willing to free his prisoners because he had need of money and allies to prosecute his war with the sultan. In the war over Edessa it now appears that Turks fought on both sides, for Tancred called on Ridhwan of Aleppo who sent six hundred knights. These were opposed by the two thousand from Javaly fighting on the side of the legitimate princes. After their defeat Baldwin and Joscelin shut themselves up in Tell bashir and peace was made by the intervention of the patriarch of Antioch who recalled Tancred to his oath.

If we had to depend on Latin material for our knowledge of these events it would be fragmentary indeed. Albert knows nothing of the death of Jekermisch in 1106 and Baldwin's subsequent captor Javaly. He is correct about Joscelin's having been freed before Baldwin, but the amount of the ransom is doubtful. It is impossible to fix this amount, for all the sources disagree. He is wrong in allowing Baldwin to enter Edessa at all but is correct for the general progress of the war with Tancred, although he gives no reason for Tancred's surrender of the county. The forty thousand Turks secured to help Baldwin are exaggerated beyond belief. With all his mistakes Albert gives a fair account of the main course of events and explains the basis for the later disputes between Baldwin and Tancred.

Albert returns to this dispute in book XI, chapters 10 to 12. Tancred was actively building up a great Norman state about Antioch as a nucleus, seizing land where he could from Frank, or Turk, or Armenian with complete indifference. He had tried to prevent Bertram, the son of Raymond of Toulouse, from inheriting his father's possessions in the East. This, added to the Edessan controversy, caused the king to take a hand in settling matters. King Baldwin was on his way to help Bertram take Tripoli in the spring of 1109 when he wrote to Tancred ordering him in the name of the church of Jerusalem to give up those cities which he unjustly withheld from Baldwin of Bourg and Joscelin. Both parties met the king at Tripoli. At a great council the grievances on all sides were discussed. A formal reconciliation was effected and Tancred gave up his claims. In return for this complacency the king conferred on him important fiefs in the kingdom for which the Norman would owe fealty to the crown. No other source mentions this meeting of the Frankish princes at Tripoli, but there is no good reason for doubting it as Kugler (*op. cit.*, 363–65) has shown.

For the following year Albert (XI, 16–25) gives us further details of the feud between Tancred and Baldwin of Bourg. This time Baldwin sent messengers to the king who was then engaged in the siege of Beirut to ask help against a large army led by Armigaldus (Ahmed Yel ?), Armigazi (Ilghazy), and Samargo (Sokman), which was besieging Edessa following the instigation of Tancred. The king swore the embassy to secrecy lest their tale discourage the army. After the fall of Beirut the king returned to Jerusalem and there announced to his followers the danger which threatened Edessa. All agreed to go to its relief and the king marched north through the month of June. He started with only six hundred knights and three hundred foot, but he was joined along the route by various small

contingents of hundreds and sixties and fifties, as well as by a larger force under Bertram of Tripoli, with the result that the army numbered fifteen thousand when it reached the Euphrates. Upon hearing of the arrival of the king, the Turks retired a few days' march in the direction of Harran, hoping that the Franks would fall into the trap. Baldwin of Bourg, with his army of four hundred knights and ten thousand Armenian foot soldiers, went to meet the king, told him of the movements of the forty thousand Turks, and repeated his charge against Tancred. Thereupon the king ordered Tancred up to answer for his misdeeds before a royal council. Tancred came with fifteen hundred knights, made no attempt to justify himself, but charged Baldwin and Joscelin with refusing homage and due respect to him as lord of Antioch, since Edessa had formerly been tributary to the greater city. The king rebuked Tancred for his alliance with the Turks and for his attempt to enforce the customs of the infidels upon his Christian brethren. As the court was made up of his enemies, Tancred outwardly repented and promised to be faithful in the future. The united army then crossed the river and marched against the Turks but were unable to discover them. Consequently the king accomplished nothing beyond settling disputes in Edessa where he resided for a few days. On the return journey the larger part of the army crossed the Euphrates in safety although means of transport were meager. When five thousand were still on the eastern bank, the Turks attacked and massacred a large number under the eyes of the king's host. Baldwin of Bourg had imprudently followed the main army and was surprised by the whole Turkish army. His three hundred knights were dispersed and he barely escaped capture. The king sent him back to Edessa with a strong escort.

Fulk (pp. 537–43), and his followers, Lisiard (p. 569G) and the *Estoire* (p. 646B), give much the same story al-

though in far briefer form. There is no mention of Tancred's calling in the Turks. Indeed, they would have us believe that Tancred was waiting at the Euphrates for the king's coming. They say nothing of the jealousy and hatred which divided the Franks of North Syria, and there is no hint of a council to try Tancred. The king merely revictuals Edessa and returns to the Euphrates where a massacre of poor Armenians takes place. The king and Tancred then went to their respective homes. William of Tyre (pp. 462–64) gives what appears to be his version of these events under the year 1108, when Baldwin and Joscelin were still in captivity, and he merely mentions the provisioning of Edessa and the surrounding cities and the massacre of Armenians at the river crossing. Matthew of Edessa (pp. 91–94) presents more serious difficulties. He charges Baldwin and Joscelin with calling in Maudud of Mosul for help against Tancred, but says that the Turk appeared in such force that the guilty counts were afraid to join him. Maudud turned his army against Edessa and for one hundred days the city was in grave danger, while the whole country was mercilessly ravaged. Joscelin was sent to ask help from the king, who set out after the taking of Beirut and was joined by Bertram and Tancred—the latter only upon the insistence of the king. The Turks retired but before the Franks could catch them, Tancred, feeling the unfriendly atmosphere, went to Samosata. The whole army then retreated. Through the treachery of two Franks Maudud was informed and reappeared in time to massacre the Armenians left on the bank of the Euphrates, after the main army had crossed. The Arabic side is found in Ibn el-Atyr (pp. 280–82), Kemal ed-Din (pp. 595–96), the Mirat (pp. 537–40), and the Nodjoum (pp. 495–96). These agree on a great gathering of emirs under the leadership of Maudud to undertake a holy war against the Christians. They besieged Edessa but retired to Harran upon the

approach of the Frankish army, hoping to draw it into an unfavorable position. But the Franks contented themselves with provisioning Edessa and retired to the Euphrates where they were attacked and defeated by the Turks, reinforced by troops from Damascus. The Turks stopped again before Edessa but it was now too strong to be taken.

Kugler (*op. cit.*, 367–77) has gone carefully into the contradictions which exist between Albert and Matthew of Edessa. He points out the violent animosity felt by the Edessan for the ruling counts and his admiration for Tancred, who always appears by some such phrase as "ce vaillant champion du Christ." This state of mind makes Mathew a most prejudiced authority for the affairs of Baldwin and Joscelin. Kugler also shows that the Franks generally believed Tancred guilty of connivance with the Turks, and, although Matthew shields him from all blame, his story shows a decided lack of sympathy between the Norman prince and his co-religionists, for Matthew says that Tancred only joined the army at all "à force d'instances," and that he withdrew to Samosata without touching Edessa. For these reasons Kugler believes that there may be some truth in Albert's (or the Lorrainer's) charges. Kugler's conclusions seem to me to be entirely wrong in this particular. If there were only Matthew and Albert to be considered he would have a strong case, but there remains the Mohammedan side. Looking at the attack from the latter point of view, I find this is but the first of a series of expeditions in which the emirs put aside their jealousies for the holy war. In 1104, Mohammed Shah, a son of Malek Shah, had established himself as sultan of Bagdad and had begun to bring some order out of the chaotic feuds of rival emirs. Maudud, who succeeded Javely in Mosul, was the chosen leader for this series of united attacks on the Christians. He was the first to overcome the selfishness of his kin and present the ideal of unity against

the Unbelievers, an example that was not forgotten in later years. From what we know of Maudud's character it seems extremely unlikely that he would ever have allied himself with a Christian. The real cause of the expedition of 1110 was the appeal of the Mohammedans of Syria to the sultan to avenge the taking of Tripoli (see Kemal ed-Din, 595, Nodjoum, 495, and especially Mirat, 537–39). These facts destroy the credibility of both Albert and Matthew on the point of alliances with the Turks.

The fact remains, however, that Tancred was a doubtful ally, none too eager to aid the count of Edessa. There is probably some measure of truth in Albert's story of the rivalries of the Frankish princes of North Syria, judging from what was generally the condition of the Latin East. Aside from this point Albert's story is by far the most detailed and circumstantial of all. For once he has restrained his imagination with regard to figures and gives the king a not impossible army. On the other hand, the Turkish host is grossly exaggerated, but Albert seems to have some more exact knowledge of the Turks than other Latin writers for he alone gives names for the Turkish leaders which are not impossible to identify.

The last event in the county of Edessa mentioned by Albert (XI, 36–42) is the attack of Maudud and his allies in 1111. In the early summer messengers from Baldwin of Bourg informed the king that two hundred thousand Turks were engaged in the siege of Tell bashir and in ravaging the country. The king was delayed in setting out for the north by a threatened attack from Damascus and the appearance of an Egyptian army at Ascalon. In the meantime Malducus (Maudud), Armigaldus (Ahmed Yel ?), Armigarzi (Ilghazy), and Samarga (Sokman) had given up the siege of Tell bashir after two months spent in vain attempts to mine the mountain on which the castle stood. The Turkish army separated, half going towards

Antioch and half to Mesopotamia because of a dearth of supplies. Joscelin, who had valiantly defended his stronghold, followed the latter with one hundred and fifty knights and one hundred foot. He attacked the baggage train and took much booty after killing one thousand Turks. The other Turkish army went to Aleppo to secure the aid of Ridhwan and to leave their women and children in that city, but the emir refused all help as he was at peace with Tancred. He gave his son as a hostage but persisted in remaining neutral. The Turks then threatened to kill their hostage if Ridhwan did not march with them. Since he was obdurate they carried out this treachery. They next moved to Caesarea Philippi (Shaizar) and camped on the banks of the Fer (Orontes). The next chapter tells of the great gathering of Franks in Antioch (Albert, XI, 40). Each Frankish fief-holder is mentioned with the number of troops which followed him. Several Armenian princes of the district likewise swelled the Christian ranks. The whole army amounted to sixteen thousand. It set out from Shaizar and camped for sixteen days opposite the Turks. As the people did not bring food to the camp the Christians lost more than a thousand from famine. On the fifteenth day the two armies drew up for battle. Three corps of Christians charged prematurely and were defeated. The king and Tancred tried to join battle but the Turks withdrew by hundreds and thousands "according to their custom." The next day the Turks departed for Mesopotamia having accomplished nothing. These events took place in the autumn at the feast of Saint Michael the Archangel (29 September), the time when the harvests are gathered.

This account is supported in the main by Fulk (pp. 549–57). He puts the duration of the siege of Tell bashir at one month and makes Tancred the suppliant for help from the king. Fulk went himself on this expedition and is prepared to give exact information, but his story

in no way conflicts with Albert's. He says that the union of the Christian armies took place at Rugia, that they proceeded to the River Fer, thence to Apamea, and then six miles farther to Shaizar. Finding the Turks unwilling to attack the Christians retreated because food was lacking. The *Estoire* (p. 644E) and Lislard (p. 570C) follow Fulk. Matthew of Edessa (pp. 96–97) merely adds more details. He reports that Maudud's army took several Frankish forts and made a demonstration before Edessa before crossing the river at Seruj and attacking Tell bashir. He attributes the raising of the siege to the Kurd, Ahmed Yel, who so admired Joscelin's military abilities that he made friends with the Frank. He then tells of Maudud's expedition to Shaizar where he was opposed by the king, Tancred, Bertram, and Baldwin of Bourg. There was no battle and the Turks retired "furtively." The Arabic sources (Abulfaraj, 300; Abou l'feda, 11; Ibn el-Atyr, I, 282–83, II, 32–33; Ibn Khaldoun, 15; Kemal ed-Din, 599–601; Mirat, 542–43; Nodjoum, 496; Autobiographie d'Ousama, 397) agree remarkably well with the Latins for this series of events. They all mention the siege of Tell bashir (forty-five days according to Ibn el-Atyr) preceded by a short attack on Edessa. They say that the army broke up because Sokman fell ill and the other emirs hastened off to secure his fiefs from the sultan. Maudud remained in Syria. He led his army to Aleppo, where Ridhwan closed the gates, and then to Ma'arrat en No'man, where he was joined by Toghtekin of Damascus. These two led the army to Shaizar. They found the Franks at Apamea. Then the Turks cut off the food supplies, causing the Franks to retire because of famine. They attribute the lack of a battle to the fears of the Franks who refused all engagements, although the Mohammedans attacked the Frankish rear as it retired. Several give the date as the month of Rabia I, 505 (8 September to 6 October, 1111).

All of these sources show a remarkable similarity and go far to support Albert's story in all of its particulars. Indeed, it is surprising that Albert should have known so much about the movements of the Turks and have known it so accurately. The number two hundred thousand stands, of course, for a large army. His later figures are well within the bounds of credibility. His reason for the separation of the Turkish army is wrong, but the true one could hardly have been known by a European. Joscelin's raid on the rearguard is unsupported, but it may have occurred. The difference of opinion as to the reason for no battle's being fought can easily be accounted for by national or religious prejudice. Kugler (*op. cit.*, 383–87) takes up the question of the various vassals mentioned in chapter 40, and attempts to prove that through a stylistic error the author attributed them all to Tancred as overlord, even in the case of such nobles as the count of Edessa. His argument is sufficiently convincing to cause no further discussion. The same is true of his argument about Albert's mistake in calling Shaizar "Caesarea Philippi." Here Kugler believes that it is the mistake of some later copyist and not by the original writer.

From this comparison of the accounts of Albert for the county of Edessa with all the others that we now possess, I believe that his work deserves a considerable amount of credence and that more weight should be given to his statements than they have enjoyed in the past. There is of course a considerable amount of internal evidence for Kugler's "Lorraine chronicler," but why limit Albert to one source of information? At all events, his reports are the longest, the most detailed, and are substantially true, as far as they can be checked up. He is certainly better informed about the Turks than any other Latin chronicler. Even when he exaggerates numbers and is wrong in details the correctness of his statements for the general course of events is

not impugned. Without Albert of Aachen we should have great difficulty in explaining clearly the progress of the Franks in North Syria and we should lack much information concerning the methods of the Franks in winning their foothold in the East.

ANDRE ALDEN BEAUMONT, JR.

VI

THE GENOESE COLONIES IN SYRIA

The written history of Genoa begins with the words: "A little before the time of the fleet to Caesarea in the city of the Genoese a compagna of three years and of six consuls was initiated." Thus does Caffaro, the twelfth century historian of Genoa, significantly link two facts of prime importance in the history of the city: the organization of the first communal government, and the departure for Syria of that crusading fleet which dwarfed the earlier, smaller expeditions against the Saracens nearer home. In the retrospective thought of Caffaro, writing in his last years after a long, active life in the service of the state, the two nearly synchronous events marked the beginning of an epoch; of that he was fully conscious although he lived no longer than to see it gloriously begun. One likes to think that the contemporary drawing of the white-clad, hoary Caffaro dictating to his scribe Macrobio, with hand uplifted as if to caution the younger man to mark well his words, was meant to depict the scene as that first phrase was spoken. And Caffaro was right. With the departure of the Genoese fleet in support of the First Crusade in consequence of the successful preaching of Urban II's two bishops in the old church of San Syro when so many of the great men of Genoa took the cross, there had been begun an intensive internal movement for freedom and self-government to be crowned with a moderate measure of success but to serve more significantly as a background for an extensive, external movement for the achievement of the city's destiny,

commercial power on the seas. The dawn of the twelfth century shone on this pregnant beginning. By the end of the thirteenth century Genoese fleets mightier than Caffaro could have dreamed of, had carried the commune's power to every shore of the Mediterranean, even beyond the Pillars of Hercules to the northern shores of Europe; in 1291 occurred that ill-fated Atlantic venture toward the west, so mysterious and premature a prelude to the successful effort of the most famous of all Genoese sea-captains two hundred years later. And the continuators of Caffaro scarcely feel compelled to comment on the activities of their fellow citizens on those various distant shores! The historian can only wish they had. So might we know more than the frugal sources tell us of Genoese effort, success, and failure in Byzantium, south Russia, Asia Minor, the Greek islands, Syria, Alexandria, Tunis, Ceuta, southern France, Spain, and the Balearic Isles. What Caffaro marks as the promising signal of success, they accept as every-year occurrences. They barely pause to mention Genoese exploits on far-off shores, of perhaps greater importance in the history of the city and of the Mediterranean world than the deeds of the little fleet that to him seemed so mighty and portentous.

The full story of Genoese maritime and commercial expansion in these two centuries remains yet to be told. It is the story of a young and vigorous people, bursting with energy, enterprise and newly discovered strength, pushing beyond the narrow confines of primitive village life to grasp world power, frequently enough in too many directions at once, halting occasionally in failure to recognize the imminence of success, straining their resources occasionally beyond all possibility of continuity of effort; and through it all failing to secure at home within the walls that peace without which the full fruits of their magnificent efforts abroad could not be safely garnered nor their

ever watchful enemies, whether imperial, papal, Pisan, or Venetian, be properly guarded against. It is the story of a people reaching out to test, strengthen, and increase the mainspring of their existence, trade upon the seas; to find markets, to gain and hold them at whatever cost, to throttle if need be all competitive opposition; in short it is the story of national expansion and penetration abroad in miniature. In this essay only one aspect of the picture can be even briefly sketched, that of Genoese colonial life and experiment in Syria. There in support of the crusading armies the Genoese like the Pisans and Venetians founded bases of trade upon which the prosperity of their commerce depended. Through all the vicissitudes of fortune elsewhere in the Mediterranean the foothold in Syria was always regarded as of supreme importance, although temporarily opportunity or necessity sometimes brought relations with other regions to the fore, and allowed the problems in Syria to be pushed aside for the moment.

Genoa sent to Syria in support of the crusade six naval expeditions of varying size between the years 1098 and 1110. In return for the aid furnished the crusading armies, the Genoese were granted a handsome string of colonial holdings along the coast of Syria.[1] In the north in what was to be the principality of Antioch, they assumed full sovereignty over the port of St. Simeon until it was incorporated into the principality, when they were allowed to retain a third of the harbor revenues and a section of the town; in the capital of the principality, Antioch, they received thirty houses, a church, a *fondaco* or bazar, and a

[1] Every worker in this field owes a great debt to Wilhelm Heyd, who has cleared the field in his admirable books, *Le colonie commerciali degli Italiani in oriente nel medio evo,* 2 vols., Venice, 1866–68, and *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge,* 2 vols., Leipzig, 1885–86, reprinted 1923. Since he wrote, however, much new material has come to light, especially from the archives in Genoa. It has not seemed necessary to refer repeatedly to Heyd's works in this essay. The writer here once for all acknowledges his indebtedness.

well; in Laodicea, a *ruga* or *vicus*, a church and castle; in Gibellum a building site and a *casale*, or landed estate outside the town proper. Further south in the county of Tripoli they were granted a third of the capital city, a castle, the port and the islands outside—a grant that was never enjoyed—and the entire city of Gibelet. In the kingdom of Jerusalem proper they were given quarters in the Holy City and in Jaffa, a third of Caesarea, Arsuf, Beirut, and Acre, with the same portion of the lands attached to these towns. Except in unimportant Sidon where they never secured a grant, and in Tyre where they won a strong foothold only after 1187, they had been granted, on paper at least, possessions in every important port, freedom of trade everywhere, shares in the revenues of many of the ports, all within the space of a dozen years. Well might Caffaro writing a generation later point to the first of these naval expeditions wherein he himself participated, and from which the booty was enormous, two pounds eight solidi in money and two pounds of pepper for every man of the fleet in addition to the ships' shares and the larger honoraria to the consuls and the leaders, as the beginning of Genoa's triumphant career on the seas.

It is not to be assumed that all of the crusader's grants were fully enjoyed. The leaders made promises easily in time of need and broke them as readily or only partially fulfilled them when it became obvious to them, as the states in Syria were being organized on a feudal basis, how troublesome the independent ideas of the Genoese, Venetians, and Pisans might prove. The letters of more than one pope in support of the Genoese claims testify to the difficulty experienced in securing the full letter of their rights. The Genoese view of their colonial possessions in the twelfth century previous to the Third Crusade was a simple one. They were not regarded or treated as daughter communes, scarcely as colonies, in the modern sense of the term, but

rather as trading posts, factories, where the Genoese merchants might easily conduct their commerce in buying eastern wares, for not until after 1190 was the export trade in merchandise from west to east at all comparable to the exports from east to west. The true communal aspect of the colonies does not appear until the last decade of the twelfth century, to continue until the close of the crusading period. What the Genoese needed was security of trade in the East, where the precious wares were to be purchased mainly with gold and silver. In the West markets for these wares were essential, not only in Genoa but elsewhere, in southern France, Spain, and Africa. Thus the Genoese are found making treaties with the powers of southern France, seeking the establishment of factories as foreign markets in St. Gilles, Montpellier, and Narbonne.[2] This policy led ultimately to the semi-successful but very costly attacks on the Moorish powers in Almeria, Tortosa, and the Balearic islands after 1146. It is interesting to note that as early as 1109 the leaders of the Genoese expedition in Syria, coöperating with Bertram of St. Gilles and Toulouse, son of Count Raymond, made a treaty with Bertram (never so far as we know fulfilled) in which they were promised free trade in St. Gilles, exclusion of the Pisans, and a place for thirty houses. So early in their Syrian campaigns was the necessity for western factories similar to those in Syria made a part of their general policy. Nor was the commune yet strong or experienced enough to do much more than strive to keep the trade with the East alive and as thriving as possible. Inexperienced in self-government at home, with no experience in the difficult matter of maintaining possessions beyond the seas, it faced tremendous problems in this new expansion. Genoa was scarcely able as yet to maintain its independence of the feudal powers in Liguria, or

[2] *Liber jurium reipublicae Genuensis* (*Historiae patriae monumenta*, VII., Turin, 1854), I., nos. 12, 31, 41–45, 80–82.

to suppress the factional strife within the walls for control of the consulate, those ever recurring civil wars which so often weakened the commune. Hence it was that in the first half of the twelfth century these ambitious projects east and west, intermittent warfare with Pisa for supremacy in Corsica and Sardinia, proved almost more than the resources of the commune could bear, while the Italian ambitions of Frederick Barbarossa threatened the independence of the city from another direction. The maintenance of the dearly purchased Syrian foothold was vitally important to the commune from two points of view: first, as a potential source of direct revenue to the commune, always in dire need of funds, often deeply in debt; secondly, as an open field for the commercial enterprise of individual citizens of capital and skill. As between the two, if it were not possible to secure both, the former view must give way to the latter, in this field as in every other in Genoa where individual enterprise and initiative always surpassed ability to combine, to concentrate on the maintenance of the communal spirit. Therein lie at once the defects and the virtues of Genoese achievement in these troubled yet productive years. Hence it was that the Syrian colonies were treated chiefly as a field for individual mercantile enterprise to provide the means for the maintenance of the rapidly increasing trade founded on a steady supply of eastern goods. This attitude helps to explain the apparent neglect of the Syrian colonies at times in the twelfth century, especially if it is considered in connection with the effort being expended in the West to secure there the markets essential to a prosperous east and west trade. There was at times too much for so young a state to carry through successfully. Not until toward the year 1200 did Genoa become a great world market, and not until about that time, therefore, did the efforts to establish factories in France and Spain cease, nor the commune's energies become concentrated more closely on the eastern colonies.

From the very outset the problem of the administration of the eastern colonies was difficult. The inexperience of the commune in matters of government, the magnitude of the commercial ambitions of the citizens, the intricate character of the economic changes going forward so rapidly and only vaguely understood, the uncertainty of the seas, the distance from Syria, combined to create a problem not easy to solve. It was therefore only natural for the commune to utilize the simplest method of all—the lease or quasi-enfeoffment of the Syrian possessions to Genoese citizens. This method relieved the commune of one among many burdens; it brought in a regular if modest income; and at the same time it fulfilled the most essential requirement of all, for it gave assurance that the gates of opportunity in Syria would be held open for the entry of Genoese merchants and capitalists with whose prosperity that of the commune was identical. On the other hand if the leases were in the hands of able and loyal Genoese citizens the fulfillment of the precarious grants from the crusaders would be expedited. It is difficult indeed to see how the administration could have been carried on in any other fashion in those early decades of communal experiment wherein deeply rooted feudal practices and customs were still powerful. It is significant also that the same practice was being used in the administration of the Ligurian *castra* as they fell into the hands of the civic power. It was also used in the brief ill-fated control in Almeria and Tortosa in Moorish Spain. On the whole it was evidently only the natural and obvious expedient. Moreover the dominant group of feudal families in Genoa known generally as the *visconti*, descendants of the Ligurian viscounts who represented the declining power of the margraves of the preceding centuries, still retained the control of the collection of the chief revenues of the commune, the tolls and duties at the harbor, gates, bridges, passes, and local markets. These privileges, hered-

itary with the *visconti* families, were divided among them on some basis not now clear, perhaps merely that of ancient inheritance and tradition. Therefore, it may well be that these families, powerful and active in the affairs of the commune, present always in the lists of the consuls, were able to assert a potent if doubtful claim to the control over revenues, new but similar to those long under their control. It should also be remembered that the power of the bishop and of the cathedral church of San Lorenzo was still great in the early years of the twelfth century, so powerful that some of the early grants in Syria were made to the commune indirectly through the bishop and the canons of San Lorenzo. This is true, for example, of the grant in Acre, the most promising of all commercially. Only slowly in Genoa as elsewhere among the communes of Italy was the episcopal power thrust aside in this period, and the bishop had still to be reckoned with in view of his rights in the Syrian possessions. If the commune were to assert its own control, independent of the bishop, there was much to be gained by the association in the administration across the seas of a powerful family well placed in Genoa. Whatever the relative weight of these various influences, it is certain that the Syrian colonies, soon after their acquisition, passed under the administrative control of one of the most important families of the *visconti* group, the Embriachi.

The steps by which this system was placed in operation can be followed fairly closely. On the occasion of each grant in Syria temporary measures were adopted for holding possession of the property until the authorities in Genoa could act. The leaders of the Genoese expeditions, according to Caffaro,[3] usually selected one of their number on the spot as administrator for the time being. In Tripoli they placed *legatos*, whose names are not given, to guard

[3] "De liberatione civitatum orientis," in *Fonti per la storia d' Italia pubblicate dall' Istituto storico Italiano*, XI (Rome, 1890), 120ff.

the Genoese property. On the capture of Acre in 1104, a canon of San Lorenzo, Sygbaldo by name, was placed in charge of the Genoese grant. When one-third of the city of Gibelet was given to the Genoese in the same year, before the departure of the leaders, control was placed in the hands of one of them, Ansaldo Corso. In 1109 the remaining two-thirds of this town was transferred to the Genoese; Guglielmo Embriaco was one of the leaders and his son Ugo was made administrator. Apparently Corso and Embriaco continued as joint administrators in the control of Gibelet until, perhaps on the death of his colleague, Ugo assumed control over the whole town. How or when, one cannot say, but Ugo Embriaco died there about 1135 in full control. In that year his widow made a gift to the clergy of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre for annual services for the benefit of his soul.[4] It was this Guglielmo Embriaco, the first of many of that name, the hero of the family, who thus inaugurated the Embriaco family power in Syria in 1109 in Gibelet whence their power gradually spread to all the Genoese possessions. From the beginning of Genoese operations in the crusade, he had been very active. He and his brother Primo organized and conducted the first expedition of 1099 which assisted in the capture of Jerusalem. According to one Genoese legend, Guglielmo was the first man to enter the Holy City at the moment of victory. After his return to Genoa in triumph he was consul from 1102 to 1106, and again in 1109 he led the naval expedition to Syria, when, as has been said above, he received the rest of Gibelet in the name of the commune and placed his son in control. After returning once more to Genoa he was twice again consul. With his first-hand knowledge of the confused conditions in Syria, where he had personally done so much to increase the prestige of Genoa and had earned the gratitude of the crusaders, through his power in the

[4] Röhricht, *Regesta regni Hierosolymitani,* (Innsbruck 1893), 40.

Genoese government for more than fifteen years, and by reason of his position as head of one of the most prominent *visconti* families, he succeeded before his disappearance from view in 1118 in securing for his family a position in Syria which soon marked it as one of the great families of *Outre-Mer*, as well as one of the richest and most powerful in Genoa. From Gibelet as a center the family influence was extended until it finally embraced the entire Genoese colonial system in Syria. For Genoese families of ability and energy, as for those from beyond the Alps, the crusades offered new and unusual opportunities by which the Embriachi were among the first to profit.

The members of the family who followed in the footsteps of Guglielmo were worthy of their kinsman. Sometime previous to 1127, Nicola Embriaco went to Syria, and in that year secured from Bohemond II of Antioch a confirmation of the earlier charters granting to the Genoese possessions in Antioch, St. Simeon, and Laodicea.[5] He and two of his sons apparently entered into the administration of these colonies at that time. A document of 1147 shows that long before that year the possessions in all of the northern principality in addition to Gibelet, had been leased to the Embriachi for a period of twenty years with the privilege of renewal, in return for the payment of an annual *censum.*[6] It is significant that the family name does not appear on the consular lists in Genoa between 1118 and 1176. This fact is so unusual in consideration of the importance of the family, that there is room for the assumption that with the exception of what appear to be occasional visits, as in 1144, the entire family, or at least the elders, were absent from Genoa, had emigrated to Syria to enjoy their new opportunities as well as to serve the state by guarding the Genoese rights and by securing the complete fulfillment

[5] *Lib. jur.,* I., no. 21.
[6] *Ibid.,* no. 137.

of the crusaders' grants. It was in this period that the family influence began to be evident in the Genoese colony in Acre. How early they secured the administration of this important possession is not clear. However, in 1154, in spite of neglect on the part of some of the Embriachi to pay the annual dues, and to return the holdings into the hands of the commune for reinvestiture, the consuls made a series of contracts with different members of the family for the administration of all the colonies, including Acre, for twenty-nine years.[7] There is nothing in these contracts to exclude an assumption that they may be renewals of earlier investitures. The year 1154 was one of marked activity and reorganization in Genoa. The commune had just passed through a severe political and economic crisis brought on by the recent costly offers of naval coöperation with the barons of southern France in the series of attacks, begun in 1146, upon the Moors in Almeria, Tortosa, and the Balearics. The Genoese had, at first, won enormous booty and had secured possessions on the Spanish coast to serve as a foothold for trade and further expansion there, but at such tremendous cost that just previous to the reorganization in 1154 the civic life was at a practical standstill. The dream of dominion in Spain collapsed. The last of the Spanish holdings, after being hawked about in Genoa, were sold to the count of Barcelona in 1153. In these years of western expansion and subsequent depression the Syrian colonies had been allowed to drift, to be reviewed once more in the general reorganization of government and revenues in 1154.

The arrangements made with the Embriaco family in this year were very explicit. The town of Gibelet and the possessions in Laodicea were leased to Guglielmo Embriaco II, son of Ugo, in return for the payment of 270 bezants

[7] *Lib. jur.*, nos. 196–98.

and a pallium worth 10 bezants per annum, a merely nominal sum. Another Ugo and Nicola Embriaco, sons of Nicola mentioned above, received the possessions in Antioch for 160 bezants per annum. The colony in Acre, named as the *ruga* of San Lorenzo, with its dependencies, was entrusted to the same Ugo and Nicola for 100 bezants annually. The entire colonial system in Syria, if such it may be called, had passed into the hands of members of the Embriaco family, resident in Syria, with hereditary rights, in return for the annual payment of sums little more than nominal. The work begun by Guglielmo Embriaco on the First Crusade had been completed, how early one cannot exactly say, but by 1154 the full results are manifest.

Unfortunately the exact nature of the family administration in Syria cannot be ascertained. The family exercised rigid authority over its various members in Syria during the period previous to the contracts of 1154, and no doubt afterwards as well. The object was apparently to secure a consolidation of family interest and effort, not only to be able to confront the Syrian rulers more firmly, but also to preserve their prerogatives, whether legal or usurped, against any effort by the commune to diminish their privileges. For this purpose oaths to the recognized head of the family, saving the oath to the *compagna* of Genoa exacted of all arms-bearing citizens, were required of the members of the family. One of them brought the oath from Syria to Genoa to be taken by another Embriaco temporarily resident there in 1144.[8] Family ambitions inevitably conflicted at times with communal policy and with the legal obligations of the family to the home government. The Embriachi were often recalcitrant in renewing the investiture, in fulfilling their financial obligations, slight as these were. These defalcations did not arouse serious opposition to the

[8] *Lib. jur.*, no. 89.

continuance of the family in the enjoyment of their Syrian privileges provided they succeeded in maintaining the opportunities of trade and investment for the Genoese merchants and capitalists. This they apparently did so far as it was possible. In 1143 the consuls-elect promised vaguely to secure justice for the commune "if a suit concerning the bezants of Gibelet shall be undertaken." A suit was actually brought in 1147 against the minor heirs of Nicola Embriaco for the recovery of sums owed the commune for the northern possessions, but after investigation the consuls decided that they had not the authority or right to confiscate the Genoese property of the family, and closed the contest upon the payment of 300 pounds by the tutor and guardian of the youthful heirs.[9] The elder branch of the family in Gibelet proved most difficult to control. During this period, when supervision from Genoa was necessarily slight, the head of the family in Gibelet assumed the title "*Dei gratia dominus Gibeleti,*" savoring of seignorial rights independent of the commune. They were now on an equality with the great baronial families of Syria. It may have been the ambition of the Embriachi in Gibelet, by securing the feudal and family allegiance of the members of the family in charge of other Genoese possessions in Syria, to create out of the scattered Genoese holdings a single extensive family fief.

Throughout this period the Embriachi were supported in Genoa by a small but very powerful group of capitalists of *visconti* connection, who through their grasp on the consular government in Genoa, and through their support of the Embriachi in Syria,—despite negligence in exactly fulfilling the contracts, were able to monopolize almost completely the profitable Syrian trade until 1164. In spite of the growing undercurrent of opposition to the *visconti*

[9] *Lib. jur.,* no. 137.

privileges in general, to the pretensions of the Embriachi in Syria in particular, and to the successful monopoly of the Syrian trade by their friends in Genoa, the Embriachi were able to triumph over whatever feeble opposition was offered. This remained true even during their long continued absence from Genoa and from family representation in the government there, until the general dissatisfaction with the arrogance and commercial monopoly of the faction in control produced a quasi-revolution in Genoa in 1164. It is evident that up to that date, under occasional judicious pressure from the home government, the family paid most of the *censum*. In 1162 the commune sold to two merchants the arrears for Gibelet, amounting to 540 bezants, the amount due for two years only.[10] Apparently Guglielmo Embriaco II, who died between 1157 and 1162, was the last to pay the *censum*, since Pope Urban III in 1186 wrote severe letters to various Syrian rulers and prelates, urging them to do all in their power to induce Ugo Embriaco III, then lord of Gibelet, to pay the dues formerly paid by his grandfather, Guglielmo II.[11] Alexander III, in 1179, had in vain sought to bring Ugo to terms on this point in his support of the ancient and all but forgotten claim of the cathedral church of San Lorenzo to the title to the Syrian possessions.[12] The answer to these intricate aspects of Embriaco control is plain, however. Under the difficult conditions prevailing in Syria after the initial successes early in the century, the Embriachi deserved serious consideration for their valuable services in maintaining the colonial possessions in any degree intact. What was more important still was their assistance in affording to their powerful friends in Genoa the opportunity for that vast increase in trade and wealth which characterized the years

[10] *Hist. patr. mon.*, VI., *Chartarum* II., no. 1180.
[11] *Lib. jur.*, I., nos. 351–54.
[12] *Ibid.*, no. 321. Röhricht, *Reg.*, 159.

from 1155 to 1164, as I have shown in earlier studies, the most prosperous decade of the century for Genoese trade previous to the very last, from 1190 to 1200.

In 1164, however, this particular cycle of prosperous expansion and piling up of private fortunes came to an end. Once more the faction on top had overreached itself and strained the resources of the commune to the breaking point. There came an angry outburst against those in control in Genoa because of their selfishness and arrogance; because of the great increase in the public debt, for which they were held responsible. The city was thrown into civil war followed by a protracted war with Pisa over Sardinia. Again a period of depression and loss of trade ensued. The regular communications with Syria were interrupted for nearly fifteen years. In that period the Embriachi in Syria were almost entirely freed from any interference from home. In 1168, it is true, the conditions were sufficiently stable to enable the commune to send a legate to Syria. So far as one can discover he secured nothing from the Embriachi beyond a promise to accord full trading privileges with freedom from tolls to all Genoese citizens in the town and territory of Gibelet.[13] Had the Embriachi gone still further in the recent years of trouble in Genoa in an attempt to line their own pockets at the expense of their fellow citizens? The incident is evidence of the mounting feeling in Genoa that the exclusive monopoly of the Syrian trade by the old faction friendly to the Embriachi must be ended. But the difficulties in Genoa continued for another decade in which the *visconti* found their privileges gravely threatened. The Embriachi met the situation in two ways. The branch in Gibelet threw off all pretense of fulfilling their contracts. Other members of the family returned to Genoa to take part in the struggles for the consular of-

[13] *Lib. jur.*, I., no. 256

fice from which all privilege flowed, to be content possibly with the retention of such measure of their former positions in Syria as they could save. Once more their names appear on the lists of consuls. Gibelet, however, was lost to the commune forever. It remained an Embriaco principality until its capture by the Saracens in 1187 and when the Embriachi reëntered the town in 1193 their independent rights remained unquestioned by the commune. The successes of Saladin had involved the Genoese in the disasters to the crusaders' states. With the Third Crusade another epoch in colonial experiment was to be begun on a new basis. The period of monopoly and high privilege was ended. Freedom of trade for all Genoese with capital to invest in Syria began in 1190. The commune had learned much in the century of effort which was drawing to a close. The same mistakes were not to be repeated, as we shall see.

Before passing on to the second period of reorganization and more successful colonial experiment following the Third Crusade, there remains a question in connection with Embriaco control which is difficult to answer. What was the nature of the family administration? Here the sources are almost totally silent. It must be assumed that the usual lines of semi-feudal control were followed with such modifications as the peculiar position of the Italians in Syria demanded. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the Genoese possessions, wide as they appear on paper, were probably never enjoyed *in toto* except at brief intervals, if at all. It has been made clear above that what the commune chiefly demanded in the twelfth century was open trade in Syria. Beyond that and the more or less regular payment of the *censum*, the Embriachi, as has been shown, were free to follow their own line in their relations to the Syrian governments.

On this phase of the subject, however, there are two widely separated bits of evidence from which a cautious de-

duction or two may be drawn. Belgrano is authority for the statement that in 1169 a member of the Embriaco family leased property in Acre to a Genoese colonist through one Cacciabove, *vicecomes* of the *ruga* of San Lorenzo in Acre.[14] This would indicate that the Embriachi employed agents, officials, under their personal supervision for the direct administration of some of the Genoese holdings, leaving the family free to devote their energies to the higher problems of diplomacy and politics in Syria and in Genoa. Thus might be explained the appointee of 1169, isolated as the incident seems to be. That such an assumption is not otherwise without basis, appears from the second piece of evidence to which the reference is made above. The difficulty in handling this evidence lies in the fact that it appears in the year 1200, some ten years after the reorganization of the colonies according to a plan which will later be described at length, under consuls and *vicecomites* appointed by the commune. In the year 1200 there was another marked revival of the efforts of the older families to regain their supremacy in Genoa. It was attended with some success. So far as the Embriachi are concerned it is marked not only by prominence in the home government about 1200, but by an attempt at a reassertion of their ancient and recently lost control over the Genoese colony in Acre. Since 1190 Acre had become even more important commercially than before. It was to be for the greater part of the thirteenth century the chief center of Genoese activity in trade. Hence the colony there assumed new significance in Genoese eyes and especially to that branch of the Embriaco family which no longer shared in the opportunities still being enjoyed by its kinsmen the lords of Gibelet. It was therefore

[14] *Archivio storico Italiano,* series III, vol. VIII, pt. II, p. 160. Unfortunately Belgrano, admirable workman that he was, did not publish this entry found in the notarial archives in Genoa nor give a specific reference to its location. I have so far been unable to find it.

only natural that the Genoese branch of the family should at such a favorable opportunity as was offered by the political ascendancy of its faction in 1200, endeavor to regain a privileged position in Acre.

In September, 1200, Guglielmo Embriaco senior, and Guglielmo Embriaco junior, drew up an agreement with one Otto Judex de Castello to go to Acre to assume in their name the administration of the colony there, designated by the two Embriachi as "*nostra ruga*," for two years from the following Easter.[15] Otto swore solemnly to hold the colony for the honor of God and of the commune under orders and directions from the two Embriachi whose letters would convey to him their ideas and decisions. His duties were various. The revenues of the *ruga*—rentals from houses, *fondachi*, lands, etc., incomes from harbor tolls, one-third of which was a Genoese right, and from the fees paid in the Genoese court—were to be collected by Otto. He should remit these incomes to the Embriachi in Genoa, or should hold them in Syria subject to order, as also revenues arising from Embriaco possessions elsewhere in Syria,—not otherwise described. He swore to render justice according to the use and custom of the land, for in Acre Genoese citizens were now tried in their own court under their own law, a prominent feature of the true colonial life which developed after the Third Crusade. At the end of two years, failing definite instructions from the Embriachi, Otto was empowered to transfer the office to some suitable person favorable to the family. An oath similar to that subscribed to by Otto should be exacted of the new incumbent by him in the name of the Embriachi. Within his term of office he agreed to go to Antioch, Tripoli, Gibelet, or elsewhere whenever necessary in the interest of the *ruga*. Otto's emoluments are stated explicitly. He was authorized to retain from the revenues of the *ruga* 150 bezants per

[15] Archivio di stato di Genova, Diversorum Notariorum, MS 102, folio 160ff.

annum as salary. In this were not to be computed such edibles (*victualia*, payments in kind?) as might be presented to him in the performance of his duties (a reference to the ordinary gifts so common in the Middle Ages to those in positions of power). Traveling expenses in Syria, within a reasonable amount, were to be allowed from the incomes.

In the same document the two Embriachi acknowledge that Otto has loaned each of them 325 bezants. They, therefore, authorize him to retain 750 bezants out of the revenues of the *ruga* as payment of the loan, if he so desires. It is interesting to observe that the Embriachi not only thus succeeded in placing Otto under bond, but they also realized a considerable sum in advance on their prospects in Acre. Nor did Otto stand to lose by this feature of the transaction, since the loan, expressed in the contract only in terms of repayment in bezants, was unquestionably made by Otto in Genoese pounds at a ratio per bezant not disclosed, but certainly one which would allow interest on the loan high enough to warrant concealment so as to escape the laws against usury. (The usual rate for a bona fide sea-loan to Syria was fifty per cent.) The older Embriaco further guaranteed 300 bezants of his debt to Otto (why not the whole amount does not appear, and the script is very clear) by an interesting provision in a separate agreement. He promised that if Otto were unable to collect the 300 bezants from the revenues in Acre (of this there must have been more than a fair chance in view of the recently organized consular government in the colonies, despite the Embriaco influence and confidence), he would pay the debt to Otto's agent in Genoa in pounds at the current rate of one for two within one month after the safe arrival in Genoa of any ship properly designated by Otto before a notary in Syria. The significance of this provision lies in the fact that it would enable Otto to ship merchandise from Syria on a ship chosen by him, at the sea risk of Embriaco

with no risk whatsoever to himself, in accordance with the regular practice in sea-loans. There is no similar guarantee for the debt of the younger Embriaco, which may have been given precedence in the incomes of the *ruga*.

Before passing on to such interpretation of the first and most important aspect of the agreement as may be necessary or justified, it may be interesting to observe casually another document which accompanies this series. In this contract the Embriachi figure as exporters of cloth to Syria with Otto as their agent. They intrust to him, entirely outside the sums mentioned in the documents noticed above, 200 pounds invested in cloth to be sold in Syria by Otto in return for the usual one-fourth of the profits allowed the active factor in overseas trade. The balance of the proceeds—(capital and three-fourths of the profits)—Otto was authorized to loan for the Embriachi as he saw fit "either to a knight or to a government." The expense incurred in the transportation and sale of the cloth was to be charged against the revenues of the *ruga*. This agreement presents an interesting disclosure of the commercial activity of the family in Syria. It is also interesting from another angle. According to Genoese custom merchants departing for Syria usually paid no passage money but the sum paid for the transportation of a definite quantity of goods included right of passage for one merchant. Otto thus secured part if not all of the expenses of his journey; he furthermore was enabled to carry goods of his own to dispose of in Syria at a profit. The whole transaction is a singularly interesting picture of commercial ingenuity and of the interlocking of various motives and institutions in the relations with Syria.

Returning to the more pertinent of the several features of this episode so far as the purpose of this essay is concerned, would it be safe to assume that the Embriachi from 1169 to the close of the century were using men of ability, experienced in legal and business affairs, as salaried agents

with the title of *vicecomes* to conduct the actual administration in their name, under their control during temporary or prolonged absence from the spot, perhaps so that they might return to residence in Genoa, to bolster up their declining privileges? The suggestion is inevitable. Unfortunately we know nothing more of Cacciabove nor of Otto Judex de Castello than has been given above. It is not even possible to say what success the latter agent had in Syria in the face of the new administrative system already in operation. Probably none at all. Yet the episode of 1200 has a small but striking significance as an indication of the overlapping of two experiments in administration. The older feudal family influence supposedly ended about 1190, but it was obviously hard to overthrow. The hold of the old families was still traditionally strong, and the debt of the commune to the Embriachi for services rendered in Syria was great enough to warrant their making an effort to retain their position in Acre in the face of the new centralization going forward since 1190. It was a moment of transition, of rapid development, but after all the older forces and institutions died hard. The Genoese members of the family continued to hold private property in Syria into the thirteenth century. In 1214 the same Guglielmo Embriaco major sold lands and houses in Syria and sent another Embriaco to Syria to collect what was owed him in Gibelet by the Embriaco lord of the town for a fief worth three hundred bezants per annum with authority to perform the act of allegiance therefor.[16]

As a result of Saladin's victories in Syria, the Genoese suffered grievous losses in the general decline of the Christian power. Their colonies were lost and their trade seriously disrupted. In the diplomatic preliminaries to the Third Crusade, in the transport of the expedition of Philip Au-

[16] A. S. G., Not. G. de Porta, f. 18; Not. Lanfr., Reg. IV, f. 34v.

gustus, and in the rebuilding of the Christian power in Syria they were therefore very active. Once more they received important concessions in the port towns, in some respects more important than before. Acre, Tyre, Beirut became their favorite centers of activity, trade, and settlement. To these there were presently added Aïas in Lesser Armenia, Famagusta and smaller towns in Cyprus. The new grants contained wider privileges of jurisdiction over Genoese citizens than the Genoese had possessed under the old régime. It is in this period, from 1190 to 1291, that a true colonial life far richer and more intricate in its economic, social, and political aspects came into existence. With the immediately prosperous revival of trade following the successes of the crusade, mounting in the course of the thirteenth century to a volume and diversity of the deepest significance for the economic development of western Europe, the colonies and their relation to the mother city assumed a new importance which was to continue throughout the century. Of this more active and freer connection with Syria, the sources permit so clear a view that before passing on to an examination of the new colonial administration, we may pause to survey some of the new conditions under which reorganization was imperative.

The vigor of the thirteenth century colonial life offers a sharp contrast with the halting, tentative character of that of the twelfth. Naturally this is the result of wider experience, of better organization, and especially of the amazing developments of trade. There is not space in this essay to discuss even the principal aspects of the trade, important as they are to an understanding of the relations with Syria. Suffice it to say that the annual or semi-annual voyages to Syria were more regular; that each voyage now involved hundreds of merchants and investors as compared with a dozen or a score in the period previous to 1190; that the transport of pilgrims assumed dimensions new to Genoa

and comparable to that of Venice; that the ships were larger and stronger, better fitted to meet the growing demands of the trade, able to make a swifter crossing to Syria or to visit ports of call as far west as Tunis on the way. There ensued consequently a greater security in the colonial life. The evidences of this are many and varied. Many Genoese families now lived permanently in Syria where they owned houses, shops, gardens, orchards, and ships. Others lived in the colonies for years and then returned to Genoa to enjoy rentals from Syrian property and to conduct their trading ventures with a new grasp on the opportunities and risks involved.[17] The merchants, traveling more widely in the Levant, were no longer confined in their operations to the coastal towns but penetrated to the interior, to the rich marts of Aleppo and Damascus. They established regular connections throughout Syria, in Alexandria, Tunis, Bougia, and Ceuta as outlets to their eastern operations, buying, selling, loaning money with greater security under the expanding system of credit, consigning goods to representatives in Genoa, receiving consignments of western goods at designated points in Syria. Drapers, cobblers, fishermen in Genoa form agreements to engage in their trades in Syria for terms of years.[18] Men departing from Genoa for Syria lease their property in Genoa for periods of years with provision for fertilizing, planting, and pruning of their fig and olive orchards; they sell their accounts receivable at a moment favorable to a quick departure and appoint agents to attend to their western interests during their prolonged absence from home.[19] Testaments drawn in Genoa or in the Levant dispose of elaborately detailed lists of merchandise and personal effects, slaves, clothes, armour,

[17] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. I, pt. II, ff. 70, 189v.; Reg. II, ff. 70, 70v., 117v; Reg IV, f. 238.

[18] A. S. G., Not. Lanfr. Reg. IV, f. 65; Reg. V, f. 2 Ov.; Not. Pal. de Sexto, Reg. III, f. 62v.

[19] A. S. G., Not. B. de Cassino, f. 92; Not. B. de For., Reg. II, f. 90.

articles of adornment and of personal use indicative of the growing luxury of living, and provide for the maintenance of dependent relatives in Genoa.[20] Suits at law occur in Genoa which involve obtaining evidence from merchants, sailors, and captains of ships as to transactions in Syria, indicative of the reality and vitality of the colonial life.[21]

The lure of the Levant was strong on the young men in Genoa. The widow of a Syrian colonist writes plaintively to a kinsman in Syria urging him to assume control of her late husband's affairs there and to use his influence to induce her son to return to Genoa "because it was not with her consent that he went to Syria, and she begs him to return home for the love of God." [22] An orphaned youth writes imploringly to his elder brother-in-law temporarily absent from Genoa. Together with another youth he has suddenly contracted to go east with a merchant for a wage of thirty gold bezants, sailing within eight days; in as much as he can do no business without funds he has borrowed fifteen pounds in Genoa which he must repay before his departure. Wherefore he is "reduced to supplicate your lordship by every means that you will feel the desire and the obligation to assist me in this necessity since I confide in you more than in any other person now living. Send if you please a letter to . . . lord Jacopo de Porta so that he will give me in your name fifteen pounds for without them I can do nothing." [23] Betrothals and dowries are arranged for sons and daughters prior to the departure of their elders

[20] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. I, pt. II, f. 166v. *Archives de l'orient latin*, I, 498, 500; *ibid.*, II, 43–44, 101–2. Arturo Ferretto, *Codice diplomatico*, Genoa, 1903, II, 178, note. That even the Genoese clergy resident in the colonies adopted eastern customs is testified by the prior of the church of San Lorenzo in Aïas selling a slave. *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, I, 456.

[21] A. S. G., Not. B. de Cass., f. 91v.; Not. B. de For., Reg. II, f. 231; Ferretto, *Liber magistri Salmonis*, Genoa, 1906, 308ff.

[22] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. I, pt. II, f. 44.

[23] *Ibid.*, Reg. III, f. 170.

for the East. Representatives of colonial families make betrothals in Genoa for youths and maidens of colonial birth and residence. To secure an advantageous marriage or betrothal for a daughter they are able to pay handsomely, or on the other hand to demand an equally handsome dowry from the prospective wife of a son. Two examples will illustrate this point and the wealth of some of the colonials. In 1216, Sophia Misrigio, widow of a rich deceased colonist in Syria, sends two of her kinsmen from Syria to Genoa to arrange for the betrothal of her young daughter to some citizen of Genoa who shall seem suitable to them, with authority to promise a dowry of 1000 bezants. The youthful Pietro Doria solemnly accepts the offer in the presence of his relatives, who arrange with the emissaries for the payment of the dowry in Syria within three months after the arrival there of the fleet then about to depart from Genoa. Young Doria does not go east himself to fetch his bride but appoints agents to secure the dowry there, to invest it profitably in his name, and to send it to him in Genoa at his risk.[24] Of his betrothed he makes no mention, perhaps because she is too young for an immediate marriage since Genoese living in the East frequently make betrothals with native Genoese children of a tender age. In 1251, Alaxia, widow, with her sons and brothers-in-law, all of Antioch, gives a receipt for 600 pounds paid by Jacopo de Porta, a merchant active in the Syrian trade, as the dowry of his daughter, the future wife of Alaxia's young son.[25] Both dowries are large—twice the usual amounts for marriages even among the nobility in the twelfth century. The wealth of the Genoese merchants and colonists in Syria was evidently comparable to that of the most prosperous in Genoa itself. The complaint of the Templars that after the Genoese had been driven away from Acre by the Pisans,

[24] A. S. G., Not. Lanfr., Reg. V, f. 242v–243, f. 251v.
[25] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. II, f. 214.

the order had difficulty in securing funds from which to make loans in Syria, is well known.[26]

Another illustration of the reality of the colonial life in the thirteenth century is found in the relation between the clergy in Genoa and in the colonies. It must not be forgotten that the cathedral chapter of San Lorenzo from the time of the First Crusade held a partial title to a considerable part of the Genoese properties in Syria. In the course of time, however, the commune had pushed aside the claims of San Lorenzo to all the eastern possessions except the more important churches. Over these, usually named in honor of the same patron saint, the chapter in Genoa continued to exercise control. The canons in 1222 sold for 50 pounds to Ugo Ferrario, one of the newly appointed consuls for Syria, on the eve of his departure from Genoa the right to lease the administration of the church in the colony in Acre for one year to a suitable cleric of his own choice if he found the incumbent there on his arrival unsatisfactory or dissatisfied.[27] Somewhat later, in 1254, the chapter in Genoa appointed an agent to collect from the incumbents of the churches of San Lorenzo in Acre and in Tyre the revenues and incomes due therefrom.[28] When the colonial officials inventoried the possessions of the commune in Acre and Tyre in 1249 and 1250 they did not include the incomes of the churches of the colony, a tacit admission of the rights of San Lorenzo. Many Genoese clerics held benefices in the churches in Syria. In the middle of the thirteenth century, especially during the reign of the Genoese Innocent IV, who heaped papal privileges upon his compatriots, scores of Genoese received provisions in Syria—in the provincial churches for the most part, probably so as not to

[26] Röhricht, *Geschichte des Königsreichs Jerusalem,* Innsbruck, 1898, 904, note 1. For an example of the magnitude of Genoese financial transactions with the Templars in Syria see Röhricht, *Regesta,* 308–9, 311.

[27] Ferretto, *Lib. mag. Salm.,* 214–15.

[28] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. III, f. 190.

conflict with the archiepiscopal rights in Acre and Tyre. Opizo de Flisco, of the pope's family, was patriarch of Antioch, and another kinsman from Genoa was canon in Tripoli. Under this régime young clerics of noble families like the Spinola, Bulgaro, Camilla, and Maniavacca held appointments as canons, *fratres*, prebendaries, or archdeacons in Syria and Cyprus. Some went to the East to enjoy their benefices; others remained at home and are found endeavoring to make good their claims, often vaguely stated in the papal briefs, by appointing procurators to secure their incomes in the East to be remitted to Genoa. Relatives are occasionally found attempting to secure the money, plate, and personal possessions of such appointees deceased in Syria. In the church as in every other field there existed the same close association between the mother city and the colonies.[29]

It is obvious that this vigorous colonial life demanded an administration very different from that of the twelfth century, nor is it probable that it could have existed had not the commune profited sufficiently by the experimental failures of the earlier period in Syria, and by the successes at home, to alter completely the nature of its control over the colonies in the rebuilding after 1190. Although the general outlines of this system of administration have long been known there are some aspects of it upon which sources heretofore unknown or little used throw new light.

The administration was centered in two officials known as *consules et vicecomites*. They bore both titles, the first to indicate general powers as representatives of the communal government in general, the second to indicate the more local, judicial powers, after the example of the Kingdom of Jerusalem whose judicial offices in the towns of Syria

[29] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. I, pt. II, ff. 51, 53; Reg. II, ff. 15, 98v., 247v., 228; Reg. III, ff. 123, 185v., 186, 188v., 190; Reg. IV, f. 279v.; Not. Pal. de Sexto, Reg. I, ff. 50v., 191v.

had long borne the title of *vicecomites*. For one of the striking features of the grants to the Genoese after the Third Crusade was the right to hold court for the trial of all Genoese, within certain limits as will hereafter appear. At times, to be sure, the officials are designated as *consules* or *vicecomites* without much discrimination, yet with the preference for consul when only one title was used. Since the annually elected officials in Genoa assumed office the first of February, it would appear that new appointees for the colonies could not assume their duties simultaneously with the change of administration in Genoa. The main fleet for Syria usually left Genoa in the autumn; the new officials would probably depart for their posts at that time, as was certainly the case in the only two instances where it has been possible to locate a colonial official about to leave for office in Syria.[30] Presumably these officers held office for one year only (or until a newly appointed official appeared), although this can only be assumed from the fact that the same names never appear in the documents at intervals greater than twelve months.[31] Acre was the central seat of government of the Genoese, serving as a capital for them as for the kingdom of Jerusalem proper, until they were driven thence in 1258, after which Tyre became their headquarters. These officials traveled about through the colonies, singly it would seem, and appointed representatives in the various localities where the Genoese owned properties, who usually bore the title of *vicecomites*, or were occasionally simply designated as *gerens vice consulatus*.[32] The relation between these various officials is not entirely clear. The local *vicecomes* must have had to act independently of

[30] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. I, pt. II, ff. 142–43v. (Simon Malocello). Ferretto, *Lib. mag. Salm.*, 214–15 (Ugo Ferrario and Ugo Fornario).

[31] That this assumption is sound is borne out by the explicit statements to this effect in the appointments of colonial officials for Cyprus in 1298. A. S. G., *Materie politiche*, B. 2726.

[32] *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, I, 445, 501.

the consuls in most cases, although he is found making a decision "with the consent of the consuls." [33] In the second half of the century, when the struggle among the Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese for supremacy in Syria assumed such a deadly character, the Genoese were induced still further to centralize the administration. Four times at least, after 1274, a single executive was appointed by the commune with powers of general supervision over all consuls and *vicecomites*, with the title of podestà.[34] This is a reflection of the tendency toward a single executive common in Genoa in the thirteenth century, as well as of the Venetian practice in Syria from early times. This innovation was not everywhere regarded with favor in the colonies. When the first podestà appeared in Syria in 1274 with headquarters at Tyre, the experienced consul at Aïas, Filipino Tartaro, who had served the previous year as consul at Tyre, disputed the right of a Genoese litigant to appeal his case over Tartaro's decision to the podestà, and claimed that an appeal could only be made to the commune of Genoa.[35] How this case was determined we do not know, but in all probability the consul gave way. When a similar case arose in 1279 such was the outcome. The consul had collected a fine of 300 bezants from a colonist and had failed to forward it to the podestà, who sent an agent to Aïas with an official letter demanding that the money be sent at once under penalty of 500 bezants for failure to obey. The consul hastened to reply that he was ready to observe the command and was forwarding the money after deducting the expense which he and his officials had incurred in the matter.[36] In Lesser Armenia and in Cyprus the administration of the scattered possessions was centralized in Aïas and in Fama-

[33] Röhricht, *Regesta*, p. 229.
[34] *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, I, 451, 524. Ughelli, *Italia sacra*, IV, 878–79. *Annales*, *M. G. SS.*, XVIII, 322.
[35] *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, I, 451.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 524.

gusta respectively under the officials in those cities, who, responsible to the chief officials in Syria, where in turn represented by agents in the smaller towns where the Genoese held property.

It is obvious that if the *consules et vicecomites* held office for only one year, or until the new officials arrived, not much supervision could be exercised over them by the commune within their term of office. Legates were occasionally sent east with definite instructions to the colonial officials including restrictions and regulations on the colonists with heavy penalties for disobedience either official or private. At the very end of our period an embassy was sent to Cyprus with the names of those appointed to the chief positions in each of the towns of the island, leaving the heads free to choose most of their assistants. It appears from the instructions borne by the legates that some if not all the appointees were already on the spot, some in office. All named were to hold office at the usual salary until further provision was made by the commune. The head of the colonial service in Cyprus, now known as a vicar, was instructed to summon all the officials before him to swear obedience to the instructions.[37] A clause forbidding any persons except those named to act as officials would imply that it had been the practice for the colonists, perhaps only in emergencies, to choose their own officers. Certainly there was a tendency in this direction in the second half of the century. In 1272, in the course of a dispute between the Venetians and the Genoese colonists, the Venetian *bailo* refused to deal with Simon Guercio, "*consul vicecomes et capitaneus Januensium in Syria,*" until he was shown a document proving that there had been held a general assembly of the Genoese in Tyre for the election of Guercio. Such a document was produced.[38] As early as the middle of the cen-

[37] A. S. G., *Materie politiche,* B. 2726.
[38] *Atti della società Ligure di storia patria,* XXXI, 264.

tury the commune allowed some of the subject Ligurian towns to elect their own podestà provided he were a Genoese; it would be natural to expect a similar privilege in the more important colonies. It is doubtful, however, whether the practice became common before the collapse of the Christian power in Syria.

The consuls and other officials apparently made irregular reports to the home government, and were certainly encouraged to do so, but unfortunately none has survived except the inventories of 1249 and 1250 which will be discussed later. On the other hand there are records of appeals from the decision of the officials in Syria to the home government. In 1259 Manfred of Sicily complained to the commune that the consuls at Acre had unjustly seized and sent to Genoa the property of a supposed Genoese colonist despite the claim of the widow that she was a Sicilian subject. The home government reversed the decision of the consul at Acre and remitted the money, 1410 pounds, to Sicily to be given to the widow.[39] An agreement between the Genoese officials in Tyre and the master of the Templars was reviewed and ratified in 1267 by the government in Genoa.[40] On another occasion, when the Genoese admiral in the East, Luchetto di Grimaldi, seized a ship and its cargo owned by a group of Levantines, mostly Armenians, they carried their claim for damages through to Genoa, where a decision was eventually reached in their favor after some three years of investigation and delay, and orders were issued resulting in the payment of 22,797 bezants to the claimants in Aïas.[41]

The consuls and *vicecomites*, of whom nearly fifty can be designated by name between 1187 and the close of the crusades, were men of discreet age who had served the com-

[39] *Lib. jur.*, I., no. 914.
[40] Röhricht, *Regesta*, p. 354.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 355–56, 359, 360.

mune in civil office before they were entrusted with the colonial service. Among many similar cases, Guglielmo Piperata, consul and *vicecomes* in the newly established colony in Tyre in 1187, the first known official to bear the titles, had been active in trade and public affairs in Genoa since 1160;[42] Belmusto Lercario, consul in Syria in 1203, not only had served the state as one of the eight *consiglieri* in 1196, 1199 and 1202, but had also been three times to Syria before his appointment there as consul;[43] Guglielmo de Orto, consul in Syria in 1232, and Guglielmo de Savignone, consul and *vicecomes* in 1260, had both served in Genoa as *consules de placitiis* many years before their terms in Syria.[44] As might be expected, many of these men after service abroad were elected to high office at home where their knowledge of the colonial problems could be made available to the state. Only very occasionally were the Syrian officials allowed to serve more than one term in Syria, and even then not in consecutive years in the same place. The commune had learned by bitter experience with the Embriachi and with disloyal if not dishonest servants in Syria that the state would be best served by officials appointed for a single term. In 1225 a decree was issued forbidding consuls and *vicecomites* in Syria to alienate any lands, houses, or properties under heavy penalty, as an unnamed consul in Syria was accused of having done previously.[45]

The perquisites of official position in Syria are not definitely known; whether in salaries or shares in the income of the colony, or as is probable in both, is not clear. The minor officials were paid salaries by the year.[46] On the

[42] *Chart.* II., nos. 846, 885, 893, 1325, 1492. *Lib. jur.*, I, no. 363.

[43] Röhricht, *Regesta*, pp. 169, 184, 208, 210–11. *Lib. jur.*, I., no. 551.

[44] Canale, *Nuova istoria della republica di Genova*, Florence, 1858, I, 424–25. Röhricht, *Regesta*, p. 339. *Lib. jur.*, I., no. 693.

[45] Röhricht, *Regesta*, p. 175. *Lib. jur.*, I, no. 617.

[46] A. S. G., *Mat. pol.*, B. 2726.

other hand there is ample evidence that colonial office afforded the incumbents opportunities of securing for themselves and their families privileged positions in Syria and lucrative advantages in trade. Simon Rufferio, *vicecomes* in Acre in 1212, acquired a fief in the Kingdom of Jerusalem which his son was left to manage after his departure from Syria.[47] Belmusto Lercario, consul in Syria in 1203, also secured a fief worth 300 bezants per annum, still hereditary in the family in 1253, and as late as 1274 his son, then resident in Aïas with other members of the family, was sending commercial agents to Cyprus on important missions.[48] Ogerio Riccio, consul in Syria in the spring of 1250, in December of that year was exporting ginger, sugar, and silk in considerable quantities to Genoa.[49] When Guglielmo de Camilla was consul and *vicecomes* in 1253, his nephew and namesake went out with 2300 pounds invested in cloth and other goods, one of the largest single investments of the period.[50] Two years after serving as consul in Syria in 1249, Guglielmo de Bulgaro was an important exporter of pepper and cotton from Genoa.[51] Filipino Tartaro was consul in Tyre in 1273 and in Aïas in 1274: he was constantly attended by members of his family who traded throughout the Levant and in Genoa in pepper, cotton, and cloth in very large amounts.[52] Perhaps the most interesting of many such examples, however, is the activity of Simon Malocello, consul at Acre in 1249–50. Just previous to his departure for Syria in the autumn of 1248, he went to Aigues Mortes and Montpellier where at that time the Genoese merchants were accustomed to

[47] A. S. G., Not. Lanfr., Reg. V, f. 101.

[48] Röhricht, *Regesta,* pp. 210–11. Canale, *op. cit.,* I, 451. *Arch. de l'or. lat.,* I, 462, 463.

[49] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. II, f. 42. *Arch. de l'or. lat.,* II (Doc.), 222.

[50] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. IV, f. 193v.

[51] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. II, f. 178v.; Reg. III, f. 101.

[52] *Arch. de l'or. lat.,* I, 482–83, 460–61, 507.

assemble large shipments of cloth for the Syrian trade. There he collected various sums of money owed him on bills of exchange, and made arrangements for shipments of cloth to him in Syria. On the expiration of his term of office he returned to the West with quantities of sugar and silk, the bearer of a bill of exchange on the Temple at Paris for 1750 pounds. Within a month he was preparing to return to Syria with a group of merchants for trade in Acre and Tripoli. The following year he was again in Genoa purchasing cloth and linen for export worth 1274 pounds, and closing a transaction for the sale of a villa in Cyprus. Another year later he sent an employee from Genoa to Syria on the autumn voyage with merchandise worth the enormous sum of 3904 pounds. In the meantime he had bought in Genoa twenty-three parcels of land, vineyards, woods, and gardens.[53] Consular office in Syria, like that in Genoa in the twelfth century, whether the official salary was large or not, was a stepping stone to wealth and prosperity in the Levantine trade.

The colonial life of the thirteenth century imposed upon the consuls such manifold duties, to be discussed below, that a staff of lesser officials was necessary. When the consuls did not also function as *vicecomites*, they appointed representatives with that title whose decisions and acts they reviewed.[54] For advice and counsel in the administrative center, as in Acre first and later Tyre, there was a *consilium* composed of colonists, similar to that in use in Genoa from the beginning of the twelfth century. This body, of whose size one can form no conjecture, was summoned by a crier when occasion for action by it arose. The brevity of the consular term of office and the lack of knowledge of Syrian

[53] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. I, pt. I, ff. 25v., 29, 48.; pt. II, ff. 142–43v; Reg. II, ff. 68, 103, 136v.; Reg. III, f. 167. *Arch. de l'or lat.*, II (Doc.), pp. 214, 222.

[54] See above, note 33.

conditions on the part of newly arrived officials must have made it often an important part of the governmental machinery. At least once as we have seen, and perhaps oftener, it served to elect the head of the colonial administration. Composed as it was of Genoese citizens living in the colonies, this body with the consuls gave at least the semblance of communal government patterned after that in Genoa. A suitable building, *palazzo* or *loggia*, was set aside for its use in the chief colonies, and there most of the important documents embodying the decisions and decrees of the administration were drawn, "*ubi regitur consilium.*" [55] In this phrase there is an implication of power very like that exercised by the council in Genoa, which often dominated the consuls whom it elected. The power and weight of this body was naturally far greater in the periods when concerted action on the part of the Genoese in Syria was called forth against their arch-enemies the Pisans and Venetians, as was the case almost constantly after 1258 during the so-called colonial war. Thus in 1260 in the midst of this episode so disastrous to the participants as to the Christian power in general, we find the two *consules et vicecomites* in Tyre appointing procurators: "*de voluntate et auctoritate consilii et consiliariorum . . . et nos ipsi consiliarii nomine ac vice comunis Janue facimus, constituimus, creamus et ordinamus dicti comunis et nostros syndicos et procuratores.*" [56] Just a little later, in 1264, it was agreed between the Genoese and Philip of Montfort, lord of Tyre, that newly appointed consuls and the *consilium* should take an oath before all the citizens of Tyre to uphold the terms of the Genoese concessions there; and that all the Genoese in Tyre should be assembled for a similar oath.[57] In this we

[55] Röhricht, *Regesta,* p. 339. *Arch. de l'or. lat.,* I, 444, 453, etc. *Ibid.,* II (Doc.), p. 228.

[56] Tafel-Thomas III (*Fontes rerum Austr.,* Dipl. et acta, XIV), 40.

[57] *Arch. de l'or. lat.,* II (Doc.), p. 228.

have the closest approach to the communal government to be found in the colonies, for such an assembly of all the Genoese citizens in Tyre in the presence of the consuls and council is a replica of the popular but for the most part powerless and merely formal *parlamentum* in Genoa.

For specifically judicial and similar purposes the *consules et vicecomites* were assisted by a body of *jurati* or *inquisitores*, residents of the colonies, familiar of course with all the aspects of eastern life.[58] Whether these men, *jurati curiae*, sat permanently in the Genoese courts or were appointed merely on occasions for judicial action from among those present, does not appear. On the eve of the colonial war, in 1257, when the Genoese were seeking support right and left, six such men assented to Jean d'Ibelin's grant to the Anconatani for the erection of a church, palace, and inn in a garden owned by Genoa.[59] Toward the close of the century the commune authorized any of the local officials in the towns of Cyprus to hold inquisitions at any time in the island to gather information on the execution of its regulations, independently of the head of the administration, and to send the results to Genoa.[60]

From among the colonists there were appointed various minor officials who usually continued in office through a period of years and with the council gave a measure of permanence to the administration. First among these were the *placerii*, of whom there were several in an important colony, one in a lesser.[61] They assisted the chief officials in various ways, exercised police duties, conducted the public auctions of the goods of the deceased colonists, possibly

[58] *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, II, p. 225. Ughelli, *Italia sacra.*, IV, 795–96. *Lib. jur.*, II., no. 11. Cf. Dodu, *Histoire des institutions monarchiques dans le royaume latin de Jérusalem*, Paris, 1894, 269.

[59] Röhricht, *Regesta*, p. 330.

[60] A. S. G., *Mat. pol.*, B. 2726.

[61] *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, I, 456, 470, 497, 503, 509, 513. *Ibid.*, II (Doc.), pp. 6, 11, 21, 72, 74, 224.

also the bidding for the leases of communal property to colonists in Acre and Tyre, where many of the commune's possessions were leased to colonists at auction. The *placerii* were often colonists of considerable property and comfortable mode of life. Oberto di Ventimiglia, *placerius*, for example, left in his will 300 bezants in cash for his funeral procession, masses, a monument, hot bread and alms to the poor and sick, and for the harbor works in Genoa; he also disposed of garments of cloth and silk trimmed in taffeta, plumes, amber buttons, armour, a Florentine sword, a cross-bow of fine Genoese workmanship, silver-handled knives, purses of silk and silver, etc.[62] The buildings devoted to the use of the administration—there were several such in Acre—were under the care of a minor official known in Famagusta as the *custos loggie*.[63] In each colony an active and necessary official was the notary or scribe, for the *scribania* was a very important branch of the administration. These scribes, appointed in Genoa and sent east for a year on a salary, were often well known notaries in Genoa.[64] They drew up private and official documents and also served both consuls and private citizens by assuming charge of the money and goods of merchants deceased in Syria, pending the appearance of accredited agents of the heirs.[65] There was a *censarius* to collect the rentals on communal possessions and the taxes on private holdings, for each owner of real property paid an annual *censum* to the treasury which was in charge of a *thesorerius*.[66]

The duties and activities of the *consules et vicecomites* at the head of this staff of lesser officials however efficient, were by no means confined to mere supervision of the staff.

[62] *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, II (Doc.), p. 101.
[63] *Ibid.*, II (Doc.), pp. 11, 103.
[64] A. S. G., *Mat. pol.*, B. 2726.
[65] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. I, pt. II, ff. 140v., 185v. *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, II (Doc.), 19–20. Röhricht, *Regesta*, p. 227.
[66] *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, I, 473, 498–99, 527; II (Doc.), 86, 88, 219.

The consuls, invested with the wand of office, bearing the arms of the commune, were in every way the formal representatives of the Genoese state in the Levant. Upon their shoulders rested a threefold responsibility: to the commune for the maintenance of Genoese rights against the world at large; to the rulers in the East for the observance of treaty obligations; to the colonists and traders for the preservation of those commercial opportunities and privileges upon which their prosperity depended. They were called upon to exert their skill in fields varying from high diplomacy to the regulation of the pettiest details of life in the community.

Infringements on the rights and possessions of the commune at the hands of the Venetians and Pisans were incessant, sometimes so serious as to complicate still further the troubled relations of the mother city with her traditional enemies and rivals. The bitterness of the hatred and rivalry of these maritime cities in the West was invariably reflected in the East and was occasionally prolonged there after truces had been arranged between the governments at home, and even endangered those precarious cessations of hostilities. Particularly after the middle of the century, when the Genoese strength in the West was steadily mounting toward the successful overthrow of the Pisan sea-power and the fateful challenge thrown to Venice, the quarrels among the Italians in Syria increased in deadliness, sometimes accompanied by naïve taunts and threats of vengeance, as when in 1282 the Pisans in Acre under the eyes of the Genoese gayly enacted in costume a scene depicting the capture and submission of Guido Embriaco of Gibelet.[67] There were also occasional controversies with the two powerful knightly orders over houses and lands. In all these questions the consuls were either active in person or through procurators appointed to act in their name

[67] Röhricht, *Gesch. des Königsr. Jer.*, 983.

before the rulers in Syria or before ecclesiastical authorities, local and legatine.[68] Under these conditions the consuls were often forced by local circumstances to enter into treaties with friendly powers for the maintenance of Genoese prestige.[69] It is impossible to say what legal power the consuls had in this field or whether agreements entered into by them were always sent to Genoa for ratification. In 1191 one of the consuls in Syria returned to Genoa commissioned by Richard the Lion-hearted to make a treaty with him for his projected attack on Egypt.[70] Occasionally special ambassadors were sent to the East from Genoa to make treaties which were later ratified at home.[71] Certain it is that in 1233 the two consuls in Syria through their own ambassador made an offensive and defensive alliance with the powers in Cyprus for a period of years "*de voluntate Januensium qui sunt citra mare*," and the ambassador promised that all the Genoese "*citra mare*" whom their allies wished to name would swear to observe and uphold the treaty.[72] On the other hand a similar treaty drawn in Cyprus in 1288 by the chief Genoese representative in the East was repudiated by the home government.[73] Undoubtedly the consuls were opportunists and acted as the occasion demanded within discretion, harking to the opinion of their advisers in the colonies, trustful of the approval of the home government provided they had the support of their fellow citizens "*citra mare*." This would especially be true in treaties for the extension of Genoese rights in the East, a field wherein the consuls acted freely enough in greater certainty of approval in Genoa. In the war with the Vene-

68 A. G. S. *Mat. pol., Mazzo* 3. Röhricht, *Regesta,* pp. 155, 226, 229, 339, 354. *Atti della Soc. Lig.,* XXXI, pp. 169–70.

69 Röhricht, *Gesch. des Königsr. Jer.,* 899–900.

70 *Lib. jur.,* I, no. 381.

71 Röhricht, *Regesta,* p. 354, *Lib. jur.,* II, no. 111. Cf. Caro, *Genua und die Mächte am Mittelmeer,* Halle, 1899, II, 127ff.

72 Mas-Latrie, *Histoire de l'Île de Chypre,* II, 56–58.

73 Caro, *loc. cit.*

tians in Syria following 1255, they had as allies the Knights of St. John, the Catalonians, the Anconatani, Philip of Montfort and Tyre, the Greek Christians, and Bertrand Embriaco of Gibelet.[74] Under these circumstances the consuls not only made alliances but led the Genoese colonial troops in attack or defense. They repeatedly appeared at the head of armed forces in personal conduct of military operations. When Henry, king of Cyprus, made his attack to recover the island in 1232 he was supported by Genoese ships, and accompanied by the two consuls in Syria, through whom he subsequently made a handsome grant to the commune after his entry into Famagusta.[75] The Genoese consul in Tyre in 1264 conducted the plan of defense of the city against a surprise attack by a Venetian fleet and was said to have saved the city from capture.[76] The consuls also arranged for the arming of galleys in the East for attacks on their enemies with provisions for the division of the spoils between the participants and the colonial treasury.[77] After the middle of the century the commune in theory maintained an admiral in Syria in charge of the galleys; a house and garden were set aside for his use in Acre.[78] Whether or not he acted under the direction of the consuls cannot be said, but it may be assumed that he did.

One of the chief duties of the consuls was to preside over the local Genoese courts for the trial of cases between Genoese citizens, whether colonists or temporary traders in Syria. Like the Venetians and the Pisans, the Genoese were exempt from the ordinary *cours des bourgeois* in most of the important towns, and had the right to hold their own court, presided over by the consul or his assistant, the

[74] Röhricht, *Gesch. des Konigsr. Jer.*, 899–900.
[75] *Ibid.*, 819–20.
[76] *Ibid.*, 923.
[77] Caro, *op. cit.*, I, 182.
[78] *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, II (Doc.), 220.

local Genoese *vicecomes*.[79] Where Genoese privileges were widest, as in Tyre, this court had both civil and criminal jurisdiction; in other colonies only civil cases were so tried. In Tyre after 1264, the consuls could decree the death penalty, public flogging, branding, the pillory, or banishment for Genoese criminals, but the condemned must be handed over to the lord of Tyre for the infliction of the penalty. Although the lord's officials in Tyre had the right to enter the Genoese colony by day or night to arrest a malefactor, they could not remove him from the confines of the Genoese colony if he claimed Genoese citizenship, but must at once notify the consul or his representative who would pass on the citizenship of the accused; if he were declared a Genoese he must at once be surrendered into consular custody for trial. In the same court, the consuls with the *jurati* passed upon the citizenship of any merchant who claimed exemption from the ordinary tolls and duties wherein Genoese citizens held special privileges.

An onerous duty imposed upon the consuls was the direct care and administration of the extensive properties and incomes of the commune in the important colonies in Acre and Tyre, the two seats of the colonial administration. In Tyre for example, where the Genoese received one-third of the revenues from the harbor, known as the revenues of the Chain, not only were they obliged to see that their proper share was received, but they were required to expend half of their receipts on the improvement of the harbor and quays, "on the advice of good men." In the same colony the Genoese were entitled to a third of the flow of water from the aqueduct for the operation of their sugar mill; in times of drought they had to assist in the careful apportionment of the flow conducted by men appointed for the purpose.[80]

[79] *Lib. jur.*, I, nos. 544, 516. *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, II (Doc.), 225–30.
[80] *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, *loc. cit.*

The consuls supervised the rental of the commune's extensive properties in Acre and Tyre.[81] Six or seven *palazzi*, a few houses, and a tower, were rented in Acre "*ad passagium*," for the important semi-annual fairs held on the arrival of the merchant fleets from the West when crowds of merchants and pilgrims swarmed in the town. The income from these rentals was given as 750½ bezants in 1249, and as 839 bezants for the previous year. Ten houses, an oven, a garden, an abattoir, vaults, magazines, benches for money changers, for weights and measures, etc., were leased by the year in Acre with a rental of more than 1000 bezants. The Genoese bath at Nicosia brought in 241 bezants per annum, the mill at Tyre 310 bezants. In and around Tyre they supervised the lease of a score of buildings, two baths, a number of fields and gardens, two villas with serfs and appurtenances, whose income is not given in the official inventories, aside from that of the mill. Mention is made of irrigation ditches, boundary stones marked "Ianua," to be maintained. The consuls supervised weights and measures, and the exchange of money in the market place. They had also to supervise the construction of new buildings, ovens, and baths when required by the colonists. Purchases and sales of houses were negotiated by them in the name of the commune. The management of all these properties, especially when the consuls in Syria had general jurisdiction over the colonies in Cyprus and in Lesser Armenia, entailed journeys to and fro, the despatch of letters and agents, as well as reports to the home government.

Last of all there were the manifold duties of the petty and detailed nature imposed upon them as the heads of settlements of foreigners in a strange land, through which there passed yearly hundreds of Genoese merchants engaged in trade and investment. The consuls were called

[81] See the inventories made by the consuls in Acre and Tyre in 1249 and 1250, *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, II (Doc.), 214–24.

upon to settle hundreds of minor questions for this restless, changing population, to witness and seal contracts, wills, deeds;[82] to identify new arrivals as Genoese; to assemble witnesses and receive testimony for suits at law in Genoa involving property in Syria or contracts drawn there, on order from the home government or at the request of suitors;[83] to acquit trustees of their charges; to arrange for the sale and proper disposition of the effects of Genoese deceased in Syria; to settle disputes as to the ownership of a house, or payment for a piece of cloth; to collect debts owed by colonists to traders in Genoa.[84] In short, it is in this field of detail that these colonial officials' activities most closely approach those of our modern consuls abroad; but upon them rested the greater responsibility of endeavoring to maintain in the colonies conditions of life and activity as nearly similar to those at home as the foreign environment allowed.

On the eve of the collapse of the Christian power in Syria, in a final attempt to bolster up the declining rule upon which their colonies were dependent, the Genoese sent to the Syrian region a podestà, supported by a fleet of galleys and endowed with the widest powers ever granted by the commune to a colonial official. Thus was the famous merchant, admiral, and soldier of fortune, Benedetto Zaccaria, sent to the Levant in 1288, "*cui in omnibus quae comun habebat facere ultra mare fuit attributa potestas plenaria sine ullo tractatu.*"[85] It was Genoa's ultimate effort, futile despite Zaccaria's naval and diplomatic plans, to save the doomed régime in Syria in the downfall of which the Genoese responsibility like that of the Pisans and Venetians was considerable. There is in his grant of authority the sug-

[82] See for example, *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, I, 482, 526, 527.
[83] A. S. G., Not. B. de Cassino, f. 91v.
[84] A. S. G., Not. B. de For., Reg. I, pt. II, ff. 140v., 185v.; Not. P. de Sexto, Reg. III, f. 85v.; Not. B. de Cassino, f. 84v. *Arch. de l'or. lat.*, I, 505.
[85] *Annales, M. G. SS.*, XVIII, 322.

gestion that his powers included a measure of control over the group of colonies established in the second half of the thirteenth century in Byzantium and on the northern shores of the Black Sea; in earlier crises in Syria there had been co-operation between the two groups of colonies.[86] But in 1291 occurred the loss of the last foothold in Syria. Henceforth the colonies in Cyprus and in the Black Sea region, more important now commercially than before, were governed as separate groups under the system which had been finally developed in Syria. The period of experiment was closed.

In the course of two centuries the Genoese had created and thrived upon an imposing commercial empire in the Levant. In the Syrian colonies they conducted a series of experiments in administration which passed through a succession of steps reflecting the evolutionary process through which the commune itself had passed: from feudal control by privileged families through a stage of communal administration by a loosely knit system of consular agents several in number reflecting the plural executive at home with a tendency toward election of officials in the colonies, to the final stage of concentration of power in the hands of a single executive corresponding to the podestà in Genoa who had long since displaced the consuls. Upon the basis of these colonies and the trade therewith, Genoa rose to such wealth and power at the close of the thirteenth century as to give even Venice pause. A chapter in the history of colonial expansion and commercial penetration had been written.

EUGENE H. BYRNE

[86] Caro, *op. cit.*, II, 130.

VII

A TWELFTH CENTURY PREACHER—FULK OF NEUILLY

FULK's historic career began in the village of Neuilly, one of the most celebrated places in the deanery of Chelles,[1] situated between Lagny upon the Marne and Paris, seven and a half miles separating it from the latter. Nothing is known about his birth although tradition assigns to this same village the honor of his nativity.[2] Similar obscurity conceals his parentage. It seems reasonable, however, to assume with the Abbé Charasson that Fulk could lay no claim to high descent. His own inferior position in the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the silence of the contemporary chroniclers, who rarely lose an opportunity to record the nobility of their heroes, bear witness to his plebeian blood.

His early life rises to the horizon of historic vision only after his initiation into the service of the Church. For some time before 1195[3] he officiated as parish priest[4] in the church of Neuilly. But in an age when "economy is held to

1 L'Abbé Lebeuf, *Histoire de la ville et de tout de diocèse de Paris*, Paris, 1863–67, II, 474.

2 L'Abbé A. Charasson, *Un curé plébèien au douzième siècle*, Paris, 1905, 2.

3 Rigordus, *Gesta Philippi II Augusti regis francorum*, in *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France* (ed. M. Bouquet), XVII, 42.

4 Most of the chroniclers speak of Fulk as *sacerdos*, a few as *presbyter*. These terms according to Du Cange are interchangeable. Robertus Autissiodorensis, *Chronicon*, in *Monumenta Germaniae historica: Scriptores*, ed. Pertz, XXVI, 258, refers to Fulk as a priest of Neuilly "ubi capelani officio fungebatur," and Otto de S. Blasio, *Chronicon*, *ibid.*, XX, 329, as a *sacerdos* who was *parochianus*. W. Fanning, in the *Catholic encyclopaedia*, points out that a chaplain's duties were analogous to those of the later *curé*. Fulk's position therefore was that of a parish priest.

be avarice, and sobriety, austerity," [5] it is not surprising that Fulk early violated the sanctity of his office by vice and dissipation. Living like one ignorant of the things of God, he gave free rein to his uncontrolled passions.[6] In time, however, humiliated by the jeers of his congregation,[7] and inspired by the wholesome advice of the Parisian theologians that the words of a preacher must be confirmed by lofty conduct and illustrated by the example of a pure heart, he repented and cast out the evil that was in him.[8]

Called from darkness to light, he became a *novus homo*, living only for God. Donning a rough haircloth shirt and frequently a cuirass, he burdened himself with works of piety and expended his time and strength in fasts, prayers, and vigils.[9] His parochial office imposed upon him the duty of preaching to his congregation every Sunday and feast day.[10] His superior, Maurice of Sully the bishop of Paris, however, directed all the pastors of his diocese to preach daily and prepared for them a manual of homilies for this purpose.[11] Fulk applied himself to the new labor of preaching with so much enthusiasm that all were astonished to see "another Saul become a new Paul, converted from a wolf to a lamb." His enthusiasm, however, does not seem at first to have touched his parishioners; for, when he announced his intention of replacing the old dilapidated parish church by a spacious and handsome edifice, they protested so vigor-

[5] See Bernard of Clairvaux, *Apologia ad Guilielmum,* in Migne, *Patrologia latina,* CLXXXII, 895–916.

[6] Jacques de Vitry, *Historia* (ed. F. Moschus, Duaci, 1597), II, 276.

[7] Radulphus de Coggeshall, *Chronicon angelicanum,* (Rolls series, no. 66, p. 81).

[8] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.,* 276.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] See the council of Limoges, *Sacrosancta concilia* (ed. P. Labbé), IX, 905; *Hincmari capitula ad presbyteros, ibid.,* III, 570; *Odonis Epi. Paris. Constitutiones synodiae, ibid.,* X, 1809.

[11] A. Lecoy de la Marche, *La chaire française au moyen-âge, spécialement au troisième siècle,* Paris, 1868, 23.

ously that he resolved to accomplish his purpose without soliciting their financial assistance.[12]

They had little confidence in him and repeatedly taunted him with illiteracy.[13] The insult hurt him all the more because of its truth, in spite of the fact that ignorance of the Scriptures was so prevalent [14] among the lower clergy that the Fourth Lateran council was compelled to act against the appointment of illiterates to parishes. So, "blushing for his ignorance," Fulk departed for Paris to absorb in the school of theology the teaching of its famous masters. He applied himself so diligently to his studies that, for fear that his brain might not retain all that he heard, he inscribed the words of his teachers upon tablets which he always carried with him. Week days he spent in school; Sundays and feast days in his parish where he distributed the fruit which he had gathered at the university.[15] His favorite teacher was Master Peter, the venerable cantor of the cathedral church of Notre Dame, a man learned in letters, honest in word, and honorable in act, who enlightened others like a brilliantly burning torch [16] and under whose instruction Fulk's zeal and industry were soon rewarded by a reputation of learning and the title of "Master." [17]

As his knowledge increased, the field of his preaching was extended. Invited by the priests of his neighborhood to preach to the illiterate laity, he began with fear and timidity to expound the word of God.[18] For two years nothing but

[12] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 289.

[13] Radulphus de Coggeshall (Rolls series, no. 66, p. 81).

[14] See *Vita S. Norberti Magdeburgensis archiepiscopi*, ii (*Patrol. lat.* CLXX, 1265); Radulphus Ardens, *Homiliae* (*Patrol, lat.*, CLV, 1294–1626).

[15] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 281.

[16] For a biographical sketch of Peter see Migne, *Patrol, lat.*, CCV, 12–14.

[17] The *Devastatio constantinopolitana*, in *Chroniques gréco-romanes*, (ed. C. Hopf, Berlin 1873, 86); the *Chronicon S. Medardi suessionensis* (Bouquet, XVIII, 720); Robert of Clari, *La prise de Constantinople* (Hopf. 1); and the *Chronicon leodiensi* (Pertz, XVI, 654) all apply this title to Fulk. Geoffroi de Villehardouin, *La conquête de Constantinople* (ed. N. de Wailly, Paris, 1882), 2, speaks of him as *prodome*.

[18] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 281.

failure accompanied his efforts. His sermons were interrupted, his meetings were broken up, and vile epithets were hurled at him by his auditors. Then at the very moment that he was about to submit to defeat, his fortune changed. "The pious creator," Ralph Coggeshall tells us, "not wishing the seed of his teaching to perish, gave to the voice of this preacher such force that his words like sharp arrows pierced the hearts of the depraved and softened them to tears and repentance." [19] All were amazed at the great change, and like the scholars of Paris who, at the invitation of Peter Cantor had heard Fulk preach in the church of St. Severin, attributed it to divine inspiration.[20] His reputation was made. He became a "man of God." Perseverance, incessant practice, and boundless enthusiasm had made him the foremost preacher of his age.

The time was ripe for Fulk of Neuilly. Preaching to the masses was in a deplorable state. Although not yet encumbered by the scholastic mannerisms of the late thirteenth century, it was nevertheless lacking in force and originality. "The tongue of the preacher is silent," laments Guarin of St. Victor. "The early defenders of the church suffered torture and martyrdom; those of today have their feet washed not in the blood of repentance but in that of carnal desire. They rush not to the defense of the Evangelic truth, but to the despoilment of the poor, the acquisition of wealth and the blasphemy of God." [21] Fulk's fiery zeal, his youthful enthusiasm, his indifference to precedent, stood out in sharp contrast to his age and marked him immediately as great in his profession.

[19] Radulphus de Coggeshall (Rolls series, no. 66, p. 81).

[20] *Chronicon anonymi laudunensis* (Bouquet, XVIII, 711); Rob, Autis. (Pertz, XXVI, 258); Otto de S. Blasio, *Chronicon* (Pertz, XX, 330); Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 282; Lebeuf, *Histoire de Paris,* II, 101, dates the sermon at St. Severin about 1180. This seems too early, for the first contemporary mention of Fulk is 1195.

[21] L'Abbé L. Bourgain, *La chaire française au douzième siècle,* Paris, 1879, 7.

His unusual talent as a preacher, however, had little opportunity of displaying itself in the monotonous services of the Neuilly church; nor could his zeal for the cause of Christ adequately express itself within the narrow confines of his parish. His visits to Paris, the city of iniquity "where the inhabitants were being devoured by their own corruption," [22] brought him into contact with all the prevailing vices of the age and impelled him, now disgusted with his own recent excesses, to undertake an extensive campaign for the extirpation of evil.

Fulk's career as a reformer began about 1195, accepting the earliest date given by any of the contemporary chroniclers.[23] Making Paris the base of his operations as well as the chief object of his solicitude, he conducted his crusade against vice in all directions. In accordance with the advice of Hugh of St. Victor "to preach to all, always and everywhere—to men and women, old and young, rich and poor, day and night, in the public square and in the fields," [24] he carried his appeal through the populous districts of Flanders.[25] Brabant,[26] France,[27] Normandy,[28] Champagne,[29] Picardy,[30] and Burgundy.[31] In the cities he selected for his pulpit the large open squares accommodating vast numbers; in the country districts he preached at favorable spots along

[22] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.,* 277–80.

[23] Rigordus (Bouquet, XVII, 42).

[24] Hugues de Saint Victor (Bourgain, 6).

[25] Rob. Autis. (Pertz XXVI, 258); Guntherus Alemanus, *Historia constantinopolitana* (ed. P. Riant, Geneva, 1875, 10).

[26] Albericus Monachus Trium Fontium, *Chronicon* (Pertz, XXII, 877).

[27] Otto de S. Blasio (Pertz, XX, 330); Villehardouin, p. 2; Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.., passim;* Rob. Autis. (Pertz, XXVI, 258); Albericus (Pertz, XXIII, 876).

[28] Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica,* IV, 76 (Rolls series no. 51); Guntherus, 10, also names Brittany.

[29] *Dev. const.* (Hopf, 86); Villehardouin, 26.

[30] Johannes de Flissicuria, *Elogium Fulconis,* in Mabillon, *AA. SS. o. s. Ben., saec.* IV, 1, p. 574.

[31] Rob. Autis. (Pertz, XXVI, 258); Rad. Cog. (Rolls series, no. 66, p. 82); Villehardouin, 26.

the roads or went from door to door urging all to release themselves from bondage to Satan and attach themselves to the glory of God.[32] Agreeing with Alain of Lille, that "one must not speak the same way to soldiers as to prelates, to princes as to monks, and to married women as to virgins," [33] and with his master Peter Cantor, that "he who always has the same sermon for all his auditors is like a physician who has the same medicine for all maladies," Fulk paid particular attention to individual infirmities and needs.[34] The ignorant he comforted by the word of wisdom; the afflicted he strengthened by the word of consolation; those who doubted he instructed by the word of advice, those who resisted by the word of reprimand, those who erred by the word of censure, the indolent by the word of exhortation, and those who showed signs of becoming enlightened by the word of encouragement.[35]

Large crowds attended him everywhere, attracted not only by his fame as an orator and worker of miracles, but also by the amusement provided by his dramatic actions and ready wit. On one occasion he was provoked to anger by the incessant jostling and pushing of the crowd. Seizing his stick he struck lustily about and cursed the chief offenders. So great, however, was their faith in him that the victims kissed their bruises, believing them to have been sanctified.[36] On another occasion, according to Robert of Hoveden, Fulk boldly approached King Richard of England and warned him, in behalf of Almighty God, to dispose as quickly as possible of his three evil daughters. "Hypocrite," shouted the indignant king, "thou liest, inasmuch as I have

[32] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 283.

[33] Alanus de Insulis, *Summa de arte predicatoria*, c. 39 (*Patrol. lat.* CCX, 185–86).

[34] Venerabilis Petri Cantoris, *Verbum abbreviatum*, c. 8 (*Patrol. lat.*, CCV, 24).

[35] Otto de S. Blasio (Pertz, XX, 330); Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 283–84.

[36] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 284–85.

no daughters." Fulk nevertheless persisted and after identifying the three daughters as pride, greed, and sensuality, once more warned the king to dispose of them. "So shall it be done," responded the king. "My pride I give to the Knights of the Temple; my greed to the Cistercians; and my sensuality to the entire clergy." [37] Although it is doubtful if this dialogue ever was held—for it is one of those which in their fundamental form appear time and time again, but rarely in the same setting—it nevertheless is of significance in that it presents a contemporary conception of Fulk's character.[38]

Although Fulk preached against every form of vice, he denounced with particular bitterness usury, avarice, extravagance, prostitution, and clerical marriage. Of these the first was looked upon as especially objectionable because of the misery which it caused, a usurer being classed with a thief and regarded as peculiarly the offspring of the devil.[39] Coming from Italy the practice had crossed the Alps, and, stimulated by the crusades, had established itself in England and France. Although condemned by both church and state, it continued to flourish to such an extent that Pope Innocent III, in October, 1198, ordered the clergy to bring every usurer to judgment.[40] Fulk's preaching, however, seems to have been more effective than Innocent's decree; and usurers whom the church had been unable to intimidate by all the weapons of ecclesiastical discipline, this parish priest converted by the force and eloquence of his words. He sought them out in their homes and urged them to repent. "You are unclean and everything you have is filthy; and un-

[37] Roger of Hoveden, IV, 76–77.

[38] Charasson, *Un curé pléb.*, 90, maintains that the incident actually occurred.

[39] For Fulk's preaching against usury see Roger of Hoveden, Rad. Cog., Rob. Autis., Otto de S. Blasio, *Chron. anon. laud.*, Albericus, Jacques de Vitry, *Chron. leod.*, *Chronicon cluniacense* (Bouquet, XVIII, 742), and Matthew of Paris, *Chronica majora*, II, 440 (Rolls series, no. 57).

[40] *Epistola*, I, 399 (*Patrol. lat.*, CCXIV).

less you restore all that you have amassed and distribute your wealth among the poor, redeeming your sins through charity, you do not deserve indulgence." [41] Many observed his warning and much of what had been extorted by usury was either restored to the victims or given as alms to the poor. Usurious debts owed to Jews were reduced fifty per cent on condition that the remainder be paid within the stipulated time. In many places, however, the Jews were treated more harshly because "they had impoverished many of ours by infinite usury." [42] There is no evidence, however, that Fulk ever deliberately incited the people against them. On the contrary, he seems to have scrupulously observed the order of the pope "not to oppress or exterminate them. If you attack their vices be careful not to injure their persons." [43] Fulk's mildness stands out in sharp contrast to the severity of the barons who, coveting the wealth of the Jews, expelled them from their lands.

With equal force Fulk preached against cupidity, to which were attributed many of the sharp trading practices of the time.[44] He denounced particularly those who speculated in grain and thereby brought thousands of people to the verge of starvation. At such times he would appeal to the rich to feed the hungry and would prophesy premature death for those who failed to obey him. On one occasion he foretold a great decline in prices before the next harvest. So great was the faith of the people, that those who had hoarded a large quantity of grain threw it upon the market. Prices collapsed, Fulk's prophecy was fulfilled, and his reputation as a seer was established.[45]

Similar success rewarded his efforts in combating prosti-

[41] Otto de S. Blasio (Pertz, XX, 330).
[42] Rob. Autis. (Pertz, XXVI, 258).
[43] *Epistola,* II, 302.
[44] *Chron. anon. laud.* (Bouquet, XVIII, 711); Rad. Cog. (Rolls series, no. 66, p. 87); Otto de S. Blasio (Pertz, XX, 330).
[45] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.,* 285.

tution.[46] Some of the prostitutes were so moved by his preaching that they abandoned the houses of their debauchery for the Lord's tabernacle.[47] Some did penance by undertaking long pilgrimages on bare feet; [48] and some, cutting off their hair, entered the Cistercian convent of St. Antoine on the outskirts of Paris, founded by Fulk for their reception.[49] The larger number, however, fearing that they could not hold their passions in control, were provided with legitimate husbands, their dowries being raised by public contributions. The scholars of Paris gave two hundred and fifty pounds of silver and the burgesses more than a thousand pounds to help Fulk finance this reform.[50]

Clerical marriage also felt the force of his opposition.[51] He pointed out the married priests to the people, and heaped upon them such abuse that, covered with shame and embarrassment, they withdrew from his presence, his taunts never ceasing until his victims were well out of the range of sound. On one occasion after a priest who had been warned had refused to abandon his concubine, Fulk ordered the woman to be brought to him. Seizing the trembling culprit by the hair he cut a tonsure on her head and told her that since she did not wish to leave the priest he would ordain her a priestess.[52]

It is extremely doubtful that Fulk, like the Abbot Lucas of Sambucino, was one of the crusading preachers to combat heresy. Baronius, Lea, Charasson, and others assert without any qualification whatever that it was due to the ex-

[46] Rigordus (Bouquet, XVII, 48); Jacques de Vitry, 286; *Chron. leod.* (Pertz, XVI, 654); Otto de S. Blasio (Pertz, XX, 330); Albericus (Pertz, XXIII, 877); *Chron. cluni.* (Bouquet, XVIII, 742); Rad. Cog. (Rolls series, nos. 66. 82); Roger of Hoveden, IV, 76.

[47] *Chron. leod.* (Pertz, XVI, 654); Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 287.

[48] Rigordus (Bouquet, XVII, 48); Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 287.

[49] Albericus (Pertz, XXIII, 877); Otto de S. Blasio (Pertz, XX, 330); Rigordus (Bouquet, XVII, 48); Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 287.

[50] Otto de S. Blasio (Pertz, XX, 330).

[51] Albericus (Pertz, XXIII, 876); Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 286–87.

[52] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 286–87.

hortations of this priest that the chief propagator of a new heresy, an anchorite named Terric, who lived in a cave near Corbigny, was taken and burned at the stake.[53] This statement is manifestly based upon the chronicle of Robert of Auxerre which, after mentioning the success of Fulk as a reformer, speaks of the Albigensian heresy and of the crowds that recanted.[54] Nowhere, however, does Robert say that the heretics were converted by Fulk of Neuilly, nor, so far as I know, is there anywhere a single piece of evidence confirming such a conclusion.

Fulk's success in his campaign against vice was extraordinary. The chronicles are unanimous upon that point. "Not only the most insignificant, but even kings and princes dared not or could not resist him," says one.[55] "Usurers, whose unsatisfied avarice neither the terror of the royal power nor the censure of the church could restrain, Fulk recalled from insatiable cupidity," relates another.[56] "An innumerable multitude of diverse sexes and ages, orders and conditions were converted," asserts a third.[57] *Maximam, multitudinem, multos, magnem partem*, and *maxime* are the expressions used by still others to describe the number of Fulk's converts.[58] Fulk's success, however, seems to have been somewhat temporary, for many of those who had been converted soon relapsed into their former vices.[59]

Fulk's success as a preacher was due to the power of his oratory, the strength of his personality, the reputation of his miracles, and the character of his age. Some authorities

[53] C. Baronius, *Annales ecclesiastici*, an. 1198; H. C. Lea, *History of the inquisition*, New York, 1922, I, 130; Charasson, *Un curé plébèien*, 79.

[54] Rob. Autis. (Pertz, XXVI, 258).

[55] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 284.

[56] Rad. Cog. (Rolls series, no. 66, p. 82).

[57] *Chron. anon. laud.* (Bouquet, XVIII, 711).

[58] *Annales aquicinetini* (Pertz, XVI, 505); *Chron. leod.* (Pertz, XVI, 655); Rob. Autis. (Pertz, XXVI, 261); Albericus (Pertz, XXIII, 877); *Chron. cluni.* (Bouquet, XVIII, 742).

[59] Rob. Autis. (Pertz, XXVI, 258).

have selected him as the most famous and eloquent orator of his time.[60] That he far excelled his contemporaries there can be little question. "The Lord in His mercy," says Jacques de Vitry, "chose this priest like a star in the midst of night, like rain in a drought to cultivate His vine." [61] Fulk's sermons were delivered in the vernacular so that the masses could comprehend them; [62] they were short so that his auditors would not become bored. His words were simple but emphasized by effective gestures. Metaphysical subtlety, the blight of the late thirteenth century, found no place in his preaching; but allegory, to which, in accordance with custom, he occasionally resorted, detracted not a little from his effectiveness. Bitter satire, violent invective, and even profanity were employed by him from time to time as occasion demanded. Nor did he neglect pathos, which he used with such effect that frequently his audiences were moved to tears. His ready wit and crude humor, although entertaining to the crowd, must have repelled many prospective converts. Jacques de Vitry, in writing of the popular belief in the sanctity of Fulk's garments, narrates the following amusing incident. One day while the crowd was striving to tear Fulk's clothes from his body, his presence of mind came to his rescue. Raising his hand he shouted to the multitude: "Be careful not to tear my garments, which are not blessed; but I am now going to bless the clothing of this man." No sooner had he made the sign of the cross than the crowd swooped down upon the unfortunate, stripped the garments from his body and tore them into shreds for preservation as holy relics. On another occasion, according to the chronicle of St. Blasien, Fulk held out hope of redemption to a miser.

[60] *Histoire littéraire de la France,* XVI, 164.
[61] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.,* 276.
[62] For a discussion of the language of medieval sermons, see J. Mabillon, *Opera S. Bernardi,* Paris, 1873, III, viii-xv; Lecoy de la Marche, *La chaire française, passim;* Hauréau, in *Histoire littéraire,* XXVI, 388; Bourgain, *La chaire française,* 171–74.

"If you wish to become perfect," he told him, "get into this cask and I promise you eternal life." The rich man, having faith in Fulk's promises, did as he had been told. As soon as he was safely inside of the cask Fulk closed and sealed it, rolled it to the edge of a precipice and shoved it off; and so the penitent received eternal life. Whether this tale is based on fact or drawn from the imagination makes little difference. It is important in illustrating the rude and primitive type of humor popularly associated with Fulk's preaching.

His power lay not so much in what he said as how he said it. On certain occasions the masters and scholars of Paris wrote down his words, but when they later repeated them they found them to be entirely without force.[63] Fulk's style was direct and unembellished and his delivery, vigorous and forceful, stimulated by ardor and enthusiasm. Moreover, he knew not only what to say but when it ought to be said. He had a keen understanding of human nature. He rarely failed to analyze his auditors and to modify his utterances accordingly. This versatility gave him access to all, the masters of the university and the prostitutes of Paris alike being impressed by the power of his words.

His personality, although lacking the refinement of innate culture, nevertheless had many magnetic qualities. His enthusiasm was contagious and inspired all with whom he came into close contact. Although irascible at times, he was not unkind.[64] His acts of charity were as numerous as they were far-famed. He was holy in an unholy age; yet he was not an ascetic and he practised austerities only on two occasions, once when he abandoned his life of sin and again when he received the call to preach the crusade. It was noted with wonder that the rest of his life was free from ascetic tortures and denials. The people everywhere were astonished to see

[63] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 287.
[64] Albericus (Pertz, XXIII, 876).

him eat thankfully everything that was placed before him.[65]

The most essential cause of Fulk's success was his reputation as a worker of miracles.[66] The uncontroverted testimony of contemporaries, eye-witnesses of the events, indicates that an unusual force was operating through him, which brought comfort and relief to scores of afflicted. Some of his so-called miracles may be merely the exaggerations of an imaginative mind, accepted without qualification by the credulous masses; and some may be readily explained as the effects of a strong personality upon persons particularly susceptible to moral pressure and imperative command. There are others, however, which can not be so easily accounted for, if the same value is given to an eye-witness's evidence on this subject as is given to his testimony on other matters.

Although Fulk never claimed to be endowed with any supernatural power he was known everywhere as a "mirabilium operator." [67] His every step was attended by curious throngs, intent upon hearing or seeing the wonders which the Lord performed through him; and the roads were lined with suppliants, many of whom had come great distances, all begging for the healing touch. Fountains seem to have been particularly favored by Fulk for the demonstration of his extraordinary power; and long after his death, such places were visited by multitudes of pilgrims to test the medicinal qualities of the water which the holy man had blessed.[68]

But not only, according to Ralph Coggeshall, did Fulk have the power to perform a miracle, he also possessed the

65 Rad. Cog. (Rolls series, no. 66, p. 82). See also *Elog. Fulc.*

66 For Fulk's miracles see Otto de S. Blasio, Robert of Clari, Rob. Autis., Rad. Cog., Johannes Longus de Ypra, *Chronica* (Bouquet, XIII, 601), *Chronicon turonensi* (Bouquet, XVIII, 294), *An. Aquic.*, Albericus, *Chron. Cluni.*, Roger of Hoveden, *Annales coloniensis minimi* (Pertz, XVII, 810), *Chron. leod.*, Villehardouin, Guntherus, Jacques de Vitry, and Rigordus.

67 *An. colon.* (Pertz, XVII, 808).

68 Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 287.

rare faculty of determining the opportune time for its manifestation and the proper person upon whom to bestow its salubrious effects.[69] Some he refused on the ground that they might become addicted to vice; and others because the time was not fitting, since their sins had not as yet been expiated. Either explanation might, of course, save him from an embarrassing situation.

Many miraculous cures have been attributed to Fulk by his contemporaries. The essential element in the ceremony accompanying them seems to have been the imposition of the preacher's hands upon the body of the afflicted. Sometimes this was preceded or followed by prayers, the sign of the cross, or both; sometimes by benediction and the administration of holy water, which the suppliant was required to drink from the hands of the priest. Frequently the mere touch of his vestments resulted in the restoration of health, the cause of considerable annoyance to Fulk. The sick were carried from great distances on cots and deposited along the way of the holy man's preaching, so that they might touch his garments. Those who could, tore off small pieces which were popularly believed to have unusual medicinal properties. This practice became so obnoxious that Fulk was obliged to have a new suit each day.[70]

The miracles which are most frequently recorded by the chroniclers are the restoration of speech to the dumb, voluntary motion to the paralyzed, sight to the blind and hearing to the deaf. The chronicle of St. Blasien, on the authority of an eye-witness, Berthold of Ousenberg,[71] a churchman of some note, in recording a miracle by which the faculty of speech was restored to several persons who had been mute for a long time, states that Fulk opened the mouths

[69] Rad. Cog. (Rolls series, no. 66, p. 82).

[70] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 284.

[71] "Osinberc" in Otto de S. Blasio. Dr. Horst Kohl translates it into "Ousenberg," in *Geschichtschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit*, v. 58, p. 79.

of his patients, commanded them to speak and then, "as if by the power of the Holy Spirit, extracted a word, thereby restoring to them the power of speech although it had been dead so long."

The halt also shared in the benefits conferred by this holy man whose unusual power was comparable, in the opinion of his contemporaries, to that of the most celebrated saints of the early centuries. Two knights once came to him bringing a relative, a boy who was so badly paralyzed that he could not walk, and humbly begged the preacher for help. All were on horseback. Fulk, interested in the case, ordered the boy to dismount. The latter tried to obey but his lifeless limbs would not respond. The priest repeated the command but again without result. Then, riding toward the paralytic with the utmost speed, he raised his whip as if to strike. The boy, stricken with terror, fell from his horse to the ground. Fulk lifted him to his feet and behold, life had been restored to the afflicted members.[72]

Other infirmities also received Fulk's attention. Strength was restored to the feeble, troublesome weaknesses were dispelled, and all kinds of maladies cured.[73] He even healed diseases of the mind "for the Lord had given him power to expel demons."[74]

Some of the miracles were not recorded because of the great incredulity of men.[75] Many were of a type never before heard of.[76] One morning Fulk went to the home of a notoriously rich usurer for the purpose of converting him. After having been invited to have breakfast, Fulk asked what the meal was going to consist of. "Don't worry about that," an-

[72] Otto de S. Blasio (Pertz, XX, 330).

[73] *An. Aquic.* (Pertz, XVI, 505); Roger of Hoveden, IV, 76; Rad. Cog. (Rolls series, no. 66, p. 82); *Chron. leod.* (Pertz, XVI, 654); Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.,* 283.

[74] Roger of Hoveden, IV, 76.

[75] Rigordus (Bouquet, XVII, 48).

[76] *Chron. leod.* (Pertz, XVI, 654).

swered his host, "for the best that the city can supply will be at your disposal." But behold, when the dishes were placed upon the table they were found to contain nothing but frogs and serpents. The usurer, terror-stricken by the miracle, begged for absolution, which, however, was given to him only after he had restored to the victims of his usury what he had taken from them and distributed the rest of his wealth among the poor. This miracle made such an impression upon the people that one man rushed up to Fulk and revealed the location of his hoarded wealth. The preacher accompanied by a crowd of clergymen and laymen hastened to the designated place, but instead of disclosing a hidden fortune he uncovered a writhing mass of snakes.[77]

Much of Fulk's success was due to the character of the age. Vice and corruption flourished everywhere, among the clergy as well as among the laity. "The bishops," a contemporary of Fulk tells us, "flatter and seduce in order to extort. They are devoured by avarice; they are consumed by the love of possession; they are neither the friends nor the guardians of the churches. They ravish them, they despoil them. They sell the sacraments; they corrupt justice. For them there is but a single rule, their own wish. All that which they do is done by command and domination. What a stare and what a stride! They carry their heads high in the air. They have a cruel appearance, ferocious eyes, a hard word. Everything in them breathes of pride. Their conversation is the destruction of good customs; their life is injustice itself." [78] Similar indictments were made against the lower clergy, clerical misconduct being so flagrant that popular indifference was transformed into abhorrence and abhorrence into open opposition—an opposition which expressed itself in the reform legislation of the church councils, the growth of heresies, and the foundation of new

[77] Otto de S. Blasio (Pertz, XX, 330).
[78] Geoffry de Troyes (Bourgain), 278.

monastic houses. The world was ready for reform and welcomed the reformer. Fulk's success was assured even before his fight had begun. Multitudes came to hear him and were converted by his appeal. The wave of reform touched even notorious Paris where the people, hearing Fulk's sermon in the square of Champeaux, were so affected by his words that, tearing off their clothes, they prostrated themselves before him, confessed their sins, and offered their persons and possessions to the cause of Christ.[79]

It was not everywhere, however, that Fulk was received with enthusiasm. At times he encountered serious opposition and suffered "that which Paul had suffered from the Jews." [80] He was ridiculed and insulted. His sermons were interrupted by rude jests. His words were made inaudible by whistling and hooting. If he persisted, he was beaten, stoned, or cast into prison. In 1198, after his dispute with King Richard at Rouen, he entered the city of Lisieux and reproved the local clergy because of corruption. Incensed by his attacks they seized him, bound his legs with chains, and threw him into prison. In a short time, however, he emerged from his confinement. His ardor remained uncooled. Going to Caen he resumed his preaching. Again his enemies imprisoned him believing that it would please the king; and again he "burst forth from his fetters and his prison unharmed, rejoicing that he had been deemed worthy to suffer for the name of Christ." [81]

Fulk's reputation as a reformer was made between 1195 and 1198. In that short time he converted so many people that almost all of France showed the effects of his influence.[82] Although his remaining years were devoted largely to other purposes he never entirely ceased his reforming activities,

79 Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 282.
80 Radulphus Ardens, *Homiliae de tempore*, hom. 18 (*Patrol. lat.*, CLV).
81 Roger of Hoveden, IV, 77.
82 *An. Aquic.* (Bouquet, XVIII, 550).

and as late as March 19, 1200, was at Liège preaching against usury and other evil practices.[83]

According to John of Flexcourt, it was through Peter Cantor that Fulk began to preach the crusade.[84] Peter, declining the bishopric of Paris to which he had been elected in 1196 as the successor of Maurice of Sully, entered the Cistercian monastery of Longuspons in the district of Soissons where he applied himself to prayers and other good works. Suddenly his seclusion was broken by messengers sent by Pope Innocent III with letters ordering him to preach a crusade in France. While making ready to obey he was attacked by fever. Realizing that the end was near, he summoned Fulk, his most successful disciple, and delegated to him the duty which the pope had imposed. An able substitute having been found, he died in peace. Such is John's account, inscribed three-quarters of a century after the events described.[85] It seems to be corroborated by the testimony of the anonymous but contemporary chronicler of Laon who says that Peter Cantor gave to Fulk certain letters from Innocent III which permitted him to preach anywhere in Gaul. Nevertheless the account as it stands cannot be accepted. Peter Cantor died in 1197. Innocent III did not become pope until January 8, 1198.[86] There can be no doubt as to the year of Peter's death. The chronicler of Tours records that shortly *after* Peter's death, Pope Celestine died.[87] Robert of Auxerre, Ralph Coggeshall, Alberic of the Three Fountains, and other contemporaries of Fulk,[88] as well as such reliable historians of the thirteenth century as Vincent of Beau-

[83] Albericus (Pertz, XXIII, 878); *Chron. leod.* (Pertz, XVI, 655).
[84] Joh. de Fliss. (Mabillon IV, 1, 575).
[85] John died about 1280. A. Potthast, *Bibliotheca historica medii aevi*, Berlin, 1896, I, 404.
[86] *Gesta Innocentii*, c. 7 (*Patrol. lat.*, CCXIV).
[87] *Chron. turon.* (Bouquet, XVIII, 294).
[88] Bernardus Iterii, *Chronicon* (Bouquet, XVIII, 225).

vais [89] and William of Nangis,[90] all name 1197 as the date of Peter's death. The necrologies of the churches of Paris and Tours place Peter's death in September of that year.[91] Peter then was dead before Innocent ascended the papal throne.

The discrepancies in the account of John may easily be explained. Peter Cantor may have been confused with the cardinal legate Peter Capuano, who supervised the preparations for the crusade and to whom Fulk was responsible by the orders of the pope; and the letters which Fulk is said to have received from Peter Cantor may have been licenses from Celestine III to preach anywhere in Gaul against the vices of the time. Episcopal authorization was always required before a priest could extend the field of his preaching into other parishes of the diocese; papal sanction was usually necessary for a similar extension to other dioceses. The chronicler of Laon, whose chronology is extremely unreliable, does not say that Fulk had received papal authorization *to preach the crusade.* On the contrary, he states that Peter Cantor, in view of Fulk's success in the extirpation of vice, had obtained papal authorization for Fulk *to preach anywhere in Gaul.* The two facts which the chronicler wishes to emphasize are that Fulk had received papal authorization to preach extensively against vice, and that this authorization came through the efforts of Peter Cantor. Since these facts are recorded under the date of 1199, the pope is designated as Innocent III. So, however instrumental Peter Cantor may have been in obtaining papal sanction for Fulk's extensive campaign against vice, he could not have

[89] Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum historiale,* XXIX, 59.

[90] Guilelmus de Nangiaco, *Chronicon* (Bouquet, XX, 748).

[91] The *Necrologium parisiense* says, *"VII Kal. Oct. 1197 obiit Petrus praecentor et diaconus."* Joannes Cognatus, *Hist. tornacensis* (*Patrol. lat.,* CCV, 18), states: *"Decimo Kalendas Octobris obiit egregius doctor Petrus Cantor Parisiensis, qui in episcopum Ecclesiae huius aliquando electus, vacationem humiliter declinavit."*

been responsible for his appointment to preach the crusade.

It is equally certain that Fulk began to preach the crusade some time before he received the so-called papal commission of November 5, 1198. As early as September of that year he was in Citeaux, the Cistercian chapter general then being in session.[92] With the bishop of Langres, he assumed the cross and asked the assembly that several monks be allowed to aid him in the preaching of the crusades. Failing to get the desired assistance, for it seemed unreasonable to them to sacrifice the care of their own people in order to look after the needs of foreigners, he decided to undertake his mission alone. Addressing a great crowd of people at the door of the abbey he spoke with such force that a large number, noble and common, young and old, men and women, confessed their sins and received the sign of the cross. Fulk's crusading activities then must have begun before he received the papal instructions of November 5.

This document addressed to "Brother Fulk" reads as follows:[93]

A long time ago we heard a sample of your wholesome doctrines and were made very happy. We implored the Lord in His mercy to strengthen the good which He has begun by you. Moreover, in order that you, doing the work of an evangelist, may execute more fruitfully the office of preaching, especially in aiding the province of Jerusalem which we are striving to aid with all our might; and also in order that you may bring back multiplied, the gift committed by the Lord to you, which you are distributing for the enlightenment of the people, we have arrived at the following decision:

Following the example of Him who selected certain apostles, prophets and other evangelists so that their utterances might go

[92] Rad. Cog. (Rolls series, no. 66, p. 82).

[93] *Epistola,* I, 398. It is dated Nonis Novembris. Migne, *Patrol. lat.* and A. Potthast, *Regesta pontificum romanorum,* 1874, I, 40, place it in the year 1198. Should it not be dated later?

out through all the world and their words to the confines of the earth, we grant to you by apostolic authority, full power, with the advice and consent of our chosen son, the cardinal Peter, deacon of Sancta Maria in via Lata, legate of the apostolic see, whom we have appointed especially for the prosecution of this office, to attach to yourself as coadjutors a number of monks, black as well as white, or regular canons, whom you know to be capable of preaching, who with you, according to the prophet, should sow upon the waters lest the harvest be lost to the people.

Is this an appointment to office? Is this a commission to preach the crusade? How different from the commission sent to Abbot Lucas of Sambucino and the Bishop Laurence of Syracuse which contains a long introduction depicting the needs of the eastern Christians, enumerates the rewards to be promised to those taking the cross, and in direct terms appoints the recipients to preach the crusade in Sicily.[94] No, this document is no appointment to office. It is merely an authorization to have associates. A formal commission to preach the crusade may have been sent to Fulk but this is not it.[95] The preacher's failure to get assistance from the Cistercians at Citeaux may have been called to the attention of the pope who, never neglecting an opportunity to promote his favorite enterprise, may then have conferred upon the preacher the power which had been wanting before. Be that as it may, in September, 1201 Fulk again appeared at Citeaux, this time armed with papal letters, and the order, no longer daring to ignore his request, assigned three abbots to assist him.[96] That was the third year of his preaching of the crusade. In that short period he had with his own hand affixed the cross to more than two hundred thousand per-

[94] *Epistola*, I, 302.

[95] *"L'Apostoiles envoia en France et manda al prodome que il preeschast des croiz par s'autorite,"* says Villehardouin, p. 2. The *Dev. const.* says that he preached by the authority of the Cardinal Peter Capuano.

[96] The abbots of Columba, Perseigne, and Vaux-de-Cernay.

sons,[97] including Boniface of Montferrat, the temporal chief of the crusading expedition.

His reputation as a holy man was so great that he was frequently called upon to preside on particularly solemn occasions. One day he stopped at Corbie, a famous and flourishing monastery, where the monks received him with honor and invited him to preside at the ceremony marking the opening of a famous reliquary which had once belonged to Charlemagne. It was said that this reliquary, which had been used by Charlemagne to protect him in battle, was filled with many precious relics taken from the churches which he had visited. In his old age he had presented it, according to tradition, to his cousin, Adalhard, the abbot of Corbie. In the centuries that followed, the reliquary was only occasionally opened and there were many monks in the monastery who had never seen its contents. So Fulk undertook to perform the ceremony. Beginning with a sermon on the worship of the saints he ordered a fast of three days. Then, on the fourth day, he approached the sacred reliquary with great solemnity, his reverential conduct standing out in marked contrast with that of another preacher who had scandalized the monastery by laughing. Slowly opening the reliquary he took therefrom a bag of relics which gave off a penetrating fragrance. Without opening this bag, supposed to contain relics of Jesus Christ and the Holy Virgin, he presented it to the monks and after they had reverentially kissed it, he restored it to its receptacle and declared the ceremony at an end. The monks, however, protested and demanded that the bag be opened and the contents dis-

[97] Rad. Cog. (Rolls series, no. 66, p. 130). See also Anonymi halberstadensis, *De peregrinatione in Greciam* (Riant, I, 11); Robert of Clari, p. 1; Roger of Hoveden, IV, 77; *Chron. leod.* (Pertz, XVI, 654); Burchardus Urspergensis, *Chronicon* (Pertz, XXIII, 369); Anonymus suessionensis (Riant, I, 5); Anonymus de Bethune (Bouquet, XXIV, 760); *Gesta episcoporum halberstadensium* (Pertz, XXIII, 117); *Chron. S. Med. Suess.* (Bouquet, XVIII, 720).

played. "It is not your piety," responded the holy man, "that you wish to satisfy, but your curiosity." Their conscience being stung by this reproach they humbly acknowledged their faults and asked for forgiveness.[98]

Fulk's reputation of holiness unfortunately began to decline shortly before his death. In the four years which he spent in the preaching of the crusade he had collected a large sum of money for the assistance of the Holy Land. This money he sent to the Cistercian abbey at Citeaux where it was appropriated to the needs of the East. Part of it was sent to the Holy Land for the repair of the walls of Ptolemais (St. Jean d'Acre) and Tyre; part of it was distributed among the poor knights who had taken the cross, to be used by them in paying their expenses of equipment and transportation, and part of it was added to the bequest of Count Theobold of Champagne and the gift of Count Baldwin of Flanders, and applied to the payment of the twenty-five thousand marks owed to Venice for its fleet. Although Fulk seems to have observed the most scrupulous honesty in the administration of the funds at his disposal, ugly charges of corruption were made, especially after the peculation of Peter of Rossi, an associate, became known.[99] Even so high a dignitary as the pope did not escape the suspicions of the people and was compelled to issue a statement that none of the money collected had been devoted to his own uses but that all was being applied directly to the cause of Jerusalem.[100]

Early in 1202 Fulk was attacked by fever, and in May of that year breathed his last in the village where he had first won his fame.[101] That part of the crusading fund which was in his possession at the time of his death, was by the

[98] Joh. de Fliss. (Mabillon IV, i. 575).

[99] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 288; Joh. Longus (Bouquet, XVIII, 601); Rob. Autis. (Pertz, XXVI, 261).

[100] *Epistola*, I, 409.

[101] Jacques de Vitry, *op. cit.*, 288; Rob. Autis. (Bouquet, XVIII, 262).

order of the king of France, placed in the hands of two reliable men to be expended by them for the crusade.[102] Fulk was buried in the Neuilly churchyard, where annually scores of pilgrims from diverse lands came to pay him homage. Several years after his death a tomb was erected to his memory in the nave of the parish church. The great preacher was represented upon it in relief, clothed in his sacerdotal habits, with bare head displaying his tonsure and with a book in his hands. This tomb, around which many legends developed, existed until 1779, when for some unknown reason it was destroyed by François Louis Campigny, one of Fulk's successors.[103]

Fulk merits the fame which history has given him. Although he passed through his age like a comet, appearing suddenly in the darkness, dispelling the shadows about him by his unusual brilliance and then vanishing into eternity, the light which he gave was multiplied a hundredfold among his people. Like that of Bernard of Clairvaux, his influence on his age cannot be denied. His reforms, affecting all classes, gave to French civilization a new moral tone; and his appeal for the defense of Christendom against the attacks of the Mohammedans aroused such response among the people that of all the crusading preachers of his time his name alone is remembered.

MILTON R. GUTSCH

[102] *Dev. const.* (Hopf, 86).

[103] L'Abbé Charasson, *Neuilly-sur-Marne et ses souvenirs*, Paris, 1901, 50–51.

VIII

THE CRUSADING ARDOR OF JOHN OF GARLAND[1]

John of Garland is not well-known. Those who can locate him in time and place usually have a very vague notion about his life and works. Scarcely anybody has ever associated him with the crusades.

He was born in England toward the end of the twelfth century. While King John was at war with his barons and in conflict with Innocent III, John of Garland was a student in the university of Oxford. He was particularly impressed with the teaching of John of London, who, with Robert Grosseteste, was one of the founders of the "Oxford School" which stressed the study of linguistics, literature, and the natural sciences, under the influence of the "New Aristotle" and the fruitful contact of Anglo-Norman with Mediterranean civilization. Thus he emanated from the same milieu which later molded Roger Bacon.

John of Garland left England for Paris, in all probability between 1217 and 1220. Here he settled on the left bank of the Seine in the Clos de Garlande from which he himself derived his name, Johannes de Garlandia. He was content to spend the rest of his life at the rising university of Paris as a professor of grammar, or, as we would now say, of Latin language and literature. Before 1241 he visited his native land to tutor some youths of the English nobility

[1] A paper read at the forty-first annual meeting of the American Historical Association, in Rochester, New York, December 29, 1926.

and in 1229, at the great dispersion of the university of Paris, he transferred for three years to the newly established university of Toulouse, where he came in closest contact with the stirring emotions aroused by the Albigensian crusade. It would seem that he was still alive in 1272.

Many of the important works of John of Garland are inedited. Fortunately one of the books which he placed among his masterpieces, "Concerning the triumphs of the church," has been printed.[2] This volume is now exceedingly rare. The copy in the Bibliothèque nationale is guarded carefully among the reserved books. In this country there seem to be only three copies, in the Library of Congress, Harvard University, and Columbia University.

The scarcity of the volume is, however, no excuse for the neglect into which this work of John Garland has fallen. Even before it was published Victor Le Clerc blighted it with his scathing criticism which denounced it as an unworthy work of literature.[3] But, aside from its literary value, his advice has not been heeded that it should be studied carefully in connection with the history of the crusades and other events from 1189 to 1252, and as a reflection of public opinion in regard to those events. The chief deterrent has probably been the seeming obscurity of all of the works of John of Garland. They abound in rare words and curious literary conceits which have never been studied properly by modern scholars of Latin. The difficulty is increased in this instance by the fact that we have but one manuscript copy of our work. Although Thomas Wright was a great and a very careful scholar, his edition does not satisfy the tests of modern critical editing of medieval Latin

[2] Johannis de Garlandia, *De triumphis ecclesiae libri octo: a latin poem of the thirteenth century*, edited, from the unique manuscript in the British Museum, by Thomas Wright, London (The Roxburghe Club), 1856.

[3] "Jean de Garlande, auteur d'un poëme *De triumphis ecclesiae*," in *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XXII (1852), 77–103.

works.[4] Before the poem can be fully utilized for historical purposes it must be reëdited with an abundance of linguistic, literary, and historical notes. This can probably best be done after we have critical editions of all the inedited works of John of Garland.[5]

In its opening lines the *De triumphis ecclesiae* harks back to the *Aeneid* of Vergil.[6] It does not, however, fulfil its promise as an epic poem on a really great theme which appealed to no less a poet than Tasso, who also sounded the first note of the *Aeneid* in his *Jerusalem delivered.* If John of Garland had had poetic genius he might have composed a mighty epic on the triumphs of the church achieved by crusaders, in east and west, and north and south, against both infidels and heretics. Like Tasso, he should have begun with the First Crusade, but he preferred to write about contemporary events, roughly between 1189 and 1252, which gives his poem a historic value entirely lacking in that of Tasso.[7] With all its literary defects, the work of John of Garland thus offers valuable sidelights on important events in history, such as the Third Crusade, the Albigensian wars, the founding of the university of Toulouse, the wars between Louis IX and Henry III over Poitou, the coming of the Tartars into Europe, the strife between popes and Hohen-

4 An example of the uncertainty of Wright's text is the following:
"Horrida quae scribo detestor praelia, sicut
Flebilis exequias quas canit olor [Wright has *odit*] anus."
De triumphis ecclesiae, p. 47, ll. 1–2.

5 For details about the life and works of John of Garland see Louis John Paetow, *Morale scolarium of John of Garland* (*Johannes de Garlandia,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1927.

6 "Arma crucemque cano, qua dux superatur Averni,
Et qua succumbit vulgus inerme suum."
De triumphis ecclesiae, p. 1, ll. 11–12.

7 "Tempore luserunt longo gentilia scripta,
Deposcit tempus hoc sibi vera fides.
Praefero praeteritis multis praesentia, visa
Auditis, dubiis certa, probata vagis."
Ibid., p. 6, ll. 9–12.

staufen emperors, and the first crusade of King Louis IX.

In this paper we shall look into the *De triumphis ecclesiae* chiefly as a mirror reflecting the mental attitude of an intelligent observer of these events, with special reference to his opinion about the crusades. The propriety of dealing with the intellectual class in history is no longer questioned by historians. In medieval history it is, however, not easy to find faithful expressions of the opinions of members of this class in regard to world events and movements of their times. The attitude of a professor of the university of Paris in the thirteenth century towards the crusades, expressed emphatically and in detail, thus assumes considerable importance not merely in medieval history but also in the general history of thought.

Today we usually look upon the reign of St. Louis as the golden age of medieval history. When compared with other periods it will probably always maintain that proud distinction. The career of John of Garland in Paris coincided almost exactly with the reign of this famous French monarch. But our poet-professor detected in his own age not a glint of the golden shimmer which has been cast over it by history and romance. There was an unusual drought in France during the year 1241 when he wrote his *Morale scolarium.* In chapters XXVI and XXVII he inveighs against the profiteers who deprived many honest people of house and home in that year of high prices. In ancient days, he says, the prudence of a Pharaoh supplied his realm with provisions in the seven lean years but now there is no such virtue in our kings. The crown is practically handed over to business men, the king waits upon them, and offices and honors are sold to the highest bidders. In his inedited *Clavis compendii* he harps upon the same string, chiding the professors of the university who scold their students but who do not say a word against rich and powerful law-breakers; and he sums up his estimate of kings in the lilting line:

Regum justitia quam levis est et inanis!

We are shocked by such words applied to the reign of the "French Justinian."

Over and over again in his *De triumphis ecclesiae* John of Garland laments the multiform evils of his age. Oh, how happy were those who did not see the horrors of this day and who went to their rest in the good old times![8] Never were there so many evils; so rapidly do they multiply that it will be possible merely to touch upon the greatest.[9]

Fortunately we are able to date the poem quite accurately and can thus associate the author's expressed feelings with contemporary events. He began to write it during his stay in Toulouse, 1229–1232, and the original design probably was to sing the triumphs of the church over the Albigensian heretics. What he began in the sunny south, however, he did not finish until he was back under the lowering skies of Paris.[10] Here he was busy with the poem in 1245 when the pope came to France for the Council of Lyons.[11] He was revising the fifth book in 1250,[12] and he probably wrote the

8 "O quam felices veteres vixere, sepulti
Ante dies nostros et populare chaos!
O quoties fausti sunt hii, feralia facta
Qui non viderunt quae videt ista dies!"
De triumphis ecclesiae, p. 109, ll. 21–24.

9 "Crescit materia scelerum modo tanta, quod illam
Vix tango, numquam plura fuere mala."
Ibid., p. 4, ll. 25–26.

10 "Partibus austrinis scripsi discrimina facta,
Nunc mala sub Boreae flatibus act canam."
Ibid., p. 106, ll. 29–30.

11 "Lugdunum venit quo sanctus tempore papa,
Hoc mea Parisius musa trahebat opus.
Mille ducentenis conjungo decem quater annos,
Virginis a partu, tresque duosque ligo."
Ibid., p. 127, ll. 11–14.

In the next lines he tells us incidentally that chronologists computed 5199 years from the beginning of the world to the birth of Christ.

12 "Annos ecce quater centum trigintaque lapsos
Et sex a Karoli tempore scripta ferunt."
Ibid., p. 92, ll. 3–4.

last lines of the poem in 1252, for, very near the end, he speaks of the heir of Ferdinand III, Alfonso IV, who ascended the throne in that year.[13]

Thus the *De triumphis ecclesiae* was put into its present form after the final loss of Jerusalem in 1244, when it fell into the hands of the Charismian Turks. In all probability it was this event which inflamed the mind of our author with crusading ardor.[14] No doubt John of Garland was also much impressed with the dramatic vow of King Louis IX, who, in the midst of a dreadful fever towards the end of the same year, took the cross.[15] His emotional nature had been much stirred in 1241 when the holy relics recently acquired from Constantinople, the crown of thorns and a piece of the cross of Jesus, were exhibited in Paris by King Louis and his family. Chapter XIII of the *Morale scolarium* describes this event in crisscross hexameters and with ecstatic words about the cross. In the *De triumphis ecclesiae* he likewise speaks of the sacred relics and the Sainte Chapelle which had been erected to receive them.[16] In a world which had lost Jerusalem, which was trembling with awe at the frightful invasions of the Tartars into Europe,[17] which witnessed the

[13] "Haeres Alphonsus Ferrandi corde leonem
Gessit, et ecclesiae clara trophaea dedit."
De triumphis ecclesiae, p. 141, ll. 23–24.

It may interest some to know that John of Garland refers to Richard, king of England, as the Lion-hearted:
Quid rex Ricardus corda leonis habens?"
Ibid., p. 49, l. 6.

[14] "Strage Toresmini [*sic*] terram lactisque favique
Foedant, quas Babylon Assyriique juvant."
Ibid., p. 4, ll. 31–32.

[15] "Felix febris erat regis, qua Gallia tota
Est cum rege suo bajula facta crucis."
Ibid., p. 122, ll. 9–10.

[16] "Parisius posita probat istud sancta corona,
Quam Christi cervix immaculata tulit.
Crux probat hoc, et relliquiae, quas aede sacrata
Sacras ille colit, quas in honore tenet."
Ibid., p. 22, ll. 7–10.

[17] The description of the invasions of the Tartars in the *De triumphis*

sad spectacle of the Emperor Frederick II deposed by Pope Innocent IV at the Council of Lyons in 1245, this professor turned with mystical exaltation to the cross and to the Virgin Mary as his anchors of hope.

John of Garland was a man of peace. Like Dante he dreamed of universal peace on earth and pondered on the means by which it might be ushered into a distracted world. "What madness it is, O miserable mortals, to stir up wars!" [18] This is the opening line of the text of his poem. Like the aged swan dolefully singing its death song he detested the wars that filled his pages.[19] We should probably interpret literally his words which say that tears gushed from his eyes when he wrote about wars between Christians.[20] Probably himself a man of humble parentage, he looked with pity upon the peasants, by war despoiled of carts, grain, cattle, and horses; and cursing all lords, kings, overseers, heralds, foot soldiers, and horsemen.[21]

His most immediate example of baleful war was the strife between Louis IX of France and Henry III of England over Poitou which ended with the defeat of the English in the battle of Saintes, 1242, and the treaty of Lorris in the following year. To an Englishman living in France this war between brothers-in-law seemed like a dreadful civil commotion which could not be justified on any ground. Somewhat grudgingly he admits that it is right to fight for one's

ecclesiae, pp. 106ff., contains passages as graphic as the famous description by Matthew Paris.

18 "Quis furor, o miseri mortales, bella movere?"
De triumphis ecclesiae, p. 7, l. 13.

19 See note 4 above.

20 "Inter Christicolas dum tantas colligo strages,
Ex oculis properat plurima gutta meis."
Ibid., p. 63, ll. 27–28.

21 "Nudati lugent rurales, qui sibi plangunt
Currus abstractos, farra, boves, et equos.
Lugentes clamant, 'domini sint tot maledicti,
Reges, praepositi, praeco, pedester, eques.'"
Ibid., p. 35, ll. 9–12.

country but even then the foes of Christendom reap a benefit.[22] Wars among Christians and their attendant evils, both material and spiritual, will be the ruin of civilization. A true Christian knows not whither to turn. Nowhere can he find real quiet, nowhere peace.[23] In Orleans the demented citizens have even murdered some students.[24] Scarcely is peace effected when the wicked start new wars and some even seek to end war by making war:

In bello bellum pacificare petunt.[25]

John of Garland, however, was convinced that there was only one war which would permanently end war and usher in the millennium on earth. That was the holy war of the cross against unbelievers and heretics. Over and over he exhorted Christian princes to put an end to internecine strife and to unite their forces against the Mohammedans.[26] He did not propose a very definite program to carry out this vast design. Without much heed of the sad crusading experience of Frederick II, which involved him time and again in conflict with the pope, John of Garland frequently appealed to the emperor to cease troubling the church and to

[22] "Pro patria pugnare licet, sed pacere Parthis
Cernuntur reges dum sua bella gerunt."
De triumphis ecclesiae, p. 21, ll. 5–6.

[23] "Nescio quo vertar, aqua, flamma, rapina, ruina,
Occurunt, et habet mors vaga mille vias.
Materiale modo bellum, modo dico vicissim
Spirituale, gemit undique pulsus homo.
Nusquam tuta quies, nusquam pax, hinc premit ensis,
Hinc vitium natos dejicit, Eva, tuos,"
Ibid., p. 119, ll. 23–28.

[24] "Quae movet in clerum bellum, venit Aurelianis,
Motibus insanis sumere prompta merum."
Ibid., p. 41, ll. 13–14.

The town and gown riot of 1236 in Orleans is also touched upon in the *Morale scolarium,* l. 342.

[25] "*De triumphis ecclesiae,* p. 12, l. 28.

[26] "Inter Christicolas lamentor praelia mota,
Hortor et in Parthos vertere bella feros."
Ibid., p. 2, ll. 15–16.

place himself at the head of a vast crusade.[27] The clearest expression of the part which the emperor should play comes in a model letter which John of Garland inserted as a rhetorical exercise in his *Poetria.*[28] This is an imaginary summons appealing to all the princes of Christendom to place themselves at the emperor's command, and to carry out the wishes of the pope who desired a crusade against the Saracens. In sober reality, however, John of Garland did not believe that the emperor would ever employ the humble words of obeisance to the pope which we find in the model letter, nor did he think that world peace could be brought about by the

[27] "Si servat civile forum Fredericus in isto
Laus debetur ei, justitiaeque tenor.
Hoc si Jerusalem captae suffragia ferret,
Latius imperium palma referret ei.
Illi sed decrescit honor dum matris honorem
Ecclesiae minuit, persequiturque patrem."
De triumphis ecclesiae, p. 23, ll. 3–8.

A similar thought is expressed in chapter XXIV of his *Morale scolarium.*

[28] "DE CRUCE RECIPIENDA. C. Dei gratia Romanorum imperator semper augustus universis principibus et potentibus per imperii sui fines constitutis ad quos presentia pervenerint salutem et omne bonum. Studet nautica providentia vitare superbi maris contumelias et insultus aeris ventorum litigio conminantis. Cum potentes universi debeant cervicem humilem Ecclesie imperiis inclinare, que mundanis inpellitur procellis, mandatis venerabilis patris nostri summi Pontificis verticem porrigimus inclinatum, cum instanter persuaserit ut sancte terre ierosolomitane maturum presidium conferamus: vos autem nostris tenemini mandatis aures obediencie favorabiles exhibere, cum nostrum sit propositum infirmare Crucis hostes salutifere, qui polluunt sacram terram roseo Christi sanguine purpuratam. Commovemur autem et multum condolemus de libera Sarracenorum rebellione; profundiore vero vulnere doloris ledimur pro bellis nobis domesticis et christianorum enormi presumptione, qui summum in patrem et in venerabilem eius sponsam, videlicet sacrosanctam Ecclesiam, impudenter presumunt cottidie debellari, dum filius matrem iniquus inpetit furiali conflictu matris permittens inimicum habenis liberis evagari. Quare vestre mandamus universitati precipientes quatinus maiestatem imperialem offendere pertinentes in die purificationis beate Virginis in nostra Colonie conpareatis presentia, quia tunc ibi proponimus nostram curiam celebrare, et quod ad oportunitatem rei publice pertineat et honorem Ecclesie vestris sicut expediet consiliis adimplere. Offendit enim naturam et obviat rationi, qui matri clamose non succurrit cuius castum gremium a pollutis inquinatur." Giovanni Mari, "Poetria magistri Johannis anglici de arte prosayca metrica et rithmica," in *Romanische Forschungen,* XIII (1902), 944.

Holy Roman Empire as Dante so fondly dreamed at the beginning of the next century. Our professor of Paris, with love for both England and France, staked his hopes on the combined action of the kings of those two countries, so closely knitted together by family ties and by mutual interests. A pooling of Anglo-Norman and Capetian interests seemed to him to be the panacea for all the ills of the world and hence his *De triumphis ecclesiae* is filled with laments about strife between Louis IX and Henry III and with fervent hopes that these two princes would join all their forces in brotherly love to fight for the cross against all the foes of Christendom.[29]

John of Garland knew all about the sorry coöperation of the kings of England and France during the third crusade. In the third book of the *De triumphis ecclesiae* he described the disputes between Richard and Philip II and the way in which both of them strove for their selfish interests even during the crusade and especially after their return. One would imagine that he would have reflected on the possible recurrence of such strife even if Louis IX and Henry III could have been induced to join forces. But no such doubts rose in his mind, which pictured a rosy future if men would but heed his counsel.

When we turn to John of Garland's descriptions of, and plans for, legitimate holy wars he seems to be transformed into a man of blood and iron and his "Arma crucemque cano" sounds like a joyous hymn of battle. It is right to foil the wicked with just arms.[30] Not only are wars to deliver Jerusalem holy wars; it is of equal merit to fight the Mohammedans in Spain and in Africa. But the Mohammedans are only a fraction of the unbelievers on earth. Hence wars against the fierce Tartars and all other infidels

[29] See e.g. in the *De triumphis ecclesiae,* pp. 16, 21–24, 39–46, 55–66, 118.

[30] "Fas est injustos armis compescere justis."

Ibid., p. 5, l. 5.

are holy, legitimate wars. The worst enemies, however, are not without; they follow their snaky, slimy paths within the very bosom of Christendom. This pacific professor of the university of Paris, who had watched the Albigensian heresy at close quarters during his three years of residence at the university of Toulouse, was absolutely rabid in his hatred of all dissenters. He rejoiced in the victory of the Franks under Clovis over the Arian Visigothic king Alaric II. Who, he says, could tolerate heretics whose iron hearts can be softened neither by miracles nor by tortures, who are worse than all infidels and evil-doers, who are like hydras with poisonous fangs and who must be extirpated by doctors of theology, by fire and by sword.[31] With entire approval John of Garland described the persecutions of Folquet de Marseilles, once a troubadour, then bishop of Toulouse from 1205 to 1231, who earned the appellation "bishop of devils," and of Master Roland, who had the dead body of the heretic Galvanus exhumed, dragged through the streets of Toulouse, and then burned. In his spirited account of the battle of Muret, 1213, near the end of the fourth book, where he pictures the laments of the women for their fathers, sons, husbands, and brothers, whose bodies have floated down the Garonne to Toulouse, and the execration of war by the old men and the boys, there is not a note of pity or tolerance for those who have deviated from the established doctrine of

[31] The fourth and the fifth books of the *De triumphis ecclesiae* are devoted largely to the Albigensian heresy. This portion of John of Garland's book has been studied with care by Paul Meyer, *La chanson de la croisade contre les Albigeois commencée par Guillaume de Tudèle et continuée par un poète anonyme,* 2 vols., Paris, 1875–79; see especially II, pp. xxi–xxiii. Following are some of John of Garland's striking lines which are alluded to above:

"Sed fraudes haeresum quis tolerare potest?" (p. 68, l. 8)

"Sic ergo nec supplicium nec mira remulcent
Haereticos, quoniam ferrea corda ferunt." (p. 78, ll. 13–14)

"Haereticus pejor cunctis, velut hydra venenum
Fundit in occulto, vulnera dente gerit." (p. 79, ll. 21–22)

"Pravos extirpat et doctor, et ignis, et ensis." (p. 92, l. 31)

the church. Thus our peace-loving professor of the thirteenth century threw the doors wide open for every kind of religious war.

It would be unjust, however, to give the impression that John of Garland was a confirmed reactionary and a hopeless fanatic. We have seen that he was a scion of the "Oxford School," in many ways the most progressive group of men in the thirteenth century. As Roger Bacon was the chief spokesman of that school in behalf of the natural sciences so John of Garland, when he is better known, will probably be conceded to have been its chief advocate of the systematic study of Latin language and literature. Not only did he plead for a scientific study of the Latin of his day but he wrote grammars and word books which were designed to oust the faulty handbooks that were accepted by scholars for centuries and which roused the scorn of the humanists. In a century when the Latin classics of antiquity were shamefully set aside in Paris and in other universities, he studied them assiduously himself and fostered them among his students. He had visions of Paris as a new Athens of the West where the muses would find a new Helicon, and in order to hasten the day of its glory, he at least attempted some lofty flights of poetry. Coming to Paris shortly after official attempts were made to stem the irresistible entry of the "New Aristotle," he openly advocated the study of the new books and hoped that they would have a freer scope in the new university of Toulouse than they had had in Paris during the first decades of the thirteenth century. Imbued with the teachings of his masters of Oxford he had place in his scheme of studies for the natural sciences. He even dabbled in medicine and wrote a medical treatise which has not been found or identified. In short, he was a progressive thinker and something of a humanist in an age when humanists were as rare in Italy as they were in northern Europe. Although, in

his *Morale scolarium,* he depicted the worthless university student and the dandies who spent more time in primping than they did with grammar and rhetoric, he nevertheless expressed a good deal of confidence in the rising generation, a test of open-mindedness and mental health which cannot be met by a large number of modern professors.

As a pioneer among theorists on the crusading movement he will also probably hold his own with such writers as Pierre Dubois and Guillaume de Nogaret, who, in the fourteenth century, had the benefit of much additional knowledge and experience, and who nevertheless advocated many ways and means which seem fantastical to us today.[32] None of them foresaw how little stress we now lay on the resounding feats of arms, the sieges, and the conquests of the crusaders who were confident that a new order of civilized life would result from their terrible sufferings and their indomitable devotion to a high ideal. Things that to us now seem so vital, the peaceful penetration of the settler, the missionary, and the trader, the gradual interchange of ideas and of goods between East and West, went on scarcely noticed even by the most thoughtful medieval writers. John of Garland did not suspect that today a professor, who is our leading investigator of the crusades, would tell young college students that "the most important results [of the crusades] were the broadening of the intellectual horizon and the enrichment of the West." [33] For us the heroic, though peaceful labors of a Raymund Lull are beginning to crowd the exploits of a Richard the Lion-hearted on the pages of history. In our text-books we now devote almost as much space to the aston-

[32] It is possible that in his *De triumphis ecclesiae* John of Garland attempted to supply the material of book III, "On the triumph of the Christians," which was projected by Jacques de Vitry to supplement his famous oriental and occidental history. See A. Molinier, *Les sources de l'histoire de France,* III, p. 50 (no. 2384).

[33] Dana C. Munro, *The middle ages, 395–1272,* New York, 1921, 310.

ishing appearance of St. Francis before the sultan of Egypt near Damietta in 1220, as we do to the military failure of the first crusade of St. Louis.

To John of Garland, however, the day of fulfillment seemed to dawn when, towards the end of the year 1244, King Louis IX took the irrevocable vow of a crusader and when all Gaul made ready to carry the cross of Jesus.[34] Louis sailed from Aigues-Mortes in 1248, and when, shortly after, the news of his capture of Damietta reached Paris, John of Garland was finally able to break forth into a song of triumph of the church over all its foes. Rejoice, holy Zion, and let all Frankland join with you in happiness and joy. Laugh, O Jerusalem, for you have wept; rise up, for you have been lying so low; play, for you have labored so sorely; live a new life of freedom from your yoke.[35] His very next words, however, throw a chill wet blanket on the warm enthusiasm of his previous lines. He warns his readers that joy must be moderate and that fortune does not always smile. Then he is constrained to tell about the unsuccessful expedition against Cairo, the bloody fights in and about Mansourah, the death of the king's brother, Robert, count of Artois, the capture of King Louis with his whole army, the loss of Damietta, the ransom of the king and his insignificant operations in Palestine. The song of triumph seems to die out completely but John of Garland was able to snatch a moral victory from apparent defeat. The sins of the Christians were the cause of their failure. Reason cannot determine the inscrutable ways of God. The reader must not infer that the defeat of the king was an evil or a real loss. Soon the tide

[34] See note 15 above.

[35] "Gaude, sancta Syon; congaude, Francia felix;
  Vos gaudere crucis inclita palma jubet.
Nomine, re Blanca prolis laetatur honore,
  Gemma pudicitiae, regis amoena parens.
Ride, flevisti, Jerosolima; sta, jacuisti;
  Lude, laborasti; vive soluta jugo."

De triumphis ecclesiae, p. 130, ll. 7–12.

might turn. Did not a shepherd boy slay Goliath and deliver Israel from the hands of the Philistines? A just God will give victory to the just cause. Whether the Christians win or lose, there is clear gain in the augmentation of the true faith and in holy martyrdom. Gladly, he says, France sends her sons to die on the fields of Egypt and Palestine and thus to earn eternal reward in heaven.[36]

With renewed hope John of Garland reflected that it is customary in war to rise up after a defeat and to plan for ultimate victory by new stratagems. Hence he urged doctors of law to preach the cross, and with his characteristic poetic license, appealed to the Romans, Dacians, Hibernians, English, Teutons, and Illyrians to start a new crusade. He heard that the king of England and the king of Spain would soon throw in their forces to fight for the church. We now know that Henry III merely talked about a crusade and that Ferdinand III, king of Castile, died when he was about to start on a crusade in May, 1252. In that year John of Garland ended his poem. We detect a sad minor key in his words which say that other poets will be called upon to recite the deeds of these kings,[37] and in the last lines depicting the joys of heaven which await the martyrs and those who fight for Christ. To us all his pages, even those that glowed most brightly, now seem like cold, burnt-out embers of a fervent ancient hope of ending all wars by means of one just war.

We who have lived through stirring times, when, in the

36 "Cur, Deus, injustis pateris succumbere justos
Justus es, et justis das tua regna viris.
Sub dubio verum non quaeris, lex quia certa
Est tua, tu rectum cernis, et aequa facis.
Si vincunt, vel si vincuntur, praemia sumunt,
Augmento fidei, martyrioque sacro.
Martyrio proceres transmisit Francia felix
Ad coelum, coeli rex locupletat eos."
De triumphis ecclesiae, p. 135, ll. 13–20.

37 "Deposcunt alios illorum gesta poetas,
Qui quando tempus venerit illa canant."
Ibid., p. 139, ll. 27–28.

midst of much lofty idealism, the word "crusaders" often sprang to the lips of our contemporaries, read a book like the *De triumphis ecclesiae* with a new interest. Surely it will not be expected that a modern professor should sit in judgment over one of his kind who lived and hoped in Paris seven hundred years ago. In fear and trembling he may well wonder what the twenty-seventh century will say about the fondest hopes of our time. It will be best to close our reflections on the book of John of Garland in the mood of the pious scribe who drew the fine pen picture of William the Conqueror in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle:* "May Almighty God show mercy on his soul, and grant him the forgiveness of his sins! We have written concerning him these things, both good and bad, that virtuous men might follow after the good, and wholly avoid the evil, and might go in the way that leadeth to the Kingdom of Heaven." [38]

LOUIS J. PAETOW

[38] This character sketch is quoted very effectively by Charles H. Haskins, *The Normans in European history,* Boston and New York, 1915, 56–58.

PART TWO

OTHER HISTORICAL ESSAYS



IX

AN EXCHEQUER REFORM UNDER EDWARD I

In 1258 the barons of England inserted a clause among the Provisions of Oxford that directed that all issues of the land should flow into the exchequer and not elsewhere. The desire of the barons was not realized at once or for many years to come, but in a way it forms the text of this paper.[1] As will be seen, during the reign of Henry III and the early part of the reign of Edward I the larger part of the king's revenue did not flow into the exchequer; it was received and disbursed elsewhere.

In the year 1311 the successors of the barons of the days of Henry III placed in their Ordinances a section reading in part, "and that the issues and profits of the same customs, together with all other issues and profits of the realm arising from any matters whatsoever, shall come entirely to the king's exchequer, and by the treasurer and the chamberlains shall be delivered, to maintain the household of the king, and otherwise to his profit."[2] The wardrobe is not specifically mentioned in the Ordinances as a second treasury, but in 1324 it was charged with being in receipt of "foreign accounts" of which it had no knowledge and it was

[1] I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness for several valuable criticisms of the contents of this paper made by Hilary Jenkinson and Charles Johnson, both of the Public Record Office.

[2] The translation is that of Adams and Stephens, *Select documents of English constitutional history*, 93.

ordained that its keeper should receive no money except from the treasurer and chamberlains.[3]

Though the demands of 1258 and 1311 read much the same there was a great and in many respects a fundamental difference between the conditions under Henry III and those under his grandson. During the intervening years the more important extraordinary sources of royal revenue, the taxes upon personal property, the clerical subsidies, and even the tallages, had been brought within the jurisdiction of the exchequer and their proceeds flowed into the receipt, the lower exchequer. Concerning the status of the customs I am somewhat in doubt. In 1295 and the following year the customs figure largely on the receipt rolls and in other records of the exchequer.[4] Early in the reign of Edward II receipts from the customs, via the hands of the Friscobaldi, are recorded on the receipt rolls.[5] In June 1309 the Friscobaldi were granted the money arising from the various kinds of customs levied and the collectors of the same were told to deliver all such money to them.[6] The Florentine merchants were to act as controllers of the customs. What this relationship implied is not clear. The barons, however, were in 1311 quite specific in their demand that the receipts from the customs should be paid into the exchequer. Whatever may have been the fact with respect to these taxes there was a justification for what was virtually an attack upon the wardrobe, in the fact that that department still received a fair share of its income directly, that is without the intervention of the exchequer. Though this income was relatively much smaller in volume than that received from the exchequer, other reformers of the reign of Edward II, bent upon the centralization of the finances of the kingdom, extended

[3] *Red book of the exchequer* (Rolls Series), III, 908. T. F. Tout, *Chapters in the administrative history of mediaeval England*, II, 264.

[4] Receipt rolls, nos. 133, 135, 138, 139.

[5] Receipt roll, no. 183.

[6] *Calendar fine rolls, 1307–1319*, p. 44.

exchequer control in 1324 and 1326 to a point that must have caused despair in the ranks of the wardrobe officials.[7]

The change from a lack of centralization of control of the king's income to what was in most important respects unified control began during the administration of William de Marchia as treasurer of the exchequer. He was appointed to that office April 6, 1290.[8] Previously he had been controller of the wardrobe. There is very little chance of ever discovering whether he or his master, Edward I, was primarily responsible for the reform started in the year 1290. The idea that underlay the changes that took place was of course not original with either; the barons had brought it to the fore in 1258, though it may be doubted whether they were actuated so much by the ideal of efficiency as by discontent with the control of the wardrobe by foreigners. Under Edward I the dominant idea would seem to have been that of efficiency. William de Marchia had held high office in the wardrobe and his successor as treasurer, Walter de Langton,[9] who continued the work of reform, had been controller and then keeper of the wardrobe. The wardrobe officials brought with them to the exchequer a greater knowledge of the receipt as well as of the expenditure of the king's income than was, in all probability, possessed by any of their new colleagues. They had directed large financial transactions and were men of ability and experience. If the financial system was to be centralized no better qualified men could have been found to undertake the task.[10]

In order to make clear the character of the change that took place in 1290 and the ensuing years it is necessary to

7 *Red book of the exchequer,* III, 908, 930–69.

8 *Calendar patent rolls, 1281–1292,* p. 349.

9 Langton was appointed treasurer Sept. 28, 1295. *C. p. r., 1292–1301,* p. 149.

10 I cannot agree with Professor Tout's suggestion, *Chapters,* II, 95, that their appointment marked the abdication of "many of its functions" by the exchequer "in favor of the wardrobe."

explain a few terms and to review certain phases of the history of the administration of finance during the previous two generations,

The exchequer as is well known was that department of the government into which a large part of the income of the crown flowed and in which the books were kept. Money was paid into the exchequer; the sheriffs and others were directed to account at the exchequer. By the reign of Henry III two divisions had evolved, the receipt, the lower exchequer, into which money was paid and from which it issued, and the exchequer of account, the upper exchequer. The older separate treasury had disappeared and money paid into the receipt was now said to be paid into the treasury. The records of receipts and disbursements were kept in two series of rolls known as the receipt rolls and issue rolls. It is quite aside from the purpose of this paper to describe the character of the receipts and disbursements, though it may be noted that credits were entered upon the receipt roll not only for payments in cash, but also upon the presentation at the receipt of vouchers bearing witness to the fact that the collector of taxes who appeared at Westminster had before his arrival honored drafts upon the money he had gathered.[11] In similar fashion disbursements might mean that a royal creditor had been given cash or that he had been given an order on a collector of taxes to pay him money. The receipt had as its chief officers the treasurer and chamberlains. The exchequer of account, as its name implies, was an accounting board. Letters sent to it were addressed to the treasurer and barons. Sheriffs and other officers paid in the money they collected at the receipt. They accounted before

[11] For a description of the system of assignment see my paper in *The Bulletin of John Rylands Library*, VII, 269–78, and that of Hilary Jenkinson entitled "Medieval tallies, public and private," in *Archaeologia*, LXXIV, 303–6.

the upper exchequer. In contemporary writs and many other documents these divisions were often ignored, the writers being content with the more general term exchequer.

The wardrobe was "the financial and administrative department of the king's household." [12] Primarily it was the most important spending department of the household, but in the thirteenth century it received a large share of the revenues of the crown directly from the men who had gathered the money. A part of its income always came from the exchequer and its officers were supposed to, and usually did sooner or later, account before the treasurer and barons. The chief officer of the wardrobe was the keeper.[13]

There were before the year 1290 at last three ways in which the revenue of the crown was handled. In some instances, as in the case of a few levies of the taxes upon personal property, the money gathered was placed by its collectors in the hands of receivers who either disbursed it on order to royal officers or creditors or turned it over directly to the wardrobe. The receivers were for the time being in charge of special treasuries. A second method of handling the revenue was to pay it directly into the wardrobe, which thus became a second treasury coördinate with and not subject to the control of the exchequer in the matter of the receipt of income. In the third place the money was paid into the receipt, the treasury of the exchequer. The upper exchequer was, however, save in the most exceptional cases, without a rival as an accounting board. The receivers accounted before the treasurer and barons for their receipts and expenditures. The officers of the wardrobe did

12 T. F. Tout, *The place of Edward II in English history,* 65.

13 The less important spending departments and the minor treasuries do not concern us in this paper. For a discussion of them see Tout, *Chapters,* II, *passim,* and Agnes Sandys, "The financial and administrative importance of the London Temple in the thirteenth century," in *Essays in medieval history presented to Thomas Frederick Tout,* 147–62.

the same, as did also sheriffs and local tax collectors. The supremacy of the exchequer of account within its own sphere was never, so far as I know, seriously contested and needed no demand of barons or act of reformers to establish it. It is quite clear that the receipt did not hold the same position in relation to the revenues of the crown.

The relative position of the wardrobe and exchequer in respect to the king's income during the early days of Edward I illustrates very well the conditions before the period of change. Whenever the information is available the income of the wardrobe from taxes and other sources received independently of the exchequer was rather consistently larger than the income of the latter department. Between 1272 and 1290 the largest totals of exchequer receipts were in 1287–1288 when they reached the sum of £22,479 0*s.* 2*d.* and in 1289–90 when they amounted to £24,637 8*s.* 7*d.*[14] Usually they were far below these figures. Professor Tout estimates that between 1280 and 1290 the wardrobe received directly a yearly average of about £44,745, over twice as much as the average receipts of the exchequer.[15] During the same period the wardrobe received from the exchequer about £20,000 a year, less than a third of its income. Under Henry III the wardrobe usually received a somewhat larger proportion of its income from the exchequer and during the ten years after the Provisions of Oxford it received the greater share from that department.[16]

Another approach to the problem of the extent of the control of the exchequer over the receipt of the royal revenue is afforded by an examination of the proceeds of the taxes upon personal property. During the period between the accession of Henry III and the year 1290, there were six such taxes levied, in 1225, 1232, 1237, 1269–70, 1275,

[14] Sir James Ramsay, *The dawn of the constitution*, 542–43.
[15] Tout, *Chapters*, II, 88, 89.
[16] Tout, *Chapters*, I, 301, 315.

and 1283.[17] There are a number of records of the method of handling these taxes and the information they give is for the most part unmistakable in character.

Throughout the reign of Henry III the proceeds from the taxes upon personal property seem to have been regarded as a special fund to be disposed of as the king and his council willed or as had been agreed at the time of the grant. In 1225 the bishops of Salisbury and Bath were selected as receivers of the subsidy. The proceeds were to be brought to them in Winchester and Devizes.[18] They were to check the accounts of the collectors of the subsidy and to pay out the money they received. In due time they accounted before the treasurer and barons for both their receipts and expenditures,[19] but up to that time the exchequer seems to have had no hand in the proceedings. The tax of 1232 was a fortieth of personal property. The exchequer was this time given control over the accounting of the collectors appointed to serve in the counties. The latter were directed to send the rolls of assessment to the exchequer and to deposit the money in a safe place until they were told to bring it to the New Temple in London.[20] In practice the money was taken from the safe places to the wardrobe in Gloucester, Hereford, and Wenloc and also to the New Temple and other places where, presumably, it could be used to the best advantage.[21] In April 1233 the constable of the Tower of London was directed to send the proceeds of the fortieth from several counties to the treasurer and chamberlain at the receipt, the Tower in this instance being regarded as a

[17] The taxes of the reign of Henry III are discussed in S. K. Mitchell, *Studies in taxation under John and Henry III,* and those of the whole period in J. A. C. Vincent, *Lancashire lay subsidies.*

[18] For detailed accounts of this subsidy see Mitchell, *Studies in taxation,* 159–69; Vincent, *Lancashire lay subsidies,* I, 9–18.

[19] L. t. r. foreign accounts, no. 1.

[20] *Calendar of close rolls, 1231–1234,* p. 155.

[21] L. t. r. foreign accounts no. 1, m. 6a. The places of delivery are noted in the accounts of the collectors.

place of deposit.[22] The collectors finally accounted before the treasurer and barons and the record of the audit has been preserved.[23] Whether or not there was a preliminary accounting at the exchequer is not clear. The instructions to the collectors of the thirtieth of 1237 were different from those of 1232. The collectors were not told to send their assessment rolls to the exchequer, though they were commanded as before to put the money in a safe place until it could be transferred to London.[24] In London the money was placed in the hands of Hugh de Stockton, a Templar, in the New Temple.[25] A considerable share was taken from the local depositories to Durham, Devizes, and Bristol;[26] in Bristol at least it was placed in the care of a Templar and Hospitaller.[27] No record has been found of any accounting by Hugh or his fellow receivers at the exchequer and it may be that none was held, for the proceeds of the subsidy formed a distinctly separate fund. There is, nevertheless, the chance that the record of an accounting may have been lost. The tax of 1269–70 was levied for a crusade which Henry III did not undertake but which Edward, his son, did.[28] As it was gathered it was sent to the New Temple where it was placed in charge of Adam de Bocland, treasurer of the Hospital, William de Medburn, treasurer of the Temple, and Giles de Audenard, a clerk of the wardrobe.[29] They received the money and disbursed it. The lack of exchequer control is further illustrated by the fact that two men, Audenard and Middleton, both clerks of the wardrobe,

[22] *C. p. r., 1232–1237*, p. 15.

[23] L. t. r. foreign accounts, no. 1, m. 6a.

[24] *C. c. r., 1234–1237*, pp. 543–45; *ibid., 1237–1242*, pp. 115–17.

[25] *C. p. r., 1232–1247*, p. 222; *Calendar liberate rolls*, I, 325–26, 333.

[26] *C. p. r., 1232–1247*, p. 225; *ibid.*, 213. *Calendar liberate rolls*, I, 309.

[27] *C. l. r.*, I, 309.

[28] Mitchell, *Studies*, 295–99; Vincent, *Lancashire lay subsidies*, I, 71, 92–105.

[29] Pipe roll, no. 117 (1 Edward I), mm. 6ff. This is the record of the accounting of the receivers.

were sent out in 1272 to audit the accounts of the local collectors,[30] and that it was not until 1273 that the treasurer and barons were directed to audit the accounts of the receivers.[31] The receivers' accounts show that the money was paid directly to Edward and others connected with the crusade.[32]

The proceeds of the two taxes laid upon movables during the days of Edward I were treated in similar fashion. The collectors of the fifteenth of the year 1275 accounted finally before the treasurer and barons and delivered the assessment rolls into the treasury,[33] but all the evidence points towards the payment elsewhere of the money they gathered. The receipt rolls covering the years when the tax was being gathered contain no items relating to it and none appear until after the accounts were audited and small sums of arrears were paid in.[34] This is fairly conclusive proof that the tax was not paid into the receipt, but there is further confirming evidence. The record of the accounting of the receivers of the subsidy notes as in the treasury only about £380.[35] Most of the money is described as paid to the merchants of Lucca and a relatively small amount directly into the wardrobe. The wardrobe, however, received most of it in time. It would appear that even the preliminary accounting of the collectors took place in the local districts before William de Herelawe and Robert de Belvero and not at the exchequer.[36] The subsidy of 1283, a thirtieth, was levied for the expenses of the Welsh war. The collectors delivered the rolls of the assessment into the treasury and accounted at

[30] *C. p. r., 1266–1272,* p. 683.

[31] *C. c. r., 1272–1279,* p. 21.

[32] Pipe roll, no. 117, mm. 6ff.

[33] L. t. r. enrolled accounts, subsidies, no. 1.

[34] Receipt rolls, nos. 75, 77, 79, 82, 84, 86. A few entries of the payment of small sums are found on receipt roll no. 95 (8 Edward I, Easter) and on *ibid.* no. 97.

[35] Pipe roll, no. 123 (7 Edward I), m. 23d.

[36] *C. p. r., 1272–1281,* pp. 194, 196.

the exchequer.[37] Again receivers were appointed, William de Perton and others, and the money did not go to the receipt.[38] The roll of the audit of the accounts of the collectors of the thirtieth contains the statement in the case of every county, *In thesauro nichil.*[39] The receipt rolls for 1283 and 1284 are missing and so cannot be utilized to check this statement, which, however, really needs no checking. The accounts of the keeper of the wardrobe relating to the expenses of the Welsh war state that he received about £36,000 of the proceeds of the thirtieth directly.[40]

One method of estimating the interest of the exchequer in the taxes upon movables yet remains to be examined. In the exchequer of account there were kept two series of rolls, the memoranda rolls, in which were set down various more or less formal records of matters that concerned the exchequer. There we find in the years after the reform the copies of the commissions issued under the great seal to the taxers and collectors of subsidies, the views and audits of account of the same collectors, and numerous items subsidiary to the accounting. On the rolls covering the period of the taxes of 1275 and 1283 no records of any commissions issued to their collectors have been found and no memoranda of views and audits relating to the subsidies.[41] A few entries appear in the rolls of the years shortly after the grant of the taxes and even much later relating to the distraint of collectors who were delinquent, to the amercement of collectors who did not appear for their audit, to attachments and fines, all matters having to do with the final accounting or delinquencies aris-

[37] L. t. r. enrolled accounts, subsidies, no. 4, mm. 1 ff.

[38] The enrolled accounts of the collectors give this information, as do also the accounts of the receivers attached to the same set of enrolled accounts.

[39] L. t. r. enrolled accounts, subsidies, no. 4.

[40] *Chronica Johannis de Oxenedes* (R. S.), 301–311.

[41] I have examined both the K. r. and L. t. r. memoranda rolls for the years of the grant and collection of the taxes.

ing after the accounts of the collectors had been audited.[42]

The number of membranes contained in the memoranda rolls also bears testimony to the relatively small amount of business transacted in the exchequer of account. The average number of membranes in the series of the treasurer's remembrancer was nearly thirty for the period from 10 to 18 Edward I, and that of the king's remembrancer's series about twenty-one. Such a limited amount of space was inadequate for the recording of any considerable number of writs concerned with or memoranda of financial transactions.

As it was with the control of the taxes upon movables so it was with other important taxes. During the years after 1275, when the customs were granted to the king, no entries appear on the receipt rolls giving credit for money paid into the receipt by the collectors of the tax. On the other hand the wardrobe accounts of the years 1282–84 and of other years note large sums received from that source.[43] It is stated that the proceeds of the crusading tenth of the latter part of the reign of Henry III, a tax granted to that king by the pope, "were regularly paid into that office."[44] The wardrobe receipts of 1282–84 include, *inter alia*, in addition to the taxes mentioned, the proceeds of scutage fines, the presage of wines, revenues from the mint and exchange, and numerous payments by sheriffs.[45] Out of a total receipt in those years of £101,153 2*s*. 5*d*. the wardrobe received but £6,373 6*s*. 8*d*. from the exchequer.

After William de Marchia entered upon his duties as treasurer there was begun a series of changes in the records of the exchequer. These were the result of an attempt made by Marchia's staff to meet the new situation caused by a fun-

42 *E.g.*, in connection with the tax of 1275, L. t. r. memoranda roll, no. 53 mm. 1, 18; *ibid.*, no. 58, m. 29; *ibid.*, no. 62, m. 13; *ibid.*, no. 63, m. 39.

43 *Chronica Johannis de Oxenedes* (R. S.), 301–311.

44 Tout, *Chapters*, I, 316.

45 Oxenedes. Summarized in Ramsey, *op. cit.*, 544.

damental reversal of the older system of financial administration. From the start the goal was the unification of the control of the receipt of the income of the crown. Two important sources of revenue were affected immediately, the taxes upon personal property and the clerical subsidies. In due time tallages, customs, and other sources were brought under the control of the exchequer. Though the wardrobe was not eliminated as a second treasury, the effect of the reform was a sudden decrease in the volume of its direct, or "foreign," receipts.

In the following description of the changes in the records due to the new plan I shall emphasize what happened while William de Marchia held office as treasurer. The later changes, some of which will be mentioned, were the result of an attempt to simplify record keeping or of an extension of the new principle to sources of income not touched during the first years.

A very simple method of dealing with the important new sources of exchequer income was adopted in 1290. Instead of recording the credits due to the payment of the proceeds of the clerical subsidies and taxes upon movables upon the already existing receipt rolls, an entirely new series of records was started.[46] The ground had been broken for this procedure by the separate series of rolls of receipts from Jews,[47] but with respect to what may be termed national taxes the plan was without precedent. The new series, now called rolls of receipts from taxes, began with the Michaelmas term 19 Edward I, 1290.[48] On these rolls were entered the daily receipts from both the taxes named. No statements of the total amount of such receipts appear at the end of

[46] I owe a good part of the information in this and the following paragraphs to the admirable manuscript index to the receipt and issue rolls in the Public Record Office in London.

[47] Hilary Jenkinson, "The records of exchequer receipts from the English Jewry," *The Jewish historical society of England,* VIII, 19ff.

[48] Receipt rolls, nos. 1611 to 1745.

the rolls. The items were, however, summarized and added up at the end of the receipt rolls of the ordinary series.[49] It is possible by reference to the latter rolls to learn without effort the value to the government of either the lay or clerical tax. The partial duplication of information would seem to have been due to the novelty of the problem facing the officers of the exchequer.

This method of recording the payment of the lay and clerical taxes into the treasury was soon changed. Beginning with the Easter term of the year 1295, 23 Edward I, this being towards the close of Marchia's term as treasurer, the items relating to clerical subsidies were separated from those having to do with the taxes upon movables and entered upon another set of rolls.[50] There was thenceforth a series of rolls devoted to the clerical taxes and one to the lay taxes. The items on the new series were totalled at the end of each roll. Coincidently with this change the receipt rolls of the ordinary series ceased to note in summarized form the income from the taxes named.[51] During the years 1295 and 1296 they continued to record the payment of the remainders of account of earlier taxes, but it would seem that they soon ceased to take cognizance of even these small amounts. In order to learn anything about the subsidies it is necessary to turn to the rolls of receipts from taxes. The change in method has been overlooked by a modern historian of medieval finance who accepted the receipt roll totals of 1295 and after as including the revenue arising from all kinds of taxes.[52] His figures are, therefore, erroneous at times to the extent of many thousands of pounds. The separate rolls recording the receipts from the taxes upon personal prop-

49 Receipt rolls, nos. 115 and after.

50 I have not the new index number of the first of these rolls, that of the receipt of the lay tenth and sixth. The old reference was Receipt roll, pells, no. 95 (Easter, 23 Edward I).

51 Receipt roll, no. 135, marks the change.

52 Sir James Ramsay, *The dawn of the constitution*, 542–43.

erty continued with a few breaks to 7 Edward II and those dealing with the clerical subsidies, also with some omissions, to 11 Edward II.[53] When the separate rolls were discontinued a daily record of the payments made by the collectors of the subsidies was incorporated in the receipt rolls.

Alongside the rolls recording the receipts from taxes there was started in Michaelmas, 19 Edward I, 1290–91, another series now classified among the rolls called issue rolls, supplementary.[54] On these were itemized the disbursements of the income from the lay and clerical subsidies. The series lasted only through the exchequer years 19 and 20 Edward I, there being but six rolls in all preserved. With the opening of the year 21 Edward I the items were entered on the issue rolls of the regular series.

Under William de Marchia's successor, Walter de Langton, the credits for payment into the receipt on account of tallages and aids were also entered upon separate rolls. Clerical fines for protection were accorded similar treatment in 25 Edward I,[55] and receipts from alien clergy in 27 and 30 Edward I.[56] A short-lived set of rolls, beginning Michaelmas, 20 Edward I, and ending with the year 23 Edward I, appears to contain the records of receipts from merchants, the recoining of money, and other minor sources of income.[57] The plan of separate rolls seems to have been greatly favored. When they disappeared the material they had contained was incorporated in the receipt rolls. Of a somewhat different character but due to the same method were the jornalia rolls and the rolls of *tallie innovate*. The former were started 21 Edward I and lasted until 10 Edward II.[58]

[53] Receipt rolls nos. 1739 to 1745 end these series.

[54] Issue rolls, nos. 1310–15.

[55] The old reference, Receipt roll, auditor's, no. 73.

[56] The old references, Exchequer of receipt, miscellaneous rolls, no. 48; Receipt rolls, auditor's, no. 58.

[57] Receipt rolls, no. 1782–95.

[58] H. Jenkinson, *Archive administration*, 209.

They contain a daily record in two columns of the receipts and issues of the receipt. The extant rolls of *tallie innovate* begin 20 Edward I, 1291–92, despite the fact that the writ commanding that rolls of renewed tallies be kept dates from February 21, 1286.[59]

While the foregoing description of new classes of records has its place in that it shows that the receipt was handling what were to the exchequer new sources of income, it gives no indication of the volume of the financial transactions. In an earlier paragraph it was noted that the largest sum for one year found on the receipt rolls, between 1272 and 1290, was a little over £24,637. In 1290–91, the year of the inauguration of reform, the total was £43,191 14*s.* 11*d.* The following year it rose to £80,214 2*s.* 9*d.* The average of the yearly totals recorded on the receipt rolls for the period 19 to 23 Edward I was at least £77,677, a very large sum of money. Sir James Ramsay's figures for the Easter term of 23 Edward I do not include the sum credited to the lay tenth and sixth on the roll of receipts from taxes, the not inconsiderable sum of £32,945 6*s.* 8*d.*[60] I do not have the amount credited to the clerical subsidy during the same Easter term, so the above average may be too low. For the year 24 Edward I the receipts of the exchequer including the returns from the lay taxes and those noted on the receipt rolls were little over £76,446 and for the following year about £114,809. An immediate and sustained increase of the income of the receipt of the exchequer was, therefore, a direct result of the reform begun under Marchia.

At the time when the income of the receipt was larger than ever before, the position of the wardrobe as a second treasury was seriously threatened. "In 1290–91 a large amount of Gascon revenue kept up the ancient proportion,

[59] M. S. Giuseppi, *A guide to the manuscripts preserved in the Public Record Office,* I, 192.

[60] The old reference, Receipt roll, pells, no. 95.

but in 1291–92 the foreign receipt was little more than a tenth of the whole, £30,000 out of £33,154 coming straight from the exchequer. In 1292–93 the exchequer only contributed £19,651 out of £34,872. In 1294–95, the year of Langton's keepership in which wardrobe transactions were largest, the exchequer paid no less than £115,820 out of a total receipt of £124,792. For the whole period [1290–95] the proportion of the exchequer contribution averaged a little more than eighty-four per cent of the whole wardrobe receipt." [61] Though the wardrobe received fairly large sums directly it had to depend for the greater part of its income upon the money advanced to it by the exchequer.

As might be expected there were fluctuations in the amount of the foreign receipt of the wardrobe after 1295, but these do not seem to have been serious enough to endanger the new position of the exchequer. In 1299–1300, for example, the wardrobe received from the exchequer £49,048 19*s.* 10*d.* and from other sources, including large sums from the sale of stores, £9,106 16*s.* 2½*d.*[62] In 1305–06 the exchequer supplied the wardrobe with £50,010 and the latter department received directly £14,118.[63] The total of the wardrobe receipts during the year 1307–08 was a little over £78,630.[64] Of this sum the exchequer was responsible for £49,678 7*s.* 10½*d.* The direct income of the wardrobe was therefore about £28,952. Balances paid in by previous keepers made up over £18,000 of this sum [65] and over £5,000 came from the sale of victuals, utensils, and other supplies on hand. The account of the keeper of the wardrobe in 1299–1300 would seem to show that a considerable portion of the victuals sold that year had been

[61] Tout, *Chapters*, II, 89–90.
[62] *Liber quotidianus contrarotulatoris garderobae*, 1, 15.
[63] Tout, *Chapters*, II, 95.
[64] Tout, *Chapters*, II, 235, 361–62.
[65] Tout, *Chapters*, II, 236, n. 2.

purchased during the previous year. If this was the case in 1307–08 with respect to the supplies sold it would be fallacious to regard the £5,000 as income in any real sense of the term. From various sources such as the issues of the great seal, the new custom on wine, returns from escheators, and the like the wardrobe received somewhat less than £6,000. The analysis of the foreign receipts of the wardrobe made by Mr. Davies[66] brings out the insignificance of the sums received from the collectors of national taxes and Professor Tout has shown how small, save in a very few years of the reign of Edward II, its foreign receipts were.[67] Even in the years when such receipts were large, balances from previous keepers, receipts from sales, and the like reduce the totals to reasonable proportions.

The extension of the control of the exchequer over the receipt of the several classes of taxes described brought in its train a greater amount of business to be transacted in the exchequer of account. The upper exchequer was not only an accounting board; it was also the centre of the administrative life of the exchequer. From it writs supplementary to their commissions under the great seal were issued to the collectors of taxes. When the collectors were delinquent the sheriffs were ordered to distrain their goods or to attach their bodies. Dishonest collectors were tried before the exchequer, the treasurer and barons sitting at such times as what is now called an administrative court, and such as were found guilty were forced to pay fines or were delivered to the custody of the marshal. It was to be expected that the treasurer and barons would have much more work to do if taxes hitherto outside its jurisdiction were brought under its control.

The simplest as well as the most obvious method of estimating the volume of the new business of the exchequer

[66] J. C. Davies, *The baronial opposition to Edward II,* 183–89.
[67] Tout, *Chapters,* II, 236, 238, 240, 274, 275, 276–77.

of account is to count the number of membranes bound up in the memoranda rolls on which the writs and notes were recorded.[68] This has been done in an earlier paragraph for the period before 1290. In 20 Edward I, the year after that of the introduction of reform, the treasurer's remembrancer's roll contains 49 membranes and that of the king's remembrancer 46, both far above the average of the years before 1290. From 20 to 28 Edward I, both inclusive, the average number of membranes in the L. t. r. series is about 90 membranes and in the K. r. series about 87. Thereafter the rolls of both remembrancers increased rapidly in size until by the reign of Edward III they reached literally huge proportions. In 9 Edward III the roll of the king's remembrancer contained 325 membranes and its companion 208. The sheer bulk of such rolls is deterring to the modern student.

The entries on the same memoranda rolls concerning the taxes upon movables illustrate the character of the control of the exchequer under the new system. On the rolls following the date of the grant of the fifteenth of 1290 there are many memoranda having to do with that tax. The commissions to the taxers and collectors of the fifteenth are copied in full together with the instructions issued to the collectors and the form of the oath which they were to take at the exchequer.[69] On the treasurer's roll there are several notes to the effect that the taxers and collectors appeared and were sworn.[70] None of this information has been found in the rolls of the earlier part of the reign of Edward I. There are also on the L. t. r. roll the enrolment of writs

[68] For a fuller discussion of the increased size of the memoranda rolls and the causes of the increase see my paper, "The memoranda rolls and the remembrancers, 1282–1350," in *Essays in medieval history presented to T. F. Tout*, 215–29.

[69] K. r. memoranda roll, no. 64, mm. 5, 6; L. t. r. memoranda roll, no. 62, m. 3d.

[70] L. t. r. memoranda roll, no. 62, m. 34d.

changing the dates of payment of the taxes at the exchequer, noting the list of exempted goods, and ordering the collectors to hasten the payment of the money due from them.[71] Early in the year 1291 both rolls note the appearance of the taxers and collectors of the fifteenth in Cornwall at the exchequer with their assessment rolls [72] and in the months and years that follow the king's remembrancer records the appearance of other collectors for their views and audits of account.[73] There are also memoranda of days given to the collectors to account, of writs of distraint and attachment issued under the seal of the exchequer, of fines for the taxes, and of various other matters.[74]

As the years passed the officers of the exchequer learned how to arrange the material on the memoranda rolls in better fashion and how to make the memoranda more intelligible. The lines along which these improvements were to run were laid down largely during the decade after William de Marchia's appointment as treasurer. Already under Marchia it became usual to date the entries on the receipt roll by the days of the month instead of by saints' days. During the Michaelmas term, 19 Edward I, the treasurer and barons commanded that the date of issue be written on all tallies made at the receipt.[75] Under Langton the classification of material in the memoranda rolls began to assume more definite form though it was not until the reign of Edward II that the development was completed. The views and audits of the collectors of the ninth of 1297 were for the first time fairly complete; [76] but not until the rec-

[71] L. t. r. memoranda roll, no. 62, mm. 38d., 41, 40d.

[72] L. t. r. memoranda roll, no. 62, m. 11; K. r. memoranda roll, no. 64, m. 10.

[73] *E.g.* K. r. memoranda roll, no. 66, mm. 61–64.

[74] *E.g.* L. t. r. memoranda roll, no. 63, mm. 1d, 40d, 40, 5.

[75] Receipt roll, no. 116, m. 5.

[76] L. t. r. memoranda roll, no. 69, mm. 40, 49, 138, 138d, 139, 139d, 140.

ords of the subsidy of 1306 are reached is it possible to trace all the collectors through the various stages of their accounting.[77] The rolls of the reign of Edward II give full, well classified, and intelligible information concerning all phases of the connection of the exchequer with the taxes.

When someone in the future writes the definitive history of the medieval exchequer, a history not based on the *Dialogus* and Madox and not confined to the period of origins, the reform begun under William de Marchia will find its proper place. The more the records of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are studied in detail the more it is apparent that there was a rather continuous effort on the part of able men to make the government work smoothly and efficiently. The reform of the administration of finance went hand in hand with reforms in the administration of justice, police, and other activities of the crown. Not the least of the changes that resulted from the efforts of the reformers was that which brought about a large measure of centralization in the control of the king's income. Though not so famous as Walter de Stapledon, Marchia and Langton deserve a high place in the history of the growing power of the exchequer in the financial system of the later middle ages.

James F. Willard

[77] L. t. r. memoranda roll, no. 77, mm. 35, 35d, 36, 89, 89d, 90, 90d, 91; *ibid.*, no. 78, mm. 117, 117d, 118, 118d, 119.

X

LORD HALDANE'S MISSION TO BERLIN IN 1912

In the decade before the World War the deciding factor in European international politics was the relation of Great Britain to the two rival continental groups, the Triple and Dual Alliances. The exact nature of that relation was at the time, and is still, a matter of controversy, and it will hardly be possible to speak precisely until the British government has published its diplomatic papers, which it has begun to do. But for a single episode fairly complete information is already available. In February 1912, Lord Haldane, the secretary of state for war in the Asquith cabinet, was sent to Berlin to "explore the ground" for an agreement between Great Britain and Germany, and about the negotiations which followed, each of the participants has published his version: Lord Haldane himself,[1] the British prime minister,[2] the British foreign secretary,[3] the first lord of the admiralty,[4] the German emperor,[5] the chancellor,[6] the German foreign minister,[7] the secretary of

[1] Viscount Haldane, *Before the war,* London, 1920.

[2] H. H. Asquith, *The genesis of the war,* London, 1823.

[3] Viscount Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-five years: 1892–1916,* London and New York, 1925. References to this and other books are given to the American editions.

[4] W. S. Churchill, *The world crisis,* vol. I., London and New York, 1923.

[5] Wilhelm II, *Ereignisse und Gestalten: 1878–1918,* Leipzig, 1918; English translation, *The Kaiser's memoirs,* London and New York, 1922. For convenience, references to this and other books translated are given to the English translations.

[6] T. von Bethmann-Hollweg, *Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg,* Band I., Berlin, 1919; English translation, *Reflections on the world war,* London, 1920.

[7] E. Jaeckh, *Kiderlen-Waechter, der Staatsmann und Mensch,* Stuttgart, 1924.

the German navy office,[8] and one of the intermediaries.[9] In addition, two sets of documents have been published, the correspondence of the German naval secretary [10] and the archives of the German foreign office.[11] The British documents are not yet available, but some of the most important are included in the German collection, and the German ambassador in London reported so fully what was said to him by the foreign secretary that the British position is made sufficiently clear.[12] Finally, Russian documents [13] throw some light on the attitude of France and Russia. Thus the evidence is complete enough to justify a study of the episode.

The Haldane mission was determined upon after it became known in London that the German government proposed to increase the strength of its fleet. For that German decision the events of the summer of 1911 were directly responsible. During the Agadir crisis Mr. Lloyd George had delivered a speech which was regarded in Germany as a threat and which was believed to have forced the German government to modify its attitude towards France in the pending Moroccan negotiations. To utilize the inflamed popular sentiment in Germany as a lever for persuading the Reichstag to increase the German navy seemed to the

[8] A. von Tirpitz, *Erinnerungen,* Leipzig, 1919; English translation, *My memoirs,* New York, 1919.

[9] B. Huldermann, *Albert Ballin,* Berlin, 1922; English translation, *Albert Ballin,* London, 1922.

[10] A. von Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente,* Band I, "*Der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht,*" Stuttgart, 1924.

[11] *Die grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914,* Band, 31, Berlin, 1926. The references are given as *G. P.,* no.——.

[12] A statement of the British position was issued by the foreign office on 31 August 1915; reprinted in *Current History,* July 1918, vol. VIII, pp. 169–70.

[13] B. von Siebert, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre,* Berlin, 1921; English translation, edited by G. A. Schreiner, *Entente diplomacy and the world,* New York, 1922. *Un Livre Noir: diplomatie d'avant guerre d'après les documents des archives russes,* edited by R. Marchand, vol. I., Paris, 1922.

practical creator of that navy, Admiral von Tirpitz, a matter of course, and he acted without delay. On 30 August he addressed to the chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, a letter proposing a *Novelle*, or addition to the existing navy laws; he asked for a third squadron of the High Seas Fleet to be kept permanently in commission, for the more rapid replacement of the antiquated armored cruisers (by battle cruisers), and for a building programme of three dreadnoughts annually for the next six years (instead of two each year, as provided for by the existing laws).[14] The chancellor insisted upon postponing a decision until the Moroccan negotiations were completed, whereupon Tirpitz turned to higher authority, the kaiser. In an audience at Rominten on 26 September, the admiral sketched his ideas. Germany should offer Great Britain a "political agreement," of which William II had long dreamed: in return for the promise, "Germany will not attack England," Great Britain was to accept a 3: 2 ratio between her own and the German fleet. This ratio would secure Germany against a British attack, in which Tirpitz professed to believe, and would be secured by the *Novelle*, which would be introduced in the autumn of 1912.

The kaiser, who was "very excited about England,"[15] approved the plan, and wrote two letters to Bethmann, urging the immediate publication of the 3: 2 ratio and the acceptance of the *Novelle*. The chancellor resisted valiantly, but on 16 November he was forced to agree that the *Novelle* should be provided for in the next budget and presented

[14] Except when otherwise indicated, this and the next two paragraphs are based upon A. von Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente*, I, 207–9.

[15] Jenisch to Kiderlen, 28 Sept. 1911. *G. P.*, no. 11,308. He continued for months in a state of high indignation with England, as attested by his comments on the despatches from London. Apparently forgetting that an understanding was to be negotiated with England, he exclaimed, "Let them build what they like! We build what we need" (*G. P.*, no. 11,330), and said that coöperation with England was like "squaring the circle" (*G. P.*, no. 11,344).

to the Reichstag in the spring; the alternative was a change of government.[16] Bethmann was certainly fighting at a disadvantage. The allegations of Captain Faber, M.P., that Great Britain had been ready for war during the summer, were exceedingly inconvenient. Worse than that, the German naval attaché in London, in his reports to Tirpitz, not only argued strongly for the *Novelle* but gave his considered opinion that the British public appreciated the sentiment of Germany and would not resent an increase of the German fleet. When the ambassador, Count Metternich, took the opposite view and warned that the introduction of a new navy law would make war certain, the kaiser noted on his report, "I do not agree with the ambassador; the naval attaché is right." William had, in fact, determined to realize the 2:3 ratio, with or without British consent.

Bethmann, however, did not give up his opposition. He caused the secretary of the treasury, Wermuth, to write an elaborate letter to Tirpitz protesting that additional naval expenditure would disorganize the state finances;[17] in a second letter he demanded postponement till the following autumn. The chancellor then invited the army chiefs to submit their programme, which they did. Next he proposed that the third squadron be constituted without building any new ships, or that the building programme be determined from year to year. After long negotiations, it was agreed that a *Novelle* should be prepared, providing for three new capital ships and the third squadron, and that the Reichstag should be informed, in the speech from the throne, that plans for augmenting the national defenses were under consideration. Bethmann is generally regarded as a weak

[16] Bethmann to Metternich, 22 Nov. *G. P.*, no. 11,321.

[17] Wermuth to Tirpitz, 28 Nov. *G. P.*, no. 11,324. Tirpitz laments that Wermuth regarded national defense as *"geldfressendes Ressort."* "My principle, on the contrary, was that a nation swimming in riches and surrounded by dangerous enemies must adjust its finances to the needs of defense in order to make its future secure." Tirpitz, p. 259.

and vacillating statesman, but in this instance he showed himself to be a resourceful politician and was able to cut Tirpitz's demands in half.

His game had been from the beginning to postpone any increase in the fleet until he could negotiate with Great Britain; he hoped that the British government, which seemed sincerely anxious for better relations with Germany, would make proposals so far-reaching that a *Novelle* would not be necessary,[18] and he understood very well that a threat by Germany to add to her fleet would deter Great Britain from making proposals.[19] As Sir Edward Grey had stated in his speech in the House of Commons on 27 November that Great Britain did not wish to stand in the way of German expansion, particularly in Africa, Count Metternich was instructed to sound the British minister, if possible before Christmas, upon the possibility of a colonial agreement.[20] The result was not altogether encouraging, for Grey, while sympathetic, preferred to wait until after Christmas, so that he might discuss the matter with his colleagues; [21] which caused the impulsive and choleric kaiser to write:

> *In nuce,* one sees that so long as Grey remains in office a real *political* understanding will *not* be reached. So long as the British Government does not feel a moral *compulsion* to have to come to an understanding with us, just so long there is nothing to do—but to arm!

In fact the kaiser was not interested in the colonial question. He looked upon a possible British offer as a "gift of the

[18] Bethmann to Metternich, 14 Dec. *G. P.,* no. 11,340.

[19] Metternich to Bethmann, 29 Nov. and 9 Dec. *G. P.,* nos. 11,326 and 11,339.

[20] Bethmann to Metternich, 14 and 19 Dec. *G. P.,* nos. 11,340 and 11,343. Bethmann's plan was to approach Great Britain for a political agreement, with the assurance that Germany did not desire "to open a breach in England's ententes" (Bethmann to Metternich, 16 Dec. *G. P.,* no. 11,341), but Metternich advised against this and preferred to discuss a colonial bargain (Metternich to Bethmann, 18 Dec. *G. P.,* no. 11,342).

[21] Metternich to Bethmann, 20 Dec. *G. P.,* no. 11,344.

Danai," made to embroil Germany with her neighbors and to exclude her from the partition of Asia which Great Britain, Japan, and the United States were preparing. Rather there must be a "political working agreement," by which he understood "recognition of our political importance on the basis of equality and the working-out of policies in parallel paths throughout the world."[22] This was also what Bethmann wanted, but if there was to be no colonial agreement, how was the matter to be broached?

At this juncture a private individual bestirred himself. Albert Ballin, the director-general of the Hamburg-American Line, and a personal friend of the kaiser, had long perceived the folly and the danger of the Anglo-German naval competition; in his judgment it could be stopped by a compromise of the kind that he was accustomed to make with other shipping lines. He accordingly wrote to the English banker Sir Ernest Cassel suggesting that Mr. Winston Churchill, the newly appointed first lord of the admiralty, who was known to be an admirer of Germany and the kaiser, should come to Berlin for a heart-to-heart talk with Tirpitz. The first lord consulted Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Edward Grey, and Mr. Asquith, and it was agreed that Sir Ernest Cassel should be invited to proceed to Berlin, taking with him a memorandum laying down the terms of a possible understanding. "Acceptance of English superiority at sea—no augmentation of German naval programme—a reduction as far as possible of this programme—and, on the part of England, no impediment to our colonial expansion—discussion and promotion of our colonial ambitions—proposals for mutual declarations that the two Powers would not take part in aggressive plans or combinations against the other"—such is Bethmann's summary of this

[22] Memorandum of the kaiser, 11 Jan. 1912, *G. P.*, no. 11,346. On a report from London, he commented: "I have colonies enough. If I want any more, I shall buy them or take them without regard to England." *G. P.*, no. 11,345.

document, which the kaiser was pleased to call a *note verbale*.[23]

Cassel was received by William on 29 January 1912, and presented the British memorandum, into which the kaiser read—quite erroneously—"a formal offer of neutrality in case Germany became involved in future warlike complications, conditioned upon certain limitations in the carrying out of our programme of naval construction." Bethmann and Tirpitz were sent for, and "after hours of work," with the kaiser acting as draftsman, an answer was completed. This was handed to Cassel, who professed himself "completely satisfied"; at the same time Bethmann provided a statement of the impending naval increases.[24]

But if the unofficial intermediary was satisfied, the British government was not. For whereas its memorandum had stipulated as "fundamental" the recognition of naval superiority as "essential to Great Britain," the German reply stated as "fundamental": "The German Government welcomes with pleasure the step taken by the British Government to approach the German Government through Sir E. Cassel in view of improving the relations between the two countries." And it declared that "this year's (1912) estimates must be included in the 'present German Naval Programme' inasmuch as all the arrangements have already been completed." [25] In other words, the *Novelle* was to be maintained, though the kaiser told Tirpitz that it was "in danger, and therefore we must be very careful." A telegram,

[23] Bethmann-Hollweg, 47–49; Churchill, 95–96; Huldermann, 167; Wilhelm II, 146; *G. P.*, vol. XXXI, p. 97, note. In the kaiser's mind *note verbale* seems to have carried more implications than are properly associated with that term, for he clearly regarded the memorandum as a practically official proposal, whereas the British government was merely making soundings to discover whether the basis existed for an official proposal. Thus William began the negotiations under a misapprehension which subsisted to the very end. The text of the document is given in *G. P.*, no. 11,347, Anlage I.

[24] Churchill, 97; Wilhelm II, 147–50.

[25] *G. P.*, no. 11,347, Anlage II.

drafted by Cassel, Churchill, Haldane, and Grey, was therefore sent to Ballin pointing out that the new German naval programme would "make negotiations difficult if not impossible" but offering a compromise:

> If, on the other hand, German naval expenditure can be adapted by an alteration of the tempo or otherwise so as to render any serious increase unnecessary to meet German programme, British Government will be prepared at once to pursue negotiations on the understanding that the point of naval expenditure is open to discussion and that there is a fair prospect of settling it favorably.

If this were acceptable, a British minister would pay a "private and unofficial" visit to Berlin.[26] The British government would not object to the *Novelle* as such, but wished to negotiate about the details.

Would Germany also yield something? Warned once more by Metternich that an agreement was "out of the question" if the *Novelle* were adhered to,[27] Bethmann, not without much difficulty, persuaded the navy people to accept a discussion of tonnage,[28] but this was made contingent upon "sufficient guarantees of a friendly disposition of British policy towards us." The reply to Cassel, delivered to Ballin and sent by him to London, stated:

> Any agreement would have to provide that both Powers agree not to join in any plans, combination or warlike complications directed against each other. Such an agreement would make possible at the same time an understanding as to the money to be spent on armaments by both countries.

If these views were shared by Great Britain, Germany was "ready to continue the discussion in a friendly spirit" with

[26] Churchill, 99–100; *G. P.*, no. 11,350.
[27] Metternich to Bethmann, 31 Jan. *G. P.*, no. 11,349.
[28] Huldermann, 169.

a British minister sent to Berlin for "a private and confidential exchange of views." [29]

The two governments were inspired by conflicting purposes. Great Britain demanded a limitation of armaments as the preliminary to a political agreement; Germany insisted on a neutrality agreement as the condition of a naval compromise. Both sides recognized the difficulty. Bethmann telegraphed to Metternich that he could not assume that "Sir Edward Grey is ready for negotiations on this basis." [30] Grey, for his part, "had no great hope that anything would come of it"; but the kaiser had expressed a wish, and "if a British Minister did not go to Berlin, the inaction might be represented as an uncivil rebuff on our part of a friendly German invitation." [31] Negotiations begun in this spirit were not likely to succeed! Did each side merely wish to "smoke out" the other? Neither Grey nor Churchill was willing to go unless there was a prospect of success. So the British government, with the approval of Berlin, decided to send Lord Haldane.

> He was in the habit of visiting Germany; he had friendly personal relations with the Emperor and other important personages; his visit could be made more natural and less artificial than that of any other Minister. If nothing came of it, it would not have the appearance of an unusual effort and great failure; if the time was opportune for *rapprochement,* Haldane better than anyone else would be able to discover and improve it.[32]

As events turned out, the choice of Haldane was disastrous. He refused to be accompanied by a naval expert, "for although he did not pretend to understand all the technical details, he said that he knew all that was necessary

[29] Memorandum of Bethmann, 4 Feb. *G. P.,* no. 11,351.
[30] Bethmann to Metternich, 4 Feb. *G. P.,* no. 11,353.
[31] Grey, I, 242, 241.
[32] *Ibid.,* I, 243.

for the discussion." [33] This was exactly what he did not know, for, as will be seen, he made concessions which had to be disavowed; which convinced the kaiser of British bad faith and ruined what chances there may have been of an agreement.

Accompanied by his brother, Professor J. S. Haldane, and Sir Ernest Cassel, the British emissary arrived in Berlin on 8 February. In the time of his visit, he had two long conversations with the chancellor, and an interview with the kaiser and the secretary of the navy. As much misunderstanding was to arise out of different interpretations of what was said on these occasions, it is desirable to record the conversations in considerable detail.

In the first meeting between Haldane and Bethmann on 8 February, the discussion was confined to generalities.

Haldane explained the "drifting away" between Great Britain and Germany by a reference to recent events and the growth of German armaments. Britain did not contest Germany's right to arm, but had drawn "the natural and inevitable consequence in the interests of security." Now that the Moroccan question was settled, perhaps there was a chance for "a new departure." To Bethmann's question whether it "was really so" that Britain "had no agreements with France and Russia except those which were in writing and published to the world," Haldane replied that "it was so," and that he "saw no reason why it should not be possible for us to enter into a new and cordial friendship carrying the two old ones into it." But (according to Bethmann's version) he feared that Germany, if she felt secure from Russia, would fall upon France, in which even British "neutrality must not be reckoned with." The chancellor repudiated this imputation, saying that "the policy of peace which Germany had pursued for more than forty years ought to have spared him that question."

Bethmann said that he wished to propose a formula; "the balance of power was a phrase he did not like." Haldane recognized the

[33] Huldermann to Ballin, in Huldermann, 174.

"good intentions" of a formula of neutrality; but said, suppose England tried "to grab Denmark" or Germany attacked Portugal? Such cases were "not at all likely," said Bethmann, but he admitted that they were fatal to his formula, which provided that neither country should enter into any combinations against the other. To Haldane's suggestion of "mutual undertakings against aggressive or unprovoked attacks," Bethmann objected that "it was very difficult to define what was meant by aggression or unprovoked attack."

The discussion then turned to the question of the German fleet.

HALDANE: What was the use of entering into a solemn agreement for concord and against attack if Germany at the same moment was going to increase her battle-fleet as a precaution against us, and we had consequently to increase our battle-fleet as a precaution against her?

BETHMANN: It was absolutely essential to Germany to have a full squadron in readiness for war. At present, owing to her system of recruiting for three months in the year, she had virtually, owing to the necessity of training recruits, no fleet ready at all.

When Haldane remarked that Britain would have to maintain "five or even six squadrons in home waters," Bethmann asked whether that would be necessary if there was a friendly agreement? "Was not a clear understanding with us, an understanding which would prevent not only an Anglo-German war, but a world war, worth more than a couple of German dreadnoughts more or less?" Haldane admitted—this was to become a crucial point in the subsequent negotiations—that the proposed third squadron "was not so serious as the proposal to add a third ship every year to the German construction programme." Haldane thought Bethmann impressed by his statement that Britain would add a shilling to the income tax if necessary, and when asked for suggestions, proposed " a spreading out in size of the programme."

BETHMANN: Perhaps eight or nine years?

HALDANE: Or twelve, if you cannot do better.

BETHMANN: My admirals are very difficult.

HALDANE: That is an experience which we sometimes find in England also.

Haldane "left the Chancellor with the sense that [he] had been talking with an honest man struggling somewhat with adversity." [34] Their respective points of view were still far apart.

The next day Haldane lunched with the kaiser, Tirpitz and Bethmann being present, but the latter withdrawing before the conversations began. As the basis of discussion, the kaiser had laid down four points:

1. Begin negotiation on the basis of maintaining the *Novelle* for the present. Justification of it, its history and the changes in it.
2. Statement by England of the British programme on the basis of (a) the *Novelle,* (b) the existing fleet-law (2 ships a year).
3. England must drop the two-power standard towards us.
4. A clear treaty of alliance, or at least a treaty of neutrality.[35]

On the last point, the news from London was that

> Germany will not be offered more than has been conceded to France, Russia and other countries, that is, a promise of neutrality if Germany is attacked by another power; but if Germany is the aggressor, England must keep her hands free.[36]

This did not satisfy Tirpitz:

> England must not take part in any war between Germany and France, no matter who is the "aggressor." If we cannot secure this guarantee, then we must arm still further, in order to be superior to the Anglo-French Entente, which is *de facto* an offensive alliance.[37]

It was not likely, therefore, that in the conference with Haldane Tirpitz would make any large concessions. He remarks that he "would have sacrificed the whole bill for a

[34] *Current History,* July 1918, 166–68; *Norddeutsche allgemeine Zeitung,* 3 Apr. 1915; Bethmann's speech in the Reichstag, 19 Aug. 1915; Haldane, 57–59, 105–7; Bethmann, 49.

[35] Marginal note of the kaiser on *G. P.,* no. 11,351.

[36] Ballin to the kaiser, 7 Feb. Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente,* I, 282.

[37] Tirpitz to the chief of the naval cabinet, 8 Feb. *Ibid.,* 282.

really solid agreement of neutrality," [38] but he knew that this was not to be had. On the other hand, he may fairly complain that he had not been shown the text of the formula proposed by Bethmann, and that the latter had deprived him of a strong lever in negotiation by cutting the *Novelle* in half.[39]

The interview of 9 February lasted three hours. The kaiser was "very agreeable," says Haldane, while the attitude of Tirpitz was "a little strained"; according to the admiral, "a really business-like deal was rendered difficult by the presence of the kaiser," who "himself led the conversation."

Tirpitz began by saying that he would "welcome an understanding"; Germany had never contested England's "supremacy," but only wanted a fleet "which England could not annihilate without damaging herself." Haldane insisted that "fundamental modification was necessary," although both were free to act as they pleased. "Any agreement for settling our differences and introducing a new spirit into the relations of the two nations would be bones without flesh if Germany began by fresh shipbuilding, and so forced us to do twice as much." Wherefore, says Tirpitz, he held out to us "the prospect of a great African empire," which was intended to "excite the ambition" of the kaiser; he "only claimed the Cape to Cairo line as England's share." When the kaiser raised the question of British neutrality in a Franco-German war, Haldane replied as he had to Bethmann.

On the naval question, Tirpitz wanted some understanding about the British building programme. The two-power standard was "a hard one for Germany," which she could not admit; he proposed a 2: 3 ratio (although Bethmann had asked him not to raise this question). Haldane rejected this "politely"; the two-power standard was "not matter for admission." It was finally agreed, at the suggestion of the kaiser, to "avoid trying to define a standard propor-

[38] Tirpitz, *My memoirs,* I, 290.
[39] Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente,* I, 282.

tion in any general agreement that we might come to, and, indeed, to say nothing in it about shipbuilding." If the political agreement was included, "the kaiser should announce to the German public that the agreement on general questions . . . had entirely modified his wish for the new Fleet Law, as originally conceived, and that it should be delayed, and future shipbuilding should at least be spread over a longer period."

As to the *Novelle,* Haldane says that Tirpitz "struggled for it"; the admiral declares that it was not discussed, and that Haldane put forward "very small demands," only a slowing-up of the construction of the three ships. The admiral consented that the new ships should be laid down in 1913, 1916, and after 1917. Given a copy of the *Novelle,* Haldane simply put it in his pocket, without looking at it; but according to Tirpitz, he "admitted that we must have a third squadron. . . . Demands with request to the commissioning of ships and the personnel were matters of indifference to England."

Very guardedly Haldane raised the question whether the original Fleet Law would have to be carried out; the kaiser replied in the affirmative, and the question was withdrawn. "Haldane said finally that he would speed up the political agreement as much as possible, and that England would postpone the publication of her estimates until our *Novelle* had been published." According to Haldane, he merely said that he would see the chancellor and "discuss a possible formula." [40]

The negotiators seem to have parted with very different impressions. Haldane evidently thought that the *Novelle* would not be abandoned and talked commonplaces about British sea-power. To the kaiser and Tirpitz it appeared that the *Novelle* was of small consequence, that the third squadron was acceptable to Britain (this was to be the crux of the subsequent negotiations), and that Haldane attached most importance to a political agreement. Perhaps the trouble was that the Englishman was negotiating on naval

[40] *Current History,* July, 1918, p. 168; Haldane, 59–62; Tirpitz, *My memoirs,* I, 286–92; Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente,* I, 286–89; *G. P.,* no. 11, 426.

matters without expert advice and the Germans were discussing political questions without the assistance of the foreign office. Apparently Haldane did not ask what Germany would require for abandoning the *Novelle;* Tirpitz did not say that he would abandon it in return for a naval understanding or a neutrality agreement. Neither put all of his cards on the table.

Uncertainty existed on another point. Just what was the status of Lord Haldane? That he came in a private capacity was indeed understood, and the kaiser himself described their conversation as "*unverbindliche* line of action," [41] but because Haldane stated that he spoke "in the name of the British cabinet and with the approval of His Majesty the King," [42] the kaiser believed that the agreement with Haldane constituted a basis of negotiation acceptable to the British government, any departure from which was an indication of bad faith.[43] The British position was that whatever might be said or agreed upon, "all would be *ad referendum;* that Lord Haldane had undertaken "a voyage of discovery" "with a view to ascertaining what ideas and purposes were common to both Governments, and thus getting the conception of a possible basis for a more formal and authoritative discussion." [44] There is no evidence of bad faith on either side, but subsequent suspicion of it on both sides made the negotiations more difficult and contributed to their failure.

At their final meeting on 10 February, Haldane and Bethmann took up the question of a political agreement. Each came provided with a formula. Haldane admitted that

[41] The kaiser to Ballin, 9 Feb. Huldermann, 175.

[42] Tirpitz's memorandum of the conversation, in *Politische Dokumente,* I, 286.

[43] Memorandum of the German government, 4 Mar. *G. P.,* no. 11,381, Anlage. The kaiser's comment on no. 11,374. Memorandum of Bethmann, no. 11,376.

[44] Memorandum of the British government, 25 Mar. *G. P.,* no. 11,422, Anlage.

his was "too weak," but declared that the German one "went too far." He thereupon tried to combine the two. His own ran:

> Neither Power will make or prepare to make an unprovoked attack upon the other or join in any combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression, or become party to any plan or naval enterprise alone or in combination with any other Power directed to such an end.

Obviously this did not commit Britain to unconditional neutrality, which was what Germany wanted. The German terms and Haldane's revision are given in parallel columns.

GERMAN	HALDANE
1. The high contracting powers assure each other mutually of their desire of peace and friendship.	1. Unchanged.
2. They will not either of them make any combination or join in any such combination which is directed against the other. They declare expressly that they are not bound by any such combination.	2. They will not either of them make or prepare to make any unprovoked attack upon the other or join in any combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression or become party to any plan or naval or military enterprise alone or in combination with any other power directed to such an end.
3. If either of the high contracting parties becomes entangled in a war with one or more other powers, the other of the high contracting parties will at least observe towards the power so entangled a benevolent neutrality and use its utmost en-	3. If either of the high contracting parties becomes entangled in a war with one or more other powers in which it cannot be said to be the aggressor, the other of the high contracting parties will at least observe towards the power so entangled a

deavour for the localization of the conflict.

4. The duty of neutrality which arises [out] of the preceding article has no application in so far as it may not be conciliable with existing agreements which the high contracting powers have already made.

5. The making of new agreements which render it impossible for either of the contracting powers to observe neutrality towards the other beyond what is provided by the preceding limitation, is excluded in conformity with the provision in article 2.

6. The high contracting parties declare that they will in the case of either of them having differences with third powers mutually give their diplomatic support for the purposes of settling these differences.

benevolent neutrality and use its utmost endeavour for the localization of the conflict.

4. Unchanged.

5. Unchanged.

6. The high contracting parties declare that they will do all in their power to prevent differences and misunderstandings arising between either of them and other powers.

The change in article 2 was not unimportant: Haldane substituted his own formula, which was fairly explicit, for the German text, which was rather general. As he explained to Bethmann:

> We should find ourselves, were it accepted, precluded from coming to the assistance of France should Germany attack her and aim at getting possession of such ports as Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, a friendly occupation of which was so important for our island security. Difficulties might also arise which would hamper us in the discharge of our existing treaty obligations to Belgium, Portugal, and Japan.

But the changes in the other articles were vital. By making British neutrality dependent upon Germany not being the aggressor, Haldane refused that which Germany deemed essential; by modifying the last article in the sense that Britain did not promise diplomatic support against a third power, he made clear that his government would not sacrifice the *Entente* with France and Russia. The British minister had to inform the German chancellor that "he was unable to hold out the least prospect that we could accept the draft formula which he had just proposed."

On the naval question not much was said or could be said.

Asserting that the "forces he had to contend with were almost insuperable," Bethmann could only repeat the offer made by Tirpitz. Haldane doubted whether this would satisfy his government, and asked if the shipbuilding could not be postponed for longer; Bethmann replied that this was a technical question that he could not answer at the moment, but that "the measure of our conciliation would depend upon the scope of the political agreement." Haldane "promised to let him know privately the state of feeling [in England] about the Tirpitz proposals."

The problem of a colonial understanding was discussed in some detail.

Of the Portuguese colonies, Germany was to have all of Angola, and that "soon," while Britain would take Timor. Germany might purchase part of the Belgian Congo, on condition that the railway was extended from Katanga to northern Rhodesia. About the Penguin and Seals Islands, which Germany desired, Haldane was not informed, but he thought there could be no cession if it involved the question of Walfisch Bay.

Britain was ready to give up Zanzibar and Pemba in return for concessions about the Bagdad Railway. Bethmann said that Britain might receive a "special position" in the Bagdad-Basra section and the exclusive concession for the Basra-Koweit section, if Germany was admitted to participate in the south Persian railways; Germany

was also ready to support British claims for a harbor at Koweit. Haldane thought this "satisfactory." [45]

The positions of the two powers may be summarized as follows: Great Britain demanded the recognition of her naval superiority and the maintenance of her diplomatic combinations; Hadane, says Bethmann, "repeatedly asserted, and that too with great emphasis, that England's relations with France and Russia must under no conditions be prejudiced by closer relations with Germany." This was too great a price to pay, so it seemed to Germany, even in return for a promise not to attack Germany and to promote her colonial ambitions: her diplomatic inferiority would become permanent unless Great Britain would give a pledge of unconditional neutrality. Such a pledge she would not give: "it would be the height of dishonour," says Lord Grey, "to make an agreement with Germany that would tie our hands and oblige us to remain neutral in a war between France and Germany." [46] The position of each power was determined by the existing situation of European politics.

Lord Haldane returned to London "full of hope," though worried by the "want of continuity in the supreme direction of German policy" and fearful that Tirpitz might become chancellor.[47] Sir Edward Grey was "immensely impressed" [48] by what his colleague told him. But the wise and experienced German ambassador was not deceived. He telegraphed at once that an agreement was possible only if the *Novelle* were dropped,[49] and he was confirmed in this view

[45] *Current History,* July 1918, p. 168; Haldane, 63–66; Bethmann, 50–53; *G. P.,* nos. 11,361, 11,362, 11,364.

[46] Grey, I, 242.

[47] Haldane, 70.

[48] Metternich's telegram, 12 Feb. *G. P.,* no. 11,365.

[49] Metternich's telegram, 12 Feb. *G. P.,* no. 11,367. This irritated Bethmann, who wrote on the telegram: "I consider this quite erroneous. Haldane repeatedly assured me that he fully understood the necessity of bringing in a new fleet law." Thus there was a misunderstanding even before the negotiations began.

by his conversations with Grey and Haldane. At the same time he did not despair. According to Haldane,

> the British Government could not accept our interpretation of a declaration of neutrality because it was unwilling to jeopardize its friendly relations with France and Russia. But he thought that the version proposed by him would have a salutary effect on the relations of the two peoples, for such an agreement would show to the rest of the world the determination of both Governments to live in peace and friendship with each other. Also such an agreement would get rid of the difficulties which might arise for us out of the relations hitherto maintained by England with the *Entente*. If the formula proposed by him, or something like it, were accepted by us, the British people would have ground for confidence in our mutual relations, without which any diplomatic formula would lack permanent value.[50]

Here, as Metternich saw, was the crux of the matter. Britain had drawn closer to France and Russia because she distrusted Germany: let confidence be reëstablished between London and Berlin, and the *Entente*, without being abandoned, would be relaxed, to the ultimate advantage of Germany. The ambassador went on to say:

> A declaration of neutrality, even if only in a modified form, the acquisition of Zanzibar and Pemba, an understanding about the last sections of the Bagdad Railway in return for our participation in the South Persian lines, and the easing of the general political situation, without the building of more ships, would incontestably be regarded as a great success and gain for German policy.

The professional diplomatist saw more clearly than either the militant admiral or the pacific chancellor. The British terms might not be altogether acceptable, but some kind

[50] Metternich to Bethmann, 15 Feb. *G. P.*, no. 11,369.

of agreement was better than no agreement, and it might be possible, in time, to extend it; at least, he was willing to take the chance.

The course of the negotiations, however, deprived Metternich's views of a hearing. Grey, while anxious for an agreement on colonial questions, raised difficulties about points of detail, and insisted on subjecting the Haldane-Bethmann programme to a careful examination.[51] This was reasonable, but it irritated the Germans, who began to doubt British good faith. Neither Grey nor Bethmann fully appreciated what Bismarck used to call the "imponderables." If this matter could have been promptly settled, the chances of a naval agreement would have been greater; as it was, the serious discussion of the colonial exchanges was not begun until the naval negotiations were badly tangled.

When the British admiralty examined the draft of the *Novelle* which Haldane had brought back from Berlin, they computed that it provided for an increase of 15,000 men in the personnel of the German navy and the maintenance in permanent full commission of nearly four-fifths of the whole German fleet, in addition to the three capital ships and a number of new smaller craft. To meet this challenge, Great Britain would have to increase her naval estimates and effect a further concentration of her fleet in home waters. It was suggested, however, that if it could be made clear that the *Novelle* did not go beyond the limits of the German naval programme set out in the laws of 1900, 1906, and 1908, "except in so far as was necessary to provide for the increased complements of modern ships or the necessities of a new training squadron," it was possible that "the difficulties might be surmounted." These views were embodied in a memorandum which was handed to

[51] Metternich to Bethmann, 24 Feb. *G. P.*, no. 11,373.

Count Metternich on 24 February,[52] who had already been informed that

> the British Government felt that it would hardly be possible to conclude and defend an agreement of far-reaching significance which was intended to inaugurate a new and better era in Anglo-German relations, if at the same time an increase in naval expenditure took place on both sides.[53]

From the German point of view,—that is, on the assumption that Haldane had been empowered to establish the basis of negotiation, that basis had, as Bethmann complained, been "shifted";[54] for whereas Haldane had talked only of ships, the admiralty was now objecting to the third squadron and the increase of personnel. In the kaiser's opinion, "Haldane and I are disavowed," and the British attitude was synonymous with "an attack upon Germany's right to settle her own affairs (*freie Selbstbestimmung*) and an interference with the functions of her supreme war-lord."[55]

Meanwhile, in Berlin things had been happening which boded ill for the negotiations. The foreign minister, Kiderlen, had gone to Tirpitz with the point-blank request to drop the three ships, which was refused on the ground that without them the third squadron could not be constituted.[56] When the kaiser heard of this, he wrote a sharp letter to Kiderlen, reminding him that Tirpitz had no authority to give up the ships and declaring that Haldane had asked only for a slowing-up of their construction.[57] He also

[52] Metternich to Bethmann, 24 Feb. *G. P.*, no. 11,363, Anlage. The kaiser rather inaccurately describes the memorandum as "a document asking all sorts of questions and expressing a desire for all sorts of data." Wilhelm II, 155.

[53] Metternich to Bethmann, 22 Feb. *G. P.*, no. 11,370.

[54] Memorandum of Bethmann, 28 Feb. *G. P.*, no. 11,376.

[55] Comments on Metternich's despatch of 24 Feb. *G. P.*, no. 11,374.

[56] Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente*, I, 291.

[57] Jaeckh, II, 155–57. The kaiser asked if the minister had received private information which had been kept from him. This Kiderlen denied,

wrote to the chancellor, taking his cue from a memorandum drawn up by Tirpitz.[58] In his opinion they had got involved in "a *circulus vitiosus*, from which it will be hard to find a way out and still harder to reach an agreement satisfactory to both parties."

> We demand of England nothing less than a new orientation of her policy: she to give up her existing *Ententes*, we more or less to take the place of France. England demands of us a new orientation of our fleet policy, so that our fleet can no longer be dangerous to England in any way.

If England found Germany disposed to yield, she would promptly increase her demands. Therefore they must stand by the Haldane-Tirpitz agreement, and the longer the introduction of the *Novelle* was delayed, the more the British de-

adding that he had not meant to challenge the kaiser's authority, but had wished simply to explain to Tirpitz the point of view of the foreign office.

[58] Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente,* I, 299–300. The admiral pleaded for the maintenance of the *Novelle,* and from his point of view, he was right in so doing. He based his whole policy on the conviction that if only Germany would build a large enough fleet (which need not be so large as the British), England would be terrorized into accepting the political demands of Germany; and he was persuaded that the British objections to the *Novelle* were only preliminary to an attack on the whole fleet programme. On the latter point, he was correct in his suspicions, for Churchill remarks (I, 105) that "the fundamental proposition of the negotiations from the Admiralty point of view had been that the existing German Navy Law should not be increased, but if possible, reduced." Tirpitz expressed to Kiderlen the opinion that that if the political agreement were reached, Grey, so far from throwing France over, "will publicly emphasize the maintenance of the *Entente* all the more"; which was an additional reason for insisting on the *Novelle.* But in his major premiss, of course, he was hopelessly wrong. "This sincere, wrongheaded, purblind old Prussian," says Churchill (I, 117, 118), "firmly believed that the growth of his beloved navy was inducing in British minds an increasing fear of war, whereas it simply produced naval rejoinders and diplomatic reactions which strengthened the forces and closed the ranks of the *Entente.* . . . With every rivet that von Tirpitz drove into his ships of war, he united British opinion throughout wide circles of the most powerful people in every walk of life and in every part of the Empire. The hammers that clanged at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven were forging the coalition of nations by which Germany was to be resisted and finally overthrown."

mands would be raised.[59] Bethmann tried to counter by an "impossible" proposal not to set any dates for the new ships.[60]

By this time, however, the kaiser had received the British memorandum. Characterizing it as a "*sommation*" and "a piece of grandiose British effrontery" and declaring its demands "incompatible with our honor," he told the chancellor that the army and navy bills must be introduced at once,[61] and he instructed the foreign minister to reprimand the ambassador in London for even transmitting the British suggestions.[62] He also ordered a memorandum to be prepared in reply to the British document. The excitement of the kaiser can be gauged from his comment on a despatch from Metternich:

> I desire a specific declaration in London to Metternich, and through him to Haldane, that a transfer of the Mediterranean squadron to the North Sea will be regarded by us as a *casus belli* and will be answered by the original version of the *Novelle* and by mobilization.[63]

Bethmann was undoubtedly in a very difficult position. It had been hard enough to reach some kind of agreement with Haldane, and now it was being repudiated. "England drops part of her offers, no longer mentions the

[59] The kaiser to Bethmann, 26 Feb. Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente*, I, 301–2. The editors of the *Grosse Politik* (XXXI, 139, note *), assert that the foreign office did not accept the alternatives presented by the kaiser: in its judgment, "an Anglo-German *rapprochement* need not in any way affect England's *ententes*, but rather might lead to a Franco-German *rapprochement*." But according to Tirpitz (*Politische Dokumente*, I, 291), Kiderlen said to him that "if we come to a real understanding, the *Entente* automatically comes to an end" (*fällt von selber fort*).

[60] *Ibid.*, 306.

[61] The kaiser to Bethmann, 27 Feb. *Ibid.*, 306–308.

[62] The kaiser to Kiderlen, 28 Feb. *G. P.*, no. 11,378.

[63] On Metternich's despatch of 1 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,380. The kaiser actually wrote *casus belli* (*Kriegsfall*). Tirpitz suggests that he meant "threat of war" (*Kriegsdrohung*), a word used in several later documents.

political agreement, criticises the increase in personnel and the submarines." [64] He was therefore constrained to inform the kaiser that the army and navy bills would be ready the next day,[65] and to send the German memorandum to Metternich.[66] But he sought to gain time by requesting permission for Metternich to delay the presentation of the memorandum until the ambassador's report of his latest conversation with Haldane, just received, could be sent on to his majesty.[67] For Haldane had stated that Grey and the entire British cabinet sincerely desired an agreement with Germany, and that while determined to maintain the friendship with France, it would not support "an aggressive French policy directed to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine." [68] But when the kaiser read the despatch, he flew into a fine rage. Haldane's language proved, he averred, that "England had hitherto been disposed to support such a policy" on the part of France.[69] The army and the navy bills were to be published the next day, and the memorandum delivered in London. "My patience and that of the German people is at an end." [70] He also took the extraordinary step of telegraphing directly to Metternich that British acceptance of the *Novelle* was the only basis for negotiation and that the transfer of the Mediterranean squadron to

64 Bethmann's Memorandum, 28 Feb. *G. P.*, no. 11,376.

65 Bethmann to the kaiser, 28 Feb. Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente,* I, 308.

66 Bethmann to Metternich, 4 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,381. In the despatch, the chancellor declared that the British admiralty had misinterpreted the *Novelle* as regards the increase of personnel; on this point, see Tirpitz's letter to Bethmann, 27 Feb. *G. P.*, no. 11,375, and note *.

67 Bethmann to the kaiser, telegram, 4 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,382.

68 Metternich to Bethmann, 1 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,380. If this had been said earlier, Bethmann would have had a strong argument in his wrangling with the kaiser. There is no indication previous to this that the British were aware of German suspicions of France, which were comparable to their own of Germany; they probably assumed that the Germans understood their unwillingness to support France in a war of revenge.

69 The kaiser to Bethmann, telegram from Wilhelmshaven, 5 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,385.

70 The kaiser to Bethmann, telegram, 5 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,386.

the North Sea would be interpreted as a "threat of war." [71] It is no wonder that an eminent foreign diplomat observed to Lord Haldane, "In this highly organized nation, when you have ascended to the very top story, you find not only confusion but chaos." [72]

This action of the kaiser was too much for the harassed chancellor and he promptly offered his resignation. The intention of his majesty to order the publication of the army and navy bills by the war and naval secretaries, without the counter-signature of the chancellor, was contrary to the constitution; by the telegram to Metternich, "Your majesty has deprived the imperial chancellor of the control of foreign policy." Also, it was necessary to continue the negotiations with England, even if the basis had been shifted; if they failed, the blame must be placed on England.

> If we do not do this, not only will our relations with England be aggravated in dangerous fashion, but French chauvinism, which has already been rekindled, will be encouraged with the highest hopes. France will become so provocative and insolent that we shall be compelled to attack her. In such a war France will automatically have the assistance of Russia and doubtless that of England. . . . According to the communications which the secretary of the navy has repeatedly made to me, we cannot count on a victory over the English and French fleets.

Bethmann refused, "before God, the country, history, and my own conscience," to accept the responsibility for such a policy as that which the kaiser seemed to be favoring.[73]

Whether the chancellor's threat was seriously meant or was of the Bismarckian variety, is not clear; nor do we know what transpired between him and his master. But when he

[71] The kaiser to Metternich, telegram, 5 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,387.
[72] Haldane, 71.
[73] Bethmann to the kaiser, 6 Mar. Jaeckh, II, 159–161; Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente*, I, 318–20.

proposed not to fix dates for the new ships, Tirpitz in turn threatened resignation, and, with the help of the kaiserin, carried his point.[74] Bethmann, however, succeeded in postponing the publication of the *Novelle* while he made a last desperate attempt to negotiate with London.

First of all he turned to Ballin with the hint that "discreet support from private quarters will be appreciated." [75] On the strength of this Ballin sent his friend Huldermann to see Cassel in the south of France; this was evidently not to the liking of the chancellor, for he telegraphed to Metternich that the negotiations would make better headway by keeping out "private and irresponsible intermediaries." [76] Ballin himself went to Paris, where he was assured that financial circles "would gladly welcome an agreement between Germany and Great Britain," and to London, where he found Churchill willing to let the experts determine how many men the *Novelle* would add to the German navy. The latter, Ballin reported, was anxious for an agreement, and "was still hoping that a neutrality agreement would induce the German Government to make concessions in regard to the Navy Bill." [77]

Official news from London was, unfortunately, the reverse of encouraging. The German memorandum, protesting against the shifting of the basis of the negotiations, failed to impress Grey,[78] while Haldane denied that he had expressed any opinion in Berlin on the question of personnel; [79] on colonial questions, Metternich was referred to the colonial secretary, Mr. Harcourt, who declared that Haldane had exceeded his powers in his concessions about the Portugese colonies.[80] In the matter of the political agreement,

[74] Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente*, I, 322–25.
[75] Bethmann to Ballin, 8 Mar. Huldermann, 176–77.
[76] Bethmann to Metternich, 12 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,394.
[77] Huldermann, 181–83.
[78] Metternich's telegram, 6 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,389.
[79] Metternich's telegram, 7 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,390.
[80] Metternich to Bethmann, 11 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,437.

Britain maintained her position, as was evident from a formula now proposed by Grey.

> England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and pursue no aggressive policy towards her.
>
> Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.[81]

If this was more definite than what Haldane had offered in Berlin (p. 260), it was still far from what Germany desired.

To make matters worse, the naval attaché in London was asserting that the British campaign against the *Novelle* was only a ruse for paralyzing the German naval policy,[82] and that the British press, under orders from the government, was trying to raise a "scare" and to "bluff" Germany by references to the two-power standard.[83] The chancellor protested to the kaiser against these interpretations, and complained that details of the *Novelle* had leaked out through the navy department;[84] without effect, for although William insisted on immediate publication of the army and navy bills, Bethmann was able to withhold his consent until he learned the result of his latest representations in London.[85]

[81] Metternich's telegram, 14 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,399.

[82] Widenmann to Tirpitz, 7 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,392, Anlage. If Germany could be persuaded to build only two ships annually for the next five years, "England calculates," so the attaché argued, "that in 1918 it will be difficult, if not impossible, for Germany to return automatically to a three-ship programme." The willingness to accept some increase in personnel was, therefore, only a *"Scheinkonzession."*

[83] Widenmann to Tirpitz, 11 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,396, Anlage. The attaché believed that maintenance of the two-power standard "will cost England such huge sums that no chancellor of the exchequer will be able to find the necessary money."

[84] Bethmann to the kaiser, 12 and 14 Mar. *G. P.*, nos. 11,393 and 11,397. The chancellor took his cues from Metternich's comments on the attaché's reports, in nos. 11,392 and 11,396.

[85] Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente*, I, 327.

For the chancellor, albeit with a heavy heart, had determined to accept the Haldane neutrality formula, if a clause were added to the effect that "in the event of threatening complications with other states, an exchange of views will take place immediately between the parties." [86] A new draft was accordingly prepared for the guidance of Metternich in his further conservations with Grey, which made only two changes in the formula drafted by Haldane in Berlin. To article 2, there was added the sentence:

> And declare not to be bound at present by any such engagement.

and to article 3:

> If either of the high contracting parties is forced to go to war by obvious provocation from a third party they bind themselves to enter into an exchange of views concerning their attitude in such a conflict.[87]

In view of what Haldane had said, Bethmann was justified in thinking that these proposals, which he did not communicate to the kaiser, would be acceptable to the British government; but since the federal council had approved the *Novelle*, their immediate acceptance was urgent.[88]

But Sir Edward Grey did not consider himself bound by Haldane's suggestions. In the decisive interview with Metternich on 17 March, he declared himself against "a diplomatic document in paragraphs" of the kind desired by Germany. He said frankly—and this frankness was destined to destroy any chance of an agreement—that "a neutrality agreement depended upon individuals for its working," and while he had absolute confidence in the present

[86] Memorandum of Bethmann, 8 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,391.

[87] *G. P.*, no. 11,395.

[88] Kiderlen to Metternich, 15 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,402. The warning was repeated the next day.

chancellor, "the British Government had to consider the question that under other persons a change might come about in the direction of German policy." He therefore preferred a version intended for publication, which "anybody could understand at once and would not give rise to different interpretations." In behalf of the government, he proposed the following formula, on condition that an agreement was come to about the *Novelle*:

> *The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and friendship between them,* England declares that she will neither make *nor join in any* unprovoked attack upon Germany and pursue no aggressive policy towards her.
>
> Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.
>
> [The words in italics indicate the additions to the formula offered three days before.]

Grey explained that the words "nor join in any" clearly implied neutrality in the event of an unprovoked attack, but he refused an addition proposed by Metternich in either of the following versions:

> England will therefore as a matter of course observe at least a benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany.
>
> *Or:* England will therefore as a matter of course remain neutral if war should be forced upon Germany.

England, he said, could not risk (*aufs Spiel setzen*) her existing friendships, and a positive neutrality agreement would arouse French susceptibilities. But what he proposed would ensure peace between Germany and England, without endangering the existing friendships. "His policy was to avoid a renewed division of Europe into two camps . . . in time it would bear fruit." [89]

[89] Metternich's telegram, 17 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,403.

One wonders why Grey waited so long—more than a month—to indicate his unwillingness to negotiate a "document in paragraphs." French interference to prevent an agreement was hardly to blame, for that came later (p. 287). Was Sir Edward half-hearted about the whole business? Perhaps the British documents, when published, will furnish the answer. Also, it is curious that the foreign secretary of a parliamentary government should make the conclusion of an agreement dependent on the signature of a particular minister on the other side. Hitherto it had always been the Germans who refused to bind themselves with a parliamentary state! On the other hand, Metternich would seem to have failed in his full duty, for he did not inform Grey of Bethmann's decision to accept the Haldane draft, with additions that ought to have been acceptable. He may have thought it futile, in face of Grey's attitude, or he may have wished to make Grey responsible for the failure; but clearly he should have told Grey.

During part of the interview, Churchill was present, in order that he might hear the German view of the effects of the *Novelle* on the personnel of the German navy, and declared his readiness to send an admiralty official to Berlin to discuss the matter. But Metternich was given to understand, more clearly than on any previous occasion, that a political agreement was possible only if the *Novelle* provided for "quite small" (*nur ganz geringe*) increases and was kept within the existing fleet laws.[90] The British position was at last clear; as the kaiser noted, "This means no *Novelle* at all!"

Even now Bethmann did not give up hope. He informed the kaiser of a remark of Churchill to Ballin, to the effect that a continuation of the naval rivalry "must lead to war within the next two years." Tirpitz had said in June both "orally and in writing" that the old fleet law was "sufficient,"

[90] Metternich's telegram, 17 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,404.

and Metternich was of the opinion that a political agreement was possible at the price of the *Novelle*. Was Germany therefore, "by the publication of the *Novelle*, to give the signal for a competition in armaments which, this year or next, would conjure up the probability of an Anglo-German war together with the continental war that was necessarily bound up with it?" [91] But the kaiser was furious with Grey:

> I have never before in my life heard of concluding an agreement with and on account of a particular statesman, independent of the sovereign of the moment. From this it is evident that Grey has no notion who is really master here, and that *I* rule. He prescribes to me who shall be my minister, in case I conclude an agreement with England.[92]

He ordered a reproof for Metternich for transmitting such proposals,[93] and refused even to consider an agreement at the price of the *Novelle*. But, since England was unwilling to promise neutrality out of regard for France, he proposed an offensive and defensive alliance in which France might be included! He actually went so far as to draft a letter to King George, in which he refers to Grey's "fervent wish that Europe should cease to be split up into two camps."

> This is my fervent wish too! I therefore propose a solution that instead of the agreement your Government has itself annulled, we should make an offensive and defensive alliance—as you have with Japan—with France as a partner and open to the other powers to enter *ad libitum*. This would unite the Great Powers of Europe and consolidate peace. In this case I should be able to make reductions in the *Novelle* meeting your Government's wishes, which my Govern-

[91] Bethmann to the kaiser, 17 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,405.
[92] Comment on *G. P.*, no. 11,403.
[93] Comment on *G. P.*, no. 11,405.

ment would be able to advocate before Parliament and Public, whereas this is impossible with the proposed agreement.[94]

Undoubtedly the kaiser had his moments of genius, and this was one of them. If our proposal is accepted, he rightly noted, "the peace of Europe is assured"; it was accepted, in substance, at Locarno. "If England refuses," he went on, "it will have placed itself flagrantly in the wrong before all the world." According to Tirpitz, William persuaded Bethmann to accept this programme, perhaps over the glass of port wine which he recommended the dejected chancellor to take;[95] at any rate, as late as 8 May he was telegraphing from Corfu to enquire what had resulted from the soundings in London.[96]

London, however, was never sounded, probably on the advice of Kiderlen. Instead, Metternich was told to inform Grey that Germany could renounce the *Novelle* only in return for an "agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of England and approximating a defensive alliance with us."[97] This demand was, if anything, a raising of the German price, and was toned down by Metternich to the request for an agreement "of a far-reaching character guaranteeing absolute neutrality"; which evoked from Grey the remark that Germany "was asking for more than England had promised to any other nation except Japan, not even to France or Russia." Grey then continued:

94 Comments on *G. P.*, no. 11,405; Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente,* I, 331–32.

95 Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente,* I, 330.

96 *G. P.* XXXI, 188, note. It is no doubt idle to speculate on what the British reaction would have been; but what William was proposing (with many *arrière-pensées*) was not unlike what Sir Edward Grey suggested on 30 July 1914. The real opposition would have come more from France than from England.

97 Bethmann to Metternich, 18 March, *G. P.*, no. 11,406. On the same day Kiderlen enquired of Metternich what changes in the *Novelle* would satisfy England. Chancellor and foreign secretary were evidently not agreed on the course to be pursued, *G. P.*, no. 11,407.

> With France and Russia more serious and more lasting differences had existed than with us. In spite of that these differences had been adjusted by agreements which did not go so far as the one proposed by us. He did not see why England and Germany should not be brought into the same friendly relations that existed between England and the other two countries.

It would be regrettable if Germany made a neutrality agreement the condition of good relations, for England was ready to discuss "territorial and colonial" questions.[98] The chancellor, said Grey, had not demanded "absolute neutrality" when Haldane was in Berlin.[99]

While the diplomats were skirmishing, the naval question was practically removed from the discussions. During Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin, Mr. Churchill had made a sensational speech at Glasgow, in which, to the intense annoyance of many Germans, he had described their fleet as a "luxury"[100] and promised that "whatever may happen abroad, there will be no whining here." He was as good as his word. In his speech to the House of Commons on 18 March introducing the naval estimates he announced that a sixty-per cent superiority in dreadnoughts would be maintained against Germany, that two British keels would be laid down for every new ship added by Germany, and that the Atlantic fleet, hitherto based on Gibraltar, would be withdrawn to home waters. On the other hand, he declared that Britain would welcome a "naval holiday"; if Germany were to build no ships in the coming year, neither would Britain, and this might continue indefinitely. This speech

[98] Metternich's telegram, 19 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,410.

[99] Metternich's telegram, 22 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,418.

[100] The speech was much criticized by the Liberal press in England. But Haldane declared, on his return from Berlin, that "so far from being a hindrance to him in his negotiations, the Glasgow speech had been the greatest possible help" (Churchill, I, 103). It is interesting that the German naval attaché in London did not mention the passage about "luxury" in his report of the speech. Widenmann to Tirpitz, 10 Feb. *G. P.*, no. 11,334, Anlage II. The matter is hardly mentioned in the German documents.

seems to have broken Bethmann's resistance. He complained that the British attitude was "one-sided."

England is always proposing a limitation of armaments by us, but according to Churchill's statement, reserves to herself the right to arm still more if another Power arms, so that we, who sit between France and Russia in alliance, are bound while England is not, without guaranteeing us even a benevolent neutrality.[101]

The next day (22 March) the *Novelle* was published.

For all practical purposes this ended the long discussion, though the pretense of negotiation was kept up for a week. The British government presented a long reply to the German memorandum of 4 March, in which it was stated that Lord Haldane's conversations in Berlin had been conducted *ad referendum*, and that there was "no desire to shift the basis." [102] This Bethmann did not answer. But Grey had not yet replied to the proposal that the *Novelle* should be given up in return for absolute neutrality. Now that the *Novelle* was published, such a bargain was out of the question. Metternich was accordingly instructed not to insist on the phrase "absolute neutrality."

What concerns us is not the wording, but the substance of the English assurances. We must have the certainty that England will

[101] Bethmann to Metternich, 21 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,415. The naval attaché in London protested that Churchill was making use of the information confidentially communicated to him about the German naval plans and was trying to saddle Germany with the odium of increasing the competition in armaments; when Germany had been lulled into security, the sixty per cent margin of superiority would be forgotten and the "unconditional British supremacy at sea restored." Widenmann to Tirpitz, 19 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,411, Anlage. Metternich pointed out, in his covering despatch, that the German press had been talking about the details of the *Novelle* "for weeks." Kiderlen went so far as to protest to the kaiser that Widenmann was disobeying his instructions by "going in for political speculations" and that "his report breathes a hatred and suspicion of England which are not justified." Kiderlen to the kaiser, 22 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,413. William replied that the attaché's observations had been "particularly valuable." Müller to Kiderlen, 24 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,414.

[102] *G. P.*, no. 11,422, Anlage.

not attack us directly or in a war forced upon us by a third party. This must be clearly expressed. The further the British government goes in this direction, the greater will be the prospects of overcoming the known obstacles to an understanding.[103]

It was of no avail. In the interview on 29 March, Grey said that the cabinet had "again" considered the German proposals, but "could not go beyond the formula proposed by it." Absolute neutrality "would arouse suspicions in other Powers and injure England's relations with them"; whereas the British formula "was clear and implied at any rate the intention of neutrality in the event of an unprovoked attack." If that is so, said Metternich, let it be expressed in the formula; if Grey argued that this was more than had been promised France and Russia, he should remember that those powers had no reason to doubt British neutrality, whereas, "for a number of years Germany had not been certain of it," and the British formula was not "sufficient" to avoid the danger of "warlike complications" like those of the preceding summer. So he renewed his suggestion of an addition to the formula. This was of course refused, but Grey went on to express his hope that the "confidential relations" recently established between them would not be disturbed and that an understanding on colonial questions might be reached which would react on the question of armaments. When the excitement created by the naval bills had died down, the question of a political agreement might be taken up again. But was this necessary?

At no distant time the danger of war between France and England had existed because of Siam and Fashoda, between England and Russia because of the Dogger Bank affair. As the result of agreements on practical questions, secure and friendly relations had been created with both of these countries, and that without any political agreement so far-reaching as that proposed by us. He

[103] Kiderlen to Metternich, 25 and 27 Mar. *G. P.*, nos. 11,419 and 11,421.

had the hope and conviction that between England and Germany, even without the conclusion of a specific neutrality agreement, the same happy results could be achieved as between England and the other two countries.

The ambassador could only say that "the Imperial Government did not find in the British formula for an agreement the bases which would lead to the result desired by Sir Edward Grey," [104] and this was confirmed a few days later by a despatch from Berlin.[105]

The reasons for the failure of the negotiations are clear enough. To begin with, the Germans thought that Haldane came, to quote the kaiser, as a "negotiator" empowered to lay down the basis of an agreement, whereas in the British view he was merely to discover the conditions of an understanding; Haldane thought that he had made this clear, but it is evident that he did not, and he seemingly accepted the German offers in naval and colonial questions. When these were found unsatisfactory by his government, the Germans felt that they had been tricked. The kaiser, indeed, claimed to have suspected the British from the start.

Through Haldane's promises of an offer of a transcontinental

[104] Metternich to Bethmann, 29 Mar. *G. P.*, 11,423.

[105] Bethmann to Metternich, 3 Apr. *G. P.*, no. 11,440. For this last stage of the negotiations, Bethmann requested that Metternich make use of Herr von Kühlmann, the councillor of embassy, who had just returned from Berlin, to influence other members of the cabinet. Bethmann to Metternich, 21 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,415. The ambassador objected, on the ground that Grey was more friendly to Germany than many of his colleagues, and refused to conduct the negotiations if Kühlmann was brought into them. Metternich's telegram, 21 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,416. Bethmann acquiesced, but remarked that "neither the results thus far attained in the negotiations nor the facts reported by you are to be harmonized with the urgent desire for an understanding which you assume on the part of Sir Edward Grey." Bethmann to Metternich, 22 Mar. *G. P.*, no. 11,417. Whether this incident contributed to the decision to recall Count Metternich, does not appear from the documents; it is not likely that Bethmann would be influenced by such considerations. In fact, Metternich's recall was determined upon by the kaiser on 18 March. Tirpitz, *Politische Dokumente*, I, 330.

African colonial empire, which consisted of the territories of other nations and did not belong to England, . . . the German Government was to be induced to drop the *Novelle*. At the same time neutrality in the political agreement was to be refused, as too difficult to define. With this success Haldane was to return home. The Government would thereupon . . . go before Parliament and announce to all the people this great triumph over Germany, thereby earning congratulation and praise. Then it could further say, in reply to questions, that it had made no concessions in Europe—i.e., as regards France. . . . This would have been a colossal success in Parliament and among the English people. The Germans had given up the *Novelle* and had not received a promise of neutrality, while the prospects of an ephemeral colonial empire in Africa, to be created out of the territories of other nations, would involve Germany in the most beautiful conflicts with the nations that were to be robbed. This, *in nuce*, was Haldane's mission. I saw through him and his fine colleagues, and spoiled their fun (*ihnen den Spass gründlich versalzen*). I have saved the German people their claims to sea power and the right to determine their own armaments. I have shown the English that if they meddle with (*tasten*) our armaments, they will bite granite, thereby perhaps increasing their hatred for us; but we have won their respect, which, it is to be hoped, will at the proper time cause them to conduct negotiations in a more modest tone and to a successful issue.[106]

Bethmann did not share this extreme view. Writing in 1919, he said:

For my part I still today incline to the view that we had to do with an honourable attempt to come to an understanding on the part of England. It failed because England was not willing to follow out this understanding into its logical consequences. An understanding with us meant that France and Russia must lose the certainty that they could continue to count upon the support of England in pursuing an anti-German policy. But this was just what England would not do. . . . The naval question was an important but not a deciding factor.[107]

[106] Comments on British memorandum. *G. P.*, no. 11,422, Anlage.
[107] Bethmann, 57.

This judgment is partly correct, for Haldane stated explicitly that Britain would not sacrifice her *Ententes* and Grey was ready to conclude some kind of political agreement even after the *Novelle* was assured. But the detailed story of the negotiations shows that the naval question was fundamental and that Bethmann himself knew it. If he had had his way, there would have been no *Novelle* until he had discovered how far England would go; he was not strong enough to impose his view on the kaiser and Tirpitz, and he did not resign in protest. It does not follow, of course, that if the naval question had not been raised, Great Britain would have accepted the German neutrality formula; the probability is indeed to the contrary. But Anglo-German relations would assuredly have taken a new turn; mutual confidence would have been established, and the *Entente,* which Germany was endeavoring to nullify in the letter, would have been profoundly affected in spirit. As a German historian acutely observes, "If one notes the anxiety and concern with which the negotiations were followed by the representatives of Russia and France in London, one is bound to assume that even a loosely-worded agreement would have been very disagreeable for them." [108]

The German position was logical: if we give up the naval competition, England must give up her diplomatic combinations. But it was lacking in imagination: they failed to see that their insistence upon absolute neutrality only created in England the suspicion that their policy might not always be pacific and made British statesmen wary, if it did not even predispose them to closer relations with the powers of the *Entente.* And the German attitude was the more curious because (1) the written pledge given by Italy in the Triple Alliance was considered of slight value, and (2) in 1910 Germany had exchanged assurances with Russia that "nei-

[108] Erich Brandenburg, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege,* 355.

ther Power commits itself to any combination which might have an aggressive point directed against the other."[109] In fine, the German government lacked the political insight to strike a bargain which, though it might seem one-sided, would probably have insured the neutrality of England in any war not provoked by Germany.

The British unwillingness to promise absolute neutrality was due in part, as Haldane explained to Bethmann, to British treaty obligations with Japan, Belgium, and Portugal, but much more, as Bethmann retorted to Haldane, to British relations with France. The then premier admits this frankly.

> The formula of neutrality which we were asked to accept was of such a character that if there had been no *entente* at all Great Britain would have been bound, even in her own interest alone, to refuse it. It would . . . have precluded us from coming to the help of France should Germany on any pretext attack her and aim at getting possession of her Channel ports.[110]

Mr. Churchill is equally explicit. Commenting on the German demand that England would remain neutral "if war is forced upon Germany," he says:

> That last condition would have carried us far beyond our original intention, and might well have been held to deprive us of the power to come to the aid of France in a war "forced," or alleged to be "forced," upon Germany as a result of a quarrel between Austria and Russia. It would certainly have been regarded as terminating the Entente.[111]

Lord Grey puts the matter in more general terms:

[109] Speech of Bethmann in the Reichstag, 10 Dec. 1910. The draft of the agreement is given in *G. P.*, vol. XXVII, no. 10,159, Anlage 1.

[110] Asquith, 100.

[111] Churchill, 105. The German historian Veit Valentin points out, however (*Deutschlands Aussenpolitik, 1890–1918,* 136), that the interpretation of this undertaking was left to England.

The Germans were not really willing to give up the naval competition, and they wanted a political formula that would in effect compromise our freedom of action. We could not fetter ourselves by a promise to remain neutral in a European war. We had, indeed, no intention of supporting France and still less Russia, in a war of aggression; we had a very real intention not to support any aggressor, and we were ready to say so. But there was no formula that could be trusted to define the real aggressor in advance. . . . We were bound to keep our hands free and the country uncompromised as to its liberty of judgment, decision and action.[112]

The British position was quite as logical as the German. The *Ententes*, more particularly that with France, were, as Sir Edward Grey repeatedly said, in no way exclusive; they were not a barrier to equally cordial relations with Germany, provided actual Anglo-German differences could be adjusted. In British eyes, the agreements with France and Russia signified the liquidation of old disputes which had more than once become dangerous, and Grey feared that an agreement of the kind desired by Germany would so arouse the distrust of France and Russia that "the old bad relations" with those countries would be revived.

Just what grounds he had for such fears cannot be determined at present with precision. When Lord Haldane went to Berlin, the French and Russian ambassadors in London agreed that there was nothing in the visit which could "disquiet" them, on the contrary, "the world would be quieter" for it; they were reassured by Haldane's remark to the French ambassador in Berlin, which was confirmed by Haldane, that "it was a question of a *détente*, not an *entente*." [113] In France, there was at first a "certain nervousness," but the premier, M. Poincaré, told the Russian ambassador

112 Grey, I, 243–44. He and Haldane both told Metternich that England would make it clear to France that England would not support France in an agressive policy; *G. P.*, nos. 11,380 and 11,403. The kaiser's comment was, "Then they have not done so hitherto!"

113 Benckendorff to Sazonov, 13 Feb. Siebert, 754.

that the French Government could only welcome the attempt of Great Britain and Germany to restore more normal relations."[114] Later M. Poincaré was less confident. According to the report of the Russian ambassador's report of a conversation with the French premier,

Apropos of Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin, Germany made a quite definite proposal, according to which the London cabinet should undertake in writing to observe neutrality if Germany were involved in a war not provoked by it. The London cabinet informed M. Poincaré of this, and was apparently hesitating whether to accept or decline this proposal. M. Poincaré expressed himself emphatically against any such engagement. He gave the British government to understand that the signature of such a treaty between England and Germany would put an end forthwith to the relations existing between England and France, since no written agreement of a general political character existed between England and France. This protest produced results: the London cabinet declined Germany's proposals, which was the cause of lively discontent in Berlin.[115]

M. Poincaré himself gives a somewhat different account. He was evidently kept informed of the negotiations, though he does not say whether the several formulas were submitted to him. After the negotiations had been broken off, the British ambassador in Paris said to him privately:

Sir Edward Grey writes to me that you and M. Paul Cambon [the French ambassador in London] are both fully satisfied with our assurances as to the declaration of neutrality which Germany has asked for. I am just a little surprised that you take this so easily. If no declaration has been given, it doesn't follow necessarily that it has been altogether brushed aside. What Germany asked of us was not a simple promise of neutrality, but a definite engagement to observe a benevolent neutrality: a ridiculous notion, as a benevolent neutrality is no longer pure neutrality. However

[114] Isvolsky to Sazonov, 1 Mar. Siebert, 761–62; *Livre noir,* I, 200–201.
[115] Isvolsky to Sazonov, 5 Dec. *Livre noir,* I, 365–66.

preposterous this demand, Sir Edward Grey must have full praise for having blankly refused it—he is, as a matter of fact, surrounded by colleagues of whom several have leanings towards Germany. This makes me feel a little uncomfortable; it is imperative that this declaration of neutrality should not be made, and there is some risk to it if the German Government returns again and again to the charge. It may be true that we are only asked to be neutral in the event of Germany being attacked; but who can say that the day may not arrive when France, irritated beyond measure and threatened by Germany, will not be forced to take the offensive? No, believe me, it will not do for M. Paul Cambon to appear satisfied, and if only you speak resolutely to London, the British Government will do more than hesitate before committing the blunder which I dread.

M. Poincaré did "speak resolutely" to London, by asking the British government that "it should not deprive itself [of its liberty of action] to our detriment by a promise of neutrality which would only stimulate Germany to fresh provocatory tactics." The reply was "the government had only continued the discussion with Count Metternich to ease their consciences, but that nothing would come of it." [116] It would seem from this account that the British decision to reject the German proposal was taken *before* the intervention of M. Poincaré.

Be that as it may, the British government could not convince Germany of the innocuous character of the *Entente*. They might regard it as insurance against a possible German aggression. But in view of the support given to France by Great Britain in the Moroccan controversy, it was idle to expect Germany to be satisfied with assurances that it contained no point against her. The ultimate purpose of British policy was to substitute for the rivalry of Triple Alliance and Triple *Entente* the idea of the Concert of Europe, but this made no appeal to Admiral von Tirpitz,

[116] *Memoirs of Raymond Poincaré*, 85–87.

who was the most forceful personality in the German government, and smarted under the veiled British threats of 1911. British statesmen had a much clearer view of the European situation than their German colleagues, but they were as much afraid to make neutrality the basis of an understanding as the latter were afraid to make one without it. Some years ago, before much documentary material was available, the writer summarized the problem as follows:

> The Germans said: We cannot discuss a limitation of armaments unless Great Britain will abandon the *Entente,* for so long as you stand with Russia, they will cherish schemes of revenge or aggression. To which the British replied: So long as you can go on with your navy, we cannot give up the insurance provided by the Triple *Entente,* especially as you are protected by the Triple Alliance. When Admiral von Tirpitz offered to yield on the fleet in return for a promise of unconditional neutrality, Lord Haldane answered that Great Britain was bound by treaty to Portugal and Japan and had certain obligations towards Belgium. Neither was willing to yield anything essential. The British insisted on both their naval supremacy and their diplomatic combinations, for thus the balance of power was turned in their favor. To restore the balance in their favor, the Germans had to retain their freedom in armaments or break up the *Entente.* Each position was logical, so long as the theory of equilibrium controlled the actions of diplomacy.[117]

Subject to the correction that Tirpitz did not actually offer to give up the *Novelle*, this verdict is confirmed by the German documents. Bethmann was right when he said, "The problem before us suffers from the defect that because of its inherent difficulties, it admits of no solution." [118]

BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT

[117] "Triple Alliance and Triple *Entente*," in *American Historical Review*, Apr. 1924, vol. XXIX, 464.

[118] Bethmann to Ballin, 19 Mar. Huldermann, 184.

XI

SOURCES OF DIPLOMATIC HISTORY AND THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS[1]

Diplomatic history, always more or less in favor, has become increasingly popular since the war. Evidence of this appears on all sides. According to the lists of subjects for Ph.D. dissertations prepared by Dr. Jameson, in recent years about five in every six in the division of Modern European History relate either directly or indirectly to international relations. In the colleges, universities, and schools, as well as in the pulpit and in the press, foreign relations are discussed and studied as never before. Literally scores of courses for the study of this field have been established in our educational institutions in recent years. New publications, books, magazines, and pamphlets are appearing in increasing numbers year by year.

The causes are not far to seek. The World War, like the Thirty Years' War three centuries before, opened men's eyes to the tremendous importance of international relations. It has led to a widespread study of the anarchy in international affairs before 1914, and a determination to investigate the origins of the conflict. The tragic failure of diplomacy to avert the great disaster has given rise to a strong demand in many quarters for reform in the conduct of foreign affairs and the abolition of secret diplomacy. Furthermore, the influence of science and invention upon the economic and intellectual life of our time, bringing nations

[1] A paper read at the forty-first annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Rochester, New York, Dec. 30, 1926.

into closer contact, making them interdependent and destroying the possibility of isolation, is forcing the study of international affairs upon every thoughtful person. A new world order, with new demands of an international character, is coming into existence; the fabric of an international civilization is in the making.

Another and a somewhat more academic reason for the appeal of diplomatic history to the American student lies in the fact that a very remarkable body of source materials in this field is readily accessible in this country. I know of no other field of history for which there is such a variety, and, when critically used, so dependable and interesting a group of historical source material. The existence of the sources in print and the fact that they are to be had in many of the large libraries of the country, enable the student to proceed a long way in his investigations, before he is faced with the necessity of visiting the archives for work on the manuscripts. Further, he always has the stimulating assurance that sooner or later he can get to the original manuscripts, not only to check up and verify the published text of documents he has been using, but also to get new material and new evidence on questions not fully treated in the published matter.

A word of warning is necessary against the somewhat exuberant enthusiasm of graduate students to take subjects much too large and extensive. We in the modern field can profit by the example of the medievalist in choosing topics, especially when they are done in connection with work for the Ph.D. degree, of a more limited and simpler type. It will make for more scholarly work on the part of the student and contribute toward a sounder basis for the treatment of the field as a whole. This is the more advisable because of the great wealth of materials on most subjects relating to modern diplomatic history.

The sources for the history of international relations of

modern Europe vary greatly. They range all the way from treaties and conventions to memoirs and the veriest gossip of the press. Between these two extremes are the instructions to ambassadors, dispatches, special memoranda, out-letters, and other documents emanating directly from the foreign office; the reports of representatives abroad to the home government, in-letters and other correspondence of an official and semi-official character; reports by parliamentary committees or by special agents on particular questions, and the private correspondence of men more or less closely associated with the conduct of foreign affairs, their diaries, autobiographies, notes, recollections, and memoirs.

The vast amount of official material of this kind is rarely appreciated till the student is brought face to face with it in his research. Some idea of its voluminous nature can be gained from the fact that the number of dispatches passing in and out of the British foreign office, even in the first half of the nineteenth century, rose steadily from 5000 in 1828 to 49,000 in 1854 [2] and to several times that number since. A few years ago it was estimated that about 30,000 treaties were in existence, and that of that number more than 6000 were in effect at the time.[3] More or less satisfactory guides to these archival sources for diplomatic history are found in the research rooms of all the archives. Some are in print, others are still in manuscript form. The most useful are, of course, the kind represented by the *Calendars of state papers foreign*, published in England under the auspices of the keeper of the public records, which give brief digests of important documents, often quoting significant extracts. An example of another type of guide, which is apt to prove particularly helpful, is McLaughlin's *Diplomatic archives*

[2] A. Cecil, in *Cambridge history of British foreign policy*, N. Y. 1923, III, 588.

[3] D. P. Myers, *Manual of collections of treaties and of collections relating to treaties*, Cambridge, Mass. 1922, 583.

of the United States, or the series published by the Carnegie institution on the sources for American history in the archives of different European countries.

Sometimes the personal correspondence of officials is of peculiar significance because of a not unusual practice of some foreign ministers of taking over the negotiations personally at the critical moment. According to a recent writer on the subject, all diplomacy of real importance is conducted in that way. In such cases the official correspondence is superseded in importance by the more secret and significant personal correspondence. Or it may be that the usual documents do not exist. It is not likely, for example, that Castlereagh would issue instructions for his own guidance at the Congress of Vienna. On the other hand Talleyrand appeared with credentials he had drawn up himself. Furthermore, it was quite customary until late in the nineteenth century to regard diplomatic documents as more or less personal, especially when they related to negotiations conducted in the manner just described. In such cases the minister seems to have had no hesitation in carrying them away in his strong box when he went out of office. This accounts for the fact that important papers on foreign affairs are often found in family papers. The Historical Manuscripts Commission has discovered many, others remain buried. In any case, until they are found, the student is often at a loss how to proceed in the face of the gaps in the official records.

To these difficulties has been added in recent years the use of the long-distance telephone, aviation, and other means of rapid and direct communication between the representatives of different countries. The old and well established channels through which diplomatic negotiations have for centuries been carried on, are, like the rest of our modern life, undergoing a radical change. It remains to be seen how completely and how accurately the new diplo-

macy will register or record its movements in the archives.[4]

It is evident, of course, that only a small percentage of the great mass of materials can ever be published. Much of it is not worth publishing. Selection has to be made. Every government has undertaken to do this, publishing, either directly or through private channels, extensive series of official documents.

The earliest publication of diplomatic documents in modern times seems to have been prompted mainly by a desire to appeal to the people, a motive still very strong today. The Papal Bull of 1461 against the archbishop of Mainz was in the nature of a broadside, just as much as Napoleon III's publication of the documents on the Near East in 1854, or the respective colored books on the diplomacy antecedent to the Great War.

Among the publications of official documents the treaty collections are of first importance. First among the collections for the earlier period is Dumont's *Corps universel diplomatique*,[5] really a remarkable work for one man, when the extent of the period covered and the high standard maintained throughout the volumes is considered. Others followed his lead; Schmauss,[6] Wenck,[7] de Koch,[8] and

[4] An interesting incident illustrating this point appears in the official record in the Austrian foreign office at Vienna of the successive telephone calls in July 1914 from the Germany embassy asking for an answer to the note of its government on the matter of moderating its policy toward Serbia. According to Professor Pribram the record of each official call by telephone or messenger was scrupulously kept even to the minute.

[5] Jean Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens; contenant un recueil des traitez d'alliance, de paix, de trève, de neutralité, de commerce, d'échange, de protection et de garantie, de toutes les conventions, transactions, pactes, concordats, et autres contrats, qui ont été fait en Europe, depuis le règne de l'Empereur Charlemagne jusqu'à présent. . .*, 8 vols., La Haye, 1726–31.

[6] J. J. Schmauss, *Corpus juris gentium academicum,* 2 vols., Leipzig, 1730.

[7] Frederick A. H. Wenck, *Codex juris gentium recentissimi. . .*, 3 vols., Leipzig 1781–95.

[8] C. G. de Koch, *Table des traités de la France et les puissances étrangères depuis la paix de Westphalie jusqu'à nos jours. . .*, 2 vols., Paris, 1802.

Schoell [9] made their contributions. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, George Frederick Martens began the publication at Göttingen, of his unrivalled collection of treaties popularly known as Martens' *Recueil des traités d'alliance.*[10] It is known to every student of diplomatic history, for it has been continued by different editors in six series down to the present.

Under article XVIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations the publication of treaties by international co-operation is now provided for as follows:

> Any treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any members of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

In accordance with this provision the Secretariat has established the League's Treaty Series which has already become the standard collection for post-war agreements. It consists of six series, the text being published in the original language and in French and English when these are not the original languages of the treaties.

Martens' *Recueil* for the period before the war, and the Treaty Series of the League since, are the standard publications. Other general collections, but more limited in scope,

[9] F. Schoell, *Histoire abregée des traités de paix entre les puissances de l'Europe depuis la paix de Westphalie*, par le feu. M. de Koch, ouvrage entièrement refondu, augmenté et continué jusqu'au congrès de Vienne et aux traités de Paris de 1815, 15 vols., Paris, 1817–18.

[10] George F. Martens and others, (ed.) *Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance, de paix, de trève, de neutralité, de commerce, de limits, d'échange etc., conclus par les puissances de l'Europe . . . depuis 1761 jusqu'à présent*, 7 vols., Göttingen, 1791–1801. Continued by various editors in several series under the title *Recueil général, Nouveau recueil, général,* with supplementary and index volumes, to recent years.

are Hertslet's *Map of Europe by treaty*[11] showing the political and territorial changes between 1814 and 1878; *The map of Africa*[12] by the same editor, and Albin's *Les grands traités politiques*, etc.[13]

Besides these general collections there are those of a more distinctly national character. Here there are among the early collections that by Léonard for France, Rymer's *Foedera* for England, and Leibniz's *Juris gentium diplomaticus* for Austria. To this important group also belong the thirty-odd volumes of commercial treaties by Lewis and Edward Hertslet, de Clercq's *Recueil des traités de la France;*[14] and Martens' Russian collection.[15] The importance of these collections is well known.

Treaties furnish historical source material for the history of international relations of the most reliable and satisfactory character. Nevertheless, it is difficult to evaluate them properly without careful and discriminating study in the light of their historic origins. Furthermore, their study requires a reasonable familiarity with the technique, not only of diplomacy in general, but of the different foreign offices. The student must see the process of the successive stages through which a treaty passes from its inception to its completion; from the first conversations and instructions to plenipotentiaries to the final ratification and the preserva-

[11] Sir Edward Hertslet, *The map of Europe by treaty; showing various political and territorial changes which have taken place since the general peace of 1814*, 4 vols., London, 1875–91.

[12] . . . *The map of Africa by treaty*, 3 vols., London, 1895. Revised and completed to 1908, London, 1909.

[13] P. Albin, *Les grands traités politiques, Recueil des principaux texts diplomatiques depuis 1815 jusqu'à nos jours avec des commentaires et des notes*, Paris, 1911.

[14] A. J. H. de Clercq, *Recueil des traités de la France*, publié sous les auspices du ministre des affaires étrangères, Paris, 1864.

[15] F. F. Martens, *Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères*, publié d'ordre du ministère des affaires étrangères, 15 vols., St. Pétersbourg, 1874–1909.

tion of the document. There is an extensive literature on treaties alone.

More interesting than the treaties is the material found in the collections of state papers containing instructions to representatives abroad, reports of negotiations and other correspondence, occasional protocols, and parts of treaties. Well known examples of these are: the reports of Venetian ambassadors to the senate;[16] the Calendars of state papers, foreign;[17] the valuable collection of instructions to the ambassadors and ministers of France from the treaties of Westphalia to the French Revolution;[18] British diplomatic instructions for the same period in course of publication;[19] British and foreign state papers, a series of over 110 volumes covering the years from 1812 to date;[20] the French Yellow books or *Documents diplomatiques* by the French foreign office;[21] and for our own country, besides earlier collections,[22] the papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States since 1860.[23] These publications do not,

[16] *Le Relazioni degli ambasclatori Veneti al senato durante il secolo diecimosesto,* ed. by Alberli, 15 vols., Florence, 1839–63.

[17] *Calendar of letters and papers, foreign and domestic, of the reign of Henry VIII,* 19 vols.; also series for reigns of Edward VI, Mary, and part of Elizabeth.

[18] *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française,* publié sous les auspices de la Commission des archives diplomatiques au ministère des affaires étrangères, 23 vols., Paris, 1884.

[19] *British diplomatic instructions, 1689–1789,* London, 1922.

[20] *British and foreign state papers,* 1812—; compiled by the librarian of the keeper of the papers, Foreign office, vols. 1–110, London, 1832—.

[21] These appear under the general title Ministère des affaires étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques,* and relate to different phases of French international relations as for example *Documents diplomatiques, accords conclus, le 8 avril, 1904, entre la France et l'Angleterre au sujet du Maroc, de l'Egypte, de Terre Neuve,* Paris, 1904.

[22] Cp. A. R. Hasse, *Index to United States documents relating to foreign affairs, 1828–61,* 3 vols., Washington, 1914–21.

[23] *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States,* Washington, 1861–. Since 1870, "Foreign relations." Besides the annual volume in this series there is much other material printed on diplomatic relations. See index for each session.

of course, contain all the important documents, but rather those which the respective governments consider it wise to publish at the time.

Periodical publications of an unofficial character, but often containing important material in the division devoted to documents, should not be overlooked. As illustrations of these may be cited, the *Annual register*,[24] the *Archives diplomatiques*,[25] *Das Staatsarchiv*,[26] and for the contemporary period the *Journal of the League of Nations*.[27]

The private correspondence, diaries, autobiographies, and memoirs are too numerous to be discussed in detail. The extraordinary importance of official personal correspondence has been noted above. Wherever found, it is sure to be of interest and value. Diaries are often of rare value and occasionally autobiographies, when based on notes and documents. The case of memoirs, however, is quite different. At best, this very popular form of historical writing is apt to be unreliable and ephemeral. It has a universal interest and more than any other class of historical evidence, it is responsible for the many legends and false traditions in history which later generations find so difficult to correct. All memoirs should be used with caution and reserve. The reasons are known to every student who has had even the first rudiments of training in historical criticism. Bernheim has given them very detailed treatment in a section that might well be read with profit by the numerous group of writers now occupying themselves with the history of European

[24] The *Annual register: a review of public events at home and abroad*, 1758–, London, 1761–.

[25] *Archives diplomatiques, recueil de diplomatie et d'histoire*, Paris, 1861–.

[26] *Das Staatsarchiv, Sammelung der officiellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart*, vols. 1–21, Hamburg, 1861–72, Leipzig, 1876. Documents in French, German, and English.

[27] *Société des nations—Journal officiel. League of nations—Official journal*, (monthly) London, 1920–.

international relations before the war. The eminent French historian Aulard declares emphatically against their use. If any other source is available he gives it precedence, for, he says, matter of consequence in the memoirs is usually to be found in more reliable form elsewhere.

To the source problem of diplomatic history, already sufficiently complicated before the war, there have been added since the peace, new and perplexing difficulties of an entirely novel character. Had the conditions and rules that prevailed before the war in the custody of diplomatic documents continued after the war, the problem would never have arisen. Foreign office archives would still be securely sealed up. Their secrets, save in a few exceptional cases, would be safely buried for at least a generation or two. No historian who valued his reputation would have ventured into the field. It would have been futile, for he could not have obtained the evidence. All this, however, has been completely changed by the unprecedented publication by different governments of large selections of the most important records of their pre-war diplomacy.

The colored books issued early in the war represented something of this kind. But in a last analysis the colored books did not give the evidence, but rather such evidence as the respective governments saw fit to give to the world in the interests of their particular case. Nor is this all; as most of you are aware, the so-called evidence of the colored books was partly falsified and distorted, the most flagrant case being that of the Russian orange book.[28] Much of it has now to be discarded for the more reliable and more extensive materials published since the war by different countries, especially by Austria, Russia, Germany, and Great Britain. France has thus far not seen fit to give any further docu-

[28] Cp. G. von Romberg, *The falsification of the Russian orange book*, tr. from the German, N. Y., 1923.

ments on her pre-war diplomacy to the public save the yellow books on the Balkan question.

A discussion of the official publications by the different governments of their pre-war diplomatic records would take me too far afield. They are of the greatest importance and will, in the very nature of the case, constitute the foundations on which the international history for the period will have to be written.

The first revelations came from Soviet Russia. In a remarkable series of volumes, still in process of publication, the objectives and methods of Tsarist diplomacy are being revealed. The documents, ably edited by Professor E. A. Adamov, Director of the Archives of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, are of fascinating interest and importance in the history of European diplomacy. The two volumes on Constantinople and the Straits reveal with startling clearness the objectives of Russian diplomacy in the Near East, especially the ever recurring Byzantine dream of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great with respect to Constantinople. To realize this the Tsarist government pressed for and obtained the support of France, negotiated the Raconigi agreement with Italy and developed a policy in the Balkans which became progressively clearer and more aggressive.

The mere titles of the volumes thus far published suggest the value of the materials they contain for the student of European international relations before the World War.[29] The first volume to appear is entitled *A collection of secret documents from the archives of the former minister of for-*

[29] *Collection of secret documents from the archives of the former ministry of foreign affairs,* Petrograd, 1917; *European powers and Greece during the World War according to secret material,* etc., edited by E. A. Adamov, Moscow, 1922; *The European powers and Turkey during the World War according to secret documents of the former ministry of foreign affairs,* edited by E. A. Adamov, Moscow, 1924; *Constantinople and the Straits according to secret documents of the former ministry of foreign affairs,* edited by E. A. Adamov, 2 vols., Moscow, 1925–26.

eign affairs. The second is on *The European powers and Greece during the World War*, and the third on *The European powers and Turkey during the World War*. In the next two are brought together the documents on *Constantinople and the Straits*.

Another series of closely related documents have been appearing in the *Krasny Archiv* (*Red archives*) edited by the Central archives of U. S. S. R.[30] The materials are varied and extremely rich, being drawn not only from the state archives, but from police and civil service records and from private sources. Only a part relate to foreign affairs, the rest to domestic matters, especially to the revolutionary movement. Of those concerned with international relations the following are of peculiar interest: volume I., *Russian-German relations;* volume III., *Reports of the former minister of foreign affairs, S. D. Sazonov, to Nicholas Romanov, 1910–1912;* volume IV., *The beginning of the War of 1914: diary of the former minister of foreign affairs* (from July 3–16 to July 20, 1914) ; volume VIII., *Diplomatic preparation of the Balkan war, 1912*. This is being supplemented by a second volume now in preparation on the same subject, and by volume XV., on *The first Balkan war*, which contains the diplomatic correspondence covering the period from May 14, to October 5, 1912, including telegrams of Russian ministers in the Balkan States, of the Russian ambassadors in Paris, as well as instructions sent out to them by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Petersburg. Of especial interest is the volume published in 1926 on *Tsarist Russia in the World War*. It is ably edited by Petrovsky and arranged in four divisions dealing respectively with Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania and Italy.

Part of the official correspondence between the Russian

[30] The *Krasny Archiv* (*Red archives*), Moscow, 1923. More than twenty volumes have appeared to date. They are edited by the Tsentralnii Archiv (Central archives) of U. S. S. R.

foreign ministry and Isvolsky, the Tsar's ambassador in Paris, was published in French by René Marchand, a member of the French socialist group, in two volumes soon after the war.[31] More recently a German scholar, F. Stieve, brought together a great many others, and adding to them those of Marchand, brought out a new collection of Isvolsky's correspondence in four volumes, with a searching, though biased, biographical study of Isvolsky himself.[32]

The secret archives of the Foreign Office of Imperial Germany have fared very much like those of Russia. Following the defeat of the German armies, the government of the empire broke down, and the republic was proclaimed. The new government, eager to discredit the kaiser and the old régime, appointed a commission headed by Karl Kautsky, the socialist historian, to examine the records of the Foreign Office. The commission did not find exactly the incriminating evidence it confidently expected, but it discovered enough, and published the so-called "Kautsky documents." [33]

Dissatisfied with the inadequate character of the story of pre-war diplomacy revealed by the documents relating to the years immediately preceding 1914, the government of the republic decided to lay bare the whole story of imperial diplomacy from the date of the founding of the empire to the outbreak of the World War. The events and developments of 1912–1914 were after all either directly or indirectly the results of the policies of earlier years, and only by going back to the origins of the alliances and ententes, and by tracing their evolution in the light of plans and motives revealed in the documents year by year could a

[31] *Un livre noir. Diplomatie d'avant guerre d'aprés les documents russes,* edited by René Marchand, 2 vols., Paris, 1922–23.

[32] *Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis, 1911–14,* edited by F. Stieve, 4 vols., Berlin, 1925.

[33] *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch,* edited by Karl Kautsky, Walter Shücking, Max Monteglas, A. Mendelsohn-Bartholdy, 4 vols., Berlin, 1919; translated under the title, *Outbreak of the World War,* 2 vols., N. Y., 1924.

scientific view of the history of pre-war diplomacy be obtained. In 1919, the series now known to every student of modern history as *Die grosse Politik*[34] was started. The editors were given a free hand to publish any and every document that seemed to them of importance in the history of Germany's international relations during the forty-four years of the existence of the empire.

By revealing the truth, said Rathenau before the Reichstag in 1922, the great publication will contribute greatly to the moral peace of the world. The work is still in progress, over forty volumes having appeared. Because of the momentous importance of the events with which it deals and more especially through the fact that they relate to so recent a period, the work not only gives us the most important series of diplomatic documents published up to the present, but it breaks the long established precedent of secrecy and silence. For these reasons, too, it has attracted the attention of scholars and statesmen in all parts of the world. Literally scores of historians, students, journalists and others are searching these volumes for light on the foreign policies, not only of Germany, but of the other powers.

A French translation is being made under the auspices of *La société de l'histoire de la guerre*, with the well known historian, A. Aulard, as general editor.[35] This translation departs considerably from the German original in the matter of arrangement. In the latter the editors adopted the topical method with a chronological arrangement of the documents on each large topic or division. As a result large documents are often divided, one part being found under one topic, another under another. The French adopted the

[34] *Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914,* edited by J. Lepsius, A. Mendelsohn-Bartholdy and F. Thimme, Berlin, 1922.

[35] *La politique extérieure de l'Allemagne, 1870–1914,* Paris, 1927. The first volume, translated by Henri Audoin has just appeared, with the scholarly introduction by Aulard.

simple chronological arrangement following in that the practice of their yellow books. To facilitate the use of the materials, however, a topical table of contents is added. This is not the place to discuss the relative merits of the two plans. Each has its merits; together they supplement each other admirably, one serving as a check upon the other. The French translation, for example, because of its chronological arrangement will show at a glance where the selection of documents has been liberal and where meagre, and probably prove very helpful in suggestions as to other documents for publication.

Austria opened her archives soon after the war, and R. Gooss published three important volumes on Austro-Hungarian pre-war diplomacy,[36] followed later by A. E. Pribram's *Secret treaties of Austria-Hungary.*[37] Several years ago the British foreign office decided to publish extensive selections of the more important documents relating to its foreign policy, entrusting the editorship to the able scholarship of Professor G. P. Gooch and Colonel Harold Temperley.[38]

In the meantime it is rumored that several of the minor countries, especially Serbia, are preparing to publish state records. France, as we have seen, adheres to the old policy of absolute secrecy, declining to follow the example of the other powers. This is the more regrettable because of the important position of France in The Triple *Entente*, which makes the archives of the French foreign office of unusual significance in the study of the international policies and relations of the period.

Despite the fact, however, that so much of the material

[36] *The Austrian red book,* edited by R. Gooss, 3 vols., London, 1922.

[37] *The secret treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879–1914,* by A. F. Pribram, ed. by A. C. Coolidge, Cambridge, Mass., 1922–23.

[38] *British official documents on the origins of the war, 1898–1914,* selected and edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, 11 vols., London, 1926—. Only the last volume has appeared thus far.

for the history of the relations between the European powers on the period before the war is becoming available, we are very far from being ready to write the story. The raw materials are in part present. But before sound conclusions on many points can be arrived at much critical work is necessary. The documents are so extensive, they vary greatly in character and importance, and are often contradictory and difficult to interpret even if we accept as authentic and correct the published text. Added to this is the all too prevalent tendency to overemphasize the documents. There seems to be a sort of cult of the diplomatic document abroad in the land. I know of no other type of historical source material so liable to misconstruction and abuse in the hands of the untrained and uncritical. There is nothing sacrosanct about the documents of the foreign office. They are the most human of documents, and like all human documents call for more careful checking than other source material.

Into the question of the relative importance of the different groups of sources just mentioned, I cannot enter. They vary greatly even in themselves, according to their relation to the topic that is being studied. Source material, which is comparatively worthless for one type of problem, may become of first-rate importance in the study of a subject of a different nature. But even apart from this, every shade or degree of dependability may be found. The point is well illustrated by the diversity and character of the materials of the in-letters of the British foreign office. These contain the letters, reports, and other correspondence of the ambassadors and other agents abroad to the foreign minister at home. As a rule they are less objective than the out-letters, which contain instructions, memoranda, statements of policy, and the like, emanating from the foreign office itself. At times even the most plausible are misleading.

Many of you will recall Talleyrand's boastful claim of having originated and carried through the plan for Belgian

neutrality. He gave a graphic account of the matter in his letters written from the London conference to Sebastiani, his chief, in Paris. The version was generally accepted and is today incorporated in most of the accounts of the establishment of the neutrality of Belgium. Some years ago, while working in the archives at Vienna, I came upon an entirely different version. Checking up on this in two other foreign offices I have been forced to the conclusion that the idea was really not Talleyrand's at all, but Palmerston's, and that the representatives of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia decided that the best way to secure the support of France for Belgian neutrality was to subtly suggest it to Talleyrand and get him to promote it as his own particular idea. The scheme worked admirably and the powers were relieved from all anxiety.

This incident in the diplomatic career of the wily Talleyrand suggests the danger of an overemphasis of some of the statements by Isvolsky on the now moot questions of the origins of the war. We know the Russian was quite as much of an egotist and equally inclined to overrate his own rôle. On the other hand there can be no question as to the importance of the Isvolsky documents. The testimony of the correspondence between the Russian ambassador to France and his superior Sasonov at St. Petersburg on the policies of the two governments must be accepted till it is shown to be false. The letters and dispatches were written week by week over a period of years. They reflect not only the policies of the Russian government but Isvolsky's efforts at carrying them out; further they were written without the slightest idea that they would be published for many years. A motive for deception on any large scale would be difficult to establish. According to every canon of historical criticism, they outweigh anything that may be claimed later, even by the participants in the events, unless such claims are supported by contemporary and unprejudiced testimony. On the other

hand, in view of the importance of the questions involved, the Isvolsky documents as published have still to be subjected to the textual criticism and comparison with the originals before historical scholarship can be fully satisfied. René Marchand got most of his documents in the archives. Stieve used Marchand and the text of others as they appeared from time to time in the Red archive series and elsewhere.

More thought and study must also be given to the character and habits of diplomats upon whose word important conclusions are based. There is such a thing as a *veracity coefficient* or, as Poincaré would have it, a *mendacity coefficient.* Diplomats are extremely human. They vary greatly in their ways of saying things. Even so conservative a person as Aberdeen was accused by Lord Ellenborough of always using expressions stronger than his meaning, even sufficient "to make the emperor of Russia jump six feet high." [39] Talleyrand's tendency to exaggerate his own rôle is well known. Many similar incidents might be cited, even of our own presidents. The historian who applied the same standard of measurements to statements of successive presidents in recent years, would certainly have much to correct in his findings. Some men are enthusiastic and positive in their statements, others cautious and negative. Coleridge once asked Lamb if he had ever heard him preach. "My dear Samuel," said Lamb, "I have never heard you do anything else." Some people habitually preach, others exaggerate, a few understate the case.

Statements of policy and instructions to ambassadors and other agents abroad have as a rule fewer pitfalls for the unwary. Nevertheless the practices of the different foreign offices must be studied. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the searcher is often confronted by two sets of instructions; one, to the regularly appointed representative,

[39] Ellenborough, *Political diary,* I, 235, quoted by Cecil, in *Cambridge history of British foreign policy,* III, 564.

and the other, secret instructions of quite a different purport, to a special agent. There is also the problem of discriminating early in one's archival work between different drafts of instructions and the final dispatches themselves. Very often they are not earmarked and internal evidence has to be resorted to. I recall losing much needed time in the German foreign office working over a memorandum of Bismarck on the question of the acquisition by Napoleon III of the Belgian railroads because I failed to sense the fact that the document I was studying was only a project and did not represent the final decision. Napoleon I was prone to call for memoranda from his departmental heads, give them a rapid, searching survey and send them back with criticism and suggestions hastily scrawled across the margin over his graphic initial "N." The final results were often not reached till several revisions had been made.

Another question of fundamental importance to every student of diplomatic history is the question as to who determines policies and how far these are subject to control and revision.[40] The student must determine as clearly as he can, the constitutional position of the foreign office. A knowledge of the relationship of the minister of foreign affairs to the crown on the one hand, and to parliament on the other is vital to any successful research in diplomatic affairs.

Here again the greatest differences both in the theory and the practice of different countries occur. Even in the same country it varies with each generation and not infrequently

[40] This subject has received a great deal of attention since the war. Among the numerous works in recent years may be cited A. Ponsonby, *Democracy and diplomacy*, London, 1915; . . . *Parliament and foreign policy*, London, 1915; D. P. Heatley, *Diplomacy and the study of international relations;* J. Barthelemy, *Démocratie et la politique étrangère*, Paris, 1917; Sir Harry Johnston, *Common sense in foreign policy*, London, 1913. On the direction and control of foreign affairs in the United States there are the important studies by E. S. Corwin, *The president's control of foreign relations*, Princeton, 1917, and Quincy Wright, *The control of American foreign relations*, N. Y., 1922.

with successive ministers.[41] The conduct of foreign affairs was, down to a relatively late period, regarded as a peculiar prerogative of the crown. The gradual emancipation of the foreign office from monarchical control constitutes one of the interesting institutional developments of democratic government. But in many countries royal control was replaced by an equally despotic control exercised by a small "junta" of the ministry. The absolutism of the crown made way for the despotism of the foreign office.

In England, down to the present day, treaties and conventions have been made without the consent or even the knowledge of the House of Commons being necessary. Criticizing the government's Russian policy in 1908, Lord Curzon described the general situation admirably:

> We concede, and I think rightly concede in this country a wide and almost unlimited discretion in treaty-making to our governments. They conduct their negotiations in absolute secrecy. Parliament knows little of what is going on, and the public know less. From time to time a minister with artless candour may lift a corner of the veil and disclose the ravishing beauty of the object behind. In the present case we were denied even that privilege. The government has, it is true, power to consult, or not to consult, experts as they please. I think it hardly possible that they have done so in the present instance. They can sign a treaty at any moment they please, and I have noticed as a rather remarkable coincidence that treaties have a habit of being signed a few days after the rising of the House of Commons. In that way immunity from parliamentary criticism for at least six months is secured.[42]

[41] In November 1911 the House of Commons, after an earnest debate on this subject, passed a resolution directing its ambassadors abroad to report on the conduct and control of Foreign Affairs in the country to which they were accredited. Some of the reports are excellent and the series as a whole constitutes a very valuable review of the then current theory and practice. Parl. Papers, 1912–13, Accounts and Papers. Misc. LXVIII. Cd. 6102.

[42] *Parliamentary debates,* Fourth series, vol. 183, 999.

Frequent efforts to reform this condition have occurred.[43] In 1886 the discussion precipitated a long debate on the subject. Since the war the demands have become more numerous, reaching a climax in the debate in 1925 on Mr. Trevelyan's motion which reads in part as follows:—

That no treaty shall be ratified and no diplomatic arrangement or understanding with a Foreign State involving, directly or indirectly, national obligations, shall be concluded without the consent of Parliament, and no preparations for co-operation in war between the naval, military, or air staffs, and the naval, military, or air staffs of a Foreign State shall be lawful unless consequent upon such arrangement or understanding; and this Resolution shall be communicated to all States with which this country is in diplomatic relations and to the League of Nations.[44]

Of course, the motion was lost; no one expected it to pass.

On the other hand if this reticence prevails in so important a matter as treaties, it is hardly to be expected that parliament would be adequately informed as to the steps in the negotiations, or on those subtler obligations growing out of conversations or correspondence between ministers. A recent illustration of the working of the system is seen in the Grey-Cambon Letters, which, in 1912, finally incorporated in writing the relations between France and England, established by the military conversations begun seven years before, and carried on during most of the period without the knowledge of the cabinet or parliament.[45] A record of the first conversation was sent to three of the ministers, and a fourth was told about it.[46] The rest of the cabinet was

[43] Cp. *Parliamentary debates,* Fifth series, vol. 104, 861–901, vol. 181, 1430–78.

[44] Cp. *Parliamentary debates:* series 5, vol. 181, 1430.

[45] Sir Edward Grey, *Twenty-five years,* I, 94–95. Cp. also the British *Blue book* and the French *Yellow book.*

[46] *Ibid.,* I, 72, 74, 83–84. Grey had told Cambon on Jan. 15, 1906, that

not informed, according to the secretary's own statement, because of the exigencies of the elections, and because, after all, the ministers were quite inexperienced in such matters. Parliament and the country continued in ignorance. Suspicious ones in parliament asked questions but failed to elicit a satisfactory reply. Not until August 3, 1914, two years later when the war had started, did Grey inform the Commons and the country. Even then he omitted to read the last sentence of his own letter which reads as follows: "If those measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the governments would then decide what effect should be given them." But events moved rapidly. The following day Viviani read the two letters including the last sentence to the Chamber of Deputies and published them in the *Yellow book*.

In France there is a committee on foreign affairs, but there is little evidence that it has exercised serious control over the policies of the Quai d'Orsay. By Article VIII of the Organic Law. "The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies treaties. He communicates them to the Chambers as soon as the interests and safety of the state permit." This manifestly places in his hands the right to determine when the "interests of the state" make it wise for him to inform the legislature of conventions and treaties he may have negotiated. True, treaties of peace and commerce do not become definitive until they have been voted by the two chambers. But as everyone knows these are not the treaties that really matter.

In the debates in 1911 on the German accord of that year, Maurice Dancour introduced a motion asking the foreign minister to prepare a *Yellow book* on the subject.[47] The debate, he claimed, could not proceed intelligently with-

while the military conversation might proceed, "it must be understood that these communications did not commit either government."

[47] *Journal officiel*, Chambre débats, sess. extr. 1911, pp. 3643.

out the information the *Yellow book* would give. Foreign Minister de Selves and Premier Caillaux objected. They must first obtain the consent of foreign governments before publishing certain of the documents. Of course, the debate on the treaty took place without the *Yellow book*, the government assuring the chamber that it would publish it as soon as its hands were free, "aussitôt qu'il a dependu de lui." [48]

The deputies like the members of the other lower houses have, of course, the right to ask questions. Article 48 of the rules deals with the problem and the concluding paragraph says:

> Les ministres ont la faculté de déclarer par écrit que l'intérêt public leur interdit de répondre ou, â titre exceptionnel, qu'il réclament un délai pour rassembler les éléments de leur réponse.

Such rules give little encouragement to the members to occupy themselves with foreign affairs. A careful count made in connection with this study shows that 5424 *questions écrites* were asked from April 1910 to April 1914. In June and July 1914, during the brief session following the general election and just before the war, 338 more came in.

Strange as it may seem, however, only a small number were addressed to the foreign minister, and of these, all but a few had to do with minor questions. On November 26, 1912, M. Brisson asked the foreign minister to tell the chambers "to what France is engaged by the terms of the secret treaty of alliance between France and Russia, and by those of the Franco-English *Entente*." The minister's reply was that "the government cannot reply to this question." [49] A week later Camille Reboul asked the foreign minister

[48] *Journal officiel,* p. 2544. During the discussion Louis Marin pointed out that no *Yellow book* had been distributed to the members in the last two years. *Ibid.,* pp. 3643–47.

[49] *Journal officiel,* Chambre débats, 1912, p. 2915.

"whether he could make known the claims and the consequences of the treaty of alliance with Russia." He received the same reply.[50] In connection with the interpellations in March 1911, Deputy Jaurès declared:

> It is a scandalous and monstrous thing that today in the European and world-wide civilization, there are secret treaties between two great peoples which may be in contradiction to the will of the people themselves and to the stipulations of public law.[51]

In an interesting debate in March 1912, Jacques Pion of the Right pointed out that five secret treaties had been made between 1902 and 1909, and that the one with Italy was still secret.

As for imperial Germany, there existed, among other insignificant checks, a consultative committee on foreign affairs in the federal council presided over by Bavaria. But its control over the determination of policy was quite unimportant. The emperor exercised autocratic power in the conduct of foreign affairs, although in practice a great deal of latitude seems to have been left for considerable intervals, at least, to the chancellor and influential persons like "his gray Eminence, Holstein," in the foreign office.[52] Every now and then the erratic eruption of the imperial prerogative makes its appearance. The outstanding examples, are of course, the *Daily Telegraph* interview and the Kruger telegram. Another, rather less known, but more

[50] *Journal officiel,* Chambre débats, 1912, p. 10,402.

[51] *Journal officiel,* Chambre débats, Mar. 24, 1911, p. 1436.

[52] Von Eckhardstein remarks, in his *Ten years at the court of St. James,* that the true story of Germany's foreign policy will never be known because historians will fail to take account of Baron Holstein's activities and influence. Perhaps because of his warning, Holstein's rôle has received very searching attention and we are fairly clear on his share in the conduct of the German foreign office. With Bülow he sought the rapprochement with England while the kaiser favored an understanding with Russia till the rejection of the Björko accord showed the futility of efforts in that direction.

eloquent on the subject of the kaiser's petulant and dangerous intrusions into the affairs of the foreign office appears in the extraordinary marginal comments on the documents relating to the Serbian crisis during the fateful days of July 1914. Against the statement that his ambassador at Vienna had urged moderation on Austria, he wrote "Who authorized him to do this?" On Lichnowsky's dispatch from London the kaiser's irritation finds expression in such drastic phrases as "the Serbs must be finished as soon as possible." "Serbia's national dignity does not exist" . . . "The question has nothing to do with Grey; it is his Majesty Francis Joseph's affair. What colossal British impudence." [53]

The despotic, almost capricious, management of Austria-Hungary's foreign affairs before the World War is well known. Berchtold's delays in order to prevent Germany's suggestions that Austria moderate her policy, from reaching Francis Joseph while there was still time to act, was exposed soon after the war. Neither the Austrian nor the Hungarian parliaments had anything to do with the minister's policy and the delegations left matters too much to the ministers and the ruler. Berchtold's action is interesting, however, as an outstanding example of the power possessed by foreign ministers and executives to create a situation which may make war inevitable.[54]

In the United States we flatter ourselves that we have a constitution more or less fool proof on this score. We have a senate committee on foreign affairs and a senatorial veto on diplomatic appointments. But as every student of American diplomatic history knows, the sphere of executive ac-

[53] Karl Kautsky, *Die Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch.* The second volume has many interesting proofs of the kaiser's relations to the Foreign Office.

[54] The account of Berchtold's manipulation of the Berlin request is discussed by Pribram, Montgelas, Fay, and others.

tion is very wide.[55] Again and again in our history very serious conditions have been created by the president and the department of state; gentlemen's agreements have been made, conventions like that with Santo Domingo, and actual usurpations as in the case of Panama, have been executed without consulting even the senate committee on foreign relations. Commenting on the San Domingo affair Mr. Roosevelt said, "The Constitution did not exactly give me power to bring about the necessary agreement with San Domingo. But the Constitution did not forbid what I did. I put the agreement into effect and I continued its execution for two years before the Senate acted; and I would have continued it to the end of my term if necessary without any action by Congress." [56] If there is any doubt as to the seriousness of the subject, it will surely be quickly dispelled by a perusal of the terms of the understanding with Japan in 1905, as revealed in the Roosevelt-Lodge papers.

According to these, President Roosevelt in 1905, through his personal representative, definitely assured the prime minister of Japan, Count Katsura, of our coöperation with Great Britain and Japan in the Far East. An "agreed memorandum" [57] of the understanding was formally endorsed on July 31 by the president as follows: "Your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you would state to Katsura that I confirm every word you said." Our ambassador to Japan, Mr. Lloyd C. Griscom, was not informed, nor did the senate committee on foreign relations know anything about it. On the latter the president expressed himself forcibly on May 6: "As to

[55] For a discussion of this subject see E. S. Corwin, Quincy Wright, and others referred to above.

[56] *Theodore Roosevelt, an autobiography*, 1913, p. 551.

[57] Cp. "President Roosevelt's secret pact with Japan," *Current History Magazine*, Oct. 1924. The agreement involved, among other things, an assurance by the Japanese of peaceful intentions in regard to the Philippines, we in turn agreeing to acquiesce in the Japanese policy toward Korea.

what you say about the alliance, the trouble is, my dear Kennan, that you are speaking academically. Have you followed some of my experiences in endeavoring to get treaties through the Senate? I might just as well strive for the moon as for such a policy as you indicate . . . ."

Nevertheless, he committed the nation to a definite policy to which he would have been morally bound to adhere as long as he was in office, whether congress or the nation approved of it or not. Altogether the memorandum constitutes one of the most remarkable executive agreements in American history.

Equally instructive from the point of view of this discussion is the now famous voyage of our fleet around the world. In a way, it put to the test the indirect control of our foreign affairs claimed by congress through appropriations. There was, it will be recalled, money to send the fleet out, and the president, with a humorous sense of the realities of the situation, significantly said, that if congress didn't appropriate funds to bring it back it would stay there. While this is not exactly controlling our foreign relations, it comes very near doing so. Even the cabinet was not consulted in his policy. Mr. Roosevelt said later: "I determined on the move without consulting the Cabinet, precisely as I took Panama without consulting the Cabinet . . ." [58]

These illustrations are sufficient to demonstrate the need of discovering by whom, and in what manner, the policies of a government are determined. Unless this is done with considerable care, the student is not likely to approach his problem from the right angle.

In general it can be taken for granted that the control of foreign affairs by parliament is very slight. Apart from the fact that in most governments the executive is now

[58] *Opus. cit.* Cp. also 592–93, J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his time, shown in his letters,* 2 vols., N. Y., 1920.

elected either directly or indirectly by the people, the footprints of democracy are rarely found in the exclusive and jealously guarded preserve of the foreign office. Even conventions and treaties which furnish the student with so much satisfactory source material, cannot be read in the light of parliamentary origin and control. The same is true of the other phases of the foreign policies of different countries. The foreign minister usually acts first and tells parliament afterwards, that is, if he tells at all. What diplomats do not tell would make interesting reading. At any rate when parliament or congress get the information, a *fait accompli* has usually been established which it almost must accept.

I know of no more extraordinary spectacle associated with the functioning of democratic governments during the last half century, than the parrying and bluffing of successive foreign ministers in response to the efforts of the people's representatives to learn what was going on. The replies are usually so equivocal that they seem to be framed with a view to conceal rather than to convey information. After following the fate of interpellations and even of supplementary questions through several sessions, foreign ministers' replies can be anticipated, even as to the phraseology. At times it constitutes a sort of sport for the ministers, at others it becomes embarrassing and extremely serious. The results are usually baffling and disconcerting to the members. Speaking of Grey in this connection a member of the opposition said:

> Of all the members of the Cabinet is there one whom we would less like to tackle than the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs or to differ with him in any possible way? A man who ought to pose as a Machiavelli tells us in the House that he is not clever. He is a man who was only once in a passion, and that occasion was when he turned round upon us Radicals and, like

a Sphinx lashing its tail, called us to task for asking him inconvenient questions at convenient times.[59]

In the light of the extreme gravity of the issues involved, issues charged with potential tragedy in the life of nations, it is extraordinary that with all the boasted march of democracy this impenetrable veil is still interposed by mutual consent between the elected representatives of the people and the ministers to whom alone it is vouchsafed "to open and shut the doors of the Temple of Janus."

During the war a strong movement for reform developed. The people demanded that diplomacy be brought out into the open and that at least parliament be informed of what is going on. But the enthusiasm waned, and the will to reform weakened. Seemingly little or nothing has been accomplished in the reconstruction, except perhaps in the countries where new constitutions provide a more direct popular control of foreign affairs. In the opinion of many the statement of Lord Bryce still holds: "The adjustment of relations between the Executive and the Legislature in the conduct of foreign affairs has been one of the most difficult and indeed insoluble problems of practical politics." [60] Insoluble, says Mr. Rose, because diplomacy seems to demand "secrecy and large discretionary powers for its agents," while democracy demands popular discussion and sanction by the people. Until this difficulty is overcome the foreign office will remain the Achilles heel of all democratic governments.[61]

But it is not the function of the researcher to trouble himself about the merits or demerits of the method of conducting foreign affairs. As a historian he may, and should, draw his own conclusions, but as a searcher it is his business

[59] *Parliamentary debates,* new series, vol. 32, 2630.

[60] James Bryce, *Modern democracies,* 2 vols., New York, 1921, II, 74n.

[61] J. H. Rose, *The rise and growth of democracy in Great Britain,* Chicago, 1917, 237.

to acquaint himself with the political and constitutional conditions that are necessary for a right approach to his problem. Only by knowing by whom and in what manner the foreign policies of the government he is studying are determined can he understand and properly evaluate the evidence of the documents.

This by no means completes the task, however. There is another and more difficult work to be considered. It is an understanding of the rôle of economic and commercial influences in shaping the policies reflected in the diplomatic correspondence. In these days of economic imperialism every one is aware of the powerful rôle played by big business and by finance in shaping the foreign policies of a nation. The tendency is not new.

Grundy's *Thucydides and the history of his age*, shows the importance of economic conditions, especially the commercial, in the struggle between Athens and Sparta despite the fact that these factors are not mentioned in the classic history of the Peloponnesian War. Similar comment might be justly made of the principal wars of later history. Merely to mention the overthrow of Carthage, the crusades, the fight against Spanish supremacy, the Anglo-Dutch rivalry, the long struggle for colonial empire between France and England, the American Revolution, the Napoleonic War, and finally the World War is to suggest to the mind of every student of the foreign relations of these wars the determining influence of the commercial factor upon their development. The records of the Board of Trade reveal clearly how directly the commercial element made its wishes felt in that body and through it in the ministry and the foreign office. The industrial life and the consequent commercial and colonial rivalry, which developed between the great powers in the decades before the war, were dynamic factors in the relations between European states and had a good deal to do in bringing on the great struggle.

Diplomatic history, properly understood, involves an appreciation of all these factors in the development of foreign policies and the relations of nations. Not only can many important documents not be correctly interpreted without reference to these conditions, but the story as a whole cannot be seen in its true prospective unless it is projected upon a background created by them.

This is particularly true of the diplomatic history of contemporary Europe. Economic, social, and intellectual forces are operating more and more powerfully in the relations of states; the great financial and commercial institutions of our time like science and art do not stop at national frontiers. Year by year they are becoming increasingly stronger as positive factors in international affairs. Money and credit, great banking houses, international labor organizations, even political ideals and theories play a vastly more powerful rôle in the world today than do many of the so-called sovereign states. The Dawes plan was not worked out through the old time diplomatic channels any more than was the Bagdad Railway project. The huge European steel syndicate, through its leading French representative, has already served notice that in the future governments will have to consider the Cartel if they raise their tariff. The idea of an economic union of Europe, discussed with such alarm by an American writer in a recent article, comes from the financial and industrial magnates, not from the political leaders. Men of big business are deeply interested in foreign affairs because they wish to see foreign policies adapted to the needs of international business. More and more, diplomacy is being forced to take on economic functions also.

In the meantime thousands of men and women in all walks of life are becoming interested in international affairs, thinking along international lines, and becoming internationally minded, as it were. They are exercising powerful

pressure upon statesmen to act internationally. Post-war diplomacy may still be secret, but more and more the people of the world are demanding to know what is going on. Statesmen, in their turn, are taking the people into their confidence. If they do not, they know that they may be forced to do so by experts in different lines or by the political obligation to explain to the fifty-odd sister nations in the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva.

Besides, the experience of the last few decades demonstrates conclusively that there is neither merit in secrecy nor dynamite in publicity. Whether the League of Nations will or will not be the ultimate basis on which the international organization of our present day interdependent civilization is built up, it is clear that it is the medium—the clearing house—through which a new diplomacy with a new technique and new objectives, is being developed. In time this is bound to revolutionize the conduct of foreign affairs and greatly affect the course of the diplomatic history of our time. Perhaps the irreconcilable conflict between the foreign office and democracy may not prove to be so irreconcilable after all, and the Achilles heel of democracy may in time become as invulnerable as the rest of the body politic of modern democracies.

William E. Lingelbach

XII

ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA, IN 1835: A STUDY OF ANTE-BELLUM SOCIETY

NOTEWORTHY for natural beauty and rich in historic memory, the central cross-section of the Valley of Virginia,[1] long designated as the County of Rockbridge, offers much of interest to the visitor within its borders. The lofty Natural Bridge,[2] the sharp outline of House Mountain,[3] the view of the Blue Ridge from Vesuvius Creek,[4] and the wide vista of Goshen Pass [5] add distinction to a region whose scenery is everywhere varied and picturesque. Imagine a rugged landscape thirty-two miles long and twenty-six broad lying in the hollow between two high-flung mountain

1 The physical aspect of the Valley of Virginia which extends across the western portion of the state from Maryland to Tennessee is well described in Joseph Martin, *A new and comprehensive gazetteer of Virginia, etc.*, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1835, 19–20.

2 The Natural Bridge is located fourteen miles southeast of Lexington. Burnaby, an English traveler, first called public attention to it in 1759. Rockbridge County takes its name from this natural curiosity. *Ibid.*, 424, 427–32. Henry Howe, *Historical collections of Virginia, etc.*, Charleston, S. C., 1845, 456–60. Oren F. Morton, *A history of Rockbridge County, Virginia*, Staunton, 1920, 6–8.

3 House Mountain, which takes its name from its peculiar formation, is situated in the southwestern part of the county. In reality it is composed of two mountains, Big House Mountain and Little House Mountain, set one behind the other in such a manner that from many positions they appear as one. *Ibid.*, 10.

4 Vesuvius Creek, a short but tumultuous stream, empties into South River in the extreme northeastern part of the county.

5 Goshen Pass, five miles in length, is situated on the head-waters of the North River. Matthew Fontaine Maury so loved its wild beauty that he left a request that his body be taken to its permanent resting place by way of Goshen Pass at a time when the mountain laurel was in bloom. *Ibid.*, 9.

ranges.[6] Within this hollow picture two rivers wind past innumerable forest-covered hills until they form a single stream and eventually submerge in a greater river at the point where it turns and breaks the rocky eastern barrier blocking its way to the sea.[7] The range to the west is the Allegheny; that to the east the Blue Ridge. The two rivers are known as the North and the South; the greater river, as the James.

Rockbridge is reminiscent of the Highlands of Scotland and the broken country of the north of Ireland. In many places this resemblance is apparent in the rocky hills, in the creeks, in the rivers, in the forests, and in the soil. It reveals itself in the pink and white blossoms [8] which color the landscape in the spring; in the blue haze which obscures the mountain heights in summer; in the atmosphere of indolent charm which pervades the Valley upon a summer's day; in the changing scarlets, yellows, greens, and browns of the forest leaves in autumn; and in the dull gray fog, which drifts across the deep purple and the snow-white of the upland slopes in winter. It is found in the stillness broken only by the presence of man. It becomes a certainty with the sense of doom which dominates the soul when storm and tempest strike the Valley. It is not strange that the original population of Rockbridge was attracted to the region. They saw in it a reincarnation of an environment which had been their racial heritage in the old world.

In the seventeenth century a stubborn tenacity of religious views drove a group of followers of John Knox from Scotland to the north of Ireland.[9] In the eighteenth century,

[6] *Ibid.,* 1. According to Martin the mean length of Rockbridge is thirty-one miles and the mean width twenty-two miles. Martin, *Gazetteer,* 424.

[7] A good description of this pass, known as Balcony Falls, occurs in Martin, *Ibid.,* 425.

[8] The blossoms of fruit trees mingle with those of the mountain laurel and the rhododendron. The colors: rose, purple, pink and white from a distance appear pink and white.

[9] Less important but contributing causes for the emigration of Presby-

economic restraint and a revival of religious persecution forced the more spirited of their descendants to emigrate to America.[10] In the new world this people, now called the Scotch-Irish,[11] quickly located on the frontiers of civilization in Pennsylvania, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and other English colonies on the Atlantic coast.[12] No longer persecuted, for the most part content in their new homes, it seemed probable that their wanderings had come to an end. Actually the tradition of unrest had been with them too long to be lightly laid aside. Hardly had they taken up their residence before the lure of economic opportunity in the west made itself felt. As settlements grew in size and unoccupied land of value became a thing of phantasy, the more venturesome again and again moved westward.[13]

Among these pioneers may be mentioned one Ephraim

terians from Scotland to North Ireland, are found in the contemporary border lawlessness and governmental restrictions upon commerce. Henry Jones Ford, *The Scotch-Irish in America* (1915), 86, 89–90, 110.

10 *Ibid.*, 165, 170, 181–86. Joseph A. Waddell, *Annals of Augusta County, Virginia, etc.*, Richmond, 1886, 2–5. Morton, *Rockbridge Co.*, 15–16.

11 The term Scotch-Irish is technically incorrect. While the majority of the emigrants to America listed under this name were originally Lowland Scotch who had settled in North Ireland, they also included a goodly number from the north of England, a lesser number from Wales, France, Holland, Germany, and even a few native Irish. The Presbyterian faith formed a common bond between them. John S. MacIntosh, "The Scotch-Irish: the term and the fact," in *Proceedings and addresses of the ninth congress of the Scotch-Irish society of America* (Nashville, 1900), 182–83.

12 In the initial migrations of the Scotch-Irish practically every one of the thirteen colonies received a quota of emigrants either by direct voyage from Ireland or by filtration from one colony to another along the coast. The largest settlement took place in Pennsylvania. Ford, *The Scotch-Irish,* 170, 181–86, 215–18, 221. James Shaw, *The Scotch-Irish in history,* Springfield, Ill., 1899, 167–72. Patrick Calhoun, "Scotch-Irish, in Georgia," in *Proceedings of the Scotch-Irish society of America* (Nashville, 1892), 140–44. I. W. Avery, "The Scotch-Irish settlers and statesman of Georgia," *Ibid.*, 204. MacIntosh, "The Scotch-Irish in early colonial days," *Ibid.* (Nashville, 1900), 188–92. Morton, *Rockbridge County,* 14–15, 18.

13 The westward streams of migration flowed northwest, west and southwest from Pennsylvania and Virginia; and west and southwest from North and South Carolina, and Georgia. *Ibid.*, 21. Ford, *The Scotch-Irish,* 216–20.

McDowell and his relatives, who journeyed up the Valley of Virginia from Pennsylvania in the year of our Lord 1736.[14] Passing over the rich rolling country of the Lower Valley,[15] the little group eventually entered the rocky region of the Benjamin Borden Grant.[16] Influenced by the environment and the favorable terms of settlement offered by Borden, they determined to go no further. Word spread quickly and within two years one hundred families took up their residence in the tract.[17] Thereafter the population consistently increased, until, by 1778, it numbered about four thousand individuals.[18] It is noticeable here that the racial predominance of the Scotch-Irish, so evident in the initial generation, continued through the later years and exists to the present day.[19]

At first the land comprising the Borden Grant formed a minor portion of that fabulous Orange county whose boundaries embraced so large a share of the Old Northwest. In 1739 upon the division of Orange into Frederick and Augusta it fell to the lot of Augusta. Botetourt, which had been formed from Augusta in 1770, for a time included a portion of the Borden Grant. However, in October 1777 the legislature passed an act which separated the latter

[14] Morton prefers the year 1737 as the date of first settlement. Morton, *Rockbridge County,* 21. Howe, *Historical collections,* 453. Waddell, *Augusta County,* 16.

[15] Pennsylvania Germans, originally from the Upper Rhine district, had already largely settled the northern half of Augusta and other counties of the Lower Valley. *Ibid.,* 9–10. Howe, *Historical collections,* 451–53.

[16] *Ibid.,* 453. Waddell, *Augusta County,* 16. Morton, *Rockbridge County,* 21–28.

[17] *Ibid.,* 24.

[18] A number of settlers came directly from Ireland to Augusta and Rockbridge counties. *Ibid.,* 22–24. Waddell, *Augusta County,* 16–17. Howe, *Historical collections,* 453.

[19] Rockbridge County is one of the few places in America where the original racial stock, highly homogeneous in itself, has remained practically unchanged up to the present time. This has meant the preservation of former habits and customs to an unusual extent. *Ibid.,* 453. Waddell, *Augusta County,* 13.

from Botetourt and Augusta, and created it as an individual county under the name of Rockbridge. With the exception of ceding the territory west of Camp Mountain to Botetourt in 1785, subsequent legislatures made no change in the boundaries specified in the act of 1777.[20]

By 1835 Rockbridge had a population of slightly over 14,000, well scattered throughout the region.[21] Lexington, the county seat, founded in 1778, was the principal town, and boasted a population of about nine hundred.[22] Cedar Grove on North River, Brownsburg near Hay's Creek, Fairfield about fifteen miles north of Lexington, and Fancy Hill in the southeastern part of the county, constituted the principal villages.[23]

True to their Presbyterian faith the Scotch-Irish pioneers erected churches almost upon their arrival. The Rev. John Blair, of the Presbytery of New Castle, organized New Providence Church as early as 1746 and about the same time those of Timber Ridge, Falling Springs, and Forks of James River.[24] Other Presbyterian establishments fol-

20 The act of the legislature was passed in October 1777 and went into effect the next year, 1778. *Ibid.*, 19–20, 131, 164. Martin, *Gazetteer*, 424, 426. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 76–78. Howe, *Historical collections*, 448.

21 *Ibid.*, 448. The figures 14,244 for 1830, and 14,284 for 1840, indicate a very small increase in population in this period. Emigration to the Northwest, West and Southwest largely accounts for this situation. *Virginia state auditor's report: population statistics 1830–1850*, Richmond, 1851, 21. Martin, *Gazetteer*, 67.

22 *Ibid.*, 426–27. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 147, 150. Howe, *Historical collections*, 448.

23 *Ibid.*, 448. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 156–58. Martin gives the population of Brownsburg as 120 and that of Fairfield as 130. The other villages were considerably smaller. Martin, *Gazetteer*, 424–27.

24 All four of these churches continue to the present day, the Forks of James River Church or Hall's Meeting House as it was often called, later taking the name of New Monmouth. Among other Presbyterian churches in existence in 1835 we find those of Bethesda, Oxford, and Collierstown. A Methodist church was founded in Lexington shortly after 1823. Neriah, a Baptist church, located about five miles from Lexington, was established in 1816. A union church was organized at Hamilton's Schoolhouse as early as 1820 and another at Rapp's Mill in 1830. *Ibid.*, 453. Waddell, *Augusta County*, 17, 50. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 173–79.

lowed shortly. Although a few of the inhabitants of the county acknowledged allegiance to rival denominations, such as the Methodists, the Baptists, and the Episcopalians, in no instance did any one of these achieve sufficient strength to form a permanent congregation until the first half of the nineteenth century. Nothwithstanding competition dating from that period Presbyterianism continued to be the prevailing religious belief.[25] Dr. Reed, an English minister who toured America in behalf of the Congregational Union of England and Wales in the middle thirties, has recorded in a series of letters his impressions of the religious life of this country. His observations of Rockbridge, which began at Lexington, are penetrating and of considerable interest:

On the morning of the Sabbath, I attended an interesting service at my friend's church.[26] It was placed at the head of the town, on elevated ground, commanding a pretty view of it and of the blue mountains in the distance. It had a paddock attached to it for the use of the horses during the time of worship, and there were forty or fifty now occupying it. All the persons who came in from the vicinity, came on horseback; and the horses are nearly as numerous as the people of these parts. The church had five doors, and these and all the windows were open in consequence of the heat of the weather. This created some distraction to the congregation. Besides, there were fans in motion everywhere, and small kegs full of water with ladles were placed in the window seats and beneath the pulpit, which were used by the children, not only before, but during the service, and this caught the attention of a stranger, but did not seem much to discompose the people. The galleries were mostly occupied by blacks. The general attendance was good: the congregation wore a serious complexion; but there were not wanting some instances of negligent and irreverent manners.[27]

[25] *Ibid.*, Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 177–79.
[26] This was a Presbyterian church presided over by the Rev. J. Douglas.
[27] Andrew Reed and James Matheson, *A narrative of a visit to the American churches*, New York, 1835, 150–51.

Dr. Reed's religious interest transcended even divergence of creed. . . .

> . . . As the Methodists were just assembling for service I expressed a wish to unite with them. There were a few persons present; not more than 150. A gentleman, one of their local preachers, took the duties of the pulpit. The services in his hands were very uninteresting. He had much conceit, poor wit and many words; and all he said was gabbled and uttered seemingly by rote. His address abounded with such plumed and wise expressions as—"I put it to your rationality—white-robed angels of light—your spirit shall flutter before God in never ending bliss"—and "when you hear the clods of the valley tumbling in your coffin." It was a sorry affair—. This, however, is no specimen of the average means possessed by this people.[28]

The condition of religion among the blacks appealed strongly to Dr. Reed. His sympathy for their status is quickly apparent.

> I learned that in the afternoon there would be worship at the African Church, and I resolved to go. My obliging friend, Mr. Carruthers,[29] attended me. The building called a church is without the town, and placed in a hollow, so as to be out of sight; it is, in the fullest sense, "without the gate." It is a poor log-house, built by the hands of the negroes, and so placed, as to show that they must worship by stealth. It is, perhaps, 20 by 25; with boarding and rails, breast high, run around three sides, so as to form galleries. To this is added a lean-to to take the overplus, when the fine weather should admit of larger numbers. There were three small openings, besides the door and the chinks in the buildings, to admit light and air. The place was quite full, the women and men arranged on opposite sides; and though on a cold or rainy day,

28 Morton, *Rockbridge County,* 154–55.

29 Probably John Franklin Caruthers: Rockbridge County; A. B. Washington College 1814–1815; prominent as a merchant and agriculturist; trustee of Washington College, 1835–1840; died 1840. *Catalogue of officers and alumni of Washington and Lee University 1749–1888,* Lexington, 1888, 38, 68.

there might have been much discomfort, the impression now was very pleasing. In the presence of a powerful sun, the whole body were in strong shadow; and the light streaming through the warped and broken shingle on the glistening black faces of the people, filled the spectacle with animation. I had taken my place by the door, and was waiting the commencement.

By the law of the state, no colored persons are permitted to assemble for worship, unless a white person be present and preside. On this account, the elders of Mr. Douglas's church attend in turn, that the poor people may not lose the privileges they prize.[30] At this time, two whites and two blacks were in the pulpit. One of the blacks, addressing me as their "Strange Master" begged that I would take charge of the service. I declined doing so. He gave out Dr. Watts' beautiful psalm, "Show pity, Lord; O Lord forgive." &c. They all rose immediately. They had no books, for they could not read; but it was printed on their memory, and they sang it off with freedom and feeling. There is much melody in their voice; and when they enjoy a hymn, there is a raised expression of the face, and an undulating motion of the body, keeping time with the music, which is very touching.[31]

One of the elders then prayed; and the other followed him, by reading and exposition of Scripture. The passage was on relative and social duties; and I could not avoid observing how it reflected on the conduct of the white, and pleaded for the poor slave. They sang again "Come ye that love the Lord," and with equal freedom

[30] Cornelius C. Baldwin, editor of the Lexington paper, in commenting upon Dr. Reed's observations of religious conditions among the negroes, strongly objected to his statement that they must worship by stealth. He also denied the existence of any law requiring the presence of a white man when they met for religious purposes. According to his view the elders of the Presbyterian church customarily sent one of their congregation to the negro church because of a desire to be of aid and service and for no other reason. *Lexington Gazette,* October 23, 1835. While as regards this particular instance Mr. Baldwin was undoubtedly correct, nevertheless, the general agitation arising from the Nat Turner insurrection in 1831 and increasing abolition activities of the north, of which Dr. Reed was undoubtedly aware, had made the Virginia public suspicious of negro assemblies of any kind and lent a slight degree of color to Dr. Reed's remarks.

[31] The manner in which the negroes sang their hymns strongly suggests the syncopated music of the present day. It is possible we have one of the origins of it here.

and pleasure. The senior black who was a preacher among them, then offered prayer and preached. His prayer was humble and devotional. In one portion of it he made an affecting allusion to their wrongs. 'Thou knowest," said the good man, with a broken voice, "our state—that it is the meanest—that we are as mean and low as men can be. But we have sinned,—we have forfeited all our rights to Thee—and we would submit before Thee to these marks of thy displeasure."

He took for the text of his sermon those words, "The Spirit saith, come," etc. He spoke with connexion of our original distance; of the means provided for our approach and redemption—of the invitation as founded on these—and closed by an earnest and well sustained appeal to them to act on the gracious Invitation. "Ah sirs!" he exclaimed, "do you ask what it is to come? Oh it is to know your own weakness; it is to know your own unworthiness; it is to know that you are sinners, and ready to fall into hell for your sins; it is to fly to Jesus Christ, as your help, and as your Saviour; and to cry, 'Lord, save, or I perish!'—To come! Oh it is to fall down at his feet—to receive him as your new Master—to become new creatures—and to live a new life of faith and obedience," etc.,—"O sirs!" He continued, "that you would come! how can I persuade you to come! I have seen the good and the evil! I have seen the Christian dying, and I have seen the sinner dying." He spoke of both and then referred to his own experience—the change religion had made in him—the happiness he had had since he knew it—the desire he had that they should be happy likewise. It was indeed a very earnest and efficient appeal.

Mr. Carruthers kindly reminded me, as he paused, that it was time to leave, if I fulfilled my intention of going to the Presbyterian Church. But I felt I could not leave before the close. I could have done so in ordinary circumstances; but I could not bring myself to do anything that might seem disrespectful to this band of despised and oppressed Christians.

The other man of colour followed with a spontaneous address, meant to sustain the impression. He had some conceit and forwardness in his manner but much point in what he said. He concluded by noticing what had been doing among them lately; and by calling upon those who were really concerned to come to the Saviour, to

show it by occupying the anxious seat. They sang again, and while singing some forms before the pulpit were cleared, and about twelve persons knelt down at them with great seriousness of manner. There was no confusion, and the act of coming out does perhaps less violence to their feelings, as they are a small body, and are on an equality. One of the elders now took the matter into his hands and offered prayer. Had he sought to cool down the state of feeling, it could not have been better done. But there was no need for this; for there was no extravagance. They then rose and sang and separated. This was the first time I had worshipped with an assembly of slaves; and I shall never forget it. I was certainly by sympathy bound with those who were bound; while I rejoiced, on their account, afresh in that divine truth, which makes us free indeed, which lifts the soul on high, unconscious of a chain.

Much has been said, and is still said, about the essential inequality of the races. That is a question which must be settled by experiment. Here the experiment was undoubtedly in favor of the blacks. In sense and in feeling, both in prayer and in address, they were equal to the whites; and in free and pointed expression, much superior. Indeed, I know not that while I was in America, I listened to a peroration of an address that was superior to the one I have briefly noted to you.[32]

Dr. Reed next attended a meeting at New Providence, a country church of the Presbyterian faith. His recollection of the occasion brings the scene vividly before us.

At four the next morning I left Lexington in the carriage of a friend, having made it one of my few resting places. My intention was to join Mr. Douglas at a four-day sacramental meeting which he was attending. The congregation in which it occurred was in a state of revival, and it was among the most prosperous of this country. I had a strong desire to commune with the assembled Christians on the solemn occasion, and to make myself acquainted with the appearances of religion among them.

We had about fifteen miles to go, and partly from the heat of the day, we did not arrive until after the morning service had

[32] Reed and Matheson, *Visit to the American churches,* 151–54.

begun. The first indication of our approach to the church was in the appearance of an immense number of saddle horses, from 300 to 400, lashed to the trees; and as we continued to wind our way along, we presently saw portions of the building through the clustering trunks and foliage. On reaching the place, we found it crowded to excess, and enlivened without by a great number standing in the open doorways, sitting on the steps or reposing on the grass, where they might have the chance of hearing; and in many cases charged with the care of young and happy children, too gay to be quiet in a state of confinement. The associations were interesting, here was a large congregation, proper to a city, convened in the depths of a forest. The circumstances were striking; the day was exceedingly hot, but here, people, cattle, church, and all were thrown into most delightful shade by the overtopping trees, except where the sun shot down through an opening before the sanctuary, like a pillar of light and glory. We managed to gain admittance. It was the sacramental service. Messrs. Morrison,[33] Douglas, and Armstrong,[34] were officiating. The pastor admitted twelve persons to the church, and three of them were baptised previously. The other services were in the usual order of the Presbyterian Church. The members came successively to the tables; the persons of colour coming last. There must have been five hundred persons communicating. There was the appearance of true seriousness on the whole assembly; and everything was as quiet and solemn as it could be with a house so crowded, and the exchange of places which this method makes necessary. I gratefully united with them; we ate of one bread and drank of one cup, and were, I trust, of one spirit. In such circumstances, there was great power and sweetness in that promise, "I will be to them as a little sanctuary in the wilderness."

At noon a pause was made for half an hour as a period of refreshment. Then you might have seen the family and friendly groups, in all directions, seated at the foot of the gigantic trees

[33] Rev. James Morrison was elected pastor of New Providence Church in 1819, and served in that capacity until 1857. From 1820 to 1865 he acted as trustee of Washington College. He died in the latter year. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 174. *Catalogue of Washington and Lee University*, 37.

[34] Probably Rev. G. D. Armstrong, professor of natural science at Washington College from 1837 to 1851. *Ibid.*, 42.

partaking of their simple repast and welcoming all to partake, who were provided with less than themselves.

The afternoon service was renewed and sustained in like spirit. The birds, which had found a nest for themselves within and without this sacred habitation, flew in and out by the open windows, seeming to excite no observation except to myself, so rural were the habits of this people!

At the close of the engagements I went with Mr. Morrison. His dwelling is about two miles distant. It was really a beautiful sight to see this people—men, women, and children,—all mounted on their fine horses, and starting away, as from a centre, into every part of the forest, where you would think there was no way to be found. In our own line we had quite a cavalcade, such as old Chaucer might have celebrated, as we advanced over glade, and brook, and dingle, our path forked, and we broke off to the right and left; and again it forked and again we scattered. My eye long rested on them. Now you might see a single horseman take his solitary path through the woods; now a family cluster, parent, child, and grandchild, and now an aged pair, who told you they were closing life as they began it, alone. Now they thrid their way through the thickening forest; now they disappear in a dingle; now you see them again, but indistinctly and far away; and now they vanish altogether. My eye searched for them in vain. Why should it have searched at all? I did not know these people—I had not spoken to them. Why, then, did a sentiment of regret steal over me, as they vanished, one by one, perhaps to be seen no more forever? You can understand this.

The following day was the last of the four, and nothing would satisfy my brethren but that I should preach in the morning. There was an excellent attendance, and the people evidently heard with attention and seriousness. One circumstance gave me some surprise at the moment. Towards the close of the sermon, some twenty or thirty men rose, after each other, and went out, and in the course of three or four minutes returned to their places. It was evidently not the effect of inattention, for they were attentive themselves and showed concern to disturb the hearing of others as little as possible. I could not imagine the cause; it was afterward explained, that some rain had fallen, and they had

gone out to cover the saddles, that they might not get wet. Apart from the unpleasantness and hazard of a wet saddle, the young people here are very chary of their horses and their accouterments, as, more than anything, these mark the respectability of the party.[35]

Distance, and the difficulties of communication occasioned by the barrier of the Blue Ridge, tended to isolate Rockbridge from Lynchburg, Newmarket, Scottsville, and Richmond, the principal markets for local produce in Virginia. In consequence, as early as 1823, the farmers of the region, influenced by reasons of easier transportation and quicker sale, quite generally began to transform their cereals and fruits into liquor, a custom which served to greatly increase the number of private and public distilleries in the county. As a result the widespread drinking of the time threatened to become universal, and the churches lost influence among the people. Eventually the religious leaders of the community, alarmed at the danger confronting their cherished institutions, took vigorous steps to combat the situation. Affiliating themselves with the temperance movement they became its zealous advocates and formed temperance societies, with large memberships in the various sections. These local societies displayed much activity in the early thirties and by their influence gradually succeeded in modifying the basic economic conditions.[36] The evolution within the New Providence area is typical of the changes which took place elsewhere in the county. Prior to 1830 no less than 150,000 barrels of liquor were produced annually and every family

[35] Reed and Matheson, *Visit to American churches,* 169–72.

[36] Included among such organizations were the Lexington Temperance Society, the Eastern Temperance Society of Rockbridge, and the Rockbridge Central Temperance Society, the latter numbering 244 members. *The Union* (Lexington, Va.), Jan. 17, 1835. *The Lexington* (Virginia) *Gazette,* August 14, 1835. *The Union* of Mar. 7, 1835, announced a county temperance union for the purpose of uniting the local temperance societies.

had a still. By 1834 production had fallen to 5000 barrels annually and only one family possessed a still.[37]

The revivals of the period joined with the temperance movement in stimulating the religious interest of the community. Dr. Reed's description of religious activities of this type in the New Providence area is informing:

> In the first revival (1819–1823), no means were used except preaching and meetings for prayer. In the second, which includes the last four years, similar means were used with more frequency; and in a few instances, the serious were separated from the rest of the congregation. The persons impressed and converted, on these occasions were with very few exceptions, from fifteen to thirty years of age, inclining to the younger period. Those in respectable life were at least equally affected with the others; and in the second revival, the work began in the more wealthy families, and passed downward to the poor and the servants. There was in neither case, nor at any time, the least noise or disorder; and the most useful seasons have always been characterized by deep stillness and solemnity. The first and chief sign for good, in every case, Mr. Morrison remarked with emphasis, has been an increased spirit of prayer.
>
> The effects were very exhilarating. There are now about six hundred members of the church, and nearly two hundred of them are under twenty-five years of age, though scarcely any of them under fifteen.[38] The families composing this church, cover a district of land about ten miles square. There is scarcely one that has not domestic worship. They have no poor to receive charity from the sacrament, and only one person needing help, who receives it through private channels; and they contributed a thousand dollars last year to foreign religious objects. The pastor's salary, I think, is eight hundred dollars; and this my friend considers equal to one thousand eight hundred in New York.[39]

37 Reed and Matheson, *Visit to the American churches*, 172–74.

38 *Ibid.*, 172–74. Interesting details of a camp-meeting revival are revealed in the *Lexington Gazette* of Aug. 7, 1835.

39 Reed and Matheson, *Visit to the American churches*, 174.

Coincidently with the religious activity, the operation of the law played an important rôle in the life of the people of Rockbridge. The local judiciary through the exercise of extensive prerogatives practically governed the district until after the Civil War. In 1835, according to the official records, twenty-six gentlemen justices or magistrates formed the county court.[40] One of the number acted as the presiding justice on the occasion of its assembly, which was usually the first Monday in each month. In practice not more than ten of the justices attended any one session. Originally appointed by the governor the court perpetuated its membership, active justices voting to fill vacancies caused

[40] The Gentlemen Justices or magistrates of Rockbridge County in 1835 were John Ruff, William Moore, William Paxton, Jr., John Bowyer, Samuel Patterson, John Withrow, William Inglis, James Johnson, Reuben Grigsby, William Lusk, Robert White, John T. McKee, Joseph Steele, John McCleland, Robert R. Barton, Robert Sterrett, Archibald B. Walker, William Paxton, Sr., Alexander T. Barclay, John F. Caruthers, Alfred Leyburn, John McCorkle, Joseph Bell, Robert S. Campbell, James McDowell Jr., and Joseph Walker. *Minute Book of the Rockbridge County Court,* 1834–1837, year 1835, 102–162. The alumni records of Washington and Lee University contain information concerning a number of these men. John Bowyer, Augusta County: Washington College, 1782–1789; farmer; member of Virginia legislature; repeatedly elector for president; died 1851. Reuben Grigsby, Rockbridge Co.: Washington College, 1789–1800; teacher; farmer; member of Virginia house of delegates; captain of U. S. Army, 1812; sheriff of Rockbridge; trustee of Washington College, 1830–1843; died Feb. 6, 1863, aged 83. Robert White, trustee of Washington College, 1812–1852. John T. McKee, Rockbridge Co.: Washington College, 1804–1806; farmer; high sheriff of Rockbridge; died 1856. Joseph Steele, Rockbridge Co.: Washington College, 1814–1815; farmer; presiding justice of Rockbridge; trustee of Washington College, 1835–1865; died Sept., 1872. Robert R. Barton, M.D.: trustee of Washington College, 1835–1858: prominent physician and agriculturist. Alfred Leyburn, Rockbridge Co.: Washington College, 1821–1822; physician; farmer; member of Virginia legislature; trustee of Washington and Lee University, 1841–1878: rector of board of trustees, 1872–1878; died Oct. 30, 1878. Alexander Tedford Barclay, Rockbridge Co.: Washington College, 1814–1815; farmer; trustee of Washington College, 1835–1848; died 1848. James McDowell, Jr., Rockbridge Co.: Washington College, LL.D. 1815–1816; member of Kentucky legislature; member of Virginia legislature; governor of Virginia, 1843–1846; member U. S. congress, 1846–1851; trustee of Washington College, 1826–1851; distinguished orator and statesman; died Aug. 24, 1851. *Catalogue of Washington and Lee University,* 37–38, 50, 53, 58, 67–70.

by resignation or death. Considerable prestige and authority attended the position of magistrate, the incumbent serving without salary.[41]

The voluminous content of the minute books of the court indicates the varied business which was transacted. In 1835, in addition to hearing a large number of common-law and a few equity cases, the court directed the recording of numerous wills and deeds, provided for the administration of the estates of deceased persons, restrained several individuals to keep the peace, ordered the overseer of the poor to loan a boy to learn the blacksmith's trade, and summoned the grand jury to hear evidence of misdemeanors in the county. It likewise authorized William M. Cunningham to celebrate the rights of matrimony, appointed election commissioners, made arrangements for the levying and collection of taxes, granted several permits to sell spirituous liquors, and licensed John W. Brokenbrough [42] to practice law. Further demands upon the court involved the registration of James Harper a free negro, selection of James A. Poague and John L. Leach as gentlemen justices, voting of licenses for several houses of entertainment, issuing of numerous directions for the survey, building and repairs of roads, construction of a bridge, and the examination into a charge of burglary against a negro named Jim. Still other duties consisted of the paying of bounties for killing of predatory wild animals, prevention of the vagrancy of live stock, and the citing of numerous individuals for debt.[43]

[41] Martin, *Gazetteer,* 70–72, 427. Morton, *Rockbridge County,* 47.

[42] Hon. John W. Brockenbrough, LL.D., founded a private law school in Lexington in 1849 which later became affiliated with Washington College. Mr. Brockenbrough filled the position of professor of law at Washington College from 1865 to 1873. From 1865 to 1872 he served as rector of the board of trustees of the same institution. *Catalogue of Washington and Lee University,* 36, 43.

[43] *Minute book of the Rockbridge County court, 1834–1837,* year 1835, 102–162.

Because of the intimate relation of the county court to the life of the inhabitants, the sheriff, the chief representative of the institution, early became a most important official. Individual magistrates usually held the sheriff's office in rotation, beginning with the senior member. The fees attached to the position made it a lucrative one. Deputies or constables aided the sheriff in the performance of his duties.

The county clerk, another important official appointed by the court, issued its orders and kept the county records. A third, the county surveyor, directed surveys for roads, settled disputed land boundaries, and ran new lines or changed old ones.

The Circuit Superior Court of Law and Chancery heard cases appealed from the county court. Since this court moved in rotation from one to another of the several counties embraced in a circuit, it convened in Rockbridge only twice a year. Unlike the lower court, the circuit court confined its activities to judicial matters.

The circuit court appointed a clerk for each county in its jurisdiction. In certain instances such as that of Samuel McDowell Reid, the clerk of the county court also held the office of clerk of the circuit court.[44]

A number of eminent lawyers practiced before the Rockbridge bar at this time, among them David E. Moore,[45]

[44] Col. Samuel McDowell Reid, Rockbridge Co.: Washington College, 1812–1813; farmer; clerk of county court of Rockbridge 1831–1852; clerk of circuit court, 1831–1858; member of Virginia legislature; trustee of Washington College, 1819–1860; died Sept. 15, 1869. *Catalogue of Washington and Lee University,* 66. An account of the life of Samuel McDowell Reid appears in F. Johnston's *Memorials of old Virginia clerks, etc.,* Lynchburg, Va., 1888, 338–44, Morton, *Rockbridge County,* 48–52.

[45] David E. Moore, Rockbridge Co.: Washington College, 1816–1817. Brother of Samuel McDowell Moore: lawyer; commonwealth's attorney for Rockbridge, 1843–1875; member of Virginia legislature; member of Virginia convention, 1850–1851; trustee of Washington College, 1845–1875; died 1875, aged 77, *Catalogue of Washington and Lee University,* 70.

Samuel McDowell Moore,[46] Francis T. Anderson,[47] John Letcher,[48] James D. Davidson,[49] Gen. Charles P. Dorman,[50] and John W. Brockenbrough.

Court day, a gala occasion for the population, gave rise to much activity on the part of the merchants and professional men of the county seat. The countryside brought in its produce for barter and exchange at the stores, or for sale to special customers. On side streets farmers assembled live stock for display and extolled their merits to those who cared to listen. Here the good-natured chaffering of rival traders mingled with lively harangues. From time to time individuals detaching themselves from the crowd, walked their animals up and down, crying the while in a loud voice, "What am I bid?" "What am I bid?" Manifestations of approval or derision by the spectators greeted the consummation of a sale. Yankee peddlers and street venders

[46] Samuel McDowell Moore, Rockbridge Co.: Washington College 1814–1815; son of General Andrew Moore, U. S. senator 1804–1809; lawyer; member of House of Delegates of Va.; member of Virginia Senate; memmer of Virginia conventions, 1829–1830, 1861; member of U. S. Congress, 1833–1835; died 1875, aged 79. *Ibid.*, 68.

[47] Francis T. Anderson, Botetourt Co.: A.B. Washington College 1827–1828; lawyer, Rockbridge Co.; member of Virginia House of Delegates; judge of supreme court of appeals; trustee of Washington and Lee University, 1853–1887; rector of board of trustees, 1879–1887: died in Lexington, Va., Nov. 30, 1887, aged 79. *Ibid.*, 80.

[48] John Letcher, Lexington, Va.: Washington College 1832–1833; lawyer; presidential elector; member of U. S. Congress, 1851–1859; governor of Virginia, 1860–1864; member of Virginia House of Delegates, 1875–1877; distinguished for administrative ability, industry, and sturdy honesty; died Jan. 26, 1884. *Ibid.*, 86.

[49] James D. Davidson, Rockbridge Co.: A.B. Washington College, 1827–1828; lawyer; trustee of Washington and Lee University, 1858–1882; died Oct. 14, 1882. *Ibid.*, 81. Mr. Davidson was known throughout the state as "The Country Lawyer." He was somewhat of a wit, wrote verse and other literary productions, and had much political influence. During the course of a long and active life he assembled an extensive collection of books, pamphlets, newspapers, and manuscripts. Many of these have been preserved by his family and are now in the McCormick Agricultural Library.

[50] General Charles P. Dorman, Rockbridge Co.: Washington College 1813–1814; adjutant, War of 1812; editor; lawyer; member of Virginia legislature thirteen years; died Dec. 20, 1849. *Ibid.*, 66.

plied their trade at convenient locations. Friends from distant parts of the county met by appointment and held convivial intercourse at the taverns. On the street the coonskin cap and the rough homespun of the mountaineer brushed against the silk hat and long blue broadcloth coat and pantaloons of the visitor from Philadelphia. Trusted slaves went here and there on errands for their masters. Occasionally a barouche drawn by prancing horses, in charge of a pompous negro footman in livery, appeared upon the scene. The lumbering stagecoach, whose arrival and departure was ordinarily an event, did not attract the usual attention at such times. People from a distance came for the most part on horseback. In some instances frolicking negro boys attended the long rows of horses confined in paddocks near the court house. The bright dresses of the women, and the occasional shrill cry of their voices, rising above the steady hum of conversation, added color and life to the occasion. If the court extended over a Sunday the churches scored with heavy attendance. On week-days the taverns had the best of it. With changing faces as individuals came and went, the scene protracted itself from day to day while court continued. Once it was dismissed the town emptied as if by magic and relapsed again into its customary quiet.[51]

Because of its location in the county the county court exercised jurisdiction over the district embraced by Lexington. As a town, however, Lexington possessed a separate governmental organization. This consisted chiefly of a board of trustees elected every two years. The trustees levied the town taxes and prescribed the other rules and regulations of the community.[52]

The activities of the state militia offered a picturesque feature of the period. Following the Revolutionary War

[51] The present court day of Virginia counties which are remote from the outside world retains many of the features of the earlier period.

[52] *Lexington Gazette,* Aug. 21, 1835.

the legislature divided Virginia into military districts. Each district was composed of a number of counties and was under obligation to provide several regiments. Rockbridge contributed to the 8th and the 144th regiments. The law required assemblies of officers and men for drill and other purposes at intervals throughout the year.[53]

The chief military assemblies of the year, the regimental muster [54] and the general muster, occurred respectively in April or May and in September. The latter was considered the more important of the two. Non-attendance meant a fine of seventy-five cents or thereabout, collected by the sheriff. From break of day, men, accompanied by their families, came to the location assigned. By ten o'clock, the time set for the drill, practically the whole county had assembled either as participants or as spectators. The bright colors of the military rivaled those of the dresses of the women and children. The drill lasted two hours and was usually followed by a community celebration. The general drinking which often accompanied such an occasion enlivened the spirits of the crowd with the result that many fights and imbroglios occurred. The magistrates and constables usually found a great deal to do on such days.

The State Arsenal located at Lexington consisted of stands of arms and munitions, the whole attended by a guard. Twenty-eight men composed the latter. The salary of a guard amounted to nine dollars a month.[55] By way of compensation for the meager wage, the welfare of the men received a degree of attention, for in a local paper we find published a proclamation signed by D. E. Moore, the captain, and J. R. Jordan,[56] the surgeon, calling upon the con-

[53] Martin, *Gazetteer*, 83–85. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 222. *The Union*, Apr. 24; and *Lexington Gazette*, Oct. 23, 1835.

[54] The regimental muster of the 8th Regiment took place at Fancy Hill on May 23, 1835. *The Union*, Apr. 24, 1835. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 223.

[55] *Ibid.*, 199. *Lexington Gazette*, Sept. 11, 1835.

[56] James Reid Jordon, Lexington, Va.: Washington College, 1814–1815;

tractors of the county to offer bids for building a hospital sixteen feet square and two stories high.[57] The boisterous conduct of the guard occasionally aroused the animosity of the good citizens of Lexington and agitation arose as early as 1835 to turn the arsenal into a military school.[58] The plan became a reality with the formation of the Virginia Military Institute in 1839.[59]

As elsewhere politics constituted an active interest in the life of the people. National, state, and local issues, and the candidates for office, frequently engrossed the conversation in the taverns, country stores, and around the firesides. Political topics filled many pages of the local papers. At election time candidates for office frequently toured the county, addressing local assemblies. Public sentiment was almost equally divided between the Whigs and the Democrats, the former possessing a slight majority. Rockbridge as the birthplace of General Andrew Moore, United States senator, James McDowell, and "Honest" John Letcher, governors of the state, and General Sam Houston of Texas won its share of the political honors of the day.

Education particularly along the lines of religious instruction early played a prominent rôle in the activities of the Scotch-Irish. The prevailing conception contemplated the development of the children of the upper strata of society rather than those of the remainder of the population. Because of this point of view, the state and local authorities made little provision for free public school education.[60] The nearest approach was the act of the legislature in 1809, amended in 1816, which set aside a portion of the income of certain fines to pay the tuition of the children of indigent

distinguished physician; postmaster of Lexington, 1849–1853; died Dec. 26, 1862. *Catalogue of Washington and Lee University*, 68.

[57] *The Union*, Apr. 10, 1835.

[58] *Lexington Gazette*, Aug. 28, 1835. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 199–200.

[59] *Ibid.*, 200–201. Howe, *Historical collections*, 449–50.

[60] Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 183.

parents in the common schools. The pauper feature of this law made it unpopular among the people it was intended to benefit, and some parents refused to take advantage of its provisions. In 1832 the commissioners of education of Rockbridge paid the school fees of 320 poor children out of a total of 460 in the county, expending for this purpose $873.76. These children were distributed among the forty-four institutions, the average attendance of each child being sixty-seven days. The suggestion of the auditor, in enclosing the reports of the commissioners of Rockbridge and of other counties to the governor, that the legislature extend the act to cover the education of children of all classes, went unheeded.[61]

The common elementary institution of the period, the Old Field School, took its name from its customary situation, on a plot of barren ground at the side of a field. On such a location public-spirited citizens erected a building and hired a teacher, whom they paid $1.25 or more a month for each pupil. The teacher boarded with the parents. Attendance of the pupils was practically voluntary. The school building consisted of a small log structure of one room. The light came chiefly from a single window which filled the space along one wall where a log had been purposely omitted. This was supplemented in pleasant weather by leaving the door ajar. Just below the window a slab of wood which ran the length of the room projected and served as a writing desk. A shelf, high against the wall, held the children's lunches and their outdoor garments.

The teacher presided at a table in a cleared space at one end while the pupils sat opposite him on rows of board benches supported by wooden pegs. Webster's spelling book, Dilworth's and Pike's arithmetics, Murray's and Smith's grammars, and Adam's geography formed the principal equipment. The pupils did their writing with scratching

[61] *Ibid.* 183–84. Martin, *Gazetteer,* 77–78.

quill pens and ink of home manufacture. As a usual thing, discipline partook of the rod, regardless of sex. In cold weather a huge fireplace heated the room. The children cut the wood for the fire and brought in the water for drinking. A frequent diversion consisted of locking out the teacher in the morning and keeping him out until he signed an agreement to allow a holiday. At times he would be excluded for a week or until the parents interceded. The best teachers in the opinion of the county were New England Yankees.[62]

Although the Old Field School served a purpose, private academies provided the other and more formal junior education of the time. Greek and Latin loomed large in the curricula of these schools. The Central House School of Lexington,[63] Metcalf's Classical School near White's Gap, and other institutions of similar type possessed an established reputation.

The Ann Smith Academy of Lexington, a school for girls founded in 1807 and continued for over a century, achieved the most renown among the academies. This arose in part from the remarkable personality of Miss Ann Smith, originator of the school and director for many years, and in part from the fact that for a considerable period it was among the first of its kind in the South. Mr. and Mrs. Chapin directed the school in 1835. Because of esteem for their administration Benjamin Welch and nine other worthy citizens of Rockbridge, publicly praised the institution in a statement appearing in the *Gazette* of May 13th. An ingenious addendum informed prospective patrons that this commendation was unsolicited. Some fifty scholars attended the school. The program of the period included: "Orthography, reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, history,

[62] Morton, *Rockbridge County,* 184–186. Statement of J. A. Parker, Raphine, Va., 1919. Statement of Mrs. E. J. Erven, near Brownsburg, Va., 1919. Statement of Mrs. J. W. Wheat, Fairfield, Va., 1921.

[63] This school had from 30 to 50 scholars in 1835. *The Union,* Feb. 28, 1835.

grammar, composition, belles-lettres, algebra, geometry, astronomy and use of the globes, natural history, chemistry, natural and moral philosophy with all that is needed to complete an English education. Also Greek, Latin and French languages, music, instrumental and vocal, drawing, oil, ivory and miniature painting, fancy work, etc." The Lexington High School stands on the site which the Ann Smith Academy formerly occupied.[64]

Washington and Lee University, originally founded in 1749 and known in 1835 as Washington College, early assumed the leadership among the higher institutions of learning. In 1833, the faculty consisted of a president, two professors and a tutor, while the student body numbered forty-six.[65] Henry Vethake, a Princeton scholar of renown, succeeded Louis Marshall as president in February of 1835.[66] The class of 1835–1836 consisted of seventeen individuals, among whom may be mentioned Alexander H. Davidson, later a general in the Union Army; John Marshall McCue and James McDowell Taylor, members of the Virginia State Legislature; and John Holt Rice, a well known divine and editor of religious periodicals. The course of instruction was classical in character with a strong religious bent, due to the affiliation of the institution with the Presbyterian church.

The parents of the scholars and interested patrons frequently attended the examinations in the schools. Agricolus, an anonymous writer in the *Gazette*, reveals current dissatisfaction with the classical system of education when he

[64] *Ibid.*, May 13 and May 29, 1835. Martin, *Gazetteer*, 427. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 207–212. *Lexington Gazette*, May 4, 1839.

[65] Martin, *Gazetteer*, 427. Howe, *Historical collections*, 449. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 188–96.

[66] Louis Marshall, M.D., served as president of Washington College 1830–1834; Henry Vethake, LL.D., 1834–1836, *Catalogue of Washington & Lee University*, 40. Dr. Vethake was not inaugurated until 1835. Howe, *Historical collections*, 449. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 196. *The Union*, Feb. 21, 1835.

makes mention of two public meetings held in Lexington for the purpose of establishing additional courses at Washington College along the lines of manual instruction.[67] The sponsors of the movement planned to particularly benefit the farmers and mechanics.

The foundation of the most distinctive organization of the county, the Franklin Debating Society of Lexington, is ascribed to the year 1796. An active organization certainly arose shortly after 1800. In 1811, after operating under various titles, it assumed the name of the Franklin Society and Library Company. In time the organization acquired land, a building, and an unusually fine library. After nearly a hundred years of valuable cultural service the society ceased to function in the last years of the nineteenth century and its property came into the possession of Washington and Lee University. The library of the Franklin Society now forms a portion of the present University Library. The members of the society included the leading citizens of Lexington and many of the county. The weekly debates embraced almost every topic of national, state, and county interest.[68] David E. Moore remarked that from an early time discussion in the Franklin Society customarily preceded the adoption of any public policy in Lexington.[69] The organization exercised great influence in the county and at times made itself felt in the state.[70]

The chief contact of the Rockbridge public with the outside world came through the pages of the weekly paper entitled: first *The Union* and later *The Lexington Gazette*. Its columns set forth the wares of the local merchants,

[67] Agricolus was the pen name assumed by John F. Caruthers. *Lexington Gazette,* Sept. 25 and Oct. 2, 1835.

[68] Morton, *Rockbridge County,* 214–15. The advertisement of the sale of a share of the Franklin Society at public auction on Jan. 24, 1835, indicates the value of its property even at this early date. *The Union,* Jan. 10, 1835.

[69] Statement of David E. Moore, Lexington, Va., 1919.

[70] Morton, *Rockbridge County,* 215.

manufacturers, and professional men, and occasionally those of other counties and states. It likewise served as an organ of public opinion through the medium of long anonymous communications. The editor, an ardent Whig, advocated internal improvements, favored the gradual abolition of slavery, upheld the temperance movement, encouraged domestic manufactures, and showed much interest in agricultural development. Fair-minded and judicious on the whole, he lost his poise only on the subject of politics. To those who did not agree with his ideas on that vital activity he gave scant mercy. The subjects of general interest to the county for the year 1835 as far as revealed in his paper offer food for comment on the civilization of the period.

In January, the editor opens his first issue with poetry borrowed from rival journals in other regions, a practice which he continues throughout the year. In this and succeeding months he offers under a heading of "Rural Economy" a great variety of agricultural information collected from other publications. Occasionally he enlivens the content of this section with original contributions from his readers. Publicity is given to the attempts to organize the James River and Kanawha Company, whose canal up the North River in later years made Lexington a seaport. The editor commends the American Colonization Society for its efforts to buy and free slaves and to establish them in Liberia.[71] He comments with caution upon our strained relations with France. A Charlottesville temperance conven-

[71] The American Colonization Society was organized in Washington, D. C. Jan. 1, 1817, for the purpose of colonizing free American negroes. The plan evolved the purchase and freeing of slaves and their establishment in Africa. This society founded the Colony of Liberia in 1821, which became an independent republic in 1847. The American Colonization Society received support from numerous individuals in the southern states until activities of the abolitionists alienated their assistance and caused them in company with other southerners to view any northern interest in their negroes with suspicion and distrust.

tion is announced. The actions of the Virginia House of Delegates receive attention and criticism. The attempt of Robert Craig, a Democrat of Botetourt County, to supplant Samuel McDowell Moore, a Whig and the present incumbent of the Rockbridge congressional district, is frowned upon.

In February, he deplores the action of the Democratic Convention at Fincastle in nominating Mr. Craig for Congress and simultaneously anonymous communications from supporters of Mr. Moore begin to appear. The Rockbridge Union Volunteers duly celebrate Washington's Birthday, Mr. Philander Ewing,[72] a member of the company, delivering a speech at the Court House before a respectable assembly. The jailor advertises five estrayed steers to the public. The attacks on the United States Bank dishearten the editor. He can see no good in that direction. James McDowell, Jr.'s vote in the House of Delegates is under fire.

In March, the United States Bank question again comes to the fore. Mr. Moore, already shown to be opposed to Mr. Van Buren, is duly approved because of it. The editor publishes in full Mr. McDowell's speech in the House of Delegates on the question of electing a United States senator.

In April, Mr. Baldwin announces Mr. C. P. Dorman and Mr. Alfred Leyburn as Whig candidates of the county for seats in the Virginia House of Delegates. Opposing them are Mr. James McDowell, Jr., and Mr. W. H. Caruthers.[73] Later in the month the editor expresses dissatisfaction with the results of the April election, for while Mr. Dorman and Mr. Leyburn triumph over their rivals other counties outside

[72] Philander Davidson Ewing, Rockbridge Co. (son of John Davidson Ewing, Minister), Miss.: physician; member of Mississippi legislature; died Mar. 27, 1856. *Catalogue of Washington and Lee University*, 85.

[73] William H. Caruthers, Rockbridge Co.: farmer, Bedford Co., Nottoway Co.; held office in Confederate States army; died 1877. *Ibid.*, 71.

of Rockbridge unaccountably prefer Mr. Craig to Mr. Moore for Congress.[74] A local temperance society holds a meeting. Hugh T. White of Tennessee is urged for president. The editor publishes a series of letters from a Virginian traveling in New England to show that the innermost stronghold of abolitionism has only a moderate interest in the subject, and that the residents of the section are really not so bad as they have been painted.

In May, state politics again attract the attention of the public and the statistics of the recent elections, given in detail, are duly explained. The editor reprints the inaugural address of Henry Vethake, the new president of Washington College, and commends it to the attention of all good citizens. A series of descriptions of Virginia Springs make their first appearance. A temperance convention is called at Staunton. The action of the Baltimore Democratic convention in nominating Mr. Martin Van Buren for president and Colonel Richard M. Johnson for vice-president arouses the wrath of the editor. Though discussing a rival party he seems to feel that the honor of the state has been impugned

[74] The Rockbridge congregational district comprised Augusta, Rockbridge, Alleghany, Botetourt, Montgomery and Floyd counties. The federal and state elections in 1835 resulted as follows:

CONGRESS

	Moore (*Whig*)	Craig (*Democrat*)
Lexington	381	134
Brownsburg	116	39
Natural Bridge ...	62	39
Goshen	18	26
Total	577	238

VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES

	Dorman (*Whig*)	Leyburn (*Whig*)	McDowell (*Dem.*)	Caruthers (*Dem.*)
Lexington	337	323	236	221
Brownsburg	98	96	61	56
Natural Bridge	61	58	41	42
Goshen	16	13	33	28
Total	512	490	371	347

The Union, Feb. 28 and Apr. 10, 1835.

by the selection of so unworthy a man as Colonel Johnson of Kentucky in place of so estimable a gentleman as Mr. W. C. Rives of Virginia. In this and other issues the predilection of Colonel Johnson for his mulatto progeny is held up to scorn.

In June, he praises the novel *The Virginia Cavaliers* written by Dr. William Alexander Caruthers,[75] a resident of Rockbridge. Later he ardently defends it from the criticism which it receives in various quarters. A description of House Mountain in the *Southern Literary Messenger* pleases him and he reprints it for the benefit of his subscribers. The discussion of the national election continues.

In July, *The Union* changes its title to *The Lexington Gazette*. The James River and Kanawha Company again merits public notice. The destruction caused by a freshet on June 25th is recounted. Natural Bridge and Lexington appropriately observe the Fourth. In the former place Mr. Thomas R. Gilmore[76] delivers an address to the Volunteer Cavalry of the 8th Regiment assembled at the residence of Mr. William Moffett. In the latter, the Union Volunteers discharge musketry at daybreak. At two o'clock they gather at the Court House and afterwards march to Brushy Hill Spring, about two miles from town, where Captain Alexander T. Barclay reads the Declaration of Independence. Subsequently the company conclude the celebration by drinking several buckets of lemonade. This temperance feature heartily commends itself to the editor, who decries the usual drinking on such occasions. The murder of S. Sharp, member of the Kentucky Legislature and attorney general of that state, by J. O. Beauchamp arouses the interest of the editor and he gives all the affecting details to his readers.

[75] William Alexander Caruthers, Lexington, Va.: physician, New York, Savannah, Ga.; author of *Cavaliers of Virginia*, etc.; died 1846. *Catalogue of Washington and Lee University*, 73.

[76] Thos. R. Gilmore, Rockbridge Co.: Washington College, 1832–1833; lawyer; died 1835. *Ibid.*, 85.

The Central Temperance Society holds a meeting in Lexington. Mr. Baldwin, forgetting his recent admiration for the abolition of slavery, views with alarm the activities of abolitionists in sending incendiary literature and emissaries among the slaves. By way of arousing his public he reprints an account of an attempted slave insurrection in Mississippi.

In August, the action of an Augusta convention in urging William Henry Harrison for president is approved. The editor's attitude seems to be any one to defeat Martin Van Buren, the hated satellite of President Jackson. The action of Postmaster General Kendall in attempting to suppress newspapers hostile to the administration calls forth condemnation on the ground that the liberty of the press is the safeguard of the people. The execution of R. D. Hoy, the murderer, at Harrisonburg in Rockingham County, before a crowd said to number ten thousand, occupies several columns. W. M. Burton announces his acquisition of the Eagle Tavern in Lexington, a hostelry of long standing. The editor commends an anti-abolitionist meeting in Richmond and proposes a similar one for Rockbridge. A road to Newmarket and the junction of the Tye and James rivers is suggested as an outlet for the county products. James F. Otis of Maine narrowly escapes lynching at Lexington for supposed abolitionist activities. In an unlucky moment the editor enters into a discussion of the effects of Catholicism on civil liberty. He takes a neutral position, which arouses the animosity of his readers, and he does not hear the last of the subject for several months.

In September, the American Anti-Slavery Society [77] is

[77] The American Anti-Slavery Society, a national union of state and local societies, was formed in Philadelphia in Dec. 1833 for the purpose of abolishing slavery by radical means. William Lloyd Garrison took an active part in this society. Although a split occurred in the organization in 1840 both factions later joined the Liberty Party. A small portion of the original society remained in existence until the adoption of the fifteenth amendment in 1870.

allowed to print its program in the paper and the editor, by way of apology for the James F. Otis attack, publishes correspondence showing Mr. Otis to be innocent of affront. The editor concludes that the recent statewide agitation concerning abolitionist activities was perhaps overhasty.

On the eighteenth of the month appears the classic advertisement of John Houghawaut seeking his lost dog:

> Strayed or Stolen,
>
> From the subscriber about ten days ago, a red and white Grey Hound Pup, about 8 months old—having on a brass collar with this inscription: "I'm John Houghawaut's dog—whose dog are you?" [78]

In October, the James River and Kanawha Company again interests the editor. The Rockbridge Agricultural Society announces its annual fair with a long list of premiums. The temperance movement is encouraged. The editor joyfully proclaims that the pipes for bringing water from the Brushy Hill Spring are laid to the first mile post from town.

In November, the abolitionists again receive attention. The editor's disapproval continues though he is not so drastic in his attitude as in August. The results of the national election are duly noted. The Rockbridge Agricultural Society holds its fair and is both praised and criticized.

In December, the editor defends Mr. Leigh from the unjust attacks of the editor of the *Richmond Enquirer*. National politics continue of dominant interest. He complains of the condition of the Valley Road via Brownsburg to Staunton. The governor's message is reprinted in full and also the section of the president's message concerning our relations with France. To the surprise of the editor he finds the president less belligerent than he had expected. He concludes the year with a reference to a petition of the citizens

[78] *Lexington Gazette*, Sept. 18, 1835.

of Lexington to the legislature to change the state arsenal into a military school.

No view of Rockbridge in 1835 would be complete without mention of the complex organization of its society. A combination of old-world traditions, the Presbyterian interpretation of Calvinism, and the influence of adjacent social and economic systems based upon slavery, tended to establish and to perpetuate sharply drawn class distinctions among the population. The six groups clearly discernible were an aristocracy, a middle class, a working class, the Black-Irish, the free negroes, and the slaves. At the time of the original settlement, ability and character had largely determined individual position. In the course of time, however, this had been translated into considerations of prominence of family, education, intellectual attainments, public service, and material possessions. Custom erected more or less rigid barriers between the several groups; nevertheless, display of talent and energy enabled the exceptional few to rise from one to another. Thus a slave, because of service to his master, might win his freedom; or a workingman through improving his economic condition might gain membership in the middle class.

The aristocracy of the county, who in theory represented its highest social product, evidenced pride in their privileges and at the same time a consciousness of the responsibilities they involved. As a result they proved noticeably conservative in admitting others to their ranks. Although wealth proved an advantage in seeking entrance its presence alone was insufficient for the purpose. Intellectual distinction and unusual public service formed almost the only qualifications which they were willing to recognize. In practice the aristocracy filled its ranks from the larger landowners and manufacturers, the professional men and the larger merchants. By virtue of standing and ability the members of this group held practically all the public offices and positions

of influence. In Lexington they constituted the leading citizens. In the rural districts they occupied a position analogous to the county squires in England. Regardless of their economic status these men gave considerable time to social and cultural interests. Adherence to the old tradition of "noblesse oblige" formed a notable phase of their existence.

The middle class was composed of those members of the occupational groups already mentioned who for one reason or another failed to attain the aristocracy, the minor merchants, the smaller landowners, and the tenant farmers. Upon public questions they usually aligned themselves with the aristocracy, furnishing the support which enabled them to dominate the community. In return they received appointments to petty offices, trade or financial credit. The majority of the members of this class possessed at least an "Old Field School" education.

The working class, made up of artisans and laborers, largely depended upon the aristocracy and the middle class for its livelihood. Many found employment in connection with the manufacturing and agricultural operations of the county. While usually following the lead of their employers on political and other questions, on occasions they could be quite independent, particularly if they thought their economic rights had been infringed. On the whole their relations with the upper classes were amicable, only a small degree of the modern troubles between capital and labor occurring at this time. Individual artisans often won the respect and liking of the community because of their character and ability. The larger portion of the working class acquired sufficient education to read and write, actual illiteracy being confined to a small number.

The Black-Irish formed a group of uncertain political and social status. Their thick lips and certain other physical features would seem to indicate the presence of negro blood. This they have consistently denied for many years, claiming

descent from Irish immigrants who came to America in the early eighteenth century, and accounting for their dark color through a Spanish strain and intermarriage with the Indians. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the traditions offered by the Black-Irish have been commonly accepted, since the population of Rockbridge is preponderantly Scotch-Irish; Spanish invasions of Ireland in early times have been well authenticated; and the high cheek bones, piercing black eyes and the color of these people has lent plausibility to their claim of Indian blood. However, recent investigation has eliminated the Irish legend with its attendant Spanish strain; proved the existence of a small degree of Indian blood through intermarriage with a party of Indians who stopped among them in the early eighteenth century, and has shown their denial of negro blood to be inconsistent with the real facts. During the eighteenth century a number of planters of eastern Virginia established a colony of mulattoes in Amherst County. Shortly after the founding of this settlement the more enterprising of the inhabitants crossed the Blue Ridge and settled along Irish Creek in Rockbridge County. These adventurers became the ancestors of the Black-Irish of 1835 and of today. Notwithstanding their partial negro origin, these people will not, at the present time, associate or intermarry with the negroes. They occasionally intermarry with the white race though the whites have generally refused to accord them social equality. Physically the Black-Irish are well developed. They seem intelligent but have little education. Their number has never been large. In 1835 there were probably less than eighty families in the county.[79]

[79] Statement of Mr. Charles Mackey, near Timber Ridge, Rockbridge Co., Va., 1921. Morton, *Rockbridge County*, 146, refers to the Black-Irish as the "Brown People." Statement of Dr. W. A. Plecker, state registrar of vital statistics, state board of health, Richmond, Va., Dec. 1924. An extensive study of the Amherst and Rockbridge colonies has recently been made by Mr. Ivan McDougal of Goucher College and Dr. Arthur Estabrook of the Carnegie Foundation.

At the bottom of the social scale stood the free negroes and the slaves. Rockbridge contained comparatively few free negroes, only slightly over three hundred living in the district.[80] Although the law safeguarded their rights their position in the community was at best anomalous. The announcement of one Samuel Cunningham indicates the restrictions imposed upon their movements:

Notice

I intend to petition the next General Assembly of Virginia, for leave to remain in the State at least for a limited time.

Samuel Cunningham
A free man of color
Rockbridge County
September 4, 1835[81]

Loss of freedom papers, or removal to a locality where they were not known, rendered the free negroes liable to seizure by unscrupulous whites, and reduction again to a state of slavery. In economic and political standing they undoubtedly possessed advantages over the slaves. Socially it is doubtful if they ranked any higher. Except in individual cases the remainder of the population including the slaves looked down upon them.

The residence of the Scotch-Irish in Rockbridge coincided with the growth of the system of slavery in Virginia and other southern states. As a people, however, many did not take kindly to the institution, accepting it more because it was the custom of the country than from any great dependence upon it. The fact that cereal grains and livestock rather than cotton, rice, or tobacco suited the agriculture of the county, operated to prevent its gradual adoption on the large scale found in eastern Virginia and other

[80] The United States census records list the free colored population of Rockbridge in 1839 as 381, in 1840 as 326, and in 1850 as 364.

[81] *Lexington Gazette,* Sept. 4, 1835.

portions of the south. Public opinion was against secession as an answer to northern opposition to slavery and for a time the American Colonization Society had many warm supporters in the county. The total number of taxable slaves in Rockbridge was only 1990 [82] and these were held by a small proportion of the population. Of the five hundred and forty-eight men owning them only eight had twenty or above. It is a curious comment on the economy of the county that five of the eight used them in connection with their iron works and not for agricultural purposes alone.[83] Plantation labor in the sense the term was used elsewhere in the south existed only in a few instances.

For the most part the slaves received kindly treatment. The white population frowned upon the practice of purchasing them to sell "down the river" and where it was possible kept families together. No local slave dealers operated in the county. Only twice do advertisements of itinerant traders appear in the local press in 1835.

Occasionally when slaves ran away their owners sought them by advertisement. Richard McGuffin, of Augusta County, in January desired the capture and return of his mulatto man, Bill. His plea to the public is not without interest:

[82] The county tax records list only slaves 12 years of age and over. *Personal property record book of Rockbridge County 1830–1836,* year 1835. No official records of the total slave population of Rockbridge in 1835 exist. The nearest figures are those of the state census of the period. These note 3398 slaves in Rockbridge in 1830 and 3510 in 1840. *Virginia state auditor's report,* 21.

[83] The following residents of Rockbridge owned twenty or more slaves over 12 years of age in 1835: John Bowyer, 33; David Greenlee, 24; Benjamin F. Porter, 22, James McDowell, 20, William Weaver, 31, Edward and Mathew Bryan, 35; Jordan, Davis and Co., 45; and Thomas Mayberry, 34. The last five men were proprietors of iron works. *Personal property record book of Rockbridge County, 1830–1836,* year 1835. Col. James McDowell, Rockbridge Co.: farmer; colonel in War of 1812; high sheriff of Rockbridge; trustee of Washington College, 1796–1835. *Catalogue of Washington and Lee University,* 52.

Runaway

Runaway from the subscriber living near Greenville, Augusta Co. Va. a Mulatto man named Bill, about 40 years old, about 5 feet 8 inches high. He took with him a drab coloured close bodied coat, a striped cotton Vest Pattern, a pair of Brown Jeans Pantaloons, a new wool Hat, his other clothing not recollected. He formerly belonged to Mr. Andrew Cummings of Rockbridge Co. and it is probable he may be in that neighborhood. I will give Five Dollars Reward to any one that will lodge him in jail or pay the reward and all reasonable expenses if brought home to me.

Richard McGuffin.[84]

Most of the formal social life of the county took place in Lexington. Dances, house parties, and the lighter functions of the various educational institutions attracted the attention of the younger people. The older generation found more of interest in the Franklin Society, and on occasion, the meetings of the Washington Literary and Graham Philosophical societies of Washington College,[85] formal calls, and afternoon teas. Much visiting back and forth with other parts of Virginia took place. A few individuals traveled to distant parts of the United States and to Europe.

The informal social life in Lexington mainly centered in the homes, in the churches, and in the taverns. Naturally there was a degree of hostility existing between the latter two. Court day and muster day, when the second was held in Lexington, brought many from the country, and at such times the taverns usually monopolized the public interest. Occasionally the outside world came to Lexington in the form of a traveling theatrical troupe or circus. An example of the latter announced on October 23, 1835, must have brought delight to old and young alike:

84 *The Union,* Jan. 24, 1835.

85 The Graham Philosophical Society was founded in 1809, the Washington Literary Society some years later. Both of these became famous as debating organizations. They are still in existence. Morton, *Rockbridge County,* 196.

> The most extensive Menagerie and Aviary in the United States, consisting of 100 live Beasts and Birds, will be exhibited on Tuesday next, from 1 till 4 o'clock, P. M. Admittance 25 cents—Children under ten years, half price.[86]

Formal social intercourse in the country districts confined itself largely to the homes and to the churches. A good deal of informal visiting took place at the crossroad stores. Convivial gatherings found their natural haunt in the taverns. Fox and coon hunts appealed to those sportively inclined. Picnics, quiltings, cornhuskings, scutching parties, apple-butter boilings, spelling bees, and similar gatherings possessed a distinct social aspect.[87]

Rockbridge became famous for its mineral waters soon after its settlement. Rockbridge Alum, Cold Sulphur, and other springs received many visitors in the summer, particularly from the southern states. The social aspects of life at the springs offered quite as much inducement to visitors as their health-giving qualities. Dancing, drinking, card playing, riding, and hunting proved the great attractions.[88]

The amount of intermarrying of the various families, particularly those of the upper and middle classes, is worthy of comment. This was carried on to such an extent among them that everyone seemed more or less distantly related to everyone else. While various groups of Rockbridge families emigrated to other sections, such as Adrian and Monroe counties, Missouri, and Rockville, Indiana,[89] and numerous individuals left the neighborhood, nevertheless,

[86] *Lexington Gazette,* Oct. 23, 1835.

[87] Statement of J. W. Culton, near Raphine, Va., 1919.

[88] Rockbridge Alum Spring, opened as a resort in 1834, became the most famous of these springs in ante-bellum times. It is recorded that as many as four hundred visitors registered there in a single day. Morton, *Rockbridge County,* 158–60.

[89] Rockbridge like other sections of Virginia lost many of her residents from emigration to the Northwest, West, and Southwest in the period from 1825 to 1850. The fact that in spite of the large families of the time, the population of 14,244 in 1830 had only increased to 14,284 in 1840 is in-

most of the population lived and died in Rockbridge. To this day, given a list of residents of the year 1835, the descendants of more than seventy-five per cent of them will be found still living in the county. The isolation of the district and a certain feeling of clannishness has kept them living near their relatives and friends. For example, from a very early date the expression "Born in Lexington," usually abbreviated "B.I.L.," has had a significant meaning in Lexington society.[90]

With a few notable exceptions the architecture of the county was not greatly advanced, the log cabin being the prevailing type for all classes of society below the aristocracy. Slave quarters were usually rough shacks, or cabins of rounded logs, without a floor and frequently lacking windows. The buildings might or might not have plaster between the logs as a protection from the elements. The dwellings of the Free Negroes were little better than those of the slaves. The houses of the Black-Irish and the working class were of more pretentious character, the exteriors showing square-hewn logs with crevices filled with plaster, and an outside chimney made of stone or brick; the interiors having a floor and divided into several rooms separated by partitions, the whole surmounted by an attic.

The homes of the middle class showed a further architectural development. These were commonly two stories high with chimneys on the opposite ends. Occasionally a log portico projected from the front and the walls were cov-

dicative of the extent of this loss. Often representatives of several families would settle in one locality. The Rockville, Ind., settlement included members of such well known groups of Rockbridge and Augusta counties as the McFaddens, the Otts, the Christians, the Allens, the Carlisles, and the Humphreys. Statement of W. W. Walker, Walker's Creek, Rockbridge Co., Va., 1921. Statement of J. W. Wallace, near Spottswood, Augusta Co., Va., 1921. Statement of Thomas McCormick near Buena Vista, Va., 1921.

[90] The inner circle of Lexington society, regardless of other considerations, was not prone to admit an individual within its sacred precincts unless he happened to be born in Lexington.

ered with siding. A few showed the double cabin arrangement in which the connecting platform was either left open to the sky or roofed. In the latter case an extra room could be provided by boarding up the two open sides of the platform.

The aristocracy resided in rectangular brick or stone structures, two or three stories in height and adorned in front with porticoes, supported by colonial pillars, and at one or both ends with towering inside or outside chimneys. The interiors contained the usual features of the colonial house, including in several instances the beautiful well staircases. Huge fireplaces, which sometimes served to do the cooking, heated the dark, tall-ceilinged rooms. Not infrequently the servants prepared the meals in a small building located close to the house. Stoves of any kind were little used as yet, the Franklin being the best known.[91] The thickness of the walls, the poor lighting, and the uneven heating of the fireplaces, on occasions made the interiors of these buildings damp, cold, and unpleasant. The members of the Jordan family built a number of the old homes in Rockbridge and the silver plate of their handicraft on the newel post or elsewhere always meant a well built structure. The houses in many instances were strategically situated on hilltops and bore distinctive names. The owners devoted considerable attention to the surrounding grounds, usually cultivating them in formal English style. Residences such as Cherry Grove of James McDowell, Thornhill of Colonel John Bowyer, Mulberry Hill of Samuel McDowell Reid, White Hall of Henry B. Jones,[92] Bellview of Reverend James Mor-

[91] A Franklin stove sold for $20 at the Jordon foundry. Col. John Jordon, account with Dr. J. R. Jordon, 1826–1835, in Davidson collection.

[92] Henry B. Jones was a distinguished agriculturist of Rockbridge Co., whose activities both as a farmer and as a publicist contributed much to the agriculture of his day. The agricultural diary which he began on 1834 and continued until shortly before his death in 1882 is an important source document of the agriculture of the Valley of Virginia. This diary is now in the possession of his grandson, Mr. Henry B. Jones of Raphine, Va.

rison, Hickory Hill of Captain Reuben Grigsby, and others added much to the beauty of the landscape. With their large pillars and gleaming white fronts standing out from a background of trees and rocks, such houses formed a striking picture.[93]

The general health of the inhabitants of the county left much to be desired. While the active outdoor life together with favorable climatic conditions tended to give them strong and vigorous constitutions, the advantages they possessed in these respects were consistently offset by unbalanced diet, general lack of knowledge of sanitation, the widespread use of spirituous liquors, overexposure to the elements, and excessive hours of work. Strangely enough the ill health which frequently resulted did not in turn produce a heavy mortality, a fact which is clearly shown by the death toll of fifty-five among the white population in 1835, a relatively low figure as compared with statistics of the present day.[94] That it was not greater was largely due to the unremitting care of the local physicians.

Although the medical knowledge of the period was not advanced, cupping and a liberal use of calomel still being the chief reliance of a few practitioners, the majority of the doctors showed themselves well trained and skillful. In addition to the other factors which they had to overcome, they found the liberal use of home remedies, especially by the more ignorant portion of the population, a constant source of trouble. These were naturally numerous in any frontier community where doctors were almost unobtainable. Rockbridge, though it was many years removed from a frontier

[93] From the point of view of a landscape artist, these scenes were occasionally marred by the prominence in the foreground, of the cabins which were provided for the slaves and other workmen.

[94] This total has been compiled from obituary notices in *The Union* and the *Lexington Gazette* in 1835. Only individuals residing in the county at the time have been listed. No statistics as to the death rate among the negroes exist. In view of their situation it was probably somewhat higher than among the white population.

state, still retained its familiarity with them. While a few of these cures possessed undoubted worth, as much could not be said for the remainder. Either they produced no effect or they removed all doubt as to the necessity for the attention of a physician. Even the least harmless of the remedies proved a source of danger through delaying proper medical assistance. The family of James D. Davidson has retained among his papers the following local prescription:

INFALLIBLE CURE OF DROPSY

Take 1½ Gallons of hard Cider
4 lbs, new nails
1½ pints Grape vine ashes
1 Double handful of pine tops
1 Do handful of Burdock roots
1 Single handful of Sasaparilla
1 handful of Garlick
1 handful of Camomile flowers
1 handful of golden rod.

Simmer the whole together until reduced to One gallon then give the patient one ½ gill three times a day. His or her diet should be bread made out of ship stuff [95] or wheat bread baked very hard and without salt or season of any kind and use hard cider with the bread or cakes if cider can not be had Vinegar weakened with water and a little sugar will answer the purpose no meats nor salt should be used by the patient great care should be paid to this particular stem [96] after taking the ½ gill for seven days give the patient one gill three times a day and if strictly adhered to I have no doubt the patient will be cured before or by the time they have taken the gallon if not repeat it and be sure not to let the patient get wet during this year and now quit all doctors medicine and under the almightys blessing you will be mad whole.

The life of the country doctor called for varied talents. Daily traveling many miles on horseback over rough and at times almost impassable roads, seldom summoned until dis-

[95] Whole wheat.

[96] This is an uncommon use of the word stem. It probably signifies item.

ease had reached an advanced stage, forced to diagnose cases and to perform difficult operations with inadequate facilities, next to the minister relied upon as a moral and spiritual adviser, the doctors of the time were forced to find their reward in the joy of their profession and the love and respect of the community rather than in the meager material returns which their efforts brought to them. James R. Jordan, John McChesney,[97] N. M. Hitt, W. A. Caruthers, and Robert Barton possessed established reputations as physicians. The following extract from an account of Dr. Jordan gives information as to the medicine and treatment which he employed and also affords an indication of the fees which he charged for his services:

Col. John Jordan a/c [98]
With Doctor Jordan.

1835				
Jany.	4	To	Visit via & pres p Charles 6/o	1 00
"	6	"	VS 3/0 pro Jim Johnston	50
"	7	"	Visit & pres 6/o pro Charles	1 00
"	8	"	Do Do 6/o Purge 9^0 Do	1 12
"	9	"	Do Do 6/o Pills p 9^0 J. Coffman	1 13
"	10	"	Do 6/o Vs 3/o pro Charles	1 50
"	12	"	Do & pres 6/o Do	1 00
"	13	"	3 visits attendance (Die et nocte)	
"	"	"	3 Emetics & vs 30/o 2 Doses	
"	"	"	Senna 1/6 2 Emetics 1/6 Spts	
"	"	"	Lavender & Peppermint &c 9^0	5 62
"	"	"	Pro Hezekiah & Lucy Ann	
"	14	"	2 Visits (Die et nocte) 12/o	
"	"	"	Parogoric 9^0 Enema 3/o Blue	
"	"	"	Pills 9^0 p Hezekiah	
				2 75

[97] John McChesney, Augusta Co.: Washington College, 1809–1810; physician; farmer; died 1877, aged 92. *Catalogue of Washington and Lee University,* 63.

[98] Col. John W. Jordan, Rockbridge Co.: Washington College 1825–1826; manufacturer; died Feb. 1883. *Ibid.,* 78.

Jany.	15	To	2 Visits & pres 12/o Do & Lucy Ann	2 00	
"	16	"	2 Do Do 12/o Do Vs 3/o Chas	2 50	
"	18	"	1 Do Do 6/o Do	1 00	
"	19	"	1 Do Do 6/o Do	1 00	
Mar.	21	"	Visit at, (Md Reids,) salts 7c 9/o p Jas. Coffman	1 50	
"	22	"	Visit & pres (Reids) Do	1 00	1 07
July	10	"	E D 3/o pro Davy Moore [99]	50	

Looking back upon the varied social life of the Rockbridge of ante-bellum days, the historian notes a picture which is now quaint, now curious, and often pleasing. Nevertheless, as he looks more closely at the dim and dusty records and recalls the reminiscences from which he has reconstructed the scene, he perceives an ever-present background of shadow and gloom. He sees the majority of the people engaged in a grim struggle for existence, the stark realities of which would daunt most of us today. The rocky soil and primitive agricultural methods necessitated toil in the fields from dawn to dark. Distance from markets, poor roads, and limited transportation facilities increased the difficulty of disposing of agricultural and manufactured products. Scarcity of money frequently reduced local commerce to a state of barter. Lack of protection from fire endangered lives and property. The practice of living in cold damp houses, inadequately heated by drafty fireplaces, undermined health. The contamination of water in wells and springs caused periodical menace from cholera and like diseases. The uncompromising sternness of religious tenets made old and young too prone to melancholia and hysteria. The terrors of nature gave rise to numerous superstitious beliefs. The educational program perpetuated the sharply drawn class distinctions and made little attempt to meet the

[99] This financial statement contains an interesting mixture of Latin terms and abbreviations. The first line reads: "To visit by road and prescription for Charles 6 shillings—$1.00." Davidson collection.

needs of the mass. The social stigma upon manual labor restricted the young men of the better classes in choice of profession or condemned them to idleness. The provincial and self-satisfied attitude of the inhabitants toward the outside world possessed little compensation in the way of a native drama, literature, or art worthy of the name. Internal feuds and jealousies created hostility between families and set one section against another. Contact with the slaves lowered the moral tone of the community. The dark side of the picture could be enlarged. It is gruesome enough.

What was the effect of this life? Two aspects are clear. Those unable to rise above their situation in an economic sense were often coarsened and saddened. Believing that death alone could bring relief, many sought temporary forgetfulness in intemperance or religious fanaticism. A few of the weaker souls either degenerated to a state of feeble-mindedness, or taking a harsher turn gave vent to their emotions in terrible crimes. Those who could rise above their lot, in sheer self-defense adopted a philosophy which denied, ignored, or concealed the realities of their environment, substituting for reality a romanticism which made life seem endurable and even worth while.

The civilization of Rockbridge appeared to its best advantage in the life of the aristocracy. Among them we find unrivaled hospitality and social charm; a marked sense of "noblesse oblige"; qualities of leadership which provided men of ability and distinction for the service of the state and nation; an other-worldliness of great spiritual value to the community; beyond everything, character, uninfluenced by the material things of life.[100]

HERBERT A. KELLAR

[100] A companion study, which space does not permit to include here, deals with agriculture, manufactures, trade, commerce, transportation, etc. in Rockbridge in the same year, 1835.



THE WRITINGS OF DANA CARLETON MUNRO

COMPILED BY MARION PEABODY WEST

ABBREVIATIONS:—*A.H.R.=American Historical Review; Annals=Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science; H.T.M.= The History Teacher's Magazine; T. and R.=Translations and Reprints from the original sources of European history published by the Department of History of the University of Pennsylvania.*

1893

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